

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THE
AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF
THEOLOGY

Edited by

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AND COLLEAGUES IN ALLIED DEPARTMENTS

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
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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

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MISSIONS AND THE WORLD-WAR: A KINGDOM THAT CANNOT BE SHAKEN

HENRY CHURCHILL KING
Oberlin College

There is probably a growing conviction on the part of thoughtful Christian men the world over, that the incomparably terrible war through which we are passing and the world-crisis it involves suggest that the race's real trouble is that there has been no consistent and radical trial of the spirit and principles of Christ in the whole realm of human life. We are learning that we cannot be half-way Christians successfully. Here, too, Drummond's contention holds, that "the whole cross is more easily carried than the half." "The Church cannot go on," another has said, "preaching Jesus to individuals and Machiavelli to states. At last the high gods weary of such stupidity and send the deluge."

Now if it is a radically consistent and thoroughgoing Christianity which the world needs above all in these distracted times, *Christian missions should have definite suggestion and help to give*. For Christian missions, it is not too much to say, reveal Christianity at its best and purest.

Here, as nowhere else, Christian men are trying concretely to think of their Christian task in world-terms, in terms of humanity. And the war is demonstrating the necessity of such thinking today. There are no men who are more manifestly doing just that kind of thinking than our great missionary statesmen.

Here, as nowhere else, Christian men are seeing that they must bring a message of principles that do not hold simply for a single class or race, but universally and for all men. No narrow nationalism is here possible. And the war is daily proving the self-contradictory futility of trying to limit the application of great principles by national boundaries.

Here, as nowhere else, men should be able to speak of a God who is no tribal possession, but the Father of all men, and hence of a religion that has the right to be supreme and final for the entire human race.

Christian missions would plainly be doomed if we conceived our task less largely. That is a very significant fact when we weigh it, for it means that a victorious Christianity must be world-wide, humanity-wide, God-wide, in its outlook. And it is inconceivable that we should finally require less from a civilization that is to command the respect and loyalty of men.

We may trust, indeed, that what God is doing for men in this world-shaking crisis is bringing out into clear relief, in line with this missionary point of view, *the things that cannot be shaken*.

1. Have we not had, in the first place, a demonstration, on a world-scale, of what Wundt calls the "ambiguous" nature of civilization, so long as civilization is conceived as something apart from moral and religious ideals? "The ethical influence of civilization," he says, "is everywhere ambiguous. As it helps to deepen and refine man's moral ideas, so it opens up all sorts of paths which may lead him from the good. . . . The only legitimate inquiry is what *means* civilization places at the disposal of the will that has decided to follow the good." Now, this is the missionary viewpoint. The missionary seeks to permeate the civilization to which he goes with great new moral and religious ideals. How hideous a thing civilization can be even in Christendom, when "the will that has decided to follow the good" has been subtracted, men have had opportunity to see in these terrible days as never before. Has this generation learned rightly to use the enormous "means" placed at its disposal? Power is no blessing, but a terror, if it is not under control and is not guided to great and worthy ends. And the thoughtful man cannot help wondering today if the scientific dis-

covery of mighty forces has not advanced more rapidly than moral control. Is this generation fit to be trusted with such enormous power? Has it raised spirits which it cannot master? This war, with its scientific frightfulness, has made this question incomparably more pressing for the human race than ever before.

As Salomon Reinach has recently said:

At the future Congress among the seats reserved for the delegates of the great Powers one seat should remain vacant, as reserved to the greatest, the most redoubtable, though youngest of Powers: science in scarlet robes. That is the new fact; that is what diplomacy should not ignore; if that imminent and execrable scandal is to be averted; the whole of civilization falling a victim to science, her dearest daughter, brought forth and nurtured by her, now ready to deal her the death-blow. The all-important question is the muzzling of the mad dog. Science, as subservient to the will to destroy, must be put in chains; science must be exclusively adapted to the works of peace.

That means a necessary appeal to reason, to conscience, to moral and religious ideals. It means that *nothing can save civilization but thorough permeation with the truly Christian spirit*. Can the human race safely stop anywhere short of meeting the full Christian demands? This is surely no time for the religious forces to be faint-hearted. Our civilization must be Christian in more than name.

2. The second of the things that cannot be shaken, which God has been teaching us through this world-devastating war, is *the inescapable grip of the laws of God in the life of nations as well as of individuals*. All the belligerent nations, whether they will or not, are bearing witness to the universality of this law of cause and effect in the moral world. Let me take a single illustration, which I have used in another connection, where many might be given: The two greatest glories of the war—the splendid way in which the colonies of Great Britain, especially South Africa, have come to the aid of the mother-country, and the unshaken loyalty of Germany's working classes to the government—both alike go back to a fairly Christian regard for fairness and justice. Because, on the whole, England has been just and tolerant and generous in her dealing with her colonies; because the German government has given unmistakable evidence that it had been studying the needs

of the laboring classes and paternally caring for them (even though absolutism was served thereby), these results could be. Both nations were reaping what they had sown.

And that this war could come at all is evidence that the nations as a whole had not sown peace. They had not steadily and honestly and earnestly sought friendly relations nor had they been willing to fulfil the conditions that make such friendly relations possible.

Now this deepening conviction that nations, as well as individuals, may not escape the grip of the laws of God, but reap what they sow, for good and for ill, can hardly fail to make more penitent and humble the new civilization that is to be. That deepened conviction should mean much for the progress of the Kingdom of God throughout the earth.

3. The third one of the things which cannot be shaken, which God is teaching us in this sifting war, is the intolerable inconsistency of the selfish antagonism inevitably expressed in the war. The war is continually contradicting itself. Is there a single belligerent nation that is not somewhere using scientific principles, methods, and devices which it did not itself originate, but received from one of its present foes? Men need each other even in fighting each other. Is there a single scientific principle or method or device, appealed to or used by any belligerent, which did not owe its discovery to the scientific spirit—the willingness to get light from any quarter, and to take advantage of all that the whole race had hitherto accomplished at that particular point? Science, that is, as well as Christianity, becomes simply silly when one tries to draw lines of national antagonism within it. Is there a single principle or method appealed to by any of the belligerents which does not contradict itself when an attempt is made to limit its application—either for or against—to a single nation or group of belligerents? For example, the world has never seen scientific co-operation on so enormous a scale as has been forced upon the belligerents on both sides. Men clearly recognize the principle within individual nations and within allied groups of nations. But is it not clear beyond all peradventure that to stop co-operation there involves inherent self-contradiction?

So, too, the whole philosophy of exclusiveness and selfishness is self-defeating, whether for the individual or for the nation, or for groups within the nation. For the laws of God are laws of life, and in God's universe there is no such source of enlarging life as unselfish love, and the man or the nation that would be first of all must be first in service. Even from a merely commercial point of view, to destroy another nation economically is just so far to destroy at the same time that nation's power to be a profitable customer. Legitimate commerce is built on mutual benefit. To follow the present war with a hardly less bitter economic war—as many are proposing—would be folly unspeakable, and would sow once more the seeds of inevitable and self-destroying strife. The same thing holds of the exploiting of class by class within the nation.

4. To look at the matter from a little different point of view, any full and rational co-operation between human beings goes back to a fundamental moral and Christian principle—to, as Herrmann puts it, *the demand for “mental and spiritual fellowship among men, and mental and spiritual independence on the part of the individual.”* Both sides of the demand are equally essential. Men must have fellowship with one another, and each must be true to his own best, and that best must be called out from each.

It may be fairly said, I think, that of the two groups of belligerents the Teutonic allies, on the whole, have put their main emphasis upon fellowship—the closest scientific co-operation, though within a restricted range; the entente allies, especially England and France, have put their emphasis upon mental and spiritual independence on the part of the individual. Both emphases are imperative. Only together do they adequately express the moral law for both individuals and nations. Each group has much to learn from the other. On the one hand, we may not go our antagonistic, wasteful, selfish ways with impunity as individuals or communities or nations. We *must* scientifically co-operate—and to the limits of humanity. On the other hand, we need to secure the freest initiative and the fullest contribution from each individual and class and nation and civilization. This is of the very essence of a true democracy among men. No nation or civilization on either

side is so rich that it can afford to blot out or to ignore the contributions of the rest. To attempt to apply the principle of co-operation in a spirit of insular, provincial, exclusive, or arrogant national selfishness is self-contradictory, and is to go back two thousand years in a virtual return to the "exclusive state" of antiquity, with its absolute domination of the individual and its utter denial of any obligations outside the state.

Certainly no new civilization will be worthy the name, or will command the loyalty of humanity that does not definitely seek to combine the gifts and graces of all the nations and civilizations, whether English or German or French or Austrian or Italian or Russian or Belgian or Japanese or Polish. This is and always must be the plain assumption of the great missionary enterprise whenever it is worthily conceived. And civilization, too, can never get away from this double demand of the moral law for both mental and spiritual fellowship among men, and mental and spiritual independence on the part of the individual.

5. Once more, I cannot shake off the conviction, which I have elsewhere expressed, that in this world-shaking war *God is sifting out the true from the false Christianity*. It is being forced home upon the reasons and consciences of men today that a Christianity primarily theological, a Christianity primarily emotionally mystical, a Christianity primarily ceremonial, a Christianity that adopts God as a kind of national prerequisite, and an Old Testament kind of Christianity, have all alike failed to stand the test of these crucial days. "It is altogether too rashly assumed," says Mr. H. G. Wells, "by people whose sentimentality outruns their knowledge, that Christianity is essentially an attempt to carry out the personal teachings of Christ. It is nothing of the sort, and no church authority will support that idea. Christianity . . . was and is theological religion." That statement, unfortunately, is more true than it ought to be. So far as it is true it must cease to be true. That kind of Christianity is being shaken to its base. All these kinds of Christianity, in fact, have been readily harmonized in all the belligerent nations in this war with a bitterness and hatred and ferocity utterly un-Christlike. Tested by Christ's own principle of fruit in life, they simply are not Christian. The only kind

of Christianity that can be said to have come out of this war unscathed is a Christianity that is a true reflection of the spirit and teachings of Christ, that is consequently ethical through and through, not tribal, but universal, in its appeal, and with an ethics capable of application as truly to nations and national relations as to individuals and individual relations.

Now it will mean enormous gains for the cause of Christ the world over if men learn in even fair degree this lesson of the sifting out by the war of the Christianity of Christ—if Christ is made truly, consciously supreme, in the Bible as well as out of it; supreme in our theological thinking; supreme in our tests of religious experience; supreme in our choice of means of worship and in the place given to them; supreme in national, no less than in individual, relations. Our missionary message would both simplify and deepen, and would gain immensely in both the solidity and universality of its appeal. It would be rid of a whole load of excrescences which now hinder its progress in every mission field.

6. So, applying the standards of Christ, it should be unmistakably plain, in the next place, that, however one expresses the *missionary aim*, so long as it is kept adequate at all, it *cannot be harmonized with a selfishly exclusive patriotism or nationalism*, or with an exclusive race pride and prejudice within the nation.

On the one hand, the war calls for a new respect for nationalism, for individual races; on the other, for an equally clear recognition of the fact that in all humanity's greater ideals and aims there can be no national or racial boundaries. There must be a universal co-operation, which can be universal just because there is appreciative respect for all that each nation and race has to offer. In like manner, to get upon the missionary fields a lot of national churches, even though they are not transplanted, and even if other denominationalisms could be put aside, is not enough, as the war shows. These desperate antagonisms of Christian nations and races are evidently not after the mind of Christ, and they make a true Christian conquest of the world impossible. *The missionary is seeking the true reign of Christ in all the world* and in all the departments of its life. That is impossible except in the proportion in which the spirit of Christ is really ruling in the thoughts and

purposes of men. That aim we cannot honestly take on unless we seek it, first of all, in our own lives.

The business of missions, again, may be said to be the reverent sharing with others of our best—of what Christ has come to mean to us—of our best convictions and ideals and motives and hopes, in full appreciation of the best in the people to whom we go. Is it possible for us rightly to share this Christlike best if we are implicitly contradicting it in any other relations?

Our supreme missionary message, too—our great good tidings—is of Love at the heart of the world; of a God who in his very being is infinite, self-giving Love, joying in our joy and achievement, suffering in our suffering and sin; of the love of God revealed in Christ—an endlessly seeking, suffering, forgiving, redeeming love of God for all men. And the essence of religion is sharing in the life of God—sharing in such infinite, patient, unwearied, un baffled, seeking, suffering love. Only such sharing is eternal life. We simply cannot deliver that message with hate and pride and prejudice and exclusiveness in our own hearts. We are ministers of reconciliation. Can that reconciliation have a limited aim? In harmony with the whole spirit and teaching of Christ we are trying, in our missionary endeavor, to bring the people to whom we go to this supreme enthronement of a Christlike love in all the realms of their life—to Christ's own purpose of universal good-will. Can we fail to show it ourselves?

7. But it is not enough that our missionary endeavor itself should be made consistent. Surely, once more, this world-crisis should not pass without *bringing the common standards of our civilization into far greater consistency with our missionary motive and aim.*

For the missionary cause involves the attempt genuinely to *win* other men to conviction and purpose and love. There can be here no thought of domination; and in the precise degree in which domination comes in, in that degree the true missionary purpose is defeated. As Christian missions have gone forward and their implications have been made clear, the attitude of the missionary himself has perforce become more Christian. And this attitude foreshadows the ideal we must all hold before us in all race relations. I happen to have in my hands just now, for example, the proof of

an article by another, in which is discussed the missionary's attitude toward the people to whom he goes—in this case, the East Indians. The writer refers to "the haughty contempt" often revealed by the man of the West. He says:

His patronizing air and open condescension are always in evidence. The contagion of this spirit often seriously affects the missionary too. How many of the missionaries of the West meet these people on terms of fellowship, brotherhood, and equality? . . . The only way to real success is by the determined cultivation of a genuine appreciation of all that is worthy and admirable in the life and type of character of his people. . . . There must be added to all other qualities a love that "thinketh no evil," that "covereth a multitude of sins," that minimizes all that is unattractive, and magnifies everything that is commendable and winsome in the people.

Does this not point to *the inevitable road we must take in all race relations*? The necessary background of the Golden Rule is an understanding sympathy. A true historical spirit ought to help at just that point, for to understand is to forgive. As Orville Dewey, truly reflecting the teaching of Christ, says of individuals, so of races:

Every relation to mankind, of hate or scorn or neglect, is full of vexation and torment. There is nothing to do with men but to love them; to contemplate their virtues with admiration, their faults with pity and forbearance, and their injuries with forgiveness. Task all the ingenuity of your mind to devise some other thing, but you never can find it. To hate your adversary will not help you; to kill him will not help you; nothing within the compass of the universe can help you, but to love him.

This is the one infallible road we must all be willing to travel if Christ is to prevail.

Thus this war, though it has brought many things hard to forget or to forgive, makes more clear than ever the truth of what a great editor wrote before the war:

The great field for humanitarianism in the future—for that matter, the one great direction of true civilization—is not the field of mere religious propaganda, but *the adjustment of race differences*. The task is to find honorable and peaceful ways of lessening the dislike that most races of men have for other races—to find ways of living and working together in a world over which no one race can rule, in our stage of civilization, now long past the tribal organization. And this must be done without causing national decay.

We shall certainly need to bring to bear anew upon this problem, made infinitely more acute by the war, the love of Christ which moves the missionary to take immense pains to gain appreciative understanding, sympathy, and love for the people to whom he goes.

For we shall not idly drift into a Christlike love for men, but we shall need to use steadily and consciously with ourselves *Christ's great motives to the loving life*: the motive of the unity of our own whole inner life, so that every sin is its own worst punishment because it tends to reproduce its kind in ourselves, and so that every bit of righteousness, on the other hand, is its own best reward; the motive of the complete fulfilment of the law of God as the law of life—filling it full, carrying the spirit of the law into the remotest ramifications, into the inmost spirit of the life; the motive that comes from the thought of the other man as brother, indissolubly knit up with our lives, in great essentials just like us, and of priceless value and inevitable sacredness in the sight of God; and the motive of God's own fatherly love. These great motives still hold, and permanently hold, and are all of the very essence of Christ's spirit and teaching—of that eternal Kingdom that cannot be shaken. We shall certainly pay a bitter penalty in our own life, individual and national, for every departure from the spirit of Christ, for every refusal to come up to that spirit. The war has demonstrated that afresh. The cause of Christian missions has no greater concern than that a Christlike love of man to man, of nation to nation, of race to race, should spread over the world. To adopt a smaller aim is really to abandon the missionary purpose altogether.

For, if the missionary enterprise is justified at all, if at its best it truly represents Christianity in any fair degree, then *we must be ready to apply the fundamental aim of Christian missions to the whole of the world-life* and to the relations of all the nations. We are seeking in missions the supremacy of the spirit of Christ in all the relations of life—to bring all men and institutions and interests and causes under the dominion of Christ. But if Christ is the supreme revelation of God, he must be at the same time the supreme revelation of men, of life, of religion, of world-aims, of the eternal purposes of God. And only when we strive with all our souls, without half-

hearted inconsistency, radically and absolutely, everywhere to seek the reign of Christ, may we be sure that we shall find "the Universe on the side of the will," giving the will "the force and the edge suitable." We are otherwise fighting at cross-purposes with God.

8. Finally, it should not be possible that the Christian church should go through such a world-crisis as the present and not learn lessons which vitally affect its world-task. It is quite conceivable that *missionary reconstruction on an undreamed-of scale may result*. Some such reconstruction ought to result. Can we at all anticipate even briefly its lines?

a) First of all, it ought not to be possible for the Christian church to see the unbelievable extent to which scientific co-operation has been forced upon the nations in this war without drawing the inevitable inference that *co-operation among all the forces of righteousness is demanded to a degree so far hardly imagined*. This war has disclosed a horrible vision of the breaking down of restraints which civilization had been centuries in building up. It has shown, as we have seen, that the destructive forces have been immensely augmented and developed with pitiless scientific rigor. And it has revealed a bottomless pit of possibilities of further scientific destruction and of the scientific intensification of a world-wide spy system and hostility along many lines that bid fair to make decent human relations well-nigh impossible. Is this generation to prove wise enough and great enough not only to check these destructive agencies, but positively to replace them with agencies of constructive good-will? Against such terrible possibilities as the war has disclosed there is no adequate defense but a moral and religious one. This is no time, therefore, for the forces of righteousness to indulge in divisive differences. They must get together. The mission fields, in particular, must give examples of co-operation so thoroughly thought out and scientifically developed as to be comparable with the best that any belligerent nation has shown under the terrible pressure of this world-war.

b) Now the Christian forces will simply not be able to meet this constructive world-challenge without such co-operation. And they cannot rise to that co-operation, as has been already implied, without *an immensely greater emphasis upon the ethical and social*

elements of the Christian message in every relation and realm of life. As we have already seen, it is not a matter of indifference whether our Christianity is to be the Christianity of Christ. We are to make some clear discriminations as to our religious aims, and are definitely to abandon an Old Testament type of Christianity on the mission field as well as at home. Our teaching in both places is to be plainly and unmistakably loyal to the inner spirit of Christ himself. And it will not be loyal to Christ if we are teaching any kind of religion which a man can take on without fundamental, radical, universal good-will. The solicitous, thoughtful care which some of the nations have been showing for the common, homely, daily needs and comforts and joys of their least-favored citizens may well stir missionary supporters and workers to a still more Christlike pity and ministry.

c) It is one of the deeply disappointing things in this war that the churches of Christ have on the whole counted so little for international good-will. Is that to continue to be the case? It will continue to be the case unless there is not only patient, passionate pursuit of good-will on the part of individuals the world over, but also some definitely constructive agency through which that good-will can act. And the churches must set themselves to build up such an agency, through which the Christian spirit can be brought to bear upon all the sore and burning questions of the after-war period. Should not our Christian mission boards, with their already established international relations and with their high, unselfish aims, afford the natural and best agency for this purpose? It would not be the first time that the missionary cause has given to its supporting churches more than it has received from them. Perhaps the most significant piece of work under Christian auspices for maintaining right relations between the nations in this war has been done by the International Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association in the prison camps.

d) On the mission field all this should mean *such a unifying of Christian forces in work as the world has never yet seen*. The exigencies of mission work itself have already shown in many cases the imperative necessity for such unification; for example, in educational work, if Christian educational institutions are not to be quite

outclassed by state-supported schools. The war has demonstrated, further, the necessity of a Christian unity that can rise above national and racial antagonisms if our missionary work is not to seem a humiliating self-contradiction. For a religion that cannot conquer race prejudices and antagonisms is not worthy of God or of Christ or of world-missions. Are we to be large enough and fine enough to make such far greater unification of work possible?

e) We have had ghastly visions, too, in this war, of the ugliness and sordidness of arrogant and selfish nationalism and racial pride that is blind to the indispensable values of other peoples. We may hope that the very ghastliness of these visions may give us all *a new sensitiveness to the values of alien peoples* and a new determination sacredly to respect and guard all those values in the peoples to whom we bring our missionary message. As surely as we see that the world's civilization must suffer loss wherever the values of any people are blotted out, so surely must our appreciation of Christianity itself lack something of perfection if we fail to call out the unique, honest reaction upon the message of Christ, of any race which God has made. May the war make possible to us all a presentation of Christianity in missions more reverent than ever before of the best in the peoples to whom we go!

f) In almost every mission field, too, there will be felt after the war the definite *problem of personal reconciliations* and of the *reknitting of many personal relations*.

If the mission forces come to this Christian duty humbly and penitently (for it is impossible that the fault should be *all* on one side), it may be expected that the doing of it will carry them far beyond the degree of co-operation and unity previously attained to *a deeper and more spiritual unity*, to a unity more worthy of the name of our common sorrowing and forgiving Redeemer.

Is it not possible, too, that the almost religious sense of loving unity that seems to have come to more than one of the belligerent nations in their experiences of common sacrificial endeavor may itself suggest the possibility and the way to a still wider, more unselfish, and more Christlike unity of all men—surely of all Christian men?

Just because we shall have to resist great natural tendencies to draw off from one another along national lines we may hope that we shall see all the more clearly the necessity of extending to all our relations that full Christlike spirit which we know to be incumbent upon us in our relations to the peoples to whom we go as missionaries. And this spirit will tend to flow back upon the home churches and to do there also its healing work.

Certainly the world everywhere never more needed the religion of Christ than now, to give to men deathly sick of strife the deep abiding motive and dynamic for universal, unselfish, constructive good-will—for "a Kingdom that cannot be shaken."

THE GOSPEL PAUL "RECEIVED"

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The present age is not in danger of underrating the independence and originality of the apostle Paul. The apostle himself, through the exigencies of his struggle against reactionaries in the church, was compelled to put the strongest possible emphasis upon it. His apostolic authority and the truth of his "gospel" were at stake, and his chosen line of defense was that of the mystic who appeals neither to traditional authority nor to argument, but to inward conviction. Like Cicero, he has no need of ancestors. In things of the spirit he is himself an ancestor. Full justice must be done to this exalted sense of apostolic independence; but it should not blind us to many evidences (including statements of the apostle himself) as to what he "received."

The impression of Paul's creative originality does not rest on his own direct assertions alone. His writings prove his mind to have been of the type which does not tolerate the presence of unassimilated material. Since the period of Baur the historian of Christian origins realizes that these writings of Paul are primary documents, antedating by almost a generation the earliest narratives. They are, in fact, the chief literary monuments of the apostolic age, and their inherent power made it inevitable that they should come to dominate the thinking of the church (particularly in its Western branch) during the formative period of its theology. Conscious of this, the modern critic cannot avoid a sense of surprise amounting almost to bewilderment when he reads the Acts of the Apostles and takes full account of this author's disregard of sources of such surpassing value. The writer of Acts (whom we will designate "Luke," without prejudice to critical questions of authorship) is certainly a reverential admirer of Paul. He presents him as the great "vessel of the Spirit," divinely commissioned to proclaim the name of Jesus to the Gentiles, destined to bear witness of him before hostile Jews and in the presence of governors and kings. Yet he seems unaware of the very existence of the Pauline epistles,

and he completely inverts Paul's own conception of his distinctive apostleship and gospel.

Moreover, for the church at large in this period the procedure of Luke constitutes no real exception. It is true that Ignatius and Polycarp, writing from and to churches which looked to Paul as their founder, both refer to his epistles, and show the influence we should expect from their use. This is still more the case with First Peter, an epistle addressed to the same region. Clement, also, addressing the Corinthians from Rome, has references to Paul and his letters. Hebrews, too—a writing of which Clement makes vastly greater use than of Paul—has traces of dependence on Paul, though far less than is commonly supposed. On the other hand, the homily known as Second Clement, generally regarded as of Roman origin, has only slight traces of Pauline influence, and Hermas none whatever. Even Justin Martyr has barely an echo or two, and never appeals in any extant writing to Paul's authority, not even in support of his own advanced Christology.

If Rome in 95-170 be thus silent, what can we expect of Egypt and Syria? Ps.-Barnabas has no single trace of Paul. Didaché has none. If Palestinian writings, such as the Gospel of Matthew and the Epistle of James,¹ reflect a few remote echoes of Paulinism,² their precanonical origin was in a spirit of hostility. Their canonical embodiment shows neither sympathy nor understanding for the Pauline viewpoint. Alexandria has, of course, in Christian times (as for immemorial ages before) its closest relations with Palestine; but its evangelic tradition, whether on the gnostic side or on the orthodox, is traced, not to James in Jerusalem, but to Peter in Antioch.³ Basilides (himself probably hailing originally from North Syria) uses the Antiochian Gospel of Luke (or its Petrine

¹ The epistle may be of Alexandrian provenance, but its ascription to James shows to what authority it looks.

² Not of *Paul*. The possible allusions in Matt. 5:19 and 13:28 could not have been understood by the evangelist as referring to the work of the great apostle to the Gentiles personally. Even the unmistakable reference in Jas. 2:14-26 aims rather at antinomian ultra-Paulinism than at Paul, though it uses Pauline terms.

³ With the exception of the canonical First Peter written from Rome, Antioch seems to be the point of emanation for the early Petrine literature, Gospel of Peter, Preaching and Teaching of Peter, Apocalypse of Peter, etc.

sources). He derives his gospel from an alleged disciple of Peter named Glaukias. Orthodoxy at Alexandria, on the other hand, traces through Mark, who in I Pet. 5:13 is Peter's "son" in the faith. Mark was in reality the nephew of Barnabas, Peter's predecessor in the leadership at Antioch, and at last accounts in Acts (15:37) is associated with Barnabas there; though in Col. 4:10; II Tim. 4:11, and Philem., vs. 24 he is a follower of Paul. To "Barnabas" are ascribed the two earliest Christian writings whose style and type are recognizably Alexandrian.¹ Rome itself, for its evangelic tradition, prefers to appeal to Peter even indirectly through Mark rather than directly to Paul. And its Gospel according to Mark, intensely pro-Pauline as it is on the questions publicly at issue, shows surprisingly little dependence on the deeper Pauline ideas, and makes little use of Pauline phraseology. At Rome, as at Alexandria, both orthodox and gnostic² tradition looks to Mark (or to Luke with his Petrine sources) as authority for gospel story. We cannot deem it unnatural that tradition of this type should seek to connect with the personal followers of Jesus; but the strength of the reaction and the fact that Mark is appealed to solely as the hearer of Peter, and derives no part of his authority from his later association with Paul, is not without significance.

The content of synoptic tradition corresponds with the non-Pauline derivation attributed to it. It is not only quite independent of Paul, but widely divergent in its conception of what constitutes the message of salvation. We have, of course, two inevitable points of tangency between Gospels and Epistles, the significance of baptism and the Lord's Supper. These are the two nuclei of the agglomeration of evangelic anecdotes. We could not be dealing with the same religious movement and not find contact here between Pauline and non-Pauline tradition.³ But one cannot imagine a student of early Christianity limited in his

¹ Hebrews by Tertullian and Ps.-Origen (Cyprian?), perhaps in common dependence on a lost work of Irenaeus (cf. Zahn, *Einl.*, § 45, Anm. 8). Ps.-Barnabas has literary relations to Hebrews and is certainly Alexandrian in type of teaching.

² So Kerdon and Marcion.

³ On traces of a similar polarity in Paul see Bacon, "Reflections of Ritual in Paul," *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, VIII (October, 1915).

sources to the epistles to whom a first reading of the synoptic writings would not bring a shock of surprise. In synoptic literature Paul's central theme, the "message of reconciliation" (*διακονία τῆς καταλλαγῆς* II Cor. 5:18), dwindles to a faint echo in Mark 10:45 and chap. 14:24. This single echo reappears in the Matthean parallels to these verses; but it is completely obliterated in Luke, whose only trace of the idea occurs in Acts 20:28. The Pauline Jesus is the Isaian Suffering Servant, in the synoptics the Danielic Son of man predominates. Even Isa. 53:4 applies in Matt. 8:17 only to men's *physical* ills. The Pauline resurrection story (I Cor. 15:3-8) differs in every particular from the synoptic. It has different events, a different doctrinal standpoint, and different scriptural proofs. The Pauline doctrine of the pre-existence of Jesus is absolutely unknown to synoptic tradition; nor is its absence compensated by the later divergent forms in Matthew and Luke of the legend of miraculous birth. Paul's Christology is fundamentally an incarnation doctrine, the synoptic is a doctrine of apotheosis. The synoptists depict Jesus as "a prophet mighty in deed and word before God and all the people," miraculously delivered from the fate to which rebellious Israel consigned him, that in due time he may return to bring the Kingdom to all believers. For Paul he is the martyr-Messiah who "devoted himself" (Gal. 1:4) to save mankind from impending wrath. Reference to his teachings is extremely rare; of his mighty works there is no single mention. The synoptists make repentance the one great preliminary to salvation; Paul never preaches it and scarcely once employs the word.

Here are tremendous differences. Perhaps it is not surprising that Marcion, coming to Rome in about 138 A.D. from a region in which the Pauline gospel was supreme, should denounce the current orthodoxy as half-Jewish, and proceed to promulgate a "gospel" purified by radical excisions from what he termed the Judaizing "interpolations" of the Galilean apostles. His gospel was based on the Antiochian work of Luke, but Marcion claimed to restore it to the uncorrupted form of its sources. Even his edition of the ten major epistles of Paul was similarly expurgated. Hegesippus, in the next generation, may be counted among the great opponents of

Marcion. Journeying through the Pauline mission field on his way from Palestine to Rome, he gladly bears witness that the churches had not been carried away from the standard of orthodoxy. But that Hegesippus' standard was not based upon the Pauline epistles is fairly apparent from the reference which he makes to the lyric fragment quoted by Paul in I Cor. 2:9. Hegesippus denounces this "scripture" as "vain talk" and those who employed it (probably Gnostics who disparaged the revelations of contemporary "prophecy" as to the blessings of the messianic age) as "liars, both against the divine Scriptures and the Lord who said, 'Blessed are your eyes for they see, and your ears for they hear.'" Hegesippus seems to make slight account of First Corinthians. Indeed, he explicitly informs us that his standard was what was "proclaimed by the law and the prophets and the Lord." Like Polycarp, he "turned away from the vain talk of the many and from the false teaching [of the heretics] to the tradition handed down from the very first" (*Ad Phil.* vii). Like Papias, Polycarp's *ἑταῖρος* and Hegesippus' own earlier contemporary, he met "those who teach alien commandments, and those who have so very much to say" with the "tradition of the elders" who could report words of the Lord's personal disciples. Papias himself had rested, for his "Interpretations of the Lord's Oracles," on apostolic tradition, a "living and abiding voice" still continuing (the time of Papias' inquiries was at least prior to the scattering of the Palestinian mother-church in 135 A.D.) at the original seat of Christian teaching. Thus within half a century after Paul's death the most Pauline of the Pauline churches already are "turning to the tradition handed down" from "the apostles and elders at Jerusalem"! Papias at Hierapolis, the associate (*ἑταῖρος*) of Polycarp has two authoritative and apostolic writings with which to meet the flood of heresy: Matthew and the Revelation of John. Of Paul he seems to have made no mention. Doubtless he agreed with Hegesippus in looking to the church of "the apostles and elders at Jerusalem" as "the pure virgin, as yet uncorrupted by the vain talk" of the heretics. It was the age of reaction even in the Pauline churches, toward the tradition of Jerusalem.

¹ II Clem. xi applies it thus.

Paul could not come to his own during the generation which battled to the knife against the ultra-Pauline Marcion. During most of the second century the churches were too busy combating antinomian laxity and Docetism. Orthodoxy contended for a doctrine of the resurrection of the *flesh* (*ἀνάστασις τῆς σαρκός*). It declared those who quoted from I Cor. 15:50, "flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God" to be "wresting the epistles of our beloved brother Paul, as they do also the other scriptures."¹ Only later, upon Irenaeus and his contemporaries did the task devolve of fixing the true equilibrium between Pauline liberalism and the conservatism bred in the synagogue. First, the *ex parte* statements; afterward, the formulation of the verdict. In like manner our own age deems itself better fitted to estimate the true contribution of Paul than that which fought the battle against the vigorous and rigorous criticism of Baur.

Is it then to be inferred from the slow advance of the Pauline type of teaching to its rightful influence and its ultimate control that this type of gospel was at first relatively local? Was it at first dominant only in the churches founded by Paul in the classic Greek world on both sides of the Aegean; admitted to no more than a divided authority in regions where (as at Antioch and Rome) Paul built on the foundation of others; delayed in acceptance in Palestine and Egypt until the general circulation of a Corpus Paulinum? Such would be the course of development we should naturally anticipate. Yet here also a sweeping judgment would surely lead us astray.

Our direct information is limited. The sole contemporary record is the Book of Acts, an Antiochian work, as ancient tradition and internal evidence both witness. The book is Petro-Pauline in the sense that Paul's ministry and gospel are put in subordination to Peter and are interpreted from the Petrine point of view, as we should expect at Antioch, after Peter and Barnabas were left in control (Gal. 2:11 ff.). Moreover, Acts is by no means exempt from suspicion of later theoretical idealization. Our modern histories of the apostolic age are scarcely more than paraphrases of

¹ II Pet. 3:15 f. The passage in debate was I Cor. 15:50 and the context, as Irenaeus makes evident (*Haer.* V, ix).

this post-Pauline Antiochian work more or less modified by critical comparison of the Pauline epistles. It is the best we can do. But the way in which the story of the extension of the gospel to Philistia, Egypt, and Ethiopia is told in Acts 8:26-40 is typical of our half-knowledge. After the dispersion of the Hellenistic Christians of "the synagogue of the Alexandrians" from Jerusalem "in the persecution that arose about Stephen," the reader naturally looks for an account of the extension of Christianity to the regions of "Egypt and the parts of Libya about Cyrene" (Acts 2:10 cf. 6:9). But Luke breaks abruptly off when Philip, on the road to Gaza, has gone as far as Ashdod, and his convert, the eunuch of Candace, has passed on toward Egypt and Ethiopia. Doubtless the further links of connection between this and the great and flourishing Christian communities of the Nile Delta, of which we obtain our first glimpses late in the second century, lay before him in that interesting source from which he has drawn the story of Stephen and the seven Hellenistic "evangelists."¹ But the compiler of our Book of Acts does not regard them as "evangelists." To him they are deacons, subordinate to the apostles in Jerusalem. Their becoming evangelists is an unforeseen contingency. He has not cared to preserve any account of the expansion of Christianity in the direction of Egypt, important as this must have been. His one solicitude in this part of his narrative has been to find a place in the story (however awkward and improbable) for the apostle Paul, and the beginnings of the gospel at *Antioch*. Contrary to everything we should infer from the Pauline writings, contrary to every indication of the narrative followed from the beginning of the section in 6:1, Luke suddenly brings in at the very end of the story of the martyrdom of Stephen "a young man named Saul," who thus becomes Stephen's spiritual heir. The only premonition of this unexpected turn is in 6:9, where in the description of Stephen's assailants in "the synagogue of the Alexandrians"² the clause appears, "and of those from Cilicia and Asia." Its relation to the context is as awkward as that of the clauses at the end of

¹ Irenaeus (*Haer.* IV, xxiii, 2) not unnaturally infers that the eunuch became "the herald in Ethiopia of Christ's advent."

² The only Hellenist synagogue in Jerusalem known to the rabbinic writings (Preuschen, *Acts ad loc.*, citing *Tosephta Megilla*, III).

chap. 7. Only one synagogue is here spoken of, the Hellenistic synagogue of the Alexandrians, though their neighbors, the Libyans¹ and Cyrenians, are grouped with them. The added clause "and of those of Cilicia and Asia," if taken as part of the designation of the synagogue, makes it incredibly complex. If, on the other hand, we construe it with the foregoing *rives*, the strangers "from Cilicia and Asia" appear as unexplained intruders. The clause takes its place, therefore, along with the notoriously disjointed editorial interpolations which obtain belated admission for Paul at the end of the story (7:58, 60; 8:1a, 3).² They attest the effort of Luke to adjust the (Alexandrian?) source to his own theoretical point of view. The narrative was originally concerned, not with the *diaconate*, but with the spread of gentile Christianity by agency of the seven Hellenistic "evangelists" (21:8). According to Luke, systematic gentile evangelization began, by divine appointment, with the mission of Barnabas and Saul from *Antioch* (Acts 13:1-3). It could not take place earlier; for Judaea must first have full opportunity to hear the apostolic message and (in the persecution of Agrippa, chap. 12) have definitely rejected it.³

If the source of Acts chaps. 6-8, which we have provisionally designated "Alexandrian," leaves small room for the activity of Paul, even less is conceded by that which in Acts 9:32-11:18 makes Peter the agent of the great transition, and which may be designated correspondingly the "Caesarean" source. Luke tones down the sweeping representations of this narrative into the mere establishment of an apostolic precedent for the systematic evangelization of the Gentiles begun in the so-called First Missionary

¹ Reading with Blass (*Phil. of Gosp's*, pp. 69 f.) and the Armenian catena *Λιβύων* or *Λιβυστίνων* for *Λιβερτινών*.

² So e.g., Bleek, *Eint.*,⁴ pp. 405 f. and many later critics. See especially Wellhausen, *Noten zur Apg.*, 1907.

³ In Acts this story of the martyrdom of James, son of Zebedee, and the driving out of Peter immediately precedes the account of the First Missionary Journey (13:1 ff.), and marks the close of the first, or Petrine, half of the book. The reason is apparent from the stereotyped apologetic of the author (cf. e.g., 13:40 f., 46 f., and 28:25-28), which in the *Κήρυγμα Πέτρου* (90-100 A.D.) and other ancient sources takes the form of a twelve-year period during which the apostolic preaching is to be limited to the Jews. Afterward they are to "go forth into the world that none may say, We did not hear."

Journey (Acts 13:1-3).¹ But if we look to the primary sense, the pre-Lukan source admits no such limitations. Peter here leaves as little room for the work of Paul in the founding of gentile Christianity and the vindication of its equal standing as for the work at Caesarea previously attributed to Philip (8:25, 40). Luke harmonizes—much against the representations of Paul—by putting into Peter's mouth at the *second* Jerusalem conclave (15:7) the following reference to the previous occasion: "Brethren, ye know how that a good while ago God made choice among you that by my[!] mouth the Gentiles should hear the word of God and believe." To the reader of the Pauline epistles this sounds astonishing enough, especially when Paul himself is supposed to have been sitting by and listening without a protest. But it is a mere modicum of the claims made on Peter's behalf by the Caesarean source. According to Acts 11:1-18, especially if the β text of 11:1 be considered, the issues contended for by Paul in his major epistles are here all decided in advance. They are decided on Peter's initiative, and on a more sweeping principle. For the first conclave of Acts 11:1-18 makes *more* radical decisions than the second conclave summoned in Acts, chap. 15, to meet the same issue. The Caesarean source even takes more latitudinarian positions than Paul himself. The question of meats, even to the "eating with men uncircumcised," is not settled in Acts 9:32—11:18 by the Pauline principle of abolition through the cross, but as in Mark 7:1-23, on the broad ground that the distinction of "clean" from "unclean" flesh is and always has been a man-made distinction which had no warrant in the divine act of creation (Acts 10:10-16; 11:3, 5-10; cf. Rom. 14:14; Mark 7:17-23). The reasoning is the same in Acts 10:10-15 as in Mark 10:2-9, where the Mosaic law of divorce is "man-made" and

¹ As is now generally recognized, 13:1 marks the beginning of the second part of Acts (so e.g., Knopf in *Schriften d. neuen Test. Apg. Einl.*, § 4, p. 529). Antioch claims the real beginnings of mission work among the Gentiles, hence even Paul must begin at Jerusalem among the Greek-speaking Jews (9:29; 22:17-21). This affords the true explanation of the extraordinary *true* text 'Ελληνας in 11:20. The sense so clearly requires 'Ελλήνας that the later MSS and even modern critical texts and versions make the substitution against all the textual evidence. But this is to sacrifice Luke to his source. The correction to 'Ελληνας was deliberately made by the compiler because otherwise it would appear that his First Missionary Journey was not after all the first, and the special ordination of 13:1-3 superfluous.

that of the creation is of "God." In this Caesarean source the recognition of gentile believers is not subject to the qualification of certain "necessary" restrictions as in Acts 15:28 f. It rests explicitly on the plea that "God is no respecter of persons, but *in every nation he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is accepted of him.*" On this basis Peter actually plants a gentile church in Caesarea. Philip's earlier coming (8:40) is overlooked. Throughout the section from 9:32 to 11:18, in spite of certain editorial omissions which become much more apparent in the Western form of the text,¹ Peter stands at the head of an incipient ministry to the Gentiles, which, by the time 11:18 is reached,² has already solved all the problems of the gentile ministry of Paul without Paul's aid, and has solved them on grounds quite independent of the Pauline doctrine of the cross.

The recognition of these more flagrant contradictions of Paul in Luke's sources sets his own attempts to do justice to the great apostle to the Gentiles in a more favorable light. Widely as he differs in his story of Paul's early career (Acts 9:1-31) from the indignant retrospect of Gal. 1:11-20, we must give him credit for doing his utmost to regularize a career quite too independent of the apostolic college to come within the limits of post-apostolic philosophy. The introduction here (9:27) of Paul by Barnabas "to the apostles" is a companion sketch to the later scene where he is introduced by the same patron at Antioch (11:25).³ Both this and the account of Paul's beginning by preaching to the Greek-speaking *Jews* of Jerusalem, until they reject the gospel and violently oppose the preacher, are contradictory to Paul's positive statements. The latter story is of a piece with the almost stereo-

¹ Apparently Luke has inverted (for obvious reasons) the order of the two sections of the Caesarean source which now constitute Acts 9:32-11:18 and Acts 12:1-24. Acts 11:18 was its *finis*.

² In 11:1 the β text has $\delta \mu \epsilon \nu \sigma \theta \eta \nu \Pi \epsilon \tau \rho \sigma \delta \iota \alpha \iota \kappa \alpha \nu \theta \chi \rho \acute{o} \nu \nu \eta \theta \epsilon \lambda \eta \sigma \epsilon \pi \alpha \rho \epsilon \nu \theta \eta \nu \alpha \iota \epsilon \iota \varsigma \text{ 'I} \epsilon \rho \sigma \acute{o} \lambda \upsilon \mu \alpha \kappa \alpha \iota \pi \rho \sigma \phi \omega \nu \eta \sigma \alpha \varsigma \tau \omicron \upsilon \varsigma \delta \delta \epsilon \lambda \phi \omicron \upsilon \varsigma \kappa \alpha \iota \epsilon \pi \iota \sigma \tau \eta \rho \acute{\iota} \zeta \alpha \varsigma \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \upsilon \varsigma \epsilon \pi \alpha \rho \epsilon \nu \theta \eta \nu \alpha \iota \pi \omicron \lambda \acute{o} \nu \nu \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \nu \pi \omicron \iota \omicron \upsilon \mu \epsilon \nu \omicron \varsigma \delta \iota \alpha \tau \omega \nu \chi \omega \rho \omega \nu \delta \iota \delta \acute{\alpha} \sigma \kappa \omega \nu \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \upsilon \varsigma$. This implies, contrary to Acts, chap. 12, but in harmony with the impression made by 9:32 ff., that Peter's permanent residence is no longer at Jerusalem. His mission field is the plain of Sharon, and he is himself at the threshold of a ministry to the Gentiles. Note also the omission of Peter's answer to the charge of 11:3.

³ Cf. β text.

typed Lukan conception.¹ Authorities such as Mommsen, Schwartz, and Bousset even maintain that Paul here explicitly denies all and every relation to "the churches in Judaea" save the single visit particularly mentioned (Gal. 1:18 f.).² It is not necessary with Mommsen to suppose that Paul's first contact with Christianity was at Tarsus; it *may* not be necessary to concede to Heitmüller³ that Paul's statement in Gal. 1:17, "I *returned* to Damascus," unaccompanied by any statement of his going there, implies that Damascus was then his place of residence. It does imply, however, the tacit assumption of knowledge on the reader's part; and *in the absence of Acts* it would be natural to assume that Damascus was the scene of Paul's first contact with Christianity, and remained the center of his work "in the regions of Syria" (Gal. 1:21) until expulsion from thence, "under Aretas the king" (i.e., not earlier than the latter part of 38 A.D.), drove him to "Cilicia." Meantime, while we cannot disregard Luke's story of Paul's earlier career, it must be admitted that his knowledge seems scanty in the extreme and his data (such as they are) almost hopelessly irreconcilable with Paul's own statements. They are mostly of a generalizing and theoretic type, suggestive of the attempt to fill up the gaps of knowledge by constructive imagination.⁴ Allowing all that we reasonably can to the story of Acts, Paul's writings as a whole give surprisingly little support to the view that he had been a resident of Jerusalem during the momentous period marked by the careers of John the Baptist and Jesus. He never mentions

¹ See e.g., Acts 13:46 f.

² For Mommsen's view see ZNW, II (1901), 85. For Schwartz, *Gött. Gel. Nachr.*, 1907. For Bousset, ZNW, XV (1914), 144. Rendall (*Expos. Grk. Test on Gal.* 1:23) seeks to meet this by rendering ἀγνωστος ἑμην "I was becoming unknown." The translation makes shipwreck of the purpose of Paul's argument, which does not aim to show a *diminishing* familiarity with his face (a matter of course) but *unfamiliarity*.

³ ZNW, XIII (1912), 328.

⁴ The only specific item of Acts 9:1-31 which corresponds to a recognizable extent with Paul's own statements is the reference to his escape from Damascus (Acts 9:23-25 = II Cor. 11:32 f.), and this is clearly misdated. "Some days" (ἡμέραι ἱκαναί) after his conversion, when the news of it has not even reached Jerusalem (vs. 26), implies a date certainly not later than 36 A.D. The various expedients to reconcile this with the date "under Aretas the king" (II Cor. 11:32) break down before the practical certainty that Paul refers to a transfer of sovereignty under Caligula between 37 and 39.

Stephen or Gamaliel, Sanhedrin, or high priest. He did have predecessors in the mission field who were "of note among the apostles," but "Andronicus and Junias" are not names that we connect with the twelve. The only thing he makes unmistakably clear as to his early career is that he did not get his Christianity from the Jerusalem community, nor receive from them those formative influences which, coming from new-found brethren, could not fail to affect even so independent and vigorous a mind as his. Except for the single almost negligible attempt of Paul to get in touch with Peter and James (Gal. 1:18 f.), an attempt ignored by Luke, the spread of Christianity in North Syria and Cilicia remained for fourteen years an independent movement.

It is manifest from the foregoing that the discrepancies between Acts and the epistles, great as they are, are not due to any hostility, but rather the contrary. It is just Luke's eagerness to do justice to Paul's apostolic authority and Paul's perfect orthodoxy which makes it impossible for him to admit that he was not, from the outset, a docile agent of the twelve in Jerusalem. It makes him reject as a slander the charge that Paul encouraged the Jews among the Gentiles to "disregard the (Mosaic) customs, and not circumcise their children." Luke's theory of the law and its obligation is the plain and simple rule: Mosaism for Jewish believers (since the law was imposed on them), freedom for Gentiles—a freedom qualified in Acts 15:13-29 (*not* in Acts 11:1-18) by certain abstinences to insure (religious) "purity." To perpetuate thus in the church the separation between Jew and Gentile seems to the "pillars" at Paul's conference with them in Jerusalem quite a matter of course. Otherwise there is no sense in the division of the two spheres of influence (Gal 1:1-10). To Irenaeus (for whose generation the Jewish element in the church had become a *quantité négligeable*) it seems almost a truism that "the apostles allowed the Gentiles to act freely, but they themselves continued in the ancient observances."¹ Luke, the Gentile and High Churchman, has no idea that a continuance or rebuilding of the "middle wall of partition" would be to Paul a nullification of the work of Calvary. He cannot imagine that Paul would object to "the apostles and elders in Jerusalem" prescribing by written decree what should constitute

¹ *Haer.* III, xiv, 15.

for Gentiles purity from "the pollutions of idols." That is because Luke's idea of Paul's apostleship and Paul's gospel is diametrically opposed to Paul's own. Such difference could hardly exist, were it not that Paul's special application of the doctrine of the cross, namely, its abolition at one stroke of the servile relation to God implied in the legalistic economy, and with it the ethnic distinction of Jew and Gentile, was in a peculiar sense Paul's own, and had currency neither before nor after his time. From Paul's references to his religious experience, as an individual in Phil. 3:5-11, as a type in Rom. 7:7-8:11, we might reasonably assume that it was an outgrowth of his personal psychology. At all events, it has a distinctive coloration which enables him to speak of it as "my gospel," a special revelation whose characteristic note is the abolition of the barriers set up by the law. It is, in short, a gospel of "access in one Spirit unto the Father" in place of the temple ceremonial, a new manhood in Christ Jesus in place of old distinctions of circumcision and uncircumcision, Greek and barbarian, bondman and freeman, male and female. Can we discriminate along this line?

We can do full justice to Paul's exalted claims of independent apostleship, of receiving his gospel, not from flesh and blood, but by divine revelation, without disregarding the many proofs of large coincidence with other preachers, including those more radical as well as those more reactionary than Paul himself, if we bear in mind that these strenuous claims of direct divine authority have always to do with the question of freedom from the law. Even here, however, it is not the liberal faith and practice which is peculiar to Paul, but its ground. Paul's mere liberalism is shared, not only with a large element of the gentile Christian church, but even with an important body of Jewish propagandists in pre-Christian times. Thus at Alexandria, a full century before Paul, we have the type of "liberal" Judaism represented in Ps.-Aristeas reducing the moral precepts of the law to the single principle of imitation of the divine goodness, and the ceremonial distinctions of meats to moral allegory. The Wisdom of Solomon, and the Wisdom literature generally, had tended long and strongly toward "faith"¹

¹ Note the doctrine of salvation by "faith" in Sap. 3:9; 16:6-13, 26; II Macc. 7:40.

in the one true God and a righteous and merciful life as the sum and substance of true religion. Philo, while himself conservative, bewails the tendency of a more radical element in Alexandrian Judaism to treat the literal sense of the law as mere allegory, a husk to be stripped from the moral kernel. Josephus even brings us face to face with the same conflict raised by Paul's Judaizing opponents. He relates at length how Ananias, who first converted Izates at Charax-Spasini, assured the king that he "might worship God without being circumcised . . . for the worship of God was of more importance than circumcision." Afterward a stricter missionary from Galilee named Eleazar, anticipating the Judaizers in Galatia, compelled the king (to use Paul's expression) to be circumcised.¹ Were all this evidence disregarded, we still have epigraphic proofs in abundance of liberal Jewish brotherhoods, from Egypt to Bithynia. These brotherhoods, under the name of Hypsistarii, or worshipers of the Most High God (cf. Acts 16:17), bring Jews and Gentiles together in what appear to be churches in everything save the Christian element.² Paul, however, has a better method of reconciling universalism with the law than the allegorizing exegesis of Alexandria. The law was holy, divine, perfect, but only *preparatory* to Christ. The cross was God's signal for the incoming of a new order. This *special application* of the doctrine of the cross is distinctive of Paul. The doctrine of the cross itself as a ground of forgiveness is not. Otherwise Paul could not argue as he does in Gal. 2:15-21 to convince Peter that in admitting the second he must logically also admit the first.

Clear discrimination between the gospel which Paul "received" and that which was distinctively his own is vital to our understanding of Christian origins. It is the very key to New Testament interpretation. But the use of this key is rare. The polemic stress which Paul, in refuting those who wished to make him a mere agent of Jerusalem, lays upon his immediate divine authority leads to wholesale ascriptions of his teaching to direct supernatural revelation. But this is to ignore other no less weighty state-

¹ Josephus, *Ant.*, XX, ii. 3 f.

² Schürer in *Sitzungsberichte d. Berl. Akad.* for 1897 on *σεβόμενοι τὸν θεὸν ὑψιστόν* in Tanais. Query: Does Paul imply the existence of such non-Christian "churches" in Gal. 1:22?

ments of Paul himself, to say nothing of intimations in his letters (and even in Acts) of independent non-Pauline Christian brotherhoods, as at Rome and Ephesus in the very heart of Paul's mission field, wherein a type of gospel was proclaimed as free from the influence of Jerusalem as from Paul's own. The claim of divine revelation as the ultimate source and guaranty of Paul's message of grace and salvation through the risen Christ in its essential contents need suffer no detracting if we also do justice to the complementary claim of continuity and agreement with the general stream of gospel teaching. For on suitable occasion Paul also sets forth in explicit terms that he "received by tradition" (παρέλαβον) a "gospel" which in general outline was identical throughout the Christian world, a gospel which had been preached before him by "all the apostles," and which was still preached by him in agreement with the rest. The outline of this *traditional* apostolic gospel as "received" by Paul is sketched by him in I Cor. 15:1-11 as a preliminary to his *Auseinandersetzung* with the deniers of a bodily resurrection in the Corinthian church. It naturally centers on the cross and resurrection, with only brief mention of the former. In the same epistle (11:23 ff.), apropos of the disorders accompanying the observance of "the Lord's supper," he had quoted the special "tradition" (παράδοσις) of the observance of this rite, making reference to its origin on "the night in which he [Jesus] was betrayed." He even alludes, by the term καταγγέλλετε (vs. 26), to the "telling of the story" which, after the manner of both Jewish and pagan ritual, still accompanied the Corinthian commemoration of "the Lord's death."¹ Here we have greater detail on the passion. And the *traditional* character of this gospel is made all the more certain by the fact that Paul uses the preposition ἀπό (i.e., "from the Lord as the point of departure") and not παρά, which would be more natural to a primary witness of the scene.² He is declaring that this which he had "handed on" to the Corinthians (παρέδωκα ὑμῖν) he had himself "received by tradition" (παρέλαβον), a testimony to his interest in the unifying power of an unvarying practice

¹ The word is rendered "ye proclaim" in the R.V. The reference is to the *leipos logos* of the Hellenistic mysteries, the *haggada* of the Jewish commemorative feasts. Cf. Deut. 26:4 f.

² Note the distinctive use in the Papias fragment: τὰς παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου τῇ πίστει δεδομένας (ἐντολάς) καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς παραγινομένας τῆς ἀληθείας.

extending in all branches of the brotherhood back to its founder, the institutor of the "new covenant." Similarly, in II Cor., chaps. 3-5, when vindicating the divine authority of "ministers of the new covenant," Paul speaks of their common God-given message as a "ministry of the reconciliation." Its content was the atoning death of Jesus. This, then, is the common gospel as Paul understands it, and claims to have "received" it. How does this compare with the message as we find it in the synoptics?

We should, of course, expect, especially under the conditions of the time, that the common Christian faith would center upon the sacrament, and that phrases borrowed from its ritual would be our best clew to connection between the otherwise strangely diverse types of gospel reflected in synoptic tradition and in the rest of the New Testament. In this connection (I Cor. 11:23 ff.) are found Paul's most explicit references to the actual story of Jesus' life. The common embassy with which, according to Paul, all "ministers of the new covenant" have alike been charged is the message of the *καταλλαγή*, how that God was "reconciling the world to himself in Christ, not imputing unto them their trespasses." Moreover, as already noted, Paul not only declares that he received this doctrine "how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures" in common with Peter and the other witnesses of the resurrection, but he clearly adverts to it as the admitted common ground in his report of his argument with Peter at Antioch. It is the very essence of the gospel, according to Gal. 1:4, that Jesus "gave himself for our sins, to deliver us from the present evil world." According to Rom. 4:25 he was "delivered up for our transgressions and raised for our justification"; in fact, the raising to God's "right hand," where he now "makes intercession for us" (Rom. 8:34), is so indispensable an element in this "reconciliation" that without it our faith is "vain"; even believers are "yet in their sins" (I Cor. 15:12-17). Is it not extraordinary, then, that the Gospel of Luke contains not one syllable of this atonement doctrine?¹ Is it not strange that even Mark contains no

¹ The cancellation of the words "given for you," "poured out for you" in the institution of the sacrament (Luke 22:19 f.), is so conspicuous as to have led to the insertion in later texts of a form (vss. 19b-20) based on I Cor. 11:24 f. But the spuriousness of the addition is generally recognized by textual critics.

trace of it, save the single Isaian phrase ὑπὲρ πολλῶν in the institution of the sacrament (Mark 14:34), prophetically introduced in the form λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν in 10:45? If, as could easily be shown from the epistles, Paul's whole vision of Jesus' work is seen against the gold background of the Suffering Servant of Deutero-Isaiah—"highly-exalted" because "delivered up" for our transgressions, his life made "an offering for sin"; if, in First Peter, this pivotal dependence on Isa., chap. 53, is doubly apparent; if, in Hebrews, the figure of the atoning high priest, making intercession with his own blood in the actual presence of God,¹ is the very heart of the faith; if, in Revelation, the atoning blood of the chief of all martyrs is the purifying element for all that endure;² if, in First Clement³ and Hermas⁴ and Ps.-Barnabas⁵ and the Epistle to Diognetus,⁶ the idea is equally prominent, how is it that Luke's reiterated appeal to Isa., chap. 53, is always purely apologetic, and never connects the death of the Servant in any way with forgiveness of sin? How is it that the sole reference of Matthew to this classic prophecy (outside of the reproductions of Mark 10:45 and 14:34) applies the famous words "bare our sins" to mere physical infirmities? How is it that the whole public teaching of Jesus and of the apostles in all synoptic literature offers no single trace of this doctrine, save the bare reference in Paul's speech at Miletus to "the church of God which He bought with His [sic] own blood" (Acts 20:28)?

There is but one possible answer, startling as it is, to this question. On the central point of Jesus' death and resurrection the Palestinian gospel which dominates synoptic tradition is not truly representative. Synoptic tradition departs progressively from what the Pauline testimony proves to have been common gospel, and common, not to himself and Hellenistic Christians only, but to Peter as well. For the few traces that remain in Mark, Matthew, and Luke are clearest in the oldest documents (though even there confined to that context—the institution of the Supper—whence their eradication would be most difficult) and vanish entirely from the latest of all.

¹ Heb. 9:24-26; cf. Rom. 8:34; Isa. 53:12.

² Rev. 7:9-17.

³ xii, xvi, xxi, xlix, etc.

⁴ *Sim.* V, 6.

⁵ *Ps.-Barn.* vii.

⁶ *Ad Diogn.* ix.

1. As respects the resurrection gospel one need hardly labor the point. Notoriously, not the incidents of proof only, revealed in the record of I Cor. 15:4-11, but even the primary element, the appearance to Peter, has disappeared from synoptic tradition, leaving only fragmentary traces in Mark 14:28; 16:8; Luke 22:31 f.; 24:34; John 21:1-14, and, perhaps, Luke 5:1-9 and Matt. 14:28-33. The extant fragment of the Ev. Petri apparently related this foundation fact; but unfortunately the fragment breaks off at a point corresponding to John 21:3. The disappearance of the story from Mark is commonly attributed to accident; but had it been really acceptable to the church of the sub-apostolic age, the loss would have been supplied. We should at least have had appendixes which carried out the implications of the authentic chapters. Synoptic tradition has simply gravitated away from the so-called "Galilean" type represented in I Cor., chap. 15, whose distinctive note is manifestations *from heaven* of the glorified Redeemer, toward the so-called "Jerusalem" tradition, which focuses upon the sepulcher found empty by the women. This type of resurrection gospel is supremely concerned with the earthly body of Jesus and its ultimate fate. Certainly no reader of the Synoptic Gospels would gather from their story that Jesus was "raised again for our justification" (*διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν*). At the utmost, he might accept on the bare statement of Mark and Matthew that in some unexplained way "he died for our sins." How, or why, it would be hard for him to say. In the Fourth Gospel the matter is to some extent remedied. In contrast with the baptism of John, which is no longer admitted to be in any sense "unto remission of sins,"¹ Jesus is introduced as "the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world," and as dying for "the nation; and not for the nation only, but also that he might gather together into one the children of God that are scattered abroad."²

¹ So Mark 1:4. Matt. 3:6 also corrects the infelicity by transferring the clause *εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν* to the sacrament of the cup (Matt. 26:28).

² John 11:51 f. Cf. 12:32. The significance of the cross as breaking down the barrier of separation between man and man takes precedence in this Gospel over its significance as breaking down the barrier between man and God—an influence from Paul. Only in I John 2:1 f. does the doctrine of the removal of sin by propitiation (*ἱλασμός*) and intercession (*παράκλησις*) come clearly into view.

But the partial restoration thus effected in the Fourth Gospel of the primitive doctrine of forgiveness through the *propitiation* and *intercession* (14:12-14; 16:10; 17:11 ff.; 20:17) of Jesus is another story. Our question is why it should so largely have disappeared from synoptic teaching.

2. If we look backward from the resurrection message to its antecedents, we find in Paul a conception of Jesus' earthly work and ministry dominated throughout by the Isaian ideal of the Suffering Servant. Jesus is characterized by "meekness and lowliness," traits absolutely wanting in the Markan portrait, and only supplied in the Second Source (Q) through a quotation from some hymn of lyric Wisdom.¹ He is "highly exalted" to receive the homage of "every knee" because he "humbled himself and became obedient unto the death of the cross," or, as Paul more often puts it, he "was delivered up for our sins," "gave himself for us," "bought us with his blood," offered himself "a sacrifice for sins." Hence the proclamation to a guilty world of "glad tidings of peace." These Pauline figures and phrases have their only possible explanation in a combination of the Songs of the Servant in Deutero-Isaiah, especially Isa., chaps. 52-53, with the words of Jesus in instituting the sacrament of the cup. And yet even Paul himself makes no explicit appeal to the prophecy of the Servant, while (as we have seen) it is practically barred from synoptic tradition and (in Matthew) even turned to a different application. The phenomena are paralleled by those which accompany the use of the Isaian title, "the Servant" (ὁ παῖς θεοῦ). It is not used by Paul. It might be imagined a late development, were it not that its only occurrences in the New Testament are four sporadic cases in what appear to be some of the most primitive sources of Luke, the Petrine speeches in Acts, chaps. 3-4; and its few occurrences in patristic literature are confined to what we have reason to regard as the most ancient extant liturgical forms, the prayers in Clement of Rome (lix-lxi), in *Ἀδαχῆ* in blessing the cup and the bread (ix), and in the Martyrdom of Polycarp (xiv). Besides these instances, which have special relation to the institution

¹ On the derivation of Matt. 11:25-27=Luke 10:21 f. see Bacon, *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, IX (October, 1916), "The 'Son' as Organ of Revelation."

commemorating the martyr fate of Jesus, we find the title in a few other very ancient connections where the author seems to have similar thoughts in mind, or to be quoting the language of liturgy. It is found in Ps.-Barnabas, *Ep. ad Diogn.*, and the *Paschal Fragment* of Polycrates,¹ but wholly disappears after the second century in favor of its supposed synonym *ὁδὸς θεοῦ*.

One might at first be disposed to account for the contrast between synoptic tradition and Pauline in respect both to the Isaian title and the conception for which it stands, on the ground of religious development, the synoptic conception of Jesus' character and career, his mission and death representing the older and simpler view, that of the Pauline and later epistolary literature representing an ever-growing assimilation of the story of Jesus to the widespread theme common to the mystery-cults of the dying and rising redeemer-god. If the question concerned the Pauline doctrine of the pre-existence of Jesus and his participation as the divine "Wisdom" in the work of creation, there could be no question of its derivation from the type of thought represented in the Alexandrian Wisdom Literature rather than from the authentic Palestinian tradition of Jesus' teaching. In support of synoptic tradition may also be urged the early crystallization and generally authentic character of the anecdotes which fill the main outline of the Markan story, as well as the teaching of the Second Source. But synoptic tradition cannot here be earlier. Paul's statements are too explicit. To suppose that so fundamental a change in the whole significance of Christianity could be effected by 54 A.D., without protest from the Palestinian mother-church, is impossible. Paul's representation of the primitive and common gospel as a gospel of the "atonement," the expiatory "reconciliation" (*καταλλαγή*), must be accepted.² The supposition

¹ For a few observations (admittedly incomplete) on the use of the title *παῖς θεοῦ* see Bousset, *Christos Kyrios*, pp. 19 ff., 85-89.

² The force of the conception must not be weakened by modernizing interpretations of the sense, as when, e.g., stress is laid upon the fact that in the Pauline expressions it is not God, but "the world" which is "reconciled." The supposed implication that Paul does not share the historic Jewish conception of a divine "wrath" which must be "propitiated" is fallacious. Reference to Thayer's *Lexicon*, or to any philological standard, will show that *καταλλάσσειν* is construed regularly with the accusative of the one "received into favor." Thus even Rom. 5:10 does not mean, "Abandon your hostility to God," but, "Accept the tokens of His changed attitude toward you."

that Paul and those whom he represents could have foisted into the observance of the Lord's Supper (!) the very central words of institution, "my body," "my blood that is given for you," or could have perverted them to a meaning foreign to their original purpose, is critically inadmissible. As well maintain Hellenistic invention of the rite itself! One must either admit that Jesus himself did attach atoning value to the martyr death which he foresaw but would not flee, or take the desperate resort of the pseudo-critics who eliminate I Cor. 11:23-27 as an "interpolation."

How, then, account for the extraordinary disappearance from synoptic tradition of all save vanishing remnants of the whole "gospel of the *καταλλαγή*" along with both title and concept of the Suffering Servant who makes "propitiation" (*ἱλασμός*) for the sins of the people?

It is admitted that the doctrine could not have been advanced by Jesus in his public teaching in Galilee, nor probably even to his intimates before the time when he stood under the immediately impending shadow of the cross. It may well be assumed to have found its first explicit utterance in the supreme parable of the broken bread and outpoured wine. But the very solemnity of the occasion, and the effort to impress the meaning by symbolic agency, whether we accept the words, "Do this in memory of me," as authentic or not, are proof enough of the momentous burden of significance the utterance was intended to convey. Still we cannot think it strange that evangelists whose main purpose is to prove the divine mission of Jesus by his ministry of healing and glad tidings, and to perpetuate his precepts of a higher righteousness than that of the scribes, should pile up the anecdotes of this ministry as they have done, leaving it to the Ephesian evangelist to find room for the atonement doctrine (unhistorically enough) as part of the public teaching of Jesus, and even of John the Baptist. The surprising thing is that nothing should remain in connection with the story of the cross and of the resurrection and so little even in the institution of the memorial rite of what to Paul and those whom he represents was the very "embassage of God" (II Cor. 5:18 f.).

The contrast is largely a contrast of emphasis. For the age of Peter and Paul the death and resurrection of Jesus are the supremely

important things. His career is not, to their mind, marked by "greater works" than such as accompany the apostolic message in present and actual "gifts of the Spirit." His precepts, as understood by them, are simply a higher and truer interpretation of all that Moses and the prophets had spoken. The sub-apostolic age was much less vividly conscious of its own endowment with spiritual gifts, whether of knowledge or of power. Its first resort against the moral laxity which now threatened to invade the church was "the commandments given by the Lord to the faith." As proof of his authority and the certainty of the promised kingdom, it offered not so much its own spiritual gifts as the confirmation given to "them that heard" by "signs and wonders and manifold powers." Synoptic tradition is framed to meet these needs of the sub-apostolic age. In Mark the second need preponderates, in Matthew the first. Luke attempts historic comprehensiveness with an apologetic aim. All this must be taken into consideration. But something more than a mere difference of emphasis is required to explain why writings so nearly contemporary as Hebrews, First Peter, and Revelation of John on the one side, and the Synoptic Gospels on the other, should display the contrast we have observed in respect to "the gospel of the *καταλλαγή*."

Synoptic tradition, even in Mark, is in the main of Palestinian origin and character. Recent philological research has demonstrated its derivation in large part from sources composed in the Semitic languages. This applies in marked degree to the sources of Luke as far as Acts 15:35, as well as to those of Matthew and Mark; while our first evangelist, though composing a Greek gospel, displays Palestinian influence more strongly than any other. And Palestinian influence in this period was certainly reactionary, so far as the legalistic and mystical conceptions of religion are concerned. Both Matthew and Luke are keenly sensitive to the dangers of antinomian interpretations of the Gospel.³ In Luke the doctrine of grace and forgiveness is prominent (as against very

¹ Papias fragment.

² Heb. 2:3 f.

³ For Matthew the statement scarcely requires illustration. Consult the Greek Concordance *s.v. ἀνομία*. For Luke cf. the attachment of 14:25-35 after the parable of the Great Supper (similar treatment in Matt. 22:11-14) and 16:10-12 after that of the Unfaithful Steward. Note also Luke 16:17 f. after the "hard saying" in vs. 16.

meager use in Matthew), but the condition of this divine grace is solely *repentance*; all trace of connection with the atoning death of Jesus disappears, as we have seen, even from the passion story and the apostolic preaching after Calvary.

Sensitiveness to the moral dangers of a doctrine of vicarious retribution is a possible explanation of the data in hand, and it is one which no more lacks parallels in ancient than in modern times. It appears in Paul's protest (Rom. 3:8) against the slanderous misrepresentation of his gospel of divine forgiveness, and most probably explains the caution noted by scholars in his avoidance of the preposition *ἀντί* in speaking of the vicarious suffering of Jesus. Paul, at all events, has left no opening to ancient or modern objectors in his presentation of the doctrine, to assert that it savors of injustice, or gives a loose rein (*ἀφορμή*) to sin. The same can hardly be said of the cruder statement in Mark 10:45 (*ἀντί πολλῶν*). To Paul close reasoning on the issue of solidarity versus individual responsibility before the divine tribunal could not be a novelty. In the days of the exile Ezekiel had taken up the cudgels for strict individual accountability against a popular cry, "The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge," by which was meant: The calamities of our generation are a punishment for the sins of our fathers.¹ On the other hand, the contemporary epic of Job indignantly denies the inference from Ezekiel's individualistic creed that calamity can be taken as proof of individual wrongdoing. A greater than either Ezekiel or the poet of Job finds the solution of Israel's unmerited calamities in the songs of the Suffering Servant, Jehovah's missionary to the heathen world, martyred for the redemption of the Gentiles. Finally, Wisdom of Solomon distinguishes between chastisement and penalty.

The doctrine of the vicarious suffering of Israel was not lost, even in Palestine, after the exile. Naturally enough, we find it perpetuated in the Alexandrian branch of Judaism, where Wisdom of Solomon depicts again the figure of the martyred Servant-Son,²

¹ Cf. Lam. 5:7.

² In Wisdom of Solomon the titles *παῖς* and *υἱὸς θεοῦ* are applied to Israel interchangeably. The picture of the martyred "Servant" of God in Sap. 2:13-20 is so close to the Christian idea as to have obtained for Sap. a place of honor in the Christian canon (*Murat. Frgm.*) and even direct employment in Matt. 27:43. The Suffering Servant of Deutero-Isaiah and the kindred Servant Psalms (e.g., Ps. 22) is here depicted

rather than on Palestinian soil, where Seleucid persecution turned the glowing missionary ardor of Deutero-Isaiah into a burning zeal for the defense of the light of the law against its threatened extinction. But even Apocalypse of Baruch still echoes the Isaian doctrine that "God scattered Israel among the Gentiles that He might do the Gentiles good." Neubaur and Driver, Ottley and Delitzsch, Dalman and Schechter, have proved that the rabbinic doctrine of *Zachuth Aboth* (literally "Justification for the sake of the Fathers") is no modern development of Judaism. On the contrary, the sense of national solidarity, of divine grace bestowed unmerited on a sinful people out of regard for the merit and sufferings of righteous forefathers, has triumphed, generation after generation, against even the rigid and watchful ethical individualism of the scribes and their successors, the Tannaim, founders of talmudic, anti-Christian, Judaism.

Scribal and rabbinic legalism could efface from Judaism nearly all traces of the Isaian doctrine of vicarious suffering, though singularly enough it has permitted the Targum rendering of Isa., chap. 53, as applying to the Messiah (!) to survive. Pharisean hatred of the Maccabees and their Sadducean following could expunge almost every line of the most glorious page of Jewish history. But it could not altogether destroy the popular observance of the Memorial Day of the Jewish martyrs who gave their lives for the restoration of Torah and temple. The great Day of Atonement now marks the culmination of Judaism, the beginning with purified soul of the ritual New Year. But Hanukka, the feast of Purification and Rededication of the Temple, the feast of Renewal (*ἐγκαίνια*), or, as our version renders it, "of Dedication," still remains, even in talmudic Judaism, the monument of an older feast of the New Year,¹ whose central thought was the Atonement

in colors modified by the author's Platonism (cf. the martyred wise man in Plato's *Rep.*). Sap., chaps. 2-5, should be read as a whole in comparison with Isa., chaps. 52-53. Sap., chaps. 15-18, deals with the disciplinary function of suffering as illustrated in Israel's desert wanderings in contrast with the punitive, in this case of Egypt and Canaan.

¹ It was celebrated on December 25 (25th of Chislev) the Julian (and pre-Julian) winter solstice. On the relation of this to John 10:22-11:53 see the forthcoming article in the *Hibbert Journal* entitled, "The Feast of Lives given for the Nation."

made by the martyrs, so that God was "propitiated" and temple and Torah restored. Even Pharisean reaction could not banish from Jewish homes the hero names of Judas and Simon and John, nor that of Eleazar-Lazarus, the Arnold Winkelried of Maccabean story, who "gave himself to deliver his people and to win for himself an everlasting name."¹ Least of all could it prevent the Hellenistic-Jewish celebration of the feast by Memorial-Day sermons, such as Second and especially Fourth Maccabees—sermons wherein the central theme is a doctrine of atonement (*καταλλαγή*) through the self-devotion of the martyrs, an atonement whereof an essential part is *their mediation by immediate resurrection and glorification in the presence of God*.

It is incredible that Jesus in the institution of the memorial bread and cup can have had in mind the Levitical ceremonial of the Day of Atonement. It is equally incredible that the resurrection faith which centered, not on the sepulcher nor the "earthly tabernacle" now "dissolved," but on a glorified Intercessor, standing "at the right hand of God," should have had no thought of the heroes who "gave both their body and life that God might be propitiated for His people." Comparison of the ritual of the goats is a late afterthought in Christian literature. Neither the Pauline writings nor the synoptists afford the slightest trace of it. In all his many references to the passion Paul uses no phrase suggestive of Levitical ritual, save that taken over from Isa. 53:10, of the Servant's life made "an offering for sin."² The fact that the earliest sources always stress the voluntary self-surrender (de-votion) of Jesus, together with his intercession "at the right hand of God," as the ground of its atoning value should suffice to prove that no mere animal sacrifice was before the mind of Jesus, nor the minds of those who received "by direct transmission" from the Lord (*ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου*) their sense of the meaning of the memorial rite. We have the direct testimony of Paul that the doctrine that "Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures" formed the very basis

¹ Ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ σώσαι τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ περιποιῆσαι ἑαυτῷ θρόνον αἰώνιον (I Macc. 6:44).

² Reference to the Passover sacrifice (I Cor. 5:7) was made unavoidable by the date of the passion. But Passover is rather a family rite than Levitical.

of the primitive common gospel. This is borne out by the fact that all his references to the ministry and passion of Jesus are colored by the phraseology of Deutero-Isaiah. The absence of direct appeal, on his part, to Isaian authority in argument¹ may be accounted for by the sharp division of opinion regarding the interpretation of the Songs, and Paul's knowledge that the primary meaning of the Servant is Israel.² We are in danger of forgetting that, as between the two wings of Christianity, Paul represents that element of gentile Christendom which stood nearest the Jewish, and that his most earnest endeavors are those of the peacemaker, removing occasions of offense, conforming his liberty to the scruples of the weak, becoming all things to all men, that the threatened schism might be averted. We may be sure that if he stood fast for the fundamental gospel of the *καταλλαγή*, he avoided all exaggeration of it, especially what could be "slanderosly reported" as breaking down the principle of individual moral responsibility.

We have therefore no need to resort to the psychological miracle of the infusion *de novo* of so startling a religious innovation as the doctrine of the *καταλλαγή* into the minds of Jesus' followers during the closing days (if not hours) of his ministry. Neither need we imagine an incredible foisting of it upon the primitive Christian community by late comers such as Paul or the Hellenists. We should have no hesitation in tracing it directly, as Paul does, to "the Lord" himself. For the conception of atoning self-devotion for the sins of the people, an atonement only completed by intercession in the immediate presence of God, was not, in Jesus' time, a novel idea. Little as we see of it in talmudic Judaism—and small wonder, after the bitter conflict with Christianity—it appears with unmistakable clearness as part of the popular faith in those sermons for the celebration of the feast of the Maccabean martyrs, which have come down to us in the Greek.³ The doctrine is a

¹ As in I Pet. 2:21-24.

² So Origen tells us all Jewish authorities were agreed in his day (*Contra Cels.* I, lv).

³ Talmudic literature has also its *piskoth* for Hanukka, or sermons for the Feast of Purification, Piskah I in *Pesikta*, no less than seven others in *Pesikta Rabbati*. These, however, partake of the usual character of midrashic Scripture interpretation passing *ad vocem* from Scripture to Scripture, and, while significant, require too extended elucidation for present use.

product of the heroic age which gave to Judaism both its martyrs and its faith in a life to come. The very word *καταλλαγή* is unknown in this sense to the Greek Old Testament down to the Maccabean books.¹ In Second and Fourth Maccabees both word and doctrine appear full-fledged. In II Macc. 7:32-38 the youngest and last of the seven martyrs addresses the tyrant:

We [the Hebrews] are suffering because of our sins. But if for a brief time our living Lord shows his anger for the sake of our chastisement and discipline, He will again be reconciled (*καταλλαγῆσεται*) to his own servants. . . . For these our brethren [the preceding martyrs], who have now suffered brief pain, are fallen heir under the covenant of God (*ὑπὸ διαθήκην θεοῦ*) to everlasting life. . . . Moreover I, in like manner with my brethren, deliver up both my body and soul on behalf of the laws of our fathers, entreating God soon to become propitious to the nation (*προδίδωμι καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν περὶ τῶν πατρίων νόμων, ἐπικαλούμενος τὸν θεὸν ἵλεων ταχὺ τῷ ἔθνει γενέσθαι*) . . . and that in me and my brethren (as thy victims) thou mayest stay the wrath of the Almighty which hath been justly brought upon our whole race.

In IV Macc. 6:27 it is the venerable Eleazar, patriarch of the band of martyrs, who offers the prayer of self-devotion:

Thou knowest, O God, that though I had it in my power to remain secure, I am dying in fiery torments on account of the law. Become propitious (*ἰλεως γενεῖ*) to thy people, being satisfied with the punishment which we endure on their behalf. Make my blood a purification (*καθάρσιον*) for them, and take my life as the price of theirs (*ἀντίψυχον αὐτῶν*).

At the end of his panegyric, after the "roll-call of martyrs" (16:20-25), and the epitaph he would inscribe upon the tomb of those "who looking unto God and enduring torture unto death obtained (divine) justice for the people" (17:10), the preacher closes his exhortation with a picture of the conflict in the arena between the tyrant's cruelty and the virtue and endurance of the martyrs:

On account of which they even now are standing beside the throne of God (*νῦν παρῆσθαι τῷ θεῷ θρόνῳ*) and live in eternal bliss. For Moses says (Deut. 33:3), "And all that are sanctified (i.e., dedicated, *ἡγιασμένοι*) are underneath thy hands." These, therefore, since they were sanctified on God's account (*ἀγιασθέντες διὰ θεόν*), are rewarded, not alone with this honor, but also by the invincibility of our nation before its enemies, and the punishment

¹ In Isa. 9:5 and Jer. 31:39 (LXX) the word means only "change."

of the tyrant, and the purification of the fatherland (*καθαρισθῆναι τὴν πατρίδα*); for they became as it were an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the nation (*ὥσπερ ἀντίψυχον γεγονότας τῆς τοῦ ἔθνους ἁμαρτίας*), and through the blood of those devout men, and the propitiation wrought by their death (*διὰ τοῦ ἱλαστηρίου τοῦ θανάτου αὐτῶν*), divine Providence, which before had inflicted evil on Israel, now saved it.¹

Is not this the very language of the gospel Paul "received"? Shall we close our eyes to this and look to Leviticus for an explanation of the rite handed down "from the Lord"? Shall we connect its message of self-devotion for the forgiveness of the people's sin, its doctrine of "self-sanctification" to make propitiation and intercession for the people, its proclamation of a risen Lord "even now beside the throne of God," its prayers offered in the name of "the beloved Servant" with a temple ritual no longer near to the hearts of the people? Or shall we not rather look to the religious life of the people of Jesus' time, their lofty heritage of endurance for the faith, their memorial of the martyrs who gave their lives for God's kingdom's sake, their feast of the "reconciliation" of God (II Macc. 1:5; 5:20), the feast of the "purification" of temple and nation?² With which shall we connect the Pauline gospel of

. . . our Savior Jesus Christ; who gave himself for us that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a people for an "own possession"?³

¹ IV Macc. 17:18-22.

² In II Macc. 1:18, 33, 36; 2:16, 19; 10:3, 5 the celebration is of the "Purification of the temple" or simply the "Purification." In IV Macc. 17:21 we have the true New Testament parallel, the "purification of the land and people."

³ Tit. 2:14; cf. *Hermas, Sim.*, V, 6, *καθαρίσας τὰς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ ἔδειξεν αὐτοῖς τὰς τριβους τῆς ζωῆς*.

CARLYLE'S CONCEPTION OF RELIGION

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Froude has told us that despite all the doubts which Carlyle entertained about historical Christianity he remained throughout life an uncompromising theist.¹ Numerous passages, especially from *Sartor*, from *Cromwell*, and from *Past and Present*, seem to confirm this judgment of the biographer. Yet it is worth our notice that so intimate a friend as John Sterling was by no means sure of the old prophet's belief in divine personality. Sterling was even distressed about it. So much that Carlyle said seemed to point in the orthodox direction, so large a part of his teaching lost significance if such belief were repudiated, so many of his onslaughts upon other thinkers involved the cruciality of this difference, that the churchman was impatient until his friend should have explicitly ranged himself "on the side of the angels." Yet, when pressed on the matter, Carlyle was wont to take refuge in ambiguities. He would speak with fervor of what this faith had historically effected; he would declare that without it no nation and no man had ever come to much;² he would even fiercely insist that it must be no mere theoretical assent to the theistic principle, no mere acquiescence in the idea of a Divine Mechanician who had made the universe and watched it go, but a constant trust in a particular Providence shaping human affairs and holding men responsible for their acts.³ In his interpretation of history the heroisms of the past had been shown by men who believed, not in the *Être Suprême* of Robespierre,⁴ but in the God of John Knox, not in the deity whom if He had not existed it would have been necessary for Voltaire to invent, but in the All-Seeing Judge of the English Revolutionists.

¹ *Carlyle's Life in London*, chap. xxvi.

² *Edinburgh Rectorial Address*.

³ Diderot; cf. *Sartor*, Book II, chap. vii.

⁴ *French Revolution*, Book XIX, chap. iv; cf. *Mirabeau*.

If Cromwell surpassed so far all kings who had reigned since then, he asks us: Was not the fact that Cromwell 'believed in a God' sufficient token of the gulf which separated him from them?¹ If Oliver's body had been hanged in chains on Tyburn, this was simply because he "had found the Christian religion inexecutable in this country";² if amid many similarities of personal endowment he was so much more to be admired than Frederick the Great, it was enough to point out that the one had grown up among the Puritans and the other among poor French *philosophes*, that the one had his gospel of life in the Bible, while the other had to rely upon "the withered Pontiff of Encyclopaedism."³

At the same time, for a writer who had so conspicuously both the courage and the candor of his convictions, Carlyle was strangely indefinite about his own faith. He says of Sterling, "I remember him insisting often, and with emphasis, on what he called a 'personal God,'" and excuses his own reticence on that point by pleading that "of such high topics it was not always pleasant to give account in the argumentative form, in a loud, hurried voice, walking and arguing through the fields or streets!"⁴ Sterling, he confesses, "did look hurt" at the "flippant heterodoxy" of the famous retort about Pantheism, "Suppose it were Pot-theism, if the thing is true."⁵ And in one of his many citations from the young curate's letters he breaks off just where the embarrassing theme is resumed: "There follow now several pages on 'Personal God,' and other abstruse or indeed properly unspeakable matters; these, and a general Postscript of qualifying purport I will suppress."⁶

Sterling indeed could have produced some colorable reason for uncertainty as to the sense which Carlyle attached to the religious language so constantly upon his lips. Why, for example, did he so cherish that enigmatic phrase of *Faust* about the world as the living visible garment of God? Why should he have compared the secret of man's being to the secret of the Sphinx, "a riddle that he cannot rede, and for ignorance of which he suffers death"?⁷ What did he

¹ *Past and Present*, Book III, chap. xiv.

⁴ *John Sterling*, Book II, chap. iii.

² *Loc. cit.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

³ *Frederick*, Book III.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Book II, chap. ii.

⁷ *Past and Present*, Book II; cf. *Sartor*, Book I, chap. viii.

mean when he spoke of "light-sparkles floating in the ether of deity"¹ and of the earth, with its noisy crew of a Mankind, as "fading like a cloud-speck from the azure of the All"?² Why his mournful cry that of the Whence and the Whither of humanity "Sense knows not, Faith knows not; only that it is through Mystery to Mystery, from God and to God"?³ How did he understand his own statements that a religious concept is at best symbolic, that the being of God is not only out of Space but out of Time, and that the metaphysical search for ultimates must end in negation?⁴ In truth there are materials, if we look them out, in Carlyle, for constructing a system not very unlike that of Spinoza; but in doing so we must ignore or explain away many passages of a very different type. It was against this incoherence that Sterling protested. Wholly apart from religious motives or interests, he was surely right in urging Carlyle to put two and two together. It was a matter of intellectual consistency, of seeing the upshot of one's own opinions, of drawing the inference to which a scheme of thought is by implication committed.

To the present writer it appears that the ambiguity in question was not due to any indecisiveness in the philosopher's own mind, still less to any wish for concealment or disguise of his spiritual attitude. It was due rather to two very different causes. In the first place, Carlyle was obsessed by the idea that the language of English theologians was permeated by "cant," and it was eminently distasteful to him to adopt as his own any traditional formula which they employed. This was one of his real foibles. Just as he loved to speak of hell in gross material terms, apparently because the word was out of fashion with the polite Broad Church, so I suspect he was shy of such phrases as "the personality of God," because it was used with so little reflection in ecclesiastical circles. Yet we should stultify the purport of half his writings if we supposed him to disbelieve in that for which this phrase stands. In the second place, his immense intellectual acquirements did not include any severe training in metaphysic; but he had an irresistible

¹ *Sartor*, Book I, chap. viii.

² *Death of Goethe*.

³ *Sartor*, Book III, chap. viii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Book III, chap. iii; Book I, chap. viii; cf. *Characteristics*.

impulse, especially when talking theology, to play with metaphysical language. He was somewhat like a layman who ventures on the terminology of lawyers and finds that he has implied far more than was in his mind. We shall thus do him an injustice if we attribute to him all those opinions in this abstract sphere which might reasonably be inferred from his formulae if such had been used by a technical metaphysician. I shall try to make this clear by collecting and examining some of the more important passages from which a general view of his cosmic outlook may be obtained.

I

On the subject of religious origins Carlyle's doctrine, though in many respects it is now a commonplace, was very notably ahead of his time. He has no patience with fraud theories—"a most mournful hypothesis, that of quackery giving birth to any faith, even in savage men."¹ The greater faiths, at all events, had lived far too long for an explanation like that. A Cagliostro might prosper for a day, but his run would be short, like that of a forged banknote.² Ere long "Nature will proclaim with terrible veracity that forged notes are forged." Conscious imposture was the key to a religion, not in its period of strength, but in its period of decay; the unfailing test was that of time. Grand Lamaism itself must have had a kind of truth in it. Mohammedanism had been the life-guidance of one hundred and eighty millions of men for twelve hundred years; who could believe that it was grounded on nothing but so much spiritual legerdemain?³ "There is no edifice that stands long but has got itself planted here and there upon the basis of fact; and being built in many respects according to the laws of Statics."⁴

The conception of early cults as the outcome of "allegorizing" appeared to Carlyle much better, although—when taken as the whole account of the subject—quite insufficient. It was better, in that it recognized the religious impulse as a genuine experiential

¹ *Heroes*, Books I and II.

² Cf. *French Revolution*, Book II, chap. iii: "The first of all Gospels is this, that a lie cannot endure forever."

³ *Hero as Prophet*.

⁴ *Latter Day Pamphlets*, No. III.

fact, and it contained the eternal principle that all expression in such a field must be symbolic. The personifications of primitive fable shadowed forth under picturesque image what men once sincerely felt about the universe in which they found themselves. But what is to us a figure must have been to them a literal truth. It was absurd to suppose, for example, that one generation deliberately personified the bright sky, and that a later generation mistaking this metaphor for fact, came to conceive Zeus, the actual father of gods and men. To argue thus involved anachronism; it was not merely to *pervert*, it was to *invert* the real movement of thought.¹ Allegory does not precede, it follows the belief that is allegorized. One might as well assume that Christianity did not give birth to *The Pilgrim's Progress*, but that *The Pilgrim's Progress* gave birth to Christianity. Conscious symbolizing was relatively late; "the Faith had to be already there, standing believed by everybody, of which the Allegory could *then* become a shadow."

Carlyle finds the original datum in the mingled feelings of wonder and awe. The religious mind was the mind of a little child, and it was eternally true that only they who become as little children can enter the Kingdom of Heaven. Like Plato's Cavemen when they looked out upon the sun, our ancestors were dazzled and overwhelmed by the mystery of things. More fortunate than we, they saw Nature face to face, with no disguise of learned concepts to veil from them their own ignorance. Science had not yet deluded them into thinking that they knew all about it, and if we have ceased to share their amazement, we owe this far less to our superior insight than to our superior levity. Did not the higher type of scientific man even yet recognize that the poet, the painter, the intuitive genius, have a vision into the heart of reality which is denied to him? In rare moments of inspiration a few of us could still, thank God, recover the simplicity of the past. The universe becomes again godlike to us. We realize "the great, deep, sacred infinitude of Nescience, on which all science swims as a mere superficial film."²

This point is further developed in that section of *Sartor* which expounds "Natural Supernaturalism." To what profit had we

¹ *Heroes*, Book I.

² *Ibid.*

elaborated our knowledge of mechanical causation, if it has deceived us as to the ultimate Inscrutabilities? We had become like the minnow which is familiar with the crannies and pebbles of his native creek, but understands nothing of ocean tides and trade winds and monsoons by which, in the end, the creek itself is regulated. Why plume ourselves on having found out that Nature is an inflexible system, while we have still so faint an inkling of the principles upon which the system rests? Since Kant's day our very fundamental notions of space and time had become exposed as mere accidents of the human point of view. In vain do we contrast the natural with the miraculous; the distinction is only relative; to the king of Siam anyone who knows how to use an air-pump can work miracles at will. Our utmost success lies in the mere rearrangement and manipulation of forces whose essence is unknown to us; our true wisdom is but a *docta ignorantia*, and our fitting attitude a renewal of the early worship.¹

There is much in this way of thinking which recalls the spiritual position of Wordsworth. Carlyle, like the poet, would rather have been a pagan suckled in a creed outworn than have been brought up in a scientific school which dissolved the divine in mechanical explanations. He too envied the insight of the little child

on whom those truths do rest
Which we are toiling all our lives to find.

In an age of Benthamite illumination no one valued less than he that material progress which had involved a darkening of the soul. Indeed, passage after passage of our philosopher's eloquence might be taken as epitomized in that memorable stanza:

There was a time when meadow, grove, and stream
The earth and every common sight
To me did seem
Apparelled in celestial light,
The glory and the freshness of a dream.
It is not now as it has been of yore;—
Turn wheresoe'er I may,
By night or day,
The things which I have seen I now can see no more.

¹ Sartor, Book III, chap. viii.

But his conviction of the limits of science did not lead Carlyle, as it led Spencer, into a cult of the Unknowable. *Sartor* is not open to Mr. Bradley's reproach against *First Principles*, that of having asked mankind to worship the Absolute, without having first shown that the Absolute has any worshipful quality. Unreasoning awe is only the first stage; the features of mature religion could not appear until man's wonder at external phenomena had passed into the deeper wonder at the workings of his own mind and especially at the tumults of his own conscience. Carlyle quotes with admiration the saying of S. Chrysostom that the true Shekinah is man himself.¹ Herein lay the distinguishing feature of all the higher religions. The mainspring was no longer in the consciousness of *natural* but in the consciousness of *moral* processes. For the earliest folk, viewing the universe as itself godlike, all the parts were equally divine; thus in the Scandinavian sagas homage alternates between protecting gods and destroying *jötuns*. These poor Norsemen had not yet appreciated the awful distinction of *Thou shalt* and *Thou shalt not*. Once that turning-point of thought had been passed, it was not the mere magnitude of the forces surrounding him, it was rather the conflict of right and wrong raging ceaselessly within him which became for man a token of the supernatural order. To the Jew the imperative of duty was such as he could explain only through the formula "Thus saith the Lord." To the Arab—whose Mohammedanism is but a confused Christianity—it was *Islam*, "We must submit to God." "Mark the difference between Paganism and Christianity; one great difference. Paganism emblemized chiefly the operations of Nature; the destinies, efforts, combinations, vicissitudes of things and men in this world; Christianity emblemized the law of human duty, the moral law of man. One was for the sensuous nature . . . the other was not for the sensuous nature but for the moral. What a progress is here, if in that one respect only."²

At a superficial glance Carlyle may seem to be constructing what is called in theological textbooks "the ethical argument for theism." But nothing was farther from his mind than to contribute to the literature of apologetics. Natural theology was his

¹ *Heroes*; cf. *Sartor*, Book I, chap. x.

² *Ibid.*

bête noire. Not even Albrecht Ritschl had a more profound scorn for theoretical deductions of deity. Thus in *Characteristics* he tells us that vital religion has been replaced by "Discourses on Evidences, endeavouring, with smallest result, to make it probable that such a thing as religion exists." A probable God! A God whom tiny human creatures might *prove* to their own moderate satisfaction—such a result would be worthless, even if it could be reached. In a letter to Emerson he exclaims against "faint, possible theism, which I like considerably worse than atheism." This "which now forms our common English creed cannot be too soon swept out of the world." Diderot and Voltaire were like one who with painfully constructed sulphur match and farthing rushlight is seeking for the sun. Marks of design and the like, while suited to the devout meditation of him who already believes, were powerless to convince him who does not. Knowledge in this sphere must come, if it comes at all, "not by glimmering flint-sparks of Logic, but by an infinitely higher light of intuition, never long by Heaven's mercy wholly eclipsed in the human soul."¹

Thus, not through reasoning, but intuitively, does the conviction of right and wrong within the breast lead to faith in a Divine Ruler of the world. We are all of necessity animistic; Nature is for every man the phantasy of himself.² Belief in the paramount authority of conscience, belief that the distinction of good and evil is something which we did not make and cannot alter but to which we must reverently bow—this inevitably expresses itself as belief in God. Worship is, etymologically, just the recognition of worth; it is a value-judgment. When the Norsemen deified Odin, no doubt they selected that hero from among themselves whom they "admired without limit"—thenceforth he stood for them in the place of God. Let us not smile at such fancies; there is a deep truth in them. Let us rather ask whether we ourselves cannot do the same thing "a little more wisely."³ Is not such hero-worship still man's noblest attitude? Do we not see it in Christianity itself?

¹ Diderot; cf. *Frederick*, Book I: "Sublime *Theodicée* (Leibnizian justification of the ways of God) was not an article this individual had the least need of, nor at any time the least value for. 'Justify'? What doomed dog questions it then?"

² *Heroes*, Book I.

³ *French Revolution*, Book I, chap. ii.

And what is the Christian affirmation of a Divine Being but the faith that all power is moral, and that the laws of the universe express a moral purpose?

Carlyle never wearies of illustrating by historical examples this intimate connection between sensitiveness to duty and a theistic creed. Especially he loves to point such contrasts as that of Mohammed, to whom right and wrong were wholly incommensurable—the one high as heaven, the other low as hell—and Jeremy Bentham with his calculations of profit and loss, discovering after much addition and subtraction that the right “preponderates considerably.”¹ He speaks on the one hand of Oliver Cromwell—a phenomenon which “this poor slumberous canting age” can no longer understand—striving to make his acts of Parliament “emblems of God’s Law Book,” and on the other of Voltaire, the prince of *persiflage*, “for whom life and all that pertains to it has at best but a despicable meaning.”² He finds combined in his own time the belief that the universe is not divine, but merely a machine, and the “indistinct notion that right and wrong are not eternal but accidental, and settled by uncertain votings and talkings.”

II

What features specially arrest one’s attention in this treatment of religious phenomena?

1. In demanding a single explanatory principle for all forms of worship our author may be compared with modern “psychologists of religion.” But he has kept quite clear of one seductive fallacy by which work in this field is often beset, and which has made the “scientific” results of even such a writer as Professor James seem vapid and unreal to the concretely religious mind. Carlyle nowhere confuses the essence of religion with that abstract residuum which is left over when the individual differences of all cults have dropped out of the reckoning. He was far removed from that courteous latitudinarianism which affects to be a product of the very latest psychology, but which has really descended to us from the eighteenth-century deists. *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab*

¹ *Heroes*, Book II.

² *Cromwell*, Book V; cf. *Voltaire*.

omnibus, or *Securus iudicat orbis terrarum* was no test of truth for him. Nor did either of these become a better test when it was applied, as is the fashion today, to the feelings and emotions rather than to the intellectual beliefs of mankind. Carlyle was perhaps saved from this delusion by his horror, at least equal to Professor Bergson's, of applying mechanical and arithmetical measurement to the processes of life. For example, one could not imagine him admitting such an argument as that the expectation of personal immortality cannot be vitally religious because it is absent from Hebraism, or that the idea of a personal God must be among the religious accidents because it was not taught by Buddha. He would have held that both these tenets are to be judged, not by their title to ubiquity, but by their fitness to meet that spiritual need in which all religions take their rise. What Carlyle sought was not so much a common element *in* the faiths of the world as a common impulse *behind* them. As Teufelsdröckh puts it: "Let any Cause-and-Effect philosopher explain, not why I wear such and such a garment, obey such and such a law, but even why I am *here* to wear and obey anything."¹ So far, however, from attempting to discover the spiritual impulse of religion by eliminating the doctrinal content of religions, he knew that this impulse must reveal itself as doctrinally embodied. The embodiments, no doubt, all failed in some degree to clothe the spirit; but only through them could the spirit itself be identified.

2. It was in perfect harmony with this view, but in striking contrast to the method of the comparative psychologists, that Carlyle would interpret lower cults in terms of higher, not vice versa. This is all the more notable because few writers have been equally explicit in recognizing the unity of all faiths. To him it appeared axiomatic—however he may have fallen away from the principle in practice—that every religious mind should be able to understand every other. "A soul of man is like the souls of all other men, and everywhere in Nature deep calls unto deep."² He thought it the one disqualification for discussing any form of faith that the critic should himself be faithless. Thus Voltaire's chief

¹ *Sartor*, Book I, chap. v.

² *Historical Sketches*, "The Colchester Prophets."

offense in the eyes of Carlyle was that of having "intermeddled in religion without being himself in any measure religious."¹ In short, he had to an intense degree that human sympathy which Matthew Arnold has so well expressed:²

Children of men! the Unseen Power whose eye
For ever doth accompany mankind,
Hath looked on no religion scornfully
Which man did ever find.

That man must still to some new worship press
Doth in his eye ever but serve to show
The depth of that consuming restlessness
Which makes man's deepest woe.

But his impartial respect for every sincere worship did not lead him, as it might easily have done, into that foolishness which has been committed by modern psychologists through their equally impartial contempt. He would not, for example, "explain" the faith of Fichte by putting together in a more complicated and ingenious system elements which he had collected from a study of the cult of Odin and Thor. He would have thought this as absurd as to attempt an explanation of modern mathematics through the first efforts at figuring by tribesmen of the woods. If religion is a genuine activity of the human spirit, there is no ground to doubt that it will be equally progressive with other activities, and that in time features will disclose themselves of which the germ can scarcely be recognized at an earlier period. But if the continuity is to be recognized at all, Carlyle saw that the interpreter must proceed backward and not forward. As Plato would have put it, we may decipher the inscription when we get it in large letters though it baffles us in small. As we study the religious *nisus* in its most mature and intelligent expression, we obtain the clue by which the first feeble gropings become significant and intelligible. "Does not the Black African take of sticks and old clothes . . . what will suffice; and of those cunningly combining them, fabricate for himself an Eidolon and name it Mumbo-Jumbo, which he can henceforth pray to, with upturned awestruck eye, not without

¹ *Voltaire*.

² *Progress*.

hope? The white European mocks; but ought rather to consider, and see whether he at home could not do the same thing a little more wisely."¹

3. It is surely a high merit in Carlyle that he should have insisted with such ringing emphasis upon the *moral* element as the differentia of the higher religions. One need not here enter into his general view of morality further than to recall his insistence upon the *incommensurable* character of good and evil. In fierce protest against Bentham and the Utilitarians he laid it down that right conduct differs from wrong, not in the quantity of pleasure it produces, either to the agent himself, or to anyone else, not in any sort of consequences which may be calculated by an emotional arithmetic, but in the intrinsic nature of the act itself. He was a Puritan of the Puritans. He loved Kant's comparison of the majesty of the moral law to that of the starry heavens,² even as he loathed the "profit-and-loss morality" which would balance alternatives, "grind out Virtue from the husks of pleasure," and manufacture a rectitude by ingeniously co-ordinating the acts of a community of rogues.³ To him the path of duty was always clear, calculated goodness was really vice, and every casuist was anathema. When he told his anxious mother, a Presbyterian of the stern Burgher sect, that his views of life were the same as hers, varying only in the mode of expression, he seems to have said neither more nor less than the truth.⁴

No doubt he pushed his theory of intuitions much too far. A glance at his doctrine of punishment in the second article of *Latter Day Pamphlets* should be a warning to those who think that consequences can be ignored in a moral decision. But he was surely right in his insistence that a theistic view of the world is not readily adopted by those who look upon the difference of right and wrong as a mere contrast of *feeling*. Its natural affinity is with the ethic which rests upon reason. The sensitive nature is infinitely variable, and one man's

¹ *French Revolution*, Book I, chap. ii.

² *Historical Sketches*, Book II, chap. xxii.

³ *Sartor*, Book II, chap. vii.

⁴ Froude, *Early Life of Carlyle*, chap. v.

emotion cannot, as such, claim authority over another's. If the moral judgment is to be objective in the same sense in which science is objective, it must rest upon rational axioms as to "the good" and "the bad." And the objectivity of such axioms almost ceases to be intelligible unless the world-process is conceived as controlled by a Moral Will. The historical development of systems in our own day has gone far to confirm Carlyle's conviction that belief in God is intimately bound up with belief in conscience as a function, not of the feelings, but of the reason.

III

Pantheism is a word whose vagueness constitutes what Mr. Bradley would call a "philosophical scandal." Yet when Sterling used it as a reproach against Carlyle, we have a fairly clear idea of what he had in mind. To the churchman God was a being who feels and wills, who forms purposes, who takes a side in the human struggle, who hearkens to prayer, who cares for the individual rather than for the mass, and who will bestow upon each of his faithful children the life everlasting. Was the deity in *Sartor* all this?

On that sultry dog-day in the *Rue Saint-Thomas de l'Enfer* Teufelsdröckh reached the spiritual crisis through which he was led to his "Evangel." "The Universe is not dead and demoniacal, a charnel-house with spectres; but godlike and my Father's."¹ On divine fatherhood all Christianity rests. But Carlyle goes on to perplex us with phrases that are very remote from such a conception. How, for example, can a deity who is out of time be said to form purposes, or to hear prayers? From what sort of religious standpoint does it become of no consequence whether the individual is happy or unhappy, provided the cosmic scheme is allowed to fulfil itself? In what sense of the word "just" is it possible to say that "in this Universe there is nothing else than justice"?² How exactly is "all contradiction solved" in the *Everlasting Yea* "Love not pleasure; love God," especially when we are told that the God

¹ *Sartor*, Book II, chap. ix.

² *Past and Present*, Book III, chap. iv; cf. *French Revolution*, Book II, chap. i.

³ *Ibid.*, Book I, chap. ii.

in question reveals himself sufficiently through the facts of the natural order? What species of immortality is that which we reach by simply discovering that time itself is unreal?¹ And is not perhaps the gravest doubt of all suggested when we remember that Goethe was Carlyle's prophet of the faith, and that the difficulties of the Christian religion were to be elucidated from *Faust*?

But we can very easily press these objections too far. Like the Calvinists whom he admired, Carlyle was given to philosophizing his theology. It would be unfair, for example, to charge Calvin with disbelief in a moral God merely because he ventured a doctrine of election which we can now see to have been wholly incompatible with justice. It would be equally wrong to suspect "pantheism" in those Puritans who exalted divine sovereignty till they had really made the Most High the author of all evil not less than of all good, glorifying himself alike in the harvest and in the pestilence, responsible for the character of Caesar Borgia in the same sense as for that of St. Paul. It is a cardinal sin of present-day critics to attribute to a writer, not the opinions which he avows, but opinions which in their judgment are legitimate inferences from something he has said, even though these inferences may be expressly contradicted by what he has said elsewhere. Carlyle indeed spoke of this universe as being through and through just. So does many a pious clergyman, with an optimism like that of Dr. Pangloss in *Candide*, equally unaware that, if "the just" be that natural order which we see, then the moral consciousness of man is at once discredited, and with it that faith in a higher order of which conscience is our most authentic token. If our author spoke of God as timeless, and invoked for theological purposes the Kantian abstraction of "thing-in-itself," he used language which was once very much on the lips of orthodox Christians, and he can hardly be blamed for ignoring difficulties which English metaphysicians had scarcely even begun to point out. The theologians, too, were speaking against naïve anthropomorphism, reminding us how one day is with the Lord as a thousand years and a thousand years as one day. Dean Mansel, a generation later, advanced a doctrine with far more negative

¹ *Sartor*, Book III, chap. viii.

implications, when he distinguished in kind between divine morality and human: "In his moral attributes, no less than in the rest of his infinite being, God's judgments are unsearchable, and his ways past finding out."¹ But his critics, while arguing that Mansel was unaware of the upshot of this, never used it to prove that he was not genuinely a theist. And Mansel was a technically trained philosopher, to be tried by a far more rigorous standard than one applies to a general man of letters.

Carlyle must be his own interpreter, and innumerable passages of limpid clearness on this subject should more than discount a few vague metaphysical phrases. The whole tenor of his thought proclaims one whose faith in God was central. He looks wistfully back to the day when this creed was not even questioned, and forward—as to the world's only hope—to the day when it shall be regained. It is a far cry from *Sartor* to *The Loves of the Angels*, and the Chelsea prophet had little in common with Tom Moore; but one recalls the stanza:

When earth was nearer to the skies
Than in these days of crime and woe,
And mortals saw without surprise
In the mid air angelic eyes
Bending upon this world below.

For the transfigured return of such a time Carlyle never ceased to hope. "God is in heaven still," he exclaims, "whether Henry Brougham and Jeremy Bentham know it or not."

¹ *Bampton Lectures*, No. III.

THE MORAL DEITIES OF IRAN AND INDIA AND THEIR ORIGINS

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For the purpose of forming an idea of the language spoken by the Indo-Europeans before their dispersion, the various languages belonging to the Indo-European family have been compared. The religion of the Aryan tribe cannot be known except by a comparison of the data that we possess concerning the beliefs of those Indo-European peoples who seem to have best preserved the mentality and the customs of their ancestors. Consequently, scholars have investigated the beliefs of the Romans prior to Greek or Etruscan influence, the religious customs of the Pelasgian Greeks, the heathen survivals among Kelts, Teutons, and Slavs, and still more the religion of the Lithuanians before their conversion at the end of the Middle Ages, or the Indian poetry of the Vedas.

The inquiry has resulted in bringing forward some peculiarities that are common to all those religions, such as the essential features of the worship of the dead, a certain number of rites, of sacrificial customs, of myths, etc. As for the gods, the tempting identifications of the philologists of fifty years ago have generally proved to be unsatisfactory, and much disappointment awaits him who endeavors to discover the names of the primitive gods. The reason for that difficulty seems to be that the Indo-European gods in all probability had no real names but were simply designated by their functions. That is why Herodotus, for instance, says that the Pelasgians had given no names to their gods. This was very much the case with the Prussians before they were Christianized and Teutonized. A mediaeval author writes about them:

As the Prussians have little intelligence, they have not been able to know of God and therefore they are worshipping every creature instead of Him: like sun, moon, stars, thunder, birds, animals, even toads. They have special gods

for the fishing, the sowing, the reaping of crops, the breeding of cattle, and for every necessity of life in particular.¹

This statement is very interesting, for it closely agrees with what we know of the ancient beliefs of the Romans. The *indigitamenta* or collections of formulae used in praying to the deities on all occasions of life reveal to us the fact that Romans worshiped, outside of their main gods, gods of the house, of the family, of the fields, and many others taking care of human life, each one for his part. Such were Saturnus for the sowing, Pomona for the fruit, Robigus against smut-brand, Ops for the crops, Janus for doors, the deva Fessonia against fatigue, etc.

Similar beliefs are more or less clearly observable in the case of other Indo-European communities, so much so that it is no rash conclusion to assume that in Aryan times the divine power to a large extent was apportioned among a great number of occasional gods or special gods (*Sondergötter*), in which the people were worshipping the mysterious power of the divine as manifesting itself in all the phenomena of sky and earth. To be sure, not all the gods had the same importance among them. The gods of the sky, the "Heavenly Ones," enjoyed a decided prominence: thunder, dawn, morning and evening star, wind, sun and moon, fire and earth, and above all the god of heaven: Dyēus. The extraordinary importance of the latter is proved by the fact that his name, in contrast with those of the other deities, is found in practically all Indo-European religions: Dyāus Pitar in India, Ζεύς πατήρ in Greece, Jupiter in Italy, Ziu among the Teutons, where he is a war-god. Those heavenly ones (*devas, dei, δῖοι*) were spoken of and worshiped as powerful beings capable of bestowing prosperity on man or of destroying all his works or possessions. On that account they received sacrifices. Moreover, since they were thought to be the forces ruling the cosmic elements (elemental deities), they were doomed to play an important and often rather unedifying part in mythical stories meant to account for the phenomena of nature. Schrader² and Feist³ thus go so far as to deny to the heavenly ones

¹ Quoted by Schrader, "Aryan Religion," *Encycl. Relig. Ethics*, II, 31.

² *Op. cit.*, 49.

³ "Ausbreitung und Herkunft der Indogermanen," *Kultur*, p. 355.

any moral character whatever. Sin (Sanskrit *agras*, Greek *ἀγος*) was supposed to be punished by the souls of the ancestors and the gods, guardians of the tribe (*θεοὶ πατρώοι*), just as in Greece the Furies and Erinyes were held to be the avengers of the social crimes such as parricide, regicide, high treason, failure to bury one's relatives, etc. This is probably somewhat exaggerated, since in Homer, for instance, Zeus often appears as the protector of truth, hospitality, and other virtues. But it is, however, certain that the moral aspect of the gods was completely in the background among the attributes of the heavenly ones who were characterized by some function or activity in connection with natural phenomena. Now, as for the Indo-Iranians with whom we are more especially concerned in this article, Herodotus in his well-known passage, i. 131-40, says of the Persians that—

they count it unlawful to set up images and shrines and altars and actually charge them that do so with folly because they have not conceived the gods to be of like nature with men, as the Greeks conceived them. But their custom is to ascend to the highest peaks of the mountains and offer sacrifices to Zeus calling the whole vault of the sky Zeus; and they sacrifice also to Sun, Moon, Earth, Fire, Water, and Wind.

It would be difficult to imagine anything agreeing more closely with what is supposed to have been the Indo-European religion. The Persians at that time were thus worshiping the Heavenly Ones, the gods of the elements, and at their head Zeus, the god of the sky-vault; and those gods were impersonal.

But, of course, Herodotus is not the only witness whom we have to interrogate on the subject of Old Persian religion. The Great Kings, the Achaemenians themselves, have left us, on the rocks of Behistan or in Persepolis, long official inscriptions in cuneiform letters, in which they give a record of their own deeds. Now, when Darius makes a profession of faith he does not make himself a worshiper of Dyêus, as Herodotus would lead us to assume. He says: "Through the will of Auramazda, I am a king. Auramazda has given me a kingdom" (Bh. i. 5). Similarly Xerxes says: "Darius, my father, has built this house by the will of Auramazda. May Auramazda and the other gods protect me. . . . May Auramazda preserve all that has been founded by me or by my

father Darius" (Pers. C. 3). As they are the kings of kings (*xshâyatiya xshâyatiyânâm*), Auramazda is the greatest of gods (*mathishta bagânâm*). He is all-powerful by his will (*vashna*) and it is he who makes the nations into slaves or tributaries of Darius (Bh. i. 7) and gives victory in battle. He is the god who knows everything and provides for everything (N.R.A. 5). He is the great god who created this earth, who created the sky, who created man, who created man's happiness.¹ What is more important still, Auramazda is the ethical god *par excellence*. "O man!" says Darius, "despise not the decrees of Auramazda. Turn not away from the right path. Sin not!" (Dar. N.R.A. 6). Above all, he protects the truth. "O thou who shalt be king after me, keep thou from lying! Should a man be found to be a liar, deal thou with him severely, if thou desirest to keep thy kingdom whole" (Dar. Bh. Col. 4. 37, 40). "May Auramazda protect this land from the hostile inroads, from bad harvests and from lying" (Dar. Pers. 3). The usurpers of the crown, for instance the magian Gaumata (Smerdis), is "one that lies" (*adurujiya*), whereas Darius has received the help of Auramazda, "because," says he, "I have neither been a liar nor a tyrant" (Dar. Bh. Col. 4. 63, 64).

Thus in sharp contrast with all that we have previously seen of the Indo-European, including the Persian, religion, the ethical character of the god is now decidedly prominent and of a very high standard. Moreover, Auramazda stands so much above the other divine beings that we may almost think of monotheism. Besides Auramazda we hear in those inscriptions only of other very subordinate gods, the *aniya bagâha*. "May Auramazda with the other gods protect me," says Xerxes (Xerx. Pers. D. 3), and Darius calls those minor gods "gods of the clans" (Dar. Pers. D. 3). They are thus local deities. Among the gods subordinate to Auramazda, two deities, however, occupy a special position—Mithra and Anâhita, a god and a goddess once more, who had no place in the Indo-European pantheon of nature-gods.

With its strong moral character, its triad of personal deities, among whom Auramazda has a decided prominence, the religion of the Great Kings is distinctly superior to the Indo-European

¹ Dar. Alv. 1.

religion of the "Heavenly Ones," which, according to Herodotus' testimony, was current among the people of Persia. We may thus presume that the Great Kings were the supporters of another worship, the worship of Auramazda, which probably was practiced by a religious school in Iran, the teachings of which have been adopted by Darius and his nobility. Auramazda's religion is certainly no innovation of the Great Kings. The name of their high god has been found recently in an Assyrian inscription dating back to Assur-Banipal. It assumes there the form Assara Mazaash, which is nearer to the oldest form of the name Ashura Mazdâs. Asura is an old Indo-Iranian name denoting a divine being or a spirit endowed with a mysterious power (*maya*). As for the name Mazdâs, it means wisdom or science. We might therefore translate Asura Mazdâs by "the Wise Spirit."

Now, the worship of that great god has been preached in Iran with quite a special insistence by the renowned prophet Zoroaster or *Zarathushtra*. He probably did not create the figure of the Wise God which dates back to several centuries before the period when that sage is likely to have lived; but he endeavored to purify the worship of Asura Mazdâs or Ahura Mazdâh, as he says, from all that is not consistent with the high ideal of morality and the exalted conception of divinity embodied in Mazdeism. He also expelled the figure of Mithra from his creed. He ignores Anâhita and he makes Ahura Mazdâh the only god of the good creation and of the righteous, in opposition to the "Evil Spirit" who rules over evil creatures and the wicked. Mazdâh is the god of justice (Asha = Arta) who wants men to follow his path practicing good works, good thoughts, good deeds, rejecting the service of the "Lying Spirit," so that they can obtain the blessings that are the reward of the righteous in life here and hereafter.

In the beautiful hymns or rather versified preachings, the *gâthas*, which have been preserved for us as an invaluable deposit by the Parsees, Zarathushtra speaks of Ahura Mazdâh in still more exalted terms than do the Great Kings. He is the great creator of all kings, even of the divine. The prophet says:

This I ask thee, tell me in truth, O Lord: Who was the first originator and the father of the great law of order and justice [*asha*]? Who gave to the sun

and the stars their path? Who made the moon to wax and to wane? All that, O Wise God, I wish to know and other things besides. This I ask thee, tell me in truth, O Lord! Who gave a foundation to the earth and to the clouds so that they would not fall? Who created water and plants? Who gave swiftness to clouds and wind? Who is the creator of the good spirit? O Lord, this I ask thee, tell me in truth, Who is the benefactor who made light and darkness, who is the benefactor who made sleep and watch? Who made morning, midday, and night, that reminds the wise of their duties? [Ys. 44. 3-5.]

Thus one sees why Ahura Mazdâh is called the god of marvelous science and mysterious power. He is the most-knowing one, and the most-seeing one. No one can deceive him. He watches with radiant eyes everything that is done in open or in secret. No misdeed can escape him and he best remembers them all.

That omniscient protector of morality and creator with marvelous power, although he has a strong personality, has no anthropomorphic features. He is, however, spoken of as living in the heavenly realm, being brighter than the brightest—expressions that had, however, no material meaning for the prophet, although they might be borrowed from a somewhat more materialistic conception of his god in the *milieu* where he lived.

While Dyêus as the god of the sky is surrounded by gods who embody the forces of nature—moon, stars, wind, fire, earth, etc.—Ahura Mazdâh in the Zoroastrian system is at the head of a certain number of moral entities, representing divine attributes. Their personality is very fluid in the *gâthas*, where it is in many cases very difficult to discern whether we have to do with an abstraction or with the personification of an abstraction. Such are Asha, the Persian Arta, that appears so frequently in the names of the Persian noblemen; Arta—Khshayârshan (Artaxerxes, “who rules according to Justice”), Artahvarenah (Artaphernes, “who has the splendor of Justice”), etc. It is “justice” in the broadest meaning of that word: it is the moral law that rules over the world of the honest and religious people (the *ashavan* or *artavan*, “those who do not lie”), it is the law that moves all beings of the good creation according to some fixed rules.

Next to Asha there is Vohu-Manah, “the Right Mind,” or the religious mentality that brings men to the worship of God and to

the practice of virtue, and, as a consequence of it, to the possession of Mazdâh's blessings in this world and after. The reign or the rule of Vohu-Manah, procuring these blessings, is also personified under the name of Khshathra Vairya, the good rule to be chosen (by the righteous).

No less important is *Ârmaiti*, "Devotion," submission to the religious law of wise conduct. Next to her are Haurvatât, "Prosperity," and Ameretatât, "Immortality." There is a decided tendency in Mazdeism to assemble those beings, called Amesha-Spentas, "the Holy Immortal Ones," in a group of seven, but there is much discrepancy as regards the seventh one. Sometimes it is Ahura Mazdâh himself, sometimes Sraosha, "Discipline," sometimes one of the other more or less personified abstractions that are found in the *gâthas*, such as Ashay, "Reward," Tushnâmatay, "Silent Submission," and others. In this way Ahura Mazdâh is surrounded by a court of seven ministers in the same way as the Great Kings had seven great councilors.

The Amesha-Spentas are the bestowers of Mazdâh's graces and blessings. They are in the system of Zoroaster purely ethical entities. In later Mazdeism, however, we find that the guardianship of the world has been apportioned among them. Asha is guardian of fire, Vohu-Manah protects domestic animals, Khshathra Vairya is the genius of metals, Armaiti presides over earth, Haurvatât and Ameretatât are the genii of waters and plants. Moreover, their number is clearly placed at seven, including Mazdâh. Besides that heptad, the Persian creed knows of a triad that we have found in Darius' inscription: Auramazda, Mithra, and Anâhita (Am. 4. Am. 1). The two co-associates of Mazdâh have, it is true, completely disappeared from Zoroaster's doctrine, but they reappear in later times. Mithra, above all, is an important deity of the Iranians and, as is well known, his domain has been extended at one time into the whole Roman Empire as a god of soldiers. He is the god who watches the world from on high, who sees everything and knows the truth. He is the god of good faith and of contracts. The Persians used to swear by Mithra. He chastises the liars, those who break the treaties, and smites them in battle. The sun is his eye by which he sees all things. We know that in the Asiatic and

in the European cult of Mithra he appears as a sun-god. In the Avesta he is, above all, the god who protects truth and morality, and as such he is closely connected with Ahura Mazdâh in the post-gâthic religion. Anâhita, "the Spotless One," also called Ardvi Sûra, is the goddess of the beneficent and fructifying waters.

As is well known, the people of Iran are closely related to the Indo-Europeans of India. Before their separation they lived many years together, and not only are their languages very near to one another, but they have many religious ideas in common, although Zoroastrianism is a specifically Iranian creation.

There is no point, however, in which the similitude of ideas between the two peoples is more striking than in the beliefs concerning the gods protecting morality and the group of conceptions connected with them. Here also we have a triad. Instead of Mazdâh, Mithra, Anâhita, however, we find Varuṇa, Mitra, Aryaman. Aryaman is a very unsubstantial personality. He is not worshiped alone, but always in company with Mitra and Varuṇa. His name means "the Friend." He is a kind, beneficent deity, *helpful* to man. He also exists in the Avesta, under the name of Airyaman, and there also he is the helper, the benefactor of man, inasmuch as he is a healing god. His abode, like that of Varuṇa and Mitra, is "the bright mansion of the light." He is invoked for rain in Veda, RV. i. 141. 9: "By thee, O Agni, Varuṇa who protects law, Mitra and Aryaman, the gods who pour water in abundance are the winners."

Mitra is quite the same god as the Iranian Mithra. He is above all the god of contracts. The guest, when he is presented the welcome cake, says: "I look at thee with Mitra's eye." One remembers that Mitra's eye is the sun.' With his eye he is watching over the human tribe (RV. iii. 59. 6) and sees whether or not men are faithful to their pledges and to their oaths. The verb used for his activity is *yaj*, which is used also for the paying of debts. He and Varuṇa, so it is said in RV. ii. 27, are the gods who make men pay their debts.

But generally Mitra is invoked with Varuṇa. He makes a pair with that powerful god, the most exalted deity of the Indian pantheon in ancient times. They are the kings of heaven, the

sukshatra, "kings of a good rule." We read of their large, lofty, powerful kingdom, which reminds us of Ahura Mazdâh's good rule (Khshathra Vairya).

Their main task is to preside over the *rita*. Like Ahura Mazdâh and Mithra, they are the gods of *arta*, *asha* ("justice," "law"). The *rita* is also a law, a moral law. But, still more than the Persian *arta*, it is the law of the universe, the principle of order, the law of nature which causes the sun to rise and to set, the seasons to come back, rain to fall, the rivers to run, the fire to come out of the sticks rubbed against one another, so much so that Agni, "the Fire," is called "the son of Rita," "Ritajan," which shows a tendency toward personifying *rita*, in the same way as *arta* (= *asha*) is personified in Iran as the god of *rita*. Varuṇa holds the sun and saves it from falling, gives a way to the stars, exactly like Mazdâh, in the hymn quoted above. Thus Rita is a conception not very dissimilar from the Moira, which in Homer is the law that rules the world and is not only fate but also what is meet and right. The *rita*, being quite especially under the control of Varuṇa, is often identified with Varuṇa's will or command (*vrata*, *dhâman*). The commands of Varuṇa are constantly referred to. He is the god of commands, the *dhrita vrata* "whose commands are firm and immutable." Everything happens through his will. His commands are indefectible. This reminds us of the fact that it is by the will of Ahura Mazdâh that the kings of Persia conquer and that their enemies are destroyed. The commands of Varuṇa like those of Mazdâh have often a moral character. He and Mitra load the sinners with chains of guiltiness and sufferings. The guilty man has to pray to be released from his chains.

Aditi, "the Boundless One" or "the Freedom from Chains," is even conceived as the mother of Mitra, Varuṇa, Aryaman, who are therefore called the Âdityas, a name which eminently emphasizes their moral character. The hymns of the Rig-Veda addressed to Varuṇa and Mitra are full of allusions to those moral conceptions.

Çunaḥcepa, bound to three pillars invokes thee, O Âditya, O Varuṇa, O King, release him. . . . O Varuṇa, may our prayers and our sacrifice release us from thy wrath, of thee who art the King, wise Asura, release us from the chains of the sins that we have committed. May Varuṇa make loose

my chain above, my chain below, my chain in the middle, may we then, O Âditya, follow thy path and go to Aditi (the Freedom)" [RV. i. 24].

Observe how in that prayer Varuṇa is called "Wise Asura," which is the exact equivalent of "Ahura [i.e., Asura] the Wise [Mazdâh]."

The identity of the great moral god of India, Varuṇa, and of the god of Zoroastrians is thus undeniable, as his association with Mitra in both countries made it very probable.

If Varuṇa is the equal of Ahura Mazdâh in his moral character, he is curiously enough like him, surrounded by a group of spirits, and those spirits are abstractions like the Amesha-Spentas. Moreover, the group of the Âdityas, in its more ancient form, appears to have been constituted by seven gods. Varuṇa, Mitra, Aryaman are the first three, of course, but the four others are abstract entities of the same kind as Aditi. Among them we have Bhaga, "the Good Lot," or "the Distributor of Wealth," Aṃsa, "the Share," "the Portion," or "the Apportioner," *Daksha*, "Cleverness" or "the Clever," personification of the ability of the wise man that generates in him freedom from sin, so much so that Aditi is sometimes represented as being the daughter of Daksha, although she is generally supposed to be his mother. Such inconsequences point to the very unsubstantial personal character of those entities and show that the terms father and mother in such cases were originally allegorical. The abstract beings that occasionally are included among the Âdityas are more numerous and vary much like those in the group of the Amesha-Spentas. The number seven appears thus to be conventional. This accounts also for the facts that whereas the group of the Âdityas corresponds so closely with the group of the Amesha-Spentas, the members are not the same in India and in Iran. This is a mere chance, because the moral conceptions personified into Amesha-Spentas in Iran exist also in India and might as well have been introduced into the group. Not only does Rita correspond to Asha-Arta, but Aramati, "Devotion," "Piety" is Armaiti and Sarvatâti, "the Integrity" is Haurvatât. Khshatra, "the Kingdom of Varuṇa," is Khshatra Vairya, etc.

The Vedic religious system is put in close connection with the natural phenomena, in conformity with all that has been said about

the Indo-European religion. The efforts of the scholars have thus been directed toward the discovery of the part played by Varuṇa, Mitra, and the Âdityas in the cosmologic mythology in which the imagination of the Indians dwelt with complacency. They have proved vain to a great extent. The physical attributes of those deities are decidedly in the background. They are, however, not completely absent. It is evident indeed that, even more clearly than Mazdâh and Mitra in the Avesta, the Âdityas move in a bright atmosphere. They are surrounded by light and their connection with the sun is obvious. Have we not seen that the sun is the eye of Mitra with which he watches the world? Âditya has even become another name for the sun in the later Indian literature. The association of the Persian Mithra with the sun being clearer still, one may safely assume that, in his physical rule, Mitra is connected with the sun, or with daylight. As to Varuṇa, when his part in the natural drama is alluded to, he often appears with Mitra as a god of light, but he is occasionally brought in opposition to him, as being the god who presides over night. The Atharvaveda, which puts us in touch with the lower and more material beliefs of the old Indians, says that god at night becomes Varuṇa, at dawn he rises up in the form of Mitra. All that Varuṇa has concealed during the night Mitra at dawn will disclose.¹

On account of passages of that kind and because of the numerous statements of commentators saying that Mitra is for day and Varuṇa for night, Oldenberg assumes, not without probability, that since both are gods of light, and Mitra is obviously the sun or the sunlight, Varuṇa must in some way or another have been thought of in connection with the moon or the night sky. Only that connection is very much forgotten in the presence of the high moral character of Varuṇa in the school of priests, who made the hymns of the Rig-Veda. There had survived, however, a certain remembrance of it, above all in the more or less magical teaching concerning the gods, such as we find it in the Atharvaveda. The later development has emphasized with more complacency that material side of the divinity, just as it did in Iran for the material attainments of the Amesha-Spentas, which we have seen to be quite

¹ Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 191.

secondary. In Iran, on the whole, the material aspect of Mazdâh, of course, does not appear, but some passages of the Yasht, however, as Yt. 13. 3, seem to perpetuate some epithets referring to Mazdâh as a night-god: "When Ahura Mazdâh has put on his cloth made by the spirits and adorned with stars. . . ."

We find thus in Varuṇa=Mazdâh, Mitra=Mithra, deities in which the moral aspect is decidedly prevalent and makes up the personality and typical character of the gods: god of commands, god of justice. The material aspect, god of the sun and daylight, god of the moon and the night sky, are not completely absent but have no religious importance.

The situation of those moral gods with a somewhat faded connection with sun and moon is the more surprising, since the Indo-Europeans had already gods of sun and moon, as of other phenomena. The Indians, like all their racial brethren, had Sûryâ, "the Sun," and Mâh, "the Moon," in their pantheon, gods with no moral character at all (cf. Greek Ἡέλιος and Μήνη or Σελένη).

As supreme gods Mazdâh in Iran and Varuṇa in India are also in direct competition with the sky-god (Dyēus) who, Herodotus says, is among the people of Persia the supreme deity, but whose name does not appear in Mazdeism, whereas in the Veda, as Dyâus, "the Sky," he is a rather neglected deity.

The priests and the ruling classes both in Iran and in India have given up his cult for the worship of the great Asura, who is the god of science (Mazdâh), the god of supreme commands (Varuṇa), and for his companions Mitra and Aryaman, introducing an apparently ready-made moral religion to be fitted with the old Indo-European beliefs in which the worship of the gods ruling the natural phenomena was decidedly prominent. Even in the Veda the prayers to Varuṇa make a contrast with those addressed to other deities, in which one only alludes to the power, the strength of the gods, whereas the Indian's exuberant imagination emphasizes the part played by their gods in the phenomena of storm, lightning, rain, sunset, sunrise, etc.

Especially readymade are the groups of three and seven deities into which, as we have seen, the moral entities have been made to fit.

No wonder, thus, that Oldenberg¹ has come to the conclusion that the Âdityas are borrowed deities. He thinks that Mitra-Varuṇa being the sun and moon, the five other satellite deities are the five planets, and that we, then, have to do with a borrowing from the astral mythology of the Babylonians. He even more particularly thinks of a Sumerian influence, because in the religion of these people the moon-god had complete prominence.

The hypothesis of Oldenberg does not seem to have convinced the majority of Indianists, although Schrader has adopted it.² The reason for that skepticism is most likely that Oldenberg has contented himself with a general indication that the Âditya system recalls Babylonian or Sumerian conceptions, without endeavoring to find a more detailed and more complete correspondence between the beliefs in Chaldea and those in Iran and India.

Recent discoveries make it interesting to reconsider that very important hypothesis, and this is my purpose in this article.

In Boghaz-koi, a small Turkish village on the ruins of the capital of the king of the Hittites, an inscription has been found in which one easily recognizes the names of the gods Mitra-Varuṇa-Indra-Nāsatya.

They appear there in company with the Hittite gods: Shamash ("Sun"), Sin ("Moon"), Teshab ("Storm"). The association of Varuṇa with the moon-god and of Mitra with the sun-god is the more striking, since Indra, who seems to be put in parallelism with the storm-god, is known to be the Indian storm-god. As to Nāsatya, it is in India a name of the Aṣvins, or gods of the morning and evening stars, but it is also in Iran the name of an Ahrimanian spirit who is in close company with the daēva Indra. The association of the Aṣvins with Indra in the Veda is also very close. They are fighting with him against Vritra and receive like him the epithet "Vritra-slayer."

That discovery is of decisive importance for the history of the Indo-Iranian religion. It shows, at least, that in the second millennium B.C. the gods known by the Veda were already the gods of the Aryans.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 185, 194.

² *Enc. Rel. Eth.*, II, 13.

But this is not the only mention that we have of Indo-Iranian gods in the land of Babylonian culture.

Professor W. Max Müller¹ has deciphered on a stele of Palestinian origin the words "Mitra-shama" with the determinant of the ear. Ahura Mazdâh himself, as we have said, has been found to date back to about the same period, thanks to an inscription published by Scheil,² giving a long list of Assyrian gods.

Among them we find Assara mazaash (=Asura Mazdâs, the old form of Ahura Mazdâh) and, curiously enough, his name is immediately followed by the mention of the seven spirits of Heaven (Igigi="the Strong Ones") and the seven spirits of earth (Anunaki).

It is very interesting to observe that in Babylonia, in contrast with Iran and Indra, the number seven has a meaning. It is the accepted expression of the great number. We must, moreover, observe that the Igigi and Anunaki are supposed to concentrate all the spirits that exercise a power on the world,³ just as the Amesha-Spentas in their material aspects have been apportioned the leading of the various domains of creation.

The Babylonians had three groups of spirits. Beyond the Igigi ("Spirits of Heaven"), the Anunaki ("Spirits of the Earth"), there was a group of evil demons embodying all sufferings. The Iranian system has only two groups, the good ones and the evil ones, but this is due to its dualistic tendency. Not only is it true that the group of the seven spirits can be accounted for by the influence of the Babylonians, but the Chaldeans possessed the exact equivalents of the two triads that we have met with on Aryan ground. Of the two triads discoverable in the Babylonian religion, the first is Sin-Shamash-Ishtar, which corresponds to the Old Persian triad: Mazdâh (=Varuna)-Mitra-Anâhita. And, indeed, Ishtar, the Babylonian Venus, goddess of fertility, was, according to Herodotus, invoked as the heavenly Venus (*Θύραϊα*) by the Persians of his time. The Greek historians report also that Artaxerxes Memnon built a temple to 'Αποδῖτη 'Ανάιτις, i.e., Anâhita, the Venus of Persia.

¹ *Orient. Litt.*, L (1912), 252.

² *Rec. Trav.*, XIV, 100.

³ Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 185.

One remembers that Anâhita is the goddess of the fructifying water of heaven.

The second triad which is mentioned in Sargon's palace is Sin-Shamash-Ramman (or Adâd). This Ramman is an Assyrian deity. He is originally a god of lightning and storm, so much so that we may identify the Assyrian triad Sin-Shamash-Ramman with the Hittite triad mentioned above, Sin-Shamash-Teshab, Teshab being the Hittite storm-god. Now, Ramman is looked upon as the helper of mankind *par excellence*. One finds as a king's name Ramman nirari, "Ramman is my helper." He is specially associated with Shamash in his quality of god of justice, and, whereas Shamash gives victory like Mitra, he gives superabundance.¹ All this strikingly recalls to us the famous Aryaman, the third member of the Indian triad Varuṇa-Mitra-Aryaman.

The name Aryaman means "the Friend," and he is an eminently helping deity in Iran as well as in India, who, as we have seen, bestows abundance by pouring water. The phonetic similarity between Ramman and Aryaman renders it even possible that a popular etymology has functioned here, but we must not forget that Adâd was the most common name of that deity.

Thus we observe concerning Aryaman that not the material side—Aryaman indeed was nothing more than a storm-god with the Aryans—but the moral one has been borrowed by the Indo-Iranians. This is a very important conclusion that applies also to Varuṇa and Mitra.

The characteristic feature of Mitra's activity, as it is embodied in his name, is his part as a protector of right and law among men, a guardian of good faith and oath, a strict overseer of the actions of men, and a pitiless punisher of crime, but at the same time the friend of the good and their guide into the abode of the blest. Now Shamash, who is mainly a sun-god in Chaldea, in accordance with the marked actual tendency of the Chaldeans and Sumerians in their religion, is in Assyria above all an ethical deity.² He is for Ashurbanapal and Salmanasar the judge of the world who guides mankind aright, the lord of the law who judges according to unchangeable principles (cf. the Rita of the Aryans). He sees the

¹ Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

² *Ibid.*, p. 210.

wickedness of the enemies of the country and he helps to destroy them (exactly like Mithra). He is the king, like Varuṇa and Mitra, his power produces order and stability. He loosens the bonds of the imprisoned, as Varuṇa and Mitra release the sinner in the Vedic hymns, which we have quoted above. There is an extract of a beautiful hymn to Shamash quoted by Professor Morris Jastrow:

The law of mankind dost thou direct,
 Eternally just in the Heavens art thou,
 Of faithful judgment toward all the world art thou.
 Thou knowest what is right, thou knowest what is wrong.

 O Shamash! Supreme judge of heaven and earth art thou.
 O Shamash! on this day purify and cleanse the king,
 Release him from the ban.¹

Still more, Shamash is so emphatically the god of right and justice that he is represented as the father of Kettu, "Justice," and Mesharu, "Rectitude."² Now, this is very striking. Mithra is indeed accompanied in Iran by two satellites of the very same nature: Rashnu, a personification of justice, and Sraosha, the personification of obedience, rectitude, discipline (Yt. 16. 17; Yt. 13. 3, etc.). In the hymns (Yt. 10. 41) addressed to Mithra in the Avesta we read indeed: "Mithra strikes fear into them; Rashnu strikes a counter-fear into them; the holy Sraosha blows them away from every side towards the two Yazatas, the maintainers of the world."

This can hardly be a coincidence. Moreover, the very existence of those personified moral abstractions in Assyrian religion around Shamash and Sin is so much in the spirit of the Avesta that it seems very probable that the tendency toward personifying such entities as satellites of the god of justice originated in that *milieu*.

Now, the comparison between Sin, "Moon-God," and Varuṇa is no less instructive. The moon-god has attained a high position in the Babylonian pantheon. The moon appears indeed as the guide of the stars and the planets, the overseer of the world at night. From that conception a god of high moral character soon developed. Not only are the planets his children, but the spirits

¹ Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

² Zimmern, *Encycl. Relig. Ethics*, II, 311.

are subservient to his will. (This reminds us of the will of Varuṇa and of his position at the head of the Âditya spirits.) He is an extremely beneficent deity, he is a king, he is the ruler of men, he produces order and stability, like Shamash and like Varuṇa and Mitra, but, besides that, he is also a judge, he loosens the bonds of the imprisoned, like Varuṇa. His light, like that of Varuṇa, is the symbol of righteousness, and, like him, he is connected intimately with the heavenly and earthly spirits.¹ Like Varuṇa and Mazdâh, he is a god of wisdom.² Moreover, his material side has very much faded off, and he is, like Mazdâh, supreme, like him also, he is the decider of fates and—what is completely decisive—in the hymns addressed to him, that have very much the same loftiness as the hymns to Varuṇa, he is celebrated as the god proclaiming decisions, the god of strong commands whose commands are never put aside, etc.:

O lord, chief of all gods, who on earth and in heaven alone is exalted,
 Father illuminator, lord of increase, chief of the gods
 heavenly lord, moon-god, whose sovereignty is
 brought to perfection.

.....
 Merciful one, begetter of everything, who among
 living things occupies a lofty seat.
 Father merciful one, and restorer, whose weapon
 maintains the life of the whole world

.....
 calling to sovereignty, giving the sceptre [like Auramazda in ancient Persia]
 Who directest destinies for distant days,
 Strong chief, who from the foundation of heaven till the zenith
 Passes along in brilliancy, opening the door of heaven
 Preparing the fate of humanity.
 Lord, *proclaiming the decisions of Heaven and Earth*
Whose command is not set aside,
 and granting water [like Varuṇa] for all that has life
 On earth who is exalted? Thou alone art exalted.
 Thy strong command is proclaimed in Heaven and
 The Igigi [= spirits—compare the Amesha-Spentas] prostrate themselves.
 Thy strong command is proclaimed on earth, and

¹ Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 219: Sin, god of wisdom. This ideograph shows him in his capacity as the war-god; he is regarded as the "Lord of decision."

The Anunaki [other spirits] kiss the ground.
 Thy strong command on high, like a storm in
 the darkness, passes along and nourishment streams forth.
 When thy strong command is established on the earth, vegetation sprouts
 forth.
 Thy strong command produces right and proclaims justice to mankind.
 Thy strong command, through the distant Heavens
 And the wide earth, extends to whatever there is.
 Thy strong command, who can grasp it,
 Who can reveal it?
 Lord, in heaven is thy sovereignty, on earth is
 Thy sovereignty. Among the gods, thy brothers,
 There is none like thee.
 O King of Kings, who has no judge superior
 To him, whose divinity is not surpassed by any other!¹

Is it not ideally clear, and is it an exaggeration to say that the character of a god of commands so very typical of Varuna is no less typical of his supposed prototype? Observe also that the more one considers the hymns themselves, that are after all the most original documents, the more striking is the similitude between Shamash = Mitra and Sin = Varuna, Mazdâh. If those similitudes have not yet struck the historians of religion, it is on account of their having paid attention almost exclusively to the material side of the deities, in the belief that the moral one is necessarily secondary and fugacious. Now, the contrary is very often nearer to the truth. The gods of paganism are more fugacious than the ideas they embody for a while. The very typical conception of the god of command, the god of justice, the helper-god, were much more likely to impress the Indo-Iranian than the astral pantheon of the Babylonians. Elemental deities they had in plenty. But they needed a more accentuated moral deity than their Dyâus, who was decidedly too much implicated in mythology. The need for a god, supreme lord, guardian of morality, is specifically human, and when it is incompletely satisfied it is to be expected that the best elements of the community will in some way supply it. The Indo-Iranian priests came in contact with the gild of priests of the Babylonian countries who were better organized and had a much higher teaching than the elementary Indo-European beliefs. They had

¹ Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

developed a theological and even gnostic teaching around several of their gods, e.g., Bel and Ea. The existence of those theological schools is admitted by Professor Jastrow,¹ who says that one finds among those Babylonian priests a strange mixture of popular notions and fancies with advanced theological speculation and scientific mysticism.

In our present state of knowledge it would be decidedly premature to try to determine with any precision the time and the place where the religion of the Indo-Iranians received this very important afflux of Babylonian conceptions. All that we can say is that the possibility of a close contact between Aryans and Chaldeans at an early period is no longer disputable, now that we know of the relations between the Hittite kingdom of the Mittani² and an Aryan state, the people of which are called *haru* (cf. *harya* = *arya* on the Persian cuneiform inscriptions), while their king had the very typical name of Artatama, "the Most Righteous," and their noblemen were the *marya*, "men" (cf. Armenian *mar*, "man"; Sanskrit *maryaso divas*, "the men of heaven," = the Maruts).³ Both those people and the Hittites were under the influence of Babylonian civilization.

The history of Persian or, more exactly, Median art points to an influence from the northern part of Asia Minor and Assyria.⁴ We have seen that, in many cases, it was the northwestern aspect of Babylonian deities, such as we find it in Assyria and Cappadocia, that is most in agreement with the Aryan gods whom we own to be their equivalents.

It is therefore not unreasonable to believe in the possibility of an interchange of ideas in that mountainous region, the history of which is still surrounded with mysteries but which appears more and more to have been of a decisive importance in the history of ideas in ancient Asia. This, however, must remain undecided. As for the kind of influence exerted by Chaldean beliefs on Aryan religion, whether we have to do with wholesale borrowings or with

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 133 ff.

² Winckler, *Orient. Litt. Z.*, 1910, p. 298.

³ Darmesteter, *Ormazd et Ahriman*, p. 163.

⁴ Perroz and Chipiez, Vol. V, 515.

syncretisms, some light may be derived from von Schröder's recent book on *Arische Religion*. The theory of that renowned scholar, it is true, is at complete variance with mine. He owns that Varuṇa, Mazdâh, Mitra, Aryaman, etc., are simply epithets of the one sky-god (Dyâus). The same would apply to the Âdityas and Amesha-Spentas. Those epithets corresponding to various aspects of the great Aryan god would have materialized gradually in as many different deities. One may object to that theory, among other considerations, that the names of the Amesha-Spentas are not adjectives but abstract nouns, that not the slightest doubt may be entertained about the original abstract nature of *Rita-Asha*, *Ârmatay*, *Vohu-Manah*, *Khshathra*, *Haurvatât*, *Ameretatât*, etc. Von Schröder attacks Oldenberg's theory of the astral origin of the Âdityas, but completely ignores the numerous coincidences between the moral aspects of the gods and the corresponding side of the Chaldean deities. Though we, therefore, cannot accept his theory, we think that the existence, which he advocates, of various aspects of Dyâus, would exactly provide us with the connecting link between Chaldean theology and Aryan beliefs. The materialization of mere epithets of Dyâus in deities of such a precise character as Varuṇa, Mitra, etc., and their grouping in pairs, triads, etc., is hardly conceivable as long as one supposes that this evolution has taken place exclusively in Aryan minds; and this applies in a higher degree to the development of the exalted moral activity of those gods. But if one assumes that various Chaldean deities whose moral activity was prominent have been identified, syncretized, with various aspects of Dyâus, it immediately becomes easily intelligible why mere epithets have suddenly been raised to the dignity of lofty gods, why they have such a precise and complete activity of their own, and why they remain in groups with a prevalent ethical character.

Dyâus in the daytime, the bright sky, has been identified with Shamash, "Sun," as a god of justice, keeping watch over the faithfulness to the pledged word (Avestan *mithra*), while Dyâus at night, being syncretized with Sin, "Moon," suddenly becomes the great god of morality ruling both the material and the moral world by his commands. That the name Varuṇa means "will, command," as

Professor Meillet thinks,¹ or is akin to Greek *Οὐρανός*, "sky," Avestan *varena*, "abode of the daēvas," as has been suggested for a long time, is thus of little importance for our conclusions.

If these considerations are accepted, I hope they will contribute to broaden the field of research in the domain of Aryan religion, mythology, and civilization. Many efforts have been made to bring unity into the Aryan and the Semitic families of languages. They have proved vain up to now and may very well remain so, but if linguistics has thus failed to break down the wall which separates Indo-European from Semitic philology, it does not exclude the possibility of a reconciliation in the domain of ideas.

The influence of more civilized neighboring people on the ideas of the eastern Aryans does not prevent us in the least from holding in highest esteem the rishis of India and the sages of Iran, who have perpetuated and developed into a fine religious system conceptions in which the productiveness of Aryan imagination and sensibility was allied with the more mature and more exalted religious thought of Asia. The part of Zoroaster, who has created the admirable religion of Ahura Mazdâh, is not diminished by the fact that he has inherited ideas of various origins. He has isolated the personality of the Wise God, guardian of morality, etc., from the other gods, even from those who belonged to the same group, as Mithra and Aryaman, and has elaborated a curious system to account for the existence of evil.

For this he deserves to be looked upon as one of the greatest figures in the history of religious and philosophical ideas. In the same way as Socrates and Plato would not have been possible without the Ionian philosophers, Pythagoras, the Sophists, etc., the personality of Zoroaster was hardly conceivable as long as one did not know of the evolution of ideas in Iran and India prior to his coming. But his genius, like that of Socrates, does not seem less admirable on account of the existence of his predecessors.

¹ *Journal Asiatique*, Vol. X, 10, p. 143.

RUSSIAN LIBERAL THEOLOGY

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"For about a thousand years," Menshikov wrote lately in the *Novoe Vremia*, "orthodoxy has existed among the Russian people. For about a thousand years the poorly educated but devout clergymen have been able to communicate their faith to the good-hearted and ignorant people. But something catastrophic has happened, and this great religious mood began to die out, at first among the aristocracy, then among the intellectual classes, then among the clergy. Finally, when the pastors began to desert their charges, their flocks also scattered."

The pessimistic forebodings of the Russian publisher are not the declarations of a mind imbued with preconceived religious opinions, nor the shout of alarm of a timid heart, for Menshikov boasts of being a constant and true son of the Russian orthodox church. On the contrary, his words are the sincere expression of an evolution of Russian religious consciousness which is taking place among the leading classes in the social and literary life of Russia. Notwithstanding the firmly planted roots of its historical past, the gorgeous pomp of its liturgy, the unsurpassed beauty of its religious chants, and the majestic splendor of its rites; notwithstanding its political value as the predominating state religion and its naturalization in the Russian soul, orthodox Christianity in Russia is facing a serious crisis.

Russian writers, clinging to the ancient religious traditions of their own country, cannot refrain from lampooning with pungent witticisms and gibes the Russian aristocrats who leave their native soil to kill time in the perverse atmosphere of the most corrupted European centers, affecting German or French. The worst of it is that they make little of the orthodox inheritance of their forefathers and fall a prey to the basest materialism, or are lost in the maze of agnosticism, or betray both Russian fatherland and

Russian church by enslaving their minds under Roman Catholicism. The Russian aristocracy is indeed orthodox in name, but they no longer quench their thirst at the wellsprings of the Christian life.

The higher intellectual classes, in turn, feel a contempt for the church which nourished them. Russian universities, too, are the sanctuaries of deified reason. In their halls Christ no longer utters his appeals, while religious oddities and fancies and the extravagances of philosophers are taught to a youth morally perverted and mentally stumbling in darkness. To quote a just expression of Rt. Rev. Sergius, archbishop of Finland, "We are now witnessing in Russia a divorce between church and intelligence, and the responsibility for that moral gloom hinges largely upon the ignorance and clumsiness of the Russian clergy." Sacred learning, with the exception of the Canon Law, church history, and a rudimentary course of Christian apologetics, has been put under ban by the universities. Theological studies are frowned upon as a dialectical game of diseased minds or of sophists in idle moments. Christianity is not inwardly lived within the Russian orthodox church. Theological papers have a very small circulation. Suffice it to say that the *Ecclesiastical Messenger* of Sergiev Posad, the leading organ of Russian theological thought, counts only 1,500 subscribers.

This weaning of the Russian intelligence from the Russian church has forged two types, two antithetical systems of Russian theological thought. At the present Russia is possessed of a lay and of a clerical theology. We have there the official theology of the church and the autonomous theology of the intelligence; a theological thought bound in the swaddling clothes of the narrowest conservatism and a theological thought roaming in the boundless breadth of free speculation. We are witnesses to a dramatic conflict. On the one side is a theological culture which worships the idol of authority, holds tradition as the supreme and ultimate norm of truth, overrates the value of formulas, hunts down doctrinal novelties, and regards lethargic slumber of mind as the main characteristic of the true Christian spirit. On the other hand, we have a theological culture which hoists the standard of revolt against the ossification of ideas, throws off servility to systems and

conceptions begotten and elaborated in ancient times, refuses respect to the dogmatic rehandling of Christian truth, breaks down the fetters of dogmatic definitions, and yearns after fulness of life, the spell of newness, the independence of reason. This is a theological culture which dreams of a new Christianity rising from the scattered débris of its ancient foundations, a Christianity trumpeting to the world the thrilling event of new revelations and new inspiration of the Holy Spirit, a Christianity which will be able to realize new syntheses in the moral and spiritual life of mankind, to nourish with food fresh from heaven the peoples athirst for light, truth, and justice, a Christianity which shall open new eras in the story of the perennial onward sweep of the Christian religion.

The antagonism between these two types of culture is very sharp. It opens a yawning abyss between the church of the Russian hierarchy and the church of the individual mind. It arrays on hostile battlefields the followers of tradition and the believers in free intelligence. It gives decided contours to the religious yearnings of the awakening Russian soul, and at the same time it stimulates the dozing energies of orthodox theological thought.

On the crest of this wave which separates two spiritual worlds the gigantic figure of Leo Tolstoi attracts attention. Historian, philosopher, novelist, above all a psychologist, a pitiless and unrivaled analyzer of the human heart, Tolstoi is the chief embodiment of those anarchical instincts which, according to Berdiaev, lie at the bottom of the Russian heart. Tolstoi's anarchism expands over all the forms and varieties of man's life, passes over social, civic, religious, military institutions as the fiery breath of the desert over a luxuriant vegetation, with the fury of a hurricane beheads even the glorious flowers of the arts, and holds that the perfection of manhood is to be found in the barren steppes of religious nihilism. By reason of his attempts at a rehandling of the gospel, of his denials of the logical soundness and aesthetic beauty of Christianity, of his effort to compress within the narrow inclosure of the human intellect the values which we discover in the foundations of traditional Christian thought, Tolstoi is assuredly the founder and master of the lay theology of Russia, the

prophet and apostle of a Christianity renewed in its inner structure and reared upon an entirely new basis. In his famous *Criticism of the Orthodox Theology of Macarius*, a metropolitan of Moscow, he lays the ax to the roots of the majestic though barren tree of orthodox Christianity.

Yet the religious, or rather the irreligious, conceptions of Tolstoi have not succeeded in mastering the popular mind. His tenets, both religious and political, when applied to the daily social life by a handful of Duchoborts came into collision with the legal violence of the state and resulted in a tragic failure. The ideal religion of Tolstoi, summed up in his chief tenet of non-resistance to evil, is not appropriate to real life. It demands a degree of heroism beyond our reach; it overthrows convictions deeply rooted in the social mind; it carries with it the denial of fundamental rights which neither society nor individuals are willing to surrender; it claims such a moral perfection in human beings as to make evil vanish from the world.

In like manner Tolstoi's religion does not satisfy the demands and requirements of a man's heart, does not further the development of the searching mind, which from time to time craves the perennial vision of a light radiating from above. The religious thought of Tolstoi is a destructive power, a solvent that decomposes and volatilizes the substantial elements of the Christian faith and cripples the factors of Christian religiousness. Tolstoi, a wonderful master in the analysis of the passions, has been a narrow-minded builder in the doctrinal synthesis. His dexterity, that of a strategist who discovers at a glance the weakest point of a hostile army, failed whenever he undertook the task of erecting a citadel for the little host of his own followers. It is therefore no matter of wonder that the greatest of the Russian religious thinkers, though continuing Tolstoi's criticism of historic Christianity and inheriting his spirit, set some limits to the field of their investigations, and even dropped the irreligious radicalism of their master. No doubt they look for the Kingdom of God in their own consciousness, but they also see that Christianity as a religion of the spirit fills the veins of the social body with the purest blood. Tolstoi's religious nihilism led the way to the "undogmatic" Christianity of

those modern Russian thinkers contemptuously called theologians of the decadence, to whom we are indebted for the awakening of lay theology and of the bright views of the religion of the future.

At the head of the new school of religious thought in Russia stand Demetrius Merezhkovsky and Basil Rozanov. The former is the brilliant novelist who, with an intense dramatic feeling and most vivid colors, pictures the tumultuous life of that remote age when evangelical Christianity, becoming altered and disfigured, began its period of doctrinal exhaustion. The novel of his famous trilogy entitled *Julian the Apostate* is a striking portraiture of that doctrinal stage of Christian thought which smothered the life of the Gospels in dialectic and inaugurated the era of spiritual bondage and of hierarchical despotism.

Less systematic, yet bolder in his criticism of historic Christianity, Basil Rozanov, a philosopher and a man of letters, has forged a style of his own, a style apocalyptic, now sweetly warbling as the soft rhythm of a love song, now rude and bristling with barbarism. And in the footsteps of these two famous leaders other thinkers in Russia are searching for the Christianity of the coming generations, are setting a battering-ram against the venerable citadels of Christian dogmatism, are exploring the skies in the hope of gazing upon the radiance of the new-rising sun of justice.

Minsk sounds the rational depths of a mysticism built on a philosophical basis, a mysticism, too, for which the idea of God does not suffice.

Nicholas Berdiaev foretells a new descent of the Holy Spirit, to realize the harmonious synthesis of the revelation of the Father with that of the Son. Prince Eugenius Trubeckoi pours invectives of fire upon the Bastille of the spirit, the walls reared up by the dogmatist of Christianity, who aimed at holding thought in thralldom. And notwithstanding their destructive tenets, Russian liberals still are dwelling within the pale of the orthodox church. Whatever may be said of the rigid formalism and the doctrinal intolerance of orthodox Christianity, such men are seemingly convinced that the radicalism of their conceptions is not at a variance with such free inspiration as orthodox Christianity permits to its followers. They boast of being the orthodox of the spirit and

look down upon the orthodox of the formulas, the theologians of the traditional orthodoxy. They are the pioneers of a new living creed, the explorers of a "New Path" (*Novii Put*). Such was the title of their leading organ, which appeared at Petrograd in 1902, and which, like all the products of novelty-loving speculation, died after a brief career.

Now, what are the main grounds of Russian liberalism? A recent critic and hater of the new school of thought, Paul Stepanov, emphasizes a striking difference between the Russian lay theology and the liberal systems of Western Christianity. According to him, the latter are built up by methodical minds and lay the foundations of their religious criticism upon the scientific principles of knowledge. Russian liberalism, on the contrary, rests on a moving field. It is the offspring of fragmentary speculation. It reveals the meretricious brilliancy of unconnected thoughts, of dazzling metaphors, of startling paradoxes. There is no organic unity in its schemes; there is no steadiness of doctrine in its assertions; there is no logical connection between its tenets. Its features are unsettled, indefinite, wavering, like the flame of a candle flickering to the capricious wind of a nocturnal breeze. Russian liberals are wayward wights, who preach a new religion without knowing what they believe in, what they rest upon, and why they raze to the ground the majestic columns of Christian dogmatic. Confusion is the chief characteristic of their unfortunate attempts at a new philosophy of religion.

There is, indeed, some truth in such a biased stricture of Russian liberalism. Like all religious and philosophical systems which lived before it, Russian liberalism has neither unity of doctrine nor strictness of logical rules. It is, indeed, rather the achievement of a religious individualism than the well-settled program of a new philosophy of Christianity. It embodies a trend of mind rather than a system of doctrines. Nevertheless, its main features stand out in strong relief against the dark background of its wavering conceptions. The fundamentals of the Russian liberalism may be described as follows: (1) Evangelical Christianity has undergone the deadly influence of an evil power which has preyed upon its heart, tarnished its purity, and enfeebled its force. (2) The decay

of historic Christianity is the result of a dogmatic elaboration of the Christian truth, an elaboration which superseded the worship of the spirit by the worship of formulas. (3) The survival of Christianity will be found in the free activity and the autonomous development of the vitalizing powers of Christian thought, which have been thus far crippled and mutilated. (4) In the revival of Christianity the free development of the human mind will be interwoven with the constant action of the Deity, whose Word never ceases disclosing to men new forms of religious life, new interpretations and new meanings of revealed truth. Russian liberalism is thus a complex and confused movement. It takes its start from the sure ground of historical criticism only to meander into a philosophical mysticism grounded on a neo-Platonic basis and to culminate at length in a visionary mysticism which expands in floating worlds of imagination.

According to this view, Christianity passed through a period of intellectual stagnation which withered the luxury of its vegetation and destroyed the perfume of its evangelical flowers. The moral catastrophe of Christianity, the slow but fatal drooping of its life, the corpselike rigidity of its members, are the saddest result of the dogmatic battles which raged unceasingly between the fourth and the seventh centuries. The church devoted its speculative powers to the formulation of dogmatic definitions, to the probing of mysteries which are out of our reach, to hedging in revealed truth by syllogisms; and thus it allowed the spirit of the gospel to vanish in the mists of theological rationalism. The aroma of the Christian life, the redolence of its virtues, the matchless simplicity of its words, were lost when it came in touch with Christian dogmatism. The untaught eloquence of the fishers of Galilee seemed vapid to the refined taste of dogmatists perfectly acquainted with all the subtleties of dialectics. Clement of Alexandria and Origen were the standard-bearers of the new school of thought. The tinsel of their learning replaced the pure gold of the Gospels. The Christian truth sank under the burden of the counterfeit jewels of the gentile philosophers, stained its brow with the rouge of Greek and Roman coxcombs, wrapped itself in the leaden cloak of a ponderous erudition, appropriated to itself the methods and aims of that

human scholarship which overloads the mind while drying up the inward life of the spirit.

Christianity, rigid in its crystallized forms, was like fossil bones which no longer have a place among the living. A barren, prattling, gossiping, squabbling dogmatic superseded the life-giving teaching of the gospel. Instead of imbuing the spirits of the masses with the spirit of Christ, instead of applying to social and individual life the rules of Christian ethics, evil-hearted Pharisees and the dregs of the populace at Byzantium jangled in the streets, in the squares, in the hippodrome, grappled with the problems of the divine procession, the two wills in Christ, the unity of nature and essence in God. Churches, monasteries, council halls, became the arenas of dialectical pugilism and of tragicomical tilts.

Thus as time went on dogmaticians degraded the sublime majesty of Christ's religion and heaped up rubbish around his sanctuary.

The Christian truth [writes Rozanov], a rain dropping down from heaven, a food for Godhead, a fountain springing out from a celestial source, a palm bower filled with mysterious shadows, the Eden of the spirit and mind, the Christian truth sank into a religion of antiquarians, into a bureaucratic routine, into a matter of ceaseless wranglings, into a frolicsome pastime of idle pedants, into an ever-growing sparkling of divisions, into a brand of social perturbations.

Men no longer thought under the guidance of the Spirit living within us. The knowledge of God they drew from books, from the dead letter of ecclesiastical tradition, from the unguarded statements of pagan philosophy, from the vagaries of self-styled mystics. It was in vain that souls athirst for truth asked the church that they might cross the threshold of God's sanctuary. The eminent shepherds of the hierarchy or the mouthpieces of sacred learning answered them only with mathematical axioms, with thoroughly elaborated words, with unwarranted principles, with irksome gibberish about mysteries in God. True Christianity, that Christianity which spread its boughs over all the world, and gathered all peoples under their shelter, and fertilized its roots with the blood of its martyrs, the Christianity of, I say, the golden Apostolic age, sank down, faded away, in the chains of a rigid dogmatism. It became a historical religion, which holds, no doubt, a foremost

place in the story of the religious evolution of mankind, which looks like a huge edifice built up on geometrical lines. The great mistake, the ruinous illusion of historic Christianity, lies in the barren worship of the dogmatic formulas, which have been wrongly magnified as the echo of the fullest and purest teaching of Christ.

To the Russian liberals the ecumenical definitions of the Christian faith are but rudimentary schemes and ephemeral utterances of religious thought in a given period of time. If human life is a ceaseless succession of sunrises and sunsets, of light and darkness, of shouts of victory and silences of the tomb, even the life of the spirit, the life of the mind, passes through alternate stages of decay and revival. So vast are the spiritual contents of the Christian faith, so plentiful its spiritual richness, so unbounded its wide horizons, that every attempt at classifying its priceless and countless gems, at clouding its sky with the fogs of human reasoning, will necessarily result in a lamentable failure. The schematism of the traditional theology cannot be an eternal one for non-eternal minds. It is impressed with the stamp of a given century; it is engraved with the date of its composition; it shows the hue, the patina of the century which gave rise to it; it is streaked with the blows of those human passions which reacted against its predominance; it hides in its fibers that germ of decadence which thwarts the efforts and undoes the work of our created minds. If the centuries are rolling on and carrying with them in a hurried flight the generations, the monuments, the ideas, the majestic temples, the golden idols, the sacerdotal castes, the philosophical schools, the seats of learning, the nurseries of superstition, even the civil and literary inheritances of highly polished nations, if time is all-crumbling and all-renewing, why do we wonder at hearing it said that in a like manner the creeds of historic Christianity, the magic formulas of a dogmatism gone out of fashion in the midst of modern Christian society, will be carried off by the waves of ages and swept away by the flowing stream of new religious conceptions? Into dogmatic definition which synthesizes the religious experiences, the theological views, of a dead world we need to breathe a breath of life of our own, a blast of modernity—impel a surge of thought which, so to speak, ceases moving in the dull

sky of wintertide day, but which merges itself into the radiance of the sun beaming in its noon glory.

But what is the true meaning, the true significance, of dogmas in Christianity? Dogmas, answers Merezhkovsky, are the chains of the spirit. Dogmatic speculations, writes Rozanov, in the same strain, are the corrosives of Christian truths. Dogmas are dead principles, lifeless clay, stones served as meals on the dining-table of Christians, the multiplication table of revealed wisdom. Dogmas broke the unity of the church; they drove a poisonous arrow into the heart of Christianity; they impaired and spoiled the virginal beauty of the Gospels. It is unwise to look at the church's Fathers as the pillars of truth. They were rather the Samsons that pulled down the majestic temple of the Christian faith. Their deadly influence deserves to be compared with that of an anatomist who produces a lethargic slumber in a living being in order to dissect it, to cut off its quivering members, to make of it an amorphous and bloodless mass of flesh and muscles. The Fathers of the church are the forerunners of Kant, the teachers of Strauss. Under their pen and in the twaddlings of their dialectical lucubrations Jesus Christ was stripped of his halo of divine sainthood. He was clothed with a philosophical garb and metamorphosed into a barren pundit hunting after uncouth technical words. The theologians of the period of the ecumenical councils are petulant disputers who give currency to their trifles as though they were the quintessence of Christian teaching. The Fathers of the church, with their quotations, commentaries, formulas, imprisoned the mind and stifled freedom of inquiry, and incited Christian legists to light funeral piles, to preach a blind obedience to tyrants, to strangle every free activity, both social and intellectual. According to Merezhkovsky, dogmas are a barricade set up against the onward sweep of the army that is bravely striving for the final triumph of progress and civilization. Theology has no more practical value in real life. Its crumbling ruins are to be ranged among the old garments or the skeletons of a prehistorical museum. Take, for instance, the mystery of the Trinity. It is a worthless riddle. Subtle controversies about the divine procession give no light to those who seek social improvement, or a reconciliation between

religious and scientific thought, or amiable relations between church and state. Christian truths are summed up like grammar rules; children are forced to imprint them upon their minds like magical sentences.

Prince Trubeckoi asserts that every pedantic rule, every dialectical garb, cripples the spontaneous movements of the spirit within us, and dogmas are like a goal which severs the divine Teacher from intercourse with men.

There is still another essential difference between the conceptions of dogmas held by the traditional and that held by the progressive theology. If in the theological system of the Fathers of the church and of the ecumenical councils dogma is a fossilized larva, a crystallized form, in the later theology it is a prominent factor of progress, an everlasting germ of vitality, an evolutionary force which, at the joyful warmth of springtide, makes green again the winter-hardened fields.

In fact, dogmatics, to borrow the definition of Merezhkovsky, is a vital knowledge which develops itself organically, and spreads out its roots, and expands its boughs, and invigorates its trunk, and multiplies its scions. It is, explains Minsk, an indefinite intellectual creation, an evolutionary process of new forms, a new aspect of the supreme and universal truth. The official dogmatic, conceived as a vast and intangible reservoir of eternal and immutable theoretical truths, as a mausoleum of infallible formulas, is not a building set up by God or a token of the intellectual vitality of Christian teaching. As a stable foundation of Christianity dogma should be an inner truth, a truth unveiling itself to the spiritual eyes of man, and, as such, a truth acting as a principle of Christian life. It is made up of two elements: the outward shell, viz., the formula of its expression, and the inward kernel, viz., its doctrinal contents. This latter element is the vital substance of dogma, the divine spark that illumines our minds. To force a follower of Christ to an idolatrous worship of dogmatic formulas would be to apply violence to the free spirit living within him.

The creeds, the dogmatic formulas, are not and ought not to be instruments of torture and obligatory rules. Every Christian is possessed of his own religious experience. The seed of the gospel

falls down from heaven into the soil of the individual conscience, and there it finds a fruitful earth which causes it to sprout and to assume a definite shape.

Since this is the nature of dogma, it would be unwise to look upon it as a fixed and changeless expression of a religious truth, as a mask giving to all members of Christianity the same countenance, the same smile, the same wrinkles. Dogma is, in fact, a spiritual truth begotten of the religious experience of each individual conscience. Its outward determination has therefore no substantial value; its moral necessity is dependent upon theoretical exigencies, which are the outcome of our education or the artificial rules of our disciplined mind. And since the theoretical knowledge of any Christian develops in both the individual and the collective mind, in a like manner dogmatic formulas, far from being immutable and fixed, follow the evolution of the conscience, both individual and collective. Thus, so to speak, they rush on into the never-ceasing circulation of the life of our Christian thought. In a given period of our development, in the historical life of Christianity, they are venerated and endeared as unchangeable axioms; in a later period they lose their old significance. A learned Christian also consents to formulas, but the sense in which he takes them is at variance with that of an unlearned believer.

Thus, the dogmatic conceptions of an uncouth Christianity differentiate themselves from the definitions of a perfected one. Each outside determination of faith is of merely relative value and meaning. Hence, it follows that the dogmatic definitions of the ecumenical councils suited the Christian mentality of that epoch and exhibited the watchword of orthodoxy. A Christian dogmatic crammed with Platonic reminiscences and modes of thought and with technical words is a timely outgrowth of Christian speculation in an age in which Platonism preponderated, but it is a glaring anachronism when Platonic thought sinks into oblivion and philosophers invade new fields of research and gaze at broader horizons. The mistake of the official theology has been that of considering and praising the Platonic garb of thought as the only and permanent formulation of the truths of the faith.

Christianity is an eternal and universal religion, and therefore its content is inexhaustible and not inexorably connected with formulas elaborated in a given period of its historical life. In every stage of its long-lived existence it puts forth many-colored blossoms which variously reveal the multifarious beauty of its lineaments and the richness of its treasures. It is an invaluable precious stone, the cuttings of which glow in varied flames as they reflect the deep green of the ocean, or the luminous blue of the Italian sky, or the pale rays of the moon.

And we may add to this that not only sundry periods of time have their peculiar formulas, but that Christians even in the same stage, in accordance with their intellectual variations, are differentiated from each other as concerns the expression of their beliefs. For instance, to the great bulk of the faithful who do not care for metaphysical speculations Christ is the Son of God; to the followers of Judaic traditions he is the promised Messiah; to the adepts of Platonism he is the Logos.

In matters of faith [writes Tolstoi] we are not able to find a formula which sets forth with an identical significance all the individual conceptions. Everyone thinks of his own; in compliance with his subjective criteria everyone gives a different meaning to the same formula. It is not only useless but dangerous to shut up the doctrinal variety of the Christian teaching within immutable formulas. No doubt some theoretical principles may rise to the dignity of perennial and universal formulas when they refer to the practical life; for instance, the commandment of God, "Thou shalt not kill," or the declaration of Christ, "Do not oppose evil." But in the domain of dogmatics there is nothing definite nor constant. The norm of faith is to be found in the individual believer, and the dogmatic theology itself is worked out by him.

Hence, it follows that dogma germinates and develops within the spirit of every Christian in proportion to his spiritual progress and the evolution of free thought in him. Like the truth which batters at the barriers of ignorance and explores new fields, Christianity, owing to the ceaseless labor of human generations, evolves its own life.

Such is, as we have summed it up, the Russian liberalism in its destructive form. It is a strong reaction against the exaggerated

formalism and the stiffened traditionalism of the Greek orthodoxy, against the superstitious overgrowth of the outward religion, to the great detriment of the inner life, against the letter which kills, to the great detriment of the spirit which vivifies. That reaction is needed whenever the religious feeling gets crystallized, whenever the religious life sinks into a mechanical achievement of ritual forms, into the unbounded adhesion to self-styled oracles of God, into a blind obedience to a tyranny which, while boasting of being inspired and guided by God, actually feels the sway of human passions and the influence of ignorance. The reaction of Russian liberalism owes its birth to the craving to shatter the material crust of Christian worship, to make plain that the religious feeling which springs out of the secret springs of our souls cannot be hemmed in by the dikes of formulas. In the irresistible straining of all the powers of the soul toward God, in the quickened throbbings of the heart seeking after God, in the mystical fellowship of our spiritual being with the Deity that dwells in regions inaccessible to us, our religious consciousness throws off the yoke of legal determinations, the material of the Canonists, and, above all, the barrenness and narrowness of Phariseeism. In a similar way religious thought which in a flight of love aspires toward God, and upon the sunlit heights of the contemplation of God swims into an ocean of uncreated light, religious thought, I say, in the dazzling splendors of the divine Wisdom, gets rid of the rigidity of formulas carefully elaborated by skilful dialecticians and finds in the bosom of God hidden treasures. Religious feeling sprouts in mystery, lives in the shrine of mysteries, grows up and refines itself in the cloud of mystery, and any attempt to bring it down from the mysterious heaven which is both its throne and its source would be to transplant it into a craggy and dry soil where, in a short time, it would fade and die.

In conclusion, we can entirely subscribe to the just remark of Rt. Rev. William Boyd Carpenter, bishop of Ripon: "The moment a creed becomes scientifically measurable the religious power of it evaporates. Self is a sacred thing; and the religion which seeks to set it aside, rather than to lift it to true self-possession, has set the seal of doom upon itself."

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¹ We give the English equivalents of the Russian titles.

CRITICAL NOTES

GALEN ON THE CHRISTIANS

In 1844 J. C. L. Gieseler in his *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte* (4th ed.), I, 1, p. 167, Anm. 16, wrote: "Der berühmte Arzt Claudius Galenus (um 160) sagte in einer seiner verloren gegangenen Schriften (die Stelle in syrischer Uebersetzung in *Bar-Hebraei Chron. syr.*, ed. *Bruns et Kirsch*, p. 55, aus *Gal. comm. in Phaedonem Platonis*, ausführlicher arabisch in *Abulfedae historia anteislamica*, ed. *Fleischer*, p. 109 aus *Gal. de sentiētiis politiae Platonicae* citiert): Hominum plerique . . . [the Latin of Fleischer is quoted to the words] ut nihil cedant vere philosophantibus." The same Latin is quoted, with reference to Gieseler (faulty in the English translation: I, 1, 4 [*sic!*]; the German is not accessible to the writer in the libraries of the University of Chicago), in Harnack's *History of Dogma*, I, 235, n. 2; without such reference in the same author's *Mission and Expansion*, I, 212 f.; with reference to Harnack in Norden's *Antike Kunstprosa*, p. 518, n. 1. Theodor Zahn does not quote the passage in full, but refers to Fleischer's *Abulfeda* in his *Der Stoiker Epiktet u. s. Verhältnis zum Christentum*, p. 24, Anm. 29 (cf. Anm. 27). Norden gives Harnack's reference to Gieseler correctly, and adds the information, obtained from the Arabist G. Jacob, that Abulfeda's source is Ibn al-Athīr; in the *Nachträge* of 1909, II, 4, he refers to K. Kalbfleisch, who in the *Festschrift für Gomperz* (Vienna, 1902), pp. 96 f., follows Steinschneider (Virchow's *Archiv f. pathologische Anatomie u. Physiologie*, CXXIV [1891], 459, No. 89) and Philippi (verbally) when he assumes as probable the identification of Fleischer's "de sentiētiis politiae Platonis" with Galen's Πλατωνικῶν διαλόγων συνόψεως ή. Kalbfleisch quotes at length in a translation made for him by Philippi Ibn abī Uṣaibi'a's version of Ḥunain b. Isḥāq's story concerning the finding and translation of a portion of this *Synopsis*; but neither he nor Steinschneider quotes in full Ibn abī Uṣaibi'a's rendition of Galen's words on the Christians, to which both refer, as occurring in this Arabic writer's *Kitāb 'ujān al-anbā' fi ṭabaqāt al-ʿaṭibbā'*, ed. A. Müller (Königsberg, 1884), I, 76. And there the knowledge of the moderns concerning Galen's celebrated statement concerning the Christians rests, so far as the writer's search in the literature accessible to him has been able to discover.

But a number of problems in regard to this statement remain untouched. Since Gieseler's day two Mohammedan authorities have been added for the statement, one a century, the other two-thirds of a century, earlier than Abulfeda. The version of neither has been subjected to careful scrutiny. The Christian version of Bar-Hebraeus has been quite forgotten, since Gieseler put it aside as being less explicit. It seems to have occurred to no one to inquire, How came those three Moslems, all of whom are known to be compilers, the most original of them being Ibn abī Uṣaibi'a, to fix upon just this one statement of Galen's concerning the Christians of his day? In the quest for the book of Galen's from which this statement appears to be taken, the discrepant statement of the Christian author has been left aside completely. Though there is a reference to Plato's writings, no one has, apparently, attempted to find any utterance or utterances of his which would seem to fit the occasion. No attempt has been made to determine the true intent and purport of Galen's words. A re-examination of the facts in the case is therefore quite in place. Unfortunately the Arabic and Syriac sections of the libraries within the writer's reach and the time just now at his disposal do not allow him to extend the search as far as he would like.

To begin with, Abulfeda's account has been placed before the public a sufficient number of times in Fleischer's excellent Latin translation. The Arabic has not been set forth in connection with other versions. Beginning a little before the place at which the beginning is usually made, it may be well to state that after mentioning as the only event worthy of note is Marcus Aurelius' reign Bardaisan's treatise on dualism, Abulfeda proceeds to say that Marcus died in the year 481 of the Seleucid era. Thereupon Commodus reigned in his stead, according to the Canon, for a period of thirteen years, and he brought his own life to an untimely end by hanging himself, which event took place at the close of the year 494 of the Seleucid era.

وقال في الكامل أنّ جالينوس كان في أيام قومودوس المذكور وقد أدرك جالينوس بطلميوس وكان دين النصراني قد ظهر في أيامه وقد ذكرهم جالينوس في كتابه في جوامع كتاب افلاطون في سياسة المدن فقال أنّ جمهور الناس لا يمكنهم ان يفهموا سياقة الاقاريل البرهانية ولذلك صاروا محتاجين الى رموز ينتفعون بها (يعني بالرموز الاخبار عن الثواب والعقاب في الدار الآخرة) من ذلك انا

نرى الآن القوم الذين يدعون نصارى أنهم اخذوا ايمانهم عن الرموز وقد يظهر منهم افعال مثل افعال من تفلسف بالحقيقة وذلك ان عدم جزعهم من الموت امر قد نراه كلنا وكذلك ايضا عفانهم عن استعمال الجماع فانّ منهم قوما رجالا ونساء ايضا قد اقاموا جميع ايام حياتهم متنعين عن الجماع ومنهم قوم قد بلغ من ضبطهم لانفسهم في التدبير وشدة حرصهم على العدل ان صاروا غير مقصرين عن الذين يتفلسفون بالحقيقة انتهى كلام جالينوس.

According to the *Kāmil* [of Ibn Athlir] Galen lived in the days of this Commodus, having been born before the death of Ptolemy [literally: "and Galen lived to the time of Ptolemy"]. In his [i.e., Galen's] time the religion of the Christians had become manifest, and Galen mentions them [i.e., the Christians] in his book *Remarks on the Book of Plato on the Republic*, where he says: "The mass of the people are not able to follow the thread of an apodictic discourse, wherefore they need allusive (enigmatic) sayings, so that they may enjoy instruction thereby (by allusive sayings he means the tales concerning rewards and punishments in the world to come). Of this sort we now see the people who are called Christians deriving their faith from such allusive sayings. Yet on their part deeds have been produced equal to the deeds of those who are in truth philosophers. For example, that they are free from the fear of death is a fact which we all have observed; likewise their abstinence from the unlawful practice of sexual intercourse. And, indeed, there are some among them, men, and women, also, who during the whole of their natural life refrain altogether from such intercourse. And some of them have attained to such a degree of severe self-control and to such earnestness in their desire for righteousness, that they do not fall short of those who are in truth philosophers. Thus far the words of Galen.

And that is all Abulfeda has to say on the reign of Commodus.

Coming now to the acknowledged source of Abulfeda (1273-1331), we find Norden stating on the authority of G. Jacob that Abulfeda quoted the passage from the *Kāmil* of Ibn Athlir (1160-1234; the *Kāmil* stops at 1231); Norden then gives the Latin of Fleischer, with two minor changes (l. 2 *Galenus* is inserted after *fecit*; l. 5 *parabolas dicit narrationes* for *narrationes dicit*), which are said to be based upon a collation by G. Jacob of Fleischer's translation with the original in the

Kāmil. If this statement of Norden's correctly represents G. Jacob, then the writer would like to know in what edition or manuscript Professor Jacob read his Ibn Athīr. The changes might as easily have been made from the Arabic of Abulfeda himself; they merely make the Latin a little less good Latin, but a slightly more literal rendering of the Arabic of Abulfeda. In the well-known and excellent edition of Ibn Athīr by Tornberg (Leyden: Brill, 1867), Vol. I, Galen is mentioned just twice: the first time, in the confused series of Roman emperors on p. 229 a half-line is devoted to a notice of his death; the second time, on p. 233 two lines and two words are dedicated to him. This last note follows a statement concerning Marcus Aurelius' reign, which is practically identical with that of Abulfeda. Thereupon Ibn Athīr proceeds: "Then Commodus reigned twelve years. And in his days lived Galen, who was born before the death of Ptolemy [literally: who lived to the time of Ptolemy] the Claudian. In his time the Christian religion had become manifest and he mentions them in his book Remarks on the Book of Plato on the Republic." Underscoring by a continuous line marks greater, by a dotted line lesser, differences of Ibn Athīr's account from that of Abulfeda. And what is here printed is all that Ibn Athīr has to say about Galen, and all that he says at this point about Commodus; nor does he say anything vitally different on the latter anywhere else. It is manifest (1) that Abulfeda has amplified his account of Commodus and Galen from other sources, and (2) that the actual statement of Galen is missing in Ibn Athīr, which is quite what we should expect in this epitomizer. If an oriental edition or manuscript of the *Kāmil* nevertheless does contain this statement, it is highly probable that it was inserted by a scribe from Abulfeda or some other source.

The third Moslem author who is known to have quoted Galen's statement on the Christians is Ibn 'Abī Uṣaibi'a (1203-70), whose great book, a biographical history of noted physicians, was published by August Müller (Königsberg, 1884). His scattered notes and his lengthy statement on Galen were published in careful résumé by Steinschneider, *Virchow's Archiv*, *loc. cit.*, and *Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen*, *Beihefte*, II (1890-91), 2. Thence, and with the aid of the well-known Semitic scholar Philippi, from the original Kalbfleisch, *op. cit.*, brought Uṣaibi'a's statement to the notice of classical scholars. From Kalbfleisch in turn Norden, *op. cit.*, derived his knowledge. But Steinschneider was interested chiefly in the bibliography of Arabic translations, and Kalbfleisch in classical and Hellenistic Greek literature. Neither has given

adequate attention to the statement concerning the Christians. By the kindness of the Surgeon General's Office Library, Washington, D.C., the writer is enabled to present Uṣaibī'a's version from the rare and expensive original edition. The whole of Uṣaibī'a's treatise on Galen covers 30 pages full of fine oriental print. Much of this, in the main well summarized by Steinschneider, does not concern us here. A brief summary of what is to our purpose, leading up to the important text, suffices. Uṣ. begins with notes from or on Iṣḥāq b. Ḥunain (†910) and Baihaqī (ca. 1161 A.D.), both of whom place Galen in the first century A.D. Thereupon follows a long argument on the incorrectness of this dating (Vol. I, 72, 11—77, 10). Steinschneider notwithstanding, the bulk of this, in fact, probably the whole of this long statement, is taken bodily from 'Ubaid Allāh b. Ḡabra'īl b. Boḥtāšū' (†ca. 1058). It does not seem to be taken from this author's larger works, but from a *risāla*, or essay, written in answer to an inquiry concerning Galen's dates (72, 11—13). That all of what follows, as far as 77, 14, with quotations from Mār Eliā, Maṭrān of Nisibis, from Hārūn b. 'Azūr ar-Rāhib, Eusebius of Caesarea, the Chronicle of Andronicus, etc., including quotations from Galen himself, is for the most part, if not in its entirety, the work, not of Uṣ., but of 'Ubaid Allāh, is shown by the opening and closing words: *هذا نصه*, "this is a transcript of it" (72, 14), and *وهذا آخر ما ذكره عبيد الله بن جبرئيل من أمر جالينوس*, "and this is the end of what 'Ubaid Allāh b. Ḡabra'īl wrote concerning the affairs of Galen" (77, 11). In further proof of 'Ubaid Allāh's authorship may be quoted the statement "said 'Ubaid Allāh," etc., strewn, somewhat sparingly, throughout this material—and the tenor of the whole lengthy argument, all of which is meant to prove the later date for Galen, which, incidentally, is quite correct. It is worth while noting that one of the chief proof texts is Galen's statement in the preface to the first book of the *Anatomy*, that he came to Rome for the first time during the reign of Antoninus. Various events in the life of Jesus, birth, baptism, ascension, are chronologically fixed with relation to Galen. Iṣḥāq b. Ḥunain, whose source is said to be John the Grammarian (one of the Alexandrian school of epitomizing paraphrasers of Galen), is elaborately proved to be mistaken. And then, still with chronological intent, but making a climax which has been beautifully led up to, the whole closes with Galen's laudatory statement concerning the Christians, the text of which follows:

وما يشهد بأن المسيح كان قبل جالينوس بمدة من الزمان ما ذكره جالينوس في تفسير كتاب افلاطون في السياسة المدنية وهذا نص قوله قال جالينوس من ذلك قد نرى القوم الذين يدعون نصارى انما ايمانهم عن الرموز والمجازة وقد تظهر منهم أفعال المتفلسفين أيضا وذلك أن عدم جزعهم من الموت وما يلقون بعده أمر قد نراه كل يوم وكذلك أيضا عفافهم عن الجماع وإن منهم قوما لا رجال فقط لكن نساء أيضا قد أقاموا أيام حياتهم ممتنعين عن الجماع ومنهم قوم قد بلغ من ضبطهم لأنفسهم في التدبير في المطعم والمشرب وشدة حرصهم على العدل أن صاروا غير مقصرين عن الدين يتفلسفون بالحقيقة

And what testifies to the fact that the Messiah lived before Galen by a considerable stretch of time is what Galen mentions in his interpretation (*tafsir*) of the book of Plato on the *Republic*. This is a transcript of his statement. Galen says: "Of this sort we see the people who are called Christians. Only from allusive sayings and miracles is their faith. Yet on their part the deeds of the philosophizers have been produced also. For example, that they are free from the fear of death and of what they may meet thereafter, is a fact which we may observe every day; likewise their abstinence from sexual intercourse. And, indeed, there are some among them, not men only, but women also, who during their natural life refrain from such intercourse. And some of them have attained to such a degree of severe self-control in eating and drinking, and to such earnestness in their desire for righteousness, that they do not fall short of those who are in truth philosophers.

With a "said 'Ubaid Allāh b. Ḡabra'īl" the statement proceeds to explain that what Galen here describes is monasticism, and that in general the state of doctrine and practice depicted in these words does not correspond to the conditions obtaining in the time of the Messiah, but to those of one hundred years later. Whereupon the account of 'Ubaid Allāh is closed by Uṣ.

In further proof, if this be needed, of the fact that the statement concerning the Christians with its explanation is quoted, not original with Uṣ., a fourth Moslem writer must be introduced into the discussion, al-Qiftī, an older contemporary of Uṣ. Al-Qiftī, who lived 1172-1248, wrote his great *History of the Learned* between the years 1230 and 1236. We possess this, not in the original, but in an abbreviated form

given to it by a later scholar, Zauzānī. This book, of which a magnificent edition was brought out by Julius Lippert (aided by notes and other work left by August Müller) (Leipzig, 1903), contains, like Uṣ., many scattered notes and a special paragraph on Galen. Not so full as Uṣ., he yet gives much of the same material as Uṣ. And—though in an entirely different context—the paragraph above quoted, with its reference to monasticism and all, is found in Qiftī practically verbatim. Except for minor differences, in which for the most part Qiftī exhibits the better text, the only difference worth noting is the loss in Qiftī, as we have him, of one sentence, the sentence on the fear of death—by homoeoteleuton.

These are the four Moslem writers, in whose works, as they have been preserved and published, Galen's laudatory words concerning the Christians are quoted, or at least mentioned. Others who knew them are mentioned in Qiftī and Uṣ. These are of no immediate concern to us. It is worth noting, however, that the three Moslems, largely independent of each other, quote the same text in the same translation. Important introductory words are omitted in the two earlier writers. Among the slight differences between the two, Q. and Uṣ. have in one case preserved what seems the better text: "From allusive sayings *only* do they derive their faith." In general their text is characterized by a slight tendency toward summarizing abbreviation, which is offset, on the other hand, by paraphrasing additions, in part interpretative. Noteworthy is the difference in the name given to Galen's work. Abulfeda and Ibn Athīr call it "Remarks on (or "Synopsis of) Plato's Book on the *Republic*"; Q. and Uṣ. call it "Interpretation." In this connection it is worthy of note that Uṣ. in his list of Galen's books and their translations into Arabic quotes on p. 101 a statement of the celebrated translator Ḥunain b. Ishāq (†873), father of the Ishāq b. Ḥunain mentioned above. In this statement Ḥunain says that he found a copy of four of the eight books of Galen's *Synopsis* (or *Remarks*, *ḡawāmi'*) on *Plato's Dialogues*, the dialogues commented on being (1) *Kratylos*, *Sophistes*, *Politikos*, *Parmenides*, *Euthydemos*; (2) *Republic* 1-4; (3) *Republic* 5-10 and *Timaeus*; (4) *Nomoi*. It has been shown that Q. and Uṣ., largely or wholly independent of each other, depend in the section in question on a Nestorian Christian of the 'Irāq, 'Ubaid Allāh b. Gabriel of the famous family of Boḥtīšū', who died ca. 1058. Can it be shown that the two general historians, also, who at this point exhibit such remarkable interest for the affairs of the Christians, are dependent on Christian authors? Such authors were well known and widely read in their time.

Both Q. and U_g. knew, besides ʿUbaid Allāh, Ibn Ġulġul of Cordova (ca. 980) and Elias ibn al-Maṭrān (†1055).

It is of some interest to note, further, that U_g. does what Qiftī does not—spoils the point of ʿUbaid Allāh's fine climax by quoting immediately afterward from this Elias b. al-Maṭrān Galen's derogatory remarks about Moses and the Messiah and their followers, among them one from the *Pulses*, quoted later in this paper, and one from a lost work, *Εἰς τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖν ἀκίνητον*, all to the same effect, to furnish examples of dogmatic teaching and unreasoning faith. U_g. thereupon proceeds to name Pergamon (Pergamos) as the birthplace of Galen, and on the following page, from an unnamed source, quotes a legendary tale, accounting for Galen's death in Sicily by placing him on a journey to Jerusalem with the intent to see there for himself the surviving disciples of the Messiah.

Turning now to the Christian writers and coming back to Gieseler, we find him at least mentioning Bar-Hebraeus' *Chronicon Syriacum*. Of this the writer has in hand only the rather faulty edition by Bruns and Kirsch (Leipzig, 1789). But a more careful examination of this too will presently appear to be very much worth while. Here we find a man very much interested in all he can find bearing on the early Christians, interested also in early physicians, most especially Galen. He dates Galen's birth in the tenth year of Trajan, 108 A.D., at least twenty years too early (Syriac text, p. 56, ll. 14 f.; Latin, pp. 53 f.). In the reign of Hadrian he mentions *Claudius Ptolemaeus*, the astronomer, and in the same sentence Galen; "and Galen," he says, "studied." The Syriac form means *studied*; not as the Latin says: *Ejus* [i.e., of Ptolemy] *praeceptor fuit* Galenus medicus (p. 54). Then, under Antoninus Pius, much space is given to Galen (Syr. 57, 19—58, 20). The passage deserves fuller exposition than has yet been given to it. He says: "In his time Galen became renowned. And that he [Galen] did not live in the time of Christ our Lord, as some think, is clear from Galen's own statement; for he says in the beginning of the first book of the *Anatomy* that he had composed the first book of the *Anatomy*, when for the first time he came up to Rome in the beginning of the reign of Antoninus Pius."

وكان في زمانه من عظماء الأطباء والفرسان والسياسة
والفلاسفة واللاهوتيين واللاهوتيين واللاهوتيين . ولا يصح
من أن يكون في زمانه من عظماء الأطباء والفرسان والسياسة
والفلاسفة واللاهوتيين واللاهوتيين واللاهوتيين . ولا يصح
من أن يكون في زمانه من عظماء الأطباء والفرسان والسياسة
والفلاسفة واللاهوتيين واللاهوتيين واللاهوتيين . ولا يصح .

And he says in his commentary on Plato's book *Phaedon*: We see these people, called Christians, who base their faith on allusive sayings and miracles, and they do not fall short of those who are in truth philosophers; for they love chastity and are assiduous in fasting and careful not to eat. And among them there are some, who during their whole lifetime abstain from sexual intercourse.

He thereupon goes on to say that this must refer to monasticism, which first made its appearance one hundred years after the ascension, while the death of Galen falls, upon reliable information, one hundred and sixty years after the ascension. Then he has more to say about Galen's coming from Pergamos (i.e., Pergamon), his many books on medicine, of which about one hundred are still extant, and his revivification of the science of Hippocrates:

And when he was told about the miracles and healings which Christ our Lord had accomplished, he said: I do not doubt that they were accomplished by divine power. And he inquired whether any of his disciples were still living, and being told that there were some in Jerusalem he rose to go to Jerusalem. But when he reached Sicily, he died there eighty-eight years old.

Bar-Hebraeus closes his statement regarding Galen with a brief version of the story told in Galen's *Περὶ θηριακῆς πρὸς Παμφίλιον*, ed. Kühn, XIV, 299 (it may be remarked, in passing, that both the Syriac and the Arabic of Bar-Hebraeus, and the Arabic of *al-Qifl* and *Agapius Mabbugensis*, substitute "the city of Antioch" for Galen's *τὴν Ἰταλιῶτιν χῶραν* in this passage). Immediately thereafter Ptolemaeus Claudius is again mentioned. Galen is mentioned once more, in passing, as having been named "mule's head" by Alexander Aphrodisiensis on account of his obstinacy in disputation and controversy (Syr. 59, 8). A little later follows a note concerning the death of Commodus by strangulation.

The Arabic of this chronicle, *Historia Dynastiarum*, which the writer has only in Pococke's edition, Oxford, 1663, differs considerably from the Syriac. It was written some years later, and Bar-Hebraeus had learned in the meantime. As Pococke's careful index shows, Galen is mentioned in four distinct places: (1) Arabic text, p. 86, l. 3; Latin, 55, in connection with Hippocrates; (2) Arabic, 91, 10; Latin, 59, in connection with Rufus, the Physician; (3) Arabic, 104, 11; Latin, 67, in connection with Dioscorides (these three statements are not found in the Syriac, though Galen's work on Hippocrates is there mentioned); (4) Arabic, 122, 16—123, 16; Latin, 77 f. Again it is the reign of Antoninus Pius. Brief mention is made of Valentinus and Marcion; then follows Galen, his many books, the theriac story, his Pergamene

origin. Then follows an apocryphal statement about his practicing medicine in Alexandria. We return to the Syriac with the statement about the time when he lived. Then comes, slightly different from the Syriac, the note that this was more than one hundred years after the ascension. The statement on the Christians differs slightly from the Syriac: Galen's book is called a commentary (شرح), Plato's book is "the book of Plato on ethics" (الاخلاق) named Phadon (فادن) and the passage is quoted as follows:

ان هاولا القوم الذين يسمون نصاري قراهم قد بنوا مذهبهم
على الرموز والمعجزات وليسوا باقل من الفلاسفة الحقيقيين باعمالهم
يجبون العفة ويدمنون الصوم والصلوة ويجتنبون المظالم وفيهم اناس
لا يدنسون بالنسا

Behold, these people, who are named Christians; you [the Arabic may have read *we*] see how they have built their belief on allusive sayings and miracles, and they are not beneath the true philosophers in their deeds, loving continence (*or* chastity) and abiding in fasting and prayer, and shunning wickedness; and among them are some, who are not defiled with women.¹

He goes on: "I say that he means by the allusive sayings the parables indited on the Kingdom of Heaven in the holy evangel." His death is then related as in the Syriac, but with omission of the legendary features. Ptolemy the Claudian is thereupon mentioned, and a little later, as in the Syriac, the statement of Alexander Aphrod. concerning Galen. Marcus Aurelius and Commodus follow, a bit more historically than in the Syriac. Commodus "died by strangulation." In his reign are named and briefly described Tatian, Montanus, and Bardaisan.

It is impossible for the writer at present to examine more closely the relation of Bar-Hebraeus to his predecessors, who wrote in Syriac. He belongs to the generation succeeding Ibn Athlir, his dates being 1226-89; apparently in some measure dependent on Ibn Athlir, as his confused mass of Antonines seems to indicate, he is yet largely independent of this source, especially in his statements on Galen. It is said that he used Qifti, and it will presently appear that he knew and used Uṣaibi'a. But the statement on the Christians is not taken from them.

There were Arabic Christian writers who preceded Uṣaibi'a and Ibn Athlir. The first of these, in all probability, was Eutychius of

¹ The text of Ṣalḥānī, which has just come to the writer's hand, as he is reading proof, does not at this point differ materially from Pococke. Ṣalḥānī's index adds two further passages on Galen, neither of which, however, has to do with the matter in hand.

Alexandria (Saʿīd ibn al-Baṭrīq), 867-940. Eutychius' *Annals* were published in 1906 by Cheikho in the *CSCO*, Ser. III, Tom. VI, 1. It is interesting to note that he mentions Galen, indeed, in the reign of Commodus (p. 105), and quotes with approval some of his words, *but not the statement regarding the Christians*. Neither does the Egyptian contemporary of Bar-Hebraeus, Petros (Buṭrus ibn Rāhib), who seems merely to have extracted Eutychius, have this statement.

But of late there has come to light another Christian historian of Syria, contemporary with, and but slightly, if any, younger than, Eutychius. The pragmatic compendium of universal history, *Kitāb al-ʿUnwān*, of Agapius of Mabbug-Hierapolis, was first published by a pupil of the late Russian master, Rosen, Alexander A. Vasiliev, in the *Patrologia Orientalis*; but Vasiliev's work is still incomplete. Meanwhile the indefatigable Cheikho has brought out a complete edition of the Arabic text in the *CSCO*, Ser. III, Tom. V. Agapius, son of Constantine (Maḥbūb al Manbiḡ), bishop of Hierapolis in Northern Syria in the first half of the tenth century, alludes to the year 942 as the year in which he was writing at least the latter part of his history. This places him slightly later than Eutychius of Alexandria, who died in 940. He was a Melchite in religion, a Greek in origin, and he knew and read both Greek and Syriac in addition to Arabic. The Florentine manuscript, the only manuscript known, which contains the latter part of Agapius' history, from Theodosius II, has up to this point a history of the Roman Caesars. In the Florentine text the length of Commodus' reign, and a list of the bishops of Rome, Antioch, Byzantium, and Jerusalem during his time, constitute the sum and substance of what is mentioned at this point. The reign of Marcus Aurelius, however, is much more fully dealt with. The tale closes with a long story about Bardaiṣan, similar to that found in the chronicle of Michael the Syrian († 1199). The Florentine text, however, is in part a mere sketchy extract from the fuller text, which forms the close of the first part of the history.

The first part, however, as published by Cheikho from one manuscript at Oxford and five others in the Orient, is, for the reign of Commodus, much fuller. The Bardaiṣan story, also, is no longer told under Marcus Aurelius, but under Commodus. The exact relation of the two texts to each other is not wholly clear to the writer at present; he himself has no time to examine it more closely, nor has he access to the work of Vasiliev on the subject. He must content himself, therefore, with this brief statement. Most interesting, however, is the paragraph preceding that on Bardaiṣan. Immediately following the note on the

accession of Commodus and the length of his reign, we find the following (pp. 180, 8—181, 5): Justinus Martyr is given brief mention, as is Dioscorides, whom the note following his name places distinctly in the reign of Hadrian. Then comes Galen, “the master in the art of medicine” (Buṭrus ibn Rāhib and Eutychius of Alexandria). He became renowned at this time and was very skilful in the art of medicine. His many books are mentioned, of which about one hundred are still extant; in this sentence the version of Bar-Hebraeus exhibits only very slight differences. Then comes the theriac story, almost exactly as in Bar-Hebraeus; likewise his Pergamene origin and Alexandrian practice and the dating from the ascension with mention of those who place him earlier. Galen’s book is called a commentary (شرح) as in Bar-Hebraeus and under the misspelt فادون the Phaidon (فادون) is still clearly apparent; the “ethics” of Bar-Hebraeus, however, is omitted. In the text of the quotation Bar-Hebraeus’ تراههم, “you see (them),” is omitted; لانهم, “because they,” is inserted after “deeds”; يراعون, “they observe,” is read for يدمنون, “they abide in”; يتدنسون appears in place of يدنسون, a mere slight difference in a grammatical form, both meaning the same, “who are (not) defiled.” The note concerning the parables is precisely the same; likewise the note on the death and age of Galen, except for a grammatical error committed by Cheikho. The succeeding note concerning Galen’s relations with Commodus and his researches as Agapius relates it is not found in precisely this form in any of the Arabic statements concerning Galen which have come to the writer’s notice. But this need not detain us.

It is clear at a glance that we have here before us the immediate source of Bar-Hebraeus’ Arabic. For the full text of the Moslems, as we have seen, Agapius cannot be the immediate source; perhaps none of the Moslem writers used him directly at this point. But the fact that the two general historians quoted mention Galen and his statement at this point, in the reign of Commodus, is remarkable. It is plainly necessary to consider separately the very fact that the Moslem historians here mention Galen’s remark on the Christians and the diversity of the texts quoted. The fact that the Moslem historians at this point exhibit interest almost solely for the affairs of the Christians can be accounted for only on the supposition that they are treading in the footsteps of Christian writers. Abulfeda’s note on the suicide of Commodus looks like an improved Bar-Hebraeus; his reference to the “Canon” points to the

source of the improvement (cf. e.g., Eusebius' *Chronikon-Kanon*, ed. Karst, p. 223). The striking remark in Ibn Athīr, followed by Abulfeda, that Galen "lived to the time of Ptolemaeus Claudius," which can only by main force be made to mean "he was born before the death of Ptolemy," points to a similar, if not an identical, source for both Ibn Athīr and Bar-Hebraeus, who, with more extended notice of Ptolemy, exhibits the same uncertainty as to Ptolemy's dates and the same tendency to bring him into relation with Galen; what this common source of these two writers was will presently appear. The prominent mention given to Galen at this point evidently antedates Agapius of Hierapolis; for it is found also in his older contemporary Eutychius, though the two are manifestly largely independent of each other at this point, with a bare possibility remaining that Agapius had seen the work of Eutychius. Again, the writer is unable to proceed farther along this line of inquiry. But one fact stands out clearly: the man who introduced Galen's statement on the Christians into this paragraph of the universal histories written in Arabic was Agapius of Hierapolis.

How then is the diversity in the texts of the statement to be explained? For manifestly this diversity is greater than Gieseler's words indicate; Abulfeda's text is not merely fuller than that of Agapius and Bar-Hebraeus, it is an utterly different text. The Greek is fairly apparent under the Arabic of both, more conspicuous in Abulfeda's version; but the Greek under the Arabic and Syriac of the Christians is *not the Greek of Galen*. Galen never said that the Christians of his day "observed" or "were constant in fasting and prayer," nor that they "were not defiled with women." But the Greek underlying Abulfeda's version is *Galen's Greek*. In the *inability of the masses to follow an apodictic discourse*, in the *those who are in truth philosophers*, etc., Galen's idiom fairly urges itself upon the reader. It would be an easy matter to retranslate Abulfeda's Arabic into Greek composed of Galen's own words and phrases; but as this would be a mere schoolboy's exercise of a kind which usually does more harm than good, such a retranslation is better left undone. Moreover, the sentiment and thought of Abulfeda's text is Galen's. The eclectic philosopher's recognition of what is good in the Christians is obvious. This scientific objectivity means much in this case, for Galen was not a Christian, nor wholly in sympathy with their point of view. This is clear from the other passages where he mentions them (cf. Galen's works, ed. Kühn, I, XLII, n. w, and see above under Uṣāibī'a). Those now extant are in the *Περὶ διαφορᾶς σφυγμῶν*. In refuting a dogmatic statement of Archigenes on eight qualities of the pulses, Galen

says (ed. Kühn, VIII, 579, ll. 13-17): κάλλιον δ' ἂν ἦν πολλῇ προσθεῖναι τινα, εἰ καὶ μὴ βεβαίαν ἀπόδειξιν, παραμυθίαν γ' οὖν ἱκανὴν τῇ λόγῳ περὶ τῶν ὀκτὼ ποιότητων, ἵνα μὴ τις εὐθὺς κατ' ἀρχὰς, ὥς εἰς Μωϋσοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ διατριβὴν ἀφειγμένος, νόμων ἀναποδείκτων ἀκούῃ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν οἷς ἦκιστα χρή. Yet Archigenes and his school are not to be persuaded nor convinced by any reasoning or proofs. So he goes on to say later in the same work (*op. cit.*, ll. 656-57) that he finally became proudly silent, thinking with the Κωμικός: Ὡς οὔτε στρεβλὸν ὀρθοῦται ξύλον, οὔτε γερανδριὸν μετατεθεὶν μωσχεύεται. θάπτον γὰρ ἂν τις τοὺς ἀπὸ Μωϋσοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ μεταδιδάξαιεν ἢ τοὺς ταῖς αἰρέσεσι προστετηκότας ἰατροὺς τε καὶ φιλοσόφους. This latter statement reminds one of Pliny's opinion of the Christians. It goes to show that, on the other hand, one must not consider Galen's praise of certain qualities and attainments of the Christians a commendation of Christians and Christianity *in toto*, such as the version of Agapius would make it. In fact, the whole point of the passage probably lies rather in the persiflage it contains on the claims of the Platonic school and of Platonic philosophy than in the praise of the Christians. At this point it becomes clear in Abulfeda's version that what we have here is Galen's *thought*, as well as his Greek, *not* Plato's thought. Here Galen exhibits the evil side of his eclectic philosophy, as above we saw him exhibit the good. Here it becomes manifest that Galen had not, what was Plato's birthright, aristocratic reserve, and that, on the other hand, he is moved by what is absent in Plato's mind, scientific vanity (hence Alexander Aphrodisiensis' epithet for Galen, "mule's head"). Of the genuineness of the words in Abulfeda's version there can, therefore, hardly be a question.

What precise words of Plato's are referred to is, however, not so easy to determine, as will be apparent from the foregoing. The writer has made such diligent search as was possible for him in the *Phaedo*, the *Politicus*, and the *Republic*. In the *Phaedo*, for example, 69ed offers a point of contact, as does 92d. In the *Politicus* 304cd might have given occasion for the remark. And in the *Republic* perhaps 382cd or 494a might be considered. Of the passages mentioned the *Phaedo* sentences look most likely. And perhaps someone who knows his Plato better than the writer may be able to furnish still better clues for Galen's words. In spite of this the writer feels constrained in this matter to decide with the Moslems for the *Republic*. In the first place, the nature of Galen's work on the *Dialogues* of Plato must be considered. Steinschneider and Kalbfleisch make much of the name *Synopsis* as against commentary. So far as the Arabic *ḡawāmi'* goes and the successful identification of the work of Galen's from which the passage is quoted, Steinschneider is

correct enough. Then how account for the unmistakable Arabic of 'Ubad Allāh and Agapius, and the Syriac of Bar-Hebraeus, all of which, though two different Arabic words are used, can only mean *interpretation* or commentary? This question is answered by Galen himself in the Προοίμιον of his Περὶ τῶν ἰδίων βιβλίων (ed. Kühn, XIX, 11): ὑποτυπώσεις γοῦν ἔγραψαν ἔνιοι τῶν πρὸ ἐμοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα βιβλία καθάπερ τινὲς ὑπογραφαί, ἕτεροι δ' εἰσαγωγὰς ἢ συνόψεις ἢ ὑφηγήσεις· ἐγὼ δ' ἀπλῶς δοὺς τοῖς μαθηταῖς οὐδὲν ἐπέγραψα· καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' ὕστερον εἰς πολλοὺς ἀφικομένων ἄλλος ἄλλην ἐπιγραφὴν ἐποιήσατο. This passage shows pretty clearly what Galen means by *Synopsis*—not at all what it means to us, nor, strictly speaking, a commentary, but rather, as the writer has translated the Arabic of the Moslem historians, *remarks* or *comments*. This, as well as the true meaning of Galen's words above indicated, makes it clear that what must be looked for is rather the general tenor of the work of Plato in question than specific passages in them. From this point of view the *Phaedo* offered a most sympathetic book to the Christians and to their understanding and version of Galen's words (note the addition in Bar-Hebraeus' Arabic "on ethics"). On the other hand, the *Republic*, with its apparently extravagant claims for the value of true philosophy, was precisely the book to elicit a remark of this nature from Galen. The probable source of the two versions also points to the greater accuracy of the Moslems. Whence did Agapius derive his text and information? In spite of the fact that he belongs to the very next generation after the great translators Qostā ibn Lūqā, Ḥunain, and Ḥubaish, it is practically certain that his text is not that of Ḥunain. The translation may be his own, but whether he received it in Greek or in Arabic, there are several indications which point pretty clearly to the place whence he derived it. The theriac story, the practice of Galen in Alexandria, which latter is absolutely unhistorical, and the sketchy summary nature of his text, as well as the epithet "master of the art of medicine," all point in the same direction, namely, to the paraphrasing epitomizers of the Alexandrian school (Steinschneider, *Virchow's Archiv*, loc. cit., pp. 277 f.). On the other hand, of the Moslems it is practically certain that Uṣaibī'a personally knew and had Ḥunain's text. His own and his predecessor Qiftī's text of the statement regarding the Christians is not, indeed, derived directly from Ḥunain. As has been shown, both quote Ibn Boḥtīsūc. But comparison with Abulfeda shows that the two are in essence identical. And the title *ḡawḏmi*c of Ibn Athīr and Abulfeda, together with the note found in Uṣaibī'a, makes it practically certain that this is the text of Ḥunain, quoted directly by 'Ubad Allāh and by Abulfeda (or an unknown source of his), and that the place whence it is

derived is the *Synopsis on the Republic*. The queer note about Ptolemaeus Claudius in Athīr and Abulfeda, which plainly contradicts the dating of Galen in the reign of Commodus, also points to the faulty chronology which was apparently the common property of Ḥunain, his son Ishāq and their source, John the Grammarian, of Alexandria.

The parenthetic remark on the meaning of "allusive sayings" is inserted in the Christian version by Agapius or his source. In the Moslem version given by Abulfeda it may be traced to Ḥunain. The explanation of Bar-Hebraeus, Qiftī, and Uṣ. about the reference of the statement to monasticism is clearly from the pen of 'Ubaid Allāh. Bar-Hebraeus' position for the note on Galen is his own, resulting from his faulty chronology, which is due to his confusion about the Antonines, his hasty reading of Boḥṭṣū's careful statement, and, perhaps, some indirect influence of the chronological errors of Ḥunain and the Alexandrian epitomizers, which latter may account for the queer Ptolemy-clause of Athīr and Abulfeda, as well. The slight differences in Bar-Hebraeus' Arabic of the statement concerning the Christians from that of Agapius are probably due to conflation with Ḥunain's text, as found in Uṣ. Whence come the earlier notes on Galen in Bar-Hebraeus' Arabic the writer cannot stop to inquire; it is said that they are from Qiftī (Lippert, *Einleitung*, p. 17). As for Bar-Hebraeus' Syriac, that is a different matter. In all except the last three lines this follows closely in the sequence of events the Galen story of Uṣaibī'a. From Uṣ. also Bar-Hebraeus derived the legendary journey toward Jerusalem. The text of the statement regarding the Christians and its ascription to the *Commentary on the Phaedo* exhibits conflation with Agapius of Mabbug-Hierapolis. From him, too, is derived the theriac tale, which occupies the last three lines. Most of this material, including the theriac story, which is missing in Uṣ. is found in Qiftī also, but so differently arranged that we may be sure the busy bishop did not use him for his source. The Syriac of Bar-Hebraeus therefore seems to be a much abbreviated Uṣ., conflate with Agapius and possibly another source (the revivification of Hippocrates).

That this inquiry leaves many gaps between Galen and us, on the one hand, and between Plato and Galen on the other, unfilled, is perfectly clear to the writer. He will welcome any and all criticism or assistance; in fact, he thinks he has opened the discussion of a problem, not finally solved it. In the interest of science he asks that, if possible, such additions be made in this *Journal*. Scattering notes, little or big, on the same subject in obscure corners of widely separated journals is, in the writer's belief, a public misdemeanor in the world-empire of science.

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THE PARDONING OF PRISONERS BY PILATE

The four evangelists, in narrating the history of the trial of Jesus before Pilate, lay much stress upon the effort made by the governor to save Jesus from the penalty which his accusers desired to have inflicted upon him. Pilate's last and supreme effort consisted in offering to pardon a prisoner, and his hope was that the people assembled before his tribunal would choose Jesus as the prisoner to be pardoned. But he made the fatal mistake of suggesting as an alternative that Barabbas was lying in prison, bound, and might properly be the object of clemency.

In all four Gospels the release of a prisoner at the time of the Passover is mentioned as a custom. The passages are the following: Matt. 27:15: *κατὰ δὲ ἑορτὴν εἰώθει ὁ ἡγεμὼν ἀπολύειν ἓνα τῷ ὄχλῳ δέσμιον, ὃν ᾔθελον*; Mark 15:6: *κατὰ δὲ ἑορτὴν ἀπέλυεν αὐτοῖς ἓνα δέσμιον, ὃν παρηγοῦντο*; John 18:39: *ἔστι δὲ συνήθεια ὑμῶν, ἵνα ἓνα ὑμῶν ἀπολύσω ἐν τῷ πάσχα*. The parallel passage of Luke is lacking in some manuscripts, and is omitted in Westcott and Hort, Nestle, the American Revised translation, and other modern editions. It reads: *ἀνάγκη δὲ εἶχεν ἀπολύειν αὐτοῖς κατὰ ἑορτὴν ἓνα* (23:17). An analysis of these statements shows that the release of a prisoner was an established thing, for all four accounts use the imperfect tense of the verb in describing the matter. A careful reading of them indicates also that it was the people and not the governor who decided what prisoner should be released, for the datives of the pronouns (*αὐτοῖς* and *ὑμῖν*), together with the verbs selected (*ᾔθελον* and *παρηγοῦντο*), clearly have this significance. In like manner, the peculiar form of expression in the passage of Luke, which is very old if not indeed genuine, proves that the people expected, and perhaps demanded, that this act of clemency be performed at the Passover.

Various accounts of the life of Christ, and many treatments of the history of the trial, have discussed these passages, either from the standpoint of explaining the phenomenon of pardon, or with a view to examining their historicity. Some have held that the release of a prisoner by Pilate at the festival of the Passover was but the continuance of an ancient Hebrew custom, inaugurated very early to commemorate the escape of the Hebrews by divine aid from their bondage in Egypt. It is said that Pilate merely followed this same ancient custom in order to please his subjects. Others, who also hold that the custom was of Hebrew origin, regard it as an indication of the considerate treatment accorded by the Romans to their subject states, in that they allowed the native customs to survive, and even instructed governors of provinces to enforce these native customs, notwithstanding the fact that they

sometimes conflicted with the Roman ideas of justice and law. But there is absolutely no evidence that the pardoning or release of a prisoner had ever occurred, even once, before the time of Pilate. Certainly it would have been mentioned somewhere in the Old Testament if it had been a rite connected with the celebration of the Passover. A matter of such significance in inducing the nation to remember periodically the most vital incident in its national development could never have passed unnoticed in the historical or even in the poetical portions of its literature. If it had been a feature of the ceremony of the celebration of the Passover, the sections of the Talmud dealing with this festival would assuredly have told in just what manner this portion of the ceremonial was performed, and at what hour on the day of the Passover it occurred. But there is not a word about it, although the Talmud contains a full description of the ceremonies from hour to hour, with an explanation of the reason for each portion of the rites performed. Furthermore, if it had been an example of Roman consideration instituted at the establishment of the Jews as a subject nation, or even at the establishment of Judea as a province, it is certain that Josephus would have mentioned it in his history of the period. Nor would it have been omitted by Philo, particularly when he was enumerating all the favors received by the Jews from the Romans.¹ Amid such general silence it becomes necessary to regard this custom as one instituted only by Pilate, and continuing merely during the period of his procuratorship in Judea.

In view of this silence, some scholars have argued that the pardoning of a prisoner was not of Hebrew origin, but was a transference of a Roman custom to the provinces, and think that the feast of the *Lectisternium* at Rome offers a parallel. This festival occurred first in 399 B.C., according to the account given by Livy, who tells of the conditions prevailing in the city during the days of the festival, and mentions the terms on which prisoners were released: "*tota urbe patentibus ianuis promiscuoque usu rerum omnium in propatulo posito notos ignotosque passim advenas in hospitium ductos ferunt, et cum inimicis quoque benigne ac comiter sermones habitos, iurgiis ac litibus temperatum; vinctis quoque dempta in eos dies vincula, religioni dende fuisse, quibus eam opem dei tulissent, vinciri.*"² It is clear that the release of prisoners described by Livy is not parallel to the release intended by Pilate. At the *Lectisternium* the prisoners were simply let out on parole, and they were to agree to return to prison at the expiration of the period of the festival. No person believes, nor can one believe, that Pilate expected that Jesus

¹*Legatio ad Gaium, passim.*

²v. 13. 5-8; cf. Dionys. xii. 9.

or Barabbas, if released, would be returned to prison at the conclusion of the celebration of the Passover. The release or pardon was intended to be permanent. A second difference between the two customs consists in the fact that at Jerusalem, if one may interpret the gospels literally, the pardoning occurred each year at the Passover, whereas the Lectisternium took place only very rarely, at times of public distress, or, later, coupled with periods of special thanksgiving.¹ In addition to this difference, it is also to be noticed that there is no hint in the descriptions of the Lectisternium that prisoners were ever set free, except at the time of the first occurrence of the festival. In ordinary times in Rome large classes of the population were prohibited from entering the temples of the gods in whose honor the Lectisternium was usually held. But at times of festival all classes were admitted, both men and women,² citizens and neighboring peoples,³ farmers and dwellers in the city,⁴ freemen and freedmen,⁵ and even the whole of Italy.⁶ Although many such statements occur, there is no passage in which prisoners are mentioned in any manner, and it is scarcely conceivable that there would be an omission in our authorities if prisoners were actually present. The Lectisternium became characteristic of the "ludi plebei," and early in the period of the empire was celebrated at the "ludi Romani," but in neither case is there any notice of a continuance of even the granting of parole which occurred on the occasion of the first Lectisternium.

In contrast with the views already given, some writers have called into question the accuracy of the accounts of this episode in the gospels, on the ground that the governor of a province had not the power of pardon. Conversely, others accept the accuracy of the accounts, but hold that releasing a prisoner was another instance of the illegalities perpetrated by Pilate on this occasion. There seems to be no instance on record, either from Rome or from the provinces, in which a Roman officer pardoned any person who had been convicted of a crime. During the period of the republic penalties for infringements of the provisions of the criminal code were revoked only by vote of the people, as happened when Cicero was recalled from banishment. But with the assumption of the dictatorship by Julius Caesar many appeals were made directly to him in behalf of those who had earlier been convicted of offenses, chiefly political offenses, and Caesar seems to have taken upon himself the right to revoke the findings of the courts, or the votes of the popular

¹ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, iii. 17.

² Livy xxvii. 51. 8.

³ *Ibid.* vii. 28. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.* xxii. 10. 8.

⁵ Macrobius i. 6. 13.

⁶ Livy xl. 10. 5.

assemblies. The revocation of sentences during the first century of the empire was comparatively rare, for each emperor seems to have held it a point of honor to uphold the dignity and decisions of his predecessor. When cases of revocation did occur, it was usually done by vote of the Senate.¹ But with the death of Domitian a change gradually came about, so that the historians relate a number of instances of men, banished by Domitian upon conviction in the courts, who were allowed by Nerva or Trajan to return to Rome. Even much later than this, although the right of pardon was assumed as a function of the emperor, it must have been used sparingly, for Antoninus Pius appealed to the Senate for its confirmation in several cases in which he desired to exercise clemency: "Is, quos Hadrianus damnaverat, in senatu indulgentias petit, dicens etiam ipsum Hadrianum hoc fuisse facturum."²

The *Corpus* of Justinian expressly forbade governors of provinces to reverse their decisions. Thus the *Codex* says: "Poenam sua dictam sententia praesidi provinciae revocare non licet."³ Practically the same statement appears in the *Digest*: "Divi fratres Arruntio Siloni rescripserunt non solere praesides provinciarum ea quae pronuntiaverunt ipsos rescindere."⁴ Callistratus, the writer of this passage of the *Digest*, continues by saying that, if it appears that the plaintiff in a case can be proved to have been guilty of perjury, or if the defendant has new evidence in his own favor which was not available at the time of trial, the penalty may be diminished, or may be entirely annulled. The governor, however, has no power to do this himself, but must lay the case before the emperor for his decision: "sed id dumtaxat a principibus fieri potest." This rescript of the *divi fratres*, that is, of Marcus Aurelius and Verus, was issued about 165 A.D.; but it cannot be imagined that the governors of the provinces in earlier times possessed greater privileges, and certainly they did not have such powers in the imperial provinces.

On the other hand, the situation was quite different when a matter had been entered for action, but had not yet been adjudicated. From the earliest times criminal actions were normally instituted by private persons, and the Romans took great pains to insure honesty on the part of plaintiffs, and to be convinced that suits were not undertaken merely to cause trouble to an enemy. For this reason they established heavy penalties against those who were guilty of trumping up false charges, or who conducted their cases so carelessly as to render the hearings in court

¹ *Digest* xlviii. 10. 5; 16. 12.

² Julius Capitolinus, *Antoninus Pius* 6. 3.

³ viii. 47. 15.

⁴ xlviii. 19. 27.

farcical, or to induce the suspicion of collusion with the defendant.¹ But it might readily happen that a plaintiff who thought he had a good case against an alleged offender would discover as the case proceeded that he had made a serious mistake. If this happened he would desire to withdraw his suit. The Roman law forbade the plaintiff to withdraw merely of his own volition, for such a privilege might encourage ill-advised or careless charges to be made in court and to be discontinued with equal readiness: "quod qualiscunque accusatio illata cognoscentis auctoritate, non accusantis voluntate aboleri debet maioreque odio dignus existimaretur, qui temere ad tam improbam accusationem processisset."² The Romans, therefore, established rules for the obtaining of permission to discontinue a suit, and in the provinces such permission could be granted only by the governor: "Si quis autem ab accusatione citra abolitionem destiterit, punitur. Abolitio privatim a praesidibus postulari ac impetrari solet, item pro tribunali, non de plano."³ From a somewhat indefinite statement by Paulus, it seems probable that the emperor could grant permission to anyone to withdraw from a prosecution, and without the restrictions imposed upon a governor: "Destitisse eum accipiemus, qui in totum animum agendi deposuit, non qui distulit accusationem. Sed qui permissu imperatoris ab accusatione destitit, impunitus est."⁴

Obviously the situation of Barabbas at the time of the trial of Jesus was that he had been accused of a crime, and was now in prison awaiting the hearing of his case. Matthew calls him merely a "notable prisoner," "δέσμιος ἐπίσημος (27:8), but the word δέσμιος means only "one who is bound," and need not at all signify imprisonment as the result of a legal conviction. Mark describes the position of Barabbas thus: μετὰ τῶν στασιαστῶν δεδεμένος οἵτινες ἐν τῇ στάσει φόνον πεποιήκεισαν (15:7). This says simply that Barabbas was bound, and the same verb, δέω, is used a few verses earlier of Jesus as he was led to the court of Pilate: δῆσαντες τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἀπήνεγκαν (15:1). Luke uses a much stronger expression: ὅστις ἦν διὰ στάσιν τινὰ γενομένην ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ φόνον βληθεὶς ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ (23:19). The same expression occurs in Matthew of a judicial conviction (5:25), and once of legal confinement (18:30), but Matthew uses it also, with a different, but synonymous, verb, to describe the position of a person kept under guard without trial, or until his trial should occur: ὁ γὰρ Ἡρώδης κρατήσας τὸν Ἰωάννην ἔδρασεν καὶ ἐν φυλακῇ ἀπέθετο (14:3). Mark and Luke both mention the crime for which

¹ *Op. cit.* xlvii. 15; xlviii. 16. 1. 1-7.

² *Ibid.* 16. 1. 7-8.

³ *Ibid.* 16. 1. 10.

⁴ *Ibid.* 16. 13.

Barabbas was held. It was insurrection, and murder committed during the insurrection. The penalty for this crime, when committed in the provinces by those who were not Roman citizens, was death. Barabbas was not in prison, therefore, as a punishment for his crime.

Insurrection was one of the acts treated as treason, and at the time of this episode the law in force on the subject was the *lex Iulia de maiestate*, a measure proposed by Augustus, and passed by the Senate. The *Digest* tells in the most general terms who is guilty of the offense of treason: "*lex autem Iulia maiestatis praecipit eum, qui maiestatem publicam laeserit, teneri.*"¹ The contents of the law are described more fully a little earlier: "*Maiestatis autem crimen illud est, quod adversus populum Romanum vel adversus securitatem eius committitur. Quo tenetur is, cuius opera dolo malo consilium initum erit, quo obsides iniussu principis interciderent: quo armati homines cum telis lapidibusve in urbe sint convenientve adversus rem publicam, locave occupentur vel templa, quove coetus conventusve fiat hominesve ad seditionem convocentur.*"² The ordinary Greek word used to translate *seditio* is *στάσις*, also used by Mark and Luke to define the crime of Barabbas. The verb commonly employed to denote this act of treason is *deficere*, which is thus defined: "*deficere autem dicuntur, qui ab his, quorum sub imperio sunt, desistunt et in hostium numerum se conferunt.*"³

The penalty for sedition is thus described by Paulus: "*Auctores seditionis et tumultus vel concitatores populi pro qualitate dignitatis aut in crucem tolluntur aut bestiis obiiciuntur aut in insulam deportantur.*"⁴ Either the first or the second of these punishments would be inflicted upon Barabbas, because he was a member of a subject state. Upon conviction for murder, of which Barabbas was apparently also guilty, a law of Sulla prescribed the same punishment: "*humiliores vero aut in crucem tolluntur aut bestiis obiiciuntur.*"⁵

It could not be the case that Barabbas had already been convicted, and was now awaiting punishment, for Pilate would then have lost the power to release him. Nor did the Romans allow an interval between conviction and execution, according to a ruling quoted by Theodosius from Gratianus: "*De his quos tenet carcer id aperta definitione sancimus, ut aut convictum velox poena subducat aut liberandum custodia diuturna non maceret.*"⁶ The same promptness in carrying out the execution of a sentence was characteristic even of the republican period, as may be

¹ *Ibid.* 4. 3.

² *Ibid.* 4. 1.

³ *Ibid.* iv. 5. 5. 1.

⁴ *Sent.* v. 22. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.* 23. 1.

⁶ *Justinian Codex* ix. 4. 5.

seen from the fact that the conspirators associated with Catiline were put to death immediately after conviction. A century later Tacitus relates a similar instance: "ductus in carcerem et statim exanimatus."¹ We must conclude, therefore, that Barabbas was in prison awaiting trial when he unexpectedly received his release. It is also to be noticed that Pilate did not pronounce sentence upon Jesus until after the choice between the two prisoners had been made. If he had already pronounced sentence, he could not have released Jesus without exceeding his legal powers.

It has been shown that no record exists which tends to prove that the system of releasing prisoners was employed by any governor of Judea before Pilate, and the use, in John's narrative, of the first person of the verb, *ἀπολύσω*, shows that it was, in the opinion of the author of John, a device conceived by Pilate. No doubt Pilate was then on his annual circuit of the province to hear cases at law, and this will explain his presence in Jerusalem at this time. He probably found it advisable to arrange his circuit to permit of his being in Jerusalem at the time of the Passover. He would be attended by troops at any time while he was on circuit, but it would be especially desirable to have troops in Jerusalem when the city was thronged with visitors. Whether he heard cases before that of Jesus it is impossible to say, but he obviously knew of the presence of Barabbas in prison awaiting trial for sedition. The course to be adopted in legally effecting the release of any prisoner would be to induce the prosecutor to withdraw his suit. The prosecutor of Barabbas, whoever he was, acceded to the expressed wish of the crowd, but the prosecutors of Jesus refused to withdraw. Consequently there is no occasion for rejecting this episode in the gospels on the ground of assumed illegality on the part of Pilate in releasing one held for trial. It was absolutely correct, from the legal standpoint, in every particular; but the phenomenon must have been rare, or the ancient writers would have mentioned it as occurring elsewhere, and under other circumstances.

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¹ *Ann.* iii. 51.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

A NEW WORK ON BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY¹

During the last fifty years, since the discovery and decipherment of the monuments of Egypt and Babylonia, many books have been written on the relation of these monuments to the Bible. Most of these are destitute of historical value on account of their dogmatic bias. Some of them are apologetic, and are written with the avowed purpose of proving the inerrancy of the Old Testament and defending the traditional theories of the authorship of its books. Such works argue from the antiquity of writing in Egypt and in Babylonia that Moses must have written the Pentateuch, regardless of the question whether either the Egyptian or the Babylonian script is adapted for the recording of Hebrew literature. They eagerly catch at the statement of Merneptah in regard to Israel, "Its seed is destroyed," as a "confirmation" of the story in Exodus of Pharaoh's killing of the Hebrew children. To this class belong the works of Sayce, Hommel, Urquhart, Kyle, and a host of minor writers. They interest religious people, but they are of little value to scientific investigators. At the other extreme stand the writings of the modern German Pan-Babylonian school. They are convinced that everything good and great in the history of the ancient world has come out of a primitive Babylonian astral *Weltanschauung*. The history of Israel and its religion, the Homeric poems, the Gospels, and primitive Christianity are all modified forms of this ancient astrology. Here belong the treatises of Winckler, Zimmern, Jeremias, Stucken, etc. Between these two extremes it is hard to find many sober, objective presentations of the facts of archaeology in their relation to the Bible. Schrader's *Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament* was a work of this sort before Winckler and Zimmern rewrote it in the interest of Pan-Babylonianism. Roger's *Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament* and Jastrow's *Hebrew and Babylonian Traditions* are modern works of a similar scientific character. Unfortunately both of these are limited to Babylonian archaeology, and both aim chiefly to give translations of

¹ *Archaeology and the Bible*. By George A. Barton. Philadelphia: American Sunday-School Union, 1916. xiv+461 pages. \$2.00.

texts that are parallel to the Bible. There is great need of a book that shall gather up all the facts of archaeology from all the lands of the ancient Orient, and present these in their historical relation to the statements of the Old Testament.

This need is met in a satisfactory manner by Professor Barton's work. He is an accomplished Sumerian and Babylonian scholar and Orientalist. He is thoroughly trained in scientific methods of research, and he has the faculty of impartial judgment that is necessary in a historian. In this work the facts of oriental archaeology are gathered with the most painstaking thoroughness. No discovery made prior to 1916 that has any bearing on the Bible is omitted. The translations of inscriptions can be trusted as made directly from the original and as representing the last word in linguistic science. Here a mass of information that hitherto has been accessible only in technical journals and reports is spread before the student in convenient form. It is a mine of archaeological and biblical information. On the sides of completeness and of accuracy this book deserves the highest praise.

Only in the matter of method of presentation is it open to unfavorable criticism. In the writing of history two methods are possible, the perpendicular or the horizontal; that is, one may take certain topics, and discuss them in historical fashion from beginning to end; or one may give cross-sections of history, and discuss all the topics in the successive periods. The latter method has come generally to be regarded as the better. In a history of Israel we do not want chapters on Israel's literature, its government, its manners, and its religions, but we need to know what were the literature, the government, the manners, and the religion in each period. In a treatise on the religion of Israel a discussion of the doctrines of God, of man, of sin, etc., in their separate historical development, such as A. B. Davidson gives in his *Theology of the Old Testament*, is found to be less satisfactory than a discussion of all the beliefs of Israel in each successive period of its history. In like manner, the facts of archaeology and of the Bible are most conveniently grouped under periods of the history of the ancient Orient. The destinies of the ancient nations interlocked, so that we do not need separate histories of each of them, but we want to know what was happening the same time in all of them.

Dr. Barton unfortunately has rejected this strictly historical method in favor of a semi-historical, topical method. In the first part he takes up, successively, Egypt, Babylonia and Assyria, the Hittites, and Palestine; and under each head discusses the land and the preservation

of its antiquities, the discovery of the antiquities and their decipherment, the chronology and outline of history, and the discoveries which bear on the Bible. If one wishes to know what was happening in the world in the time of Rameses II, one must consult each of these chapters for the appropriate paragraph. If one wishes to examine the documents which are the sources for the history of this period, one must go to the second part where the ancient documents that confirm or illustrate the Bible are given in translation. It is impossible from this book to gain a clear idea of any particular period of the world's history without considerable labor. Instead of being a history of the ancient Orient in the light of archaeology and of the Bible, it is a collection of monographs on various topics connected with oriental archaeology. To illustrate from the treatment of the Hebrew patriarchs, Abraham is discussed in the chapter on Egypt in connection with the question whether he went to Egypt in the period of Hyksos rule. His purchase of the cave of Machpelah is discussed in chap. iii, on the Hittites. His migration to Canaan is discussed in chap. v, on the archaeological history of Palestine; his sacrifice of Isaac in chap. xii, on high places and temples; while the whole question of his relation to Babylonian archaeology is postponed to the ninth chapter of the second part. The biblical student who wants to know about Abraham and his times will have hard work to gain any clear conceptions. In the same way Jacob and Joseph are mentioned at various points in the history of the several oriental nations and their archaeological connections are not created until Part II, chap. x. This is a serious defect in the work. The author owes it to his reader to classify all the data of archaeology and of the Bible and to assign them to their proper place chronologically so that one may be able to see at a glance all that is known about any given period of history. In the case of the biblical traditions this is often a difficult process; nevertheless it must be attempted if we are to use our facts for historical purposes. Perhaps it is just this difficulty, and the fear of stirring up dogmatic prejudice, that have led the author to adopt the topical rather than the historical method of treatment. It is impossible for the heresy-hunter to find out exactly what he thinks about the meaning and chronological placing of a story of Genesis. In a book published by the Sunday-School Union and intended for Sunday-school teachers and scholars this obscurity may be a virtue. In any case it is different from the trenchant historical criticism of Dr. Barton in previous articles in technical journals.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON

HARTFORD THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL¹

The title of Professor Badè's book suggests that it is an introduction to the Old Testament. In reality, it is a history of the religion of Israel from the modern critical point of view. In the introduction the author points out that the chief difficulty in the Old Testament for our age is not scientific but moral. This difficulty the traditional, static conception of the Old Testament as a uniformly inspired, inerrant word of God does not solve. The only conception that solves the problem is the evolutionary one, which recognizes that the religion of Israel has passed through a process of development from crude beginnings up to its highest products in the prophetic and the Jewish periods.

The opening chapter discusses the value of the Old Testament to the Christian from the evolutionary point of view. The Old Testament exhibits the process by which the way was prepared for the religion of Jesus, and therefore is indispensable for the understanding of the latter.

After these preliminary discussions the author proceeds to a sketch of the growth of what he calls the "Hebrew religion," by which he means the religion of Israel. No contemporary records from the patriarchal nor from the Mosaic age have come down to us, and the traditions that have survived express mainly the religious beliefs of the age when the stories were committed to writing. The traditions, however, yield indirect evidence about earlier times that may be detected by the criterion of correspondence with the conditions of nomadic life. Israel was originally a pastoral people, hence ideas and institutions in the later periods that belong to the pastoral period of development must be survivals from an earlier age. The author then proceeds to discriminate institutions that belong respectively to the nomadic, the half-nomadic, and the agricultural stages of civilization. This criterion is useful, still it is by no means the only method of discriminating older elements in later traditions. Theophorous proper names remain like ancient fossils imbedded in later conglomerates as witnesses to an earlier age. Comparative religion also is a main source of information. Beliefs and practices that are found among all the Semites must be primitive, even though they have no evident connection with nomadic life. Institutions that are characteristic of primitive religion throughout the

¹ *The Old Testament in the Light of To-day, a Study in Moral Development.* By William Frederic Badè, Professor on the Frederick Billings Foundation for Old Testament Literature and Semitic Languages, Pacific Theological Seminary, Berkeley, California. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915. x+326 pages. \$1.75 net.

world must also be primitive Hebrew, even though they are not derived from life in the desert. These two most important criteria of primitive traditions Badè seems to ignore in theory, although he uses them in practice in his account of the pre-Mosaic religion of Israel. In this sketch the earliest stage of the religion of Israel appears as practically identical with the pre-Islamic religion of the Arabs.

The third chapter is devoted to a discussion of the conception of Yahweh in the period between the conquest of Canaan and the appearance of Amos. The two leading ideas are, that Yahweh is the God of Canaan only, and that he is the God of Israel only. These limitations in the conception of God necessarily involve the moral limitation of the pre-prophetic religion of Israel. The discussion in this chapter is full and satisfactory. The only element that one misses is a clear presentation of the modifying influence of the religion of Canaan upon the religion of the desert. The new historical fact in this period was the mixing of Israel with the Canaanite population and the adoption of the civilization of Canaan. This fact should be as normative in the discussion of this period as was nomadic life in the previous period. It should be said, however, that the discussion which we miss at this point appears later in the chapter on the "monojahvism" of Deuteronomy.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the origin of the Decalogue. No one of the forms in which this code has come down to us can be regarded as Mosaic. It is the outcome of a long and complex development. Individual laws are older than Moses, others in the later recensions are post-prophetic. The Decalogue of J in Exod., chap. 34, is pre-prophetic on account of its emphasis upon ritual. On the other hand, its enactment of the three harvest festivals shows that it is post-Mosaic. It is doubtful whether Badè is on firm ground here in his reasoning. In its present form the code contains thirteen laws, but the subscription in Exod. 34: 28 states that there were ten words, and tradition is unanimous on this subject. All of the laws, except those enacting the three harvest festivals, are adapted to the nomadic stage of life. Why is it not natural to suppose that these three laws have been added by J, and that the other ten are a genuine survival from the Mosaic age? Tradition is unanimous that Moses gave Israel Ten Words. Where are these to be found, if not in the nucleus of the code of J? The Sabbath is ultimately a lunar festival. There is every probability that it originated in the desert rather than after the occupation of Canaan. The discussion of the meaning of the individual commandments in the different recensions of the Decalogue is thoroughgoing and admirable. It may be commended to

clergymen who are contemplating a series of sermons on the Ten Commandments. A perusal of these pages will save them from further torturing of this much-abused document.

The discussion of the prophets of the eighth century as the pioneers of ethical religion is fine in its presentation both of the positive elements of their teaching and of their deficiencies in comparison with the gospel of Jesus. The table of differences between the prophets and the New Testament on p. 150 is most helpful. The most original feature of this discussion is the accumulation of evidence to show that the great prophets had not yet attained theoretical monotheism. Following out this line of thought, Badè maintains that Deuteronomy itself does not teach monotheism but only "mono'ahvism." That is, through identification of Yahweh with the local ba'als of Canaan, Israel had come to believe in a number of Yahwehs who resided at the various shrines of Canaan. This belief Deuteronomy contested with the doctrine of one national God who was to be worshiped at one central sanctuary. Badè makes good his argument for this interpretation of Deuteronomy, but it may be questioned whether this conclusion has not led him to underestimate the theism of the prophets. Deuteronomy is a compromise book which seeks to blend the religion of the prophets with the old popular religion, and it may well be that its idea of God falls below the standard of Amos and Isaiah, just as its ethical standard is lower than theirs.

Jeremiah is regarded by Badè as the greatest of the prophets. He opposed the adoption of Deuteronomy and championed the genuine prophetic doctrine "righteousness, not ritual." In him true ethical monotheism was first attained. Badè entitles him "the first great heretic," because of his antagonism to the priests and to the official prophets; but surely Amos was entitled to that honor when Amaziah, high priest of Bethel, said to him; "O thou seer, go, flee thee away into the land of Judah, and there eat bread, and prophesy there: but prophesy not again any more at Bethel: for it is the king's sanctuary, and it is a royal house" (Amos 7:12 f.). The discussion of Judaism the author reserves for a later volume.

This is an excellent book, scholarly, interesting, and readable. No better introduction to the study of the religion of Israel can be suggested to the student. Its only weakness, in the opinion of the reviewer, is a tendency to a topical rather than a historical method of treatment. It makes the impression of being a collection of review articles rather than of being a history. The chapter on Deuteronomy, for instance, which appeared before as an article in the *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche*

Wissenschaft, contains matter that is relevant in a monograph, but that in a history ought to be distributed through several of the previous chapters. Chap. x on the repudiation of ritual contains matter that belongs historically in every other chapter of the book. The introductory chapters belong logically at the end of the book as the conclusion from its reasoning. The tendency to the topical rather than the historical method of treatment allies this book with A. B. Davidson's *Theology of the Old Testament* rather than with H. P. Smith's *History of the Religion of Israel*.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON

HARTFORD THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

NEW BABYLONIAN TEXT

For some time Professor A. T. Clay has been directing for Yale University the accumulation of an important collection of cuneiform tablets which at present number nearly eight thousand. The University now proposes to make the collection available for the general public, not only by publishing the texts, but by accompanying them as far as practicable by transliteration, translation, and commentary.

Under the able editorship of Professor Clay, the first volume of the series¹ has now appeared; and how fully it carries out the general plan may be seen from the fact that out of fifty-three texts published forty-two are interpreted. Most of the material is new, although in a few cases duplicates of already-published texts have been included, e.g., No. 20 corresponds to C.T. 32:6; No. 27 to C.T. 21:18, 19, and No. 44 to a text published by Winckler. These duplicates are, however, the more important since in each case they furnish complete copies of previously published fragments.

The heterogeneous character of the volume and the wide extent of time covered by the texts, measured by millenniums, give a vivid impression of the variety and value of the collection and fully justify this form of presentation for the first volume, although, as indicated in the preface, it by no means covers the range of the collection as a whole.

The new items of fresh interest in the texts are many and varied. Such are two new building inscriptions of Entemena (Nos. 4 and 5). No. 10 records the building of a temple at Marad by a hitherto unknown

¹ *Miscellaneous Inscriptions in the Yale Babylonian Collection*. By Albert T. Clay. "Yale Oriental Series, Babylonian Texts," Vol. I. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915. xii+108+1v pages. \$5.00.

son of Naram-Sin. No. 13 gives a new king of Guti, No. 14 a new building inscription of Galu-utu, ruler of Umma. No. 16 tells of Ur-engur's activity in the city of Umma on behalf of the god Shara. No. 28 presents a group of nine Sumerian laws, in several instances pointing to direct dependence on the part of Hammurapi's Code. One of these laws suggests an interesting side light on the story of the Prodigal Son, as the book points out. A Larsa dynastic list (No. 32) supplies six new rulers, making fourteen in all and showing conclusively the correctness of Thureau-Dangin's suggestion made in 1907, that Warad-Sin and Rim-Sin were two distinct persons. This text is exceedingly important for early Babylonian chronology. The kings Marduk-shapik-zêrim and Marduk-shapik-zêr-mâtim, who have hitherto often been confused, are likewise clearly distinguished in No. 37. Welcome light is thrown by No. 45 upon an obscure order of female votaries and their relation to the official religion; but in many respects the most important source material is contained in the *Yale Syllabary* (No. 53), consisting of four columns of three hundred and twenty-one lines, and it is not disproportionate that Professor Clay has devoted twenty compact pages to its elucidation. It contains several hitherto unknown signs with their values, besides several hundred new Sumerian and Babylonian values, together with about sixty new sign-names. Perhaps the most important items of wider interest in the syllabary are the phonetic reading of the ideogram for the chief god of Umma as "Shara," the Sumerian equivalent of Nabu as "Sullat," and the equation NIN.IB. equals Sumerian "Urta."

The volume as a whole contains a number of points bearing on the Old Testament. The author still more emphatically reiterates his position regarding the culture of Babylonia as set forth in *Amurru the Home of the Northern Semites*. In addition, however, to a restatement of certain items of that hypothesis, the author confines himself to a number of rather vague inferences as pointing in the same direction.

The writer assumes that the equation of the names in Gen. 14:1 with Babylonian equivalents of Hammurapi's time is so certain that although text No. 32 excludes the equation Warad-Sin equals Arioch, he can only conclude that Rim-Sin equals Arioch, but how this is to be done he does not explain, while the categorical assertion that not a single discovery has in any way impaired the accuracy of Gen. 14 is a purely negative statement. One might say without contradicting it that no discovery has yet confirmed its accuracy. No. 32 adds weight to the criticism of Johns.¹

¹ *The Relations between the Laws of Babylonia and the Laws of the Hebrew Peoples*, pp. 18 ff.

The interpretation of the dream omen, referring to Belshazzar and his father (No. 39), might be understood as placing Belshazzar of the Book of Daniel on the same plane of historicity. "The peculiar identification" of the two characters, however, in the omen is not without parallel in Babylonia and in no sense confuses the functions of the two men. The omen clearly adds emphasis to the romance character of the Book of Daniel. Nos. 46-51 are interpreted as bearing upon the Babylonian Sabbath idea, and this explanation seems attractive, but just what the bearing is, is clear neither from the text nor from the commentary. It is to be hoped that more tablets of this sort with further explanations of their contents may be brought to light.

The plates are beautifully done and the book painstakingly edited, very few slips being apparent. The following were noticed: p. 20, l. 10 (transliteration), *na* of *ma-na* omitted; p. 22, l. 52, *ma* for *mu*; p. 28, l. 6, No. 1905 should be No. 1283 (cf. p. 33); p. 31, l. 3, *-i-lu* for *ilu*; p. 45, l. 1, *ki* is added; p. 56, l. 3 (transliteration of No. 40), *meš* for *me* twice; p. 58, l. 9, *mu* for *nu*, l. 12, *-li-ku* for *lik-ma*; p. 62, l. 5 (No. 44), *E* of *E-si-da* is not in transcription.

The book as a whole fully comes up to the standard of excellence which has come to be associated with Professor Clay's work, and especially its careful historical and philological treatment makes it one of the most important recent publications in its field.

LEROY WATERMAN

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

A TEXTBOOK ON GENESIS*

This volume is a detailed study of the first eleven chapters of Genesis and is intended to be the first of a series that is to cover the whole Bible. The author makes no pretense to originality, but presents in a popular and very convincing way the interpretation of the early narratives of Genesis as generally held by modern scholars, with particular prominence given to the views of Gunkel. Chap. i is introductory, whereas chaps. ii-xii are given over to a study of the several narratives, grouped topically and arranged under the different sources from which they were drawn by the biblical editors. Chaps. xiii and xiv give a summary of the teachings of Gen., chaps. 1-11, in which the difference in point of view of the documents is well brought out, as are likewise the permanent

* *Israel's Account of the Beginnings*. By Walter M. Patton. New York: Pilgrim Press, 1916. xii+182 pages.

teachings of these chapters. Two appendixes and complete indexes conclude the book.

The plan that the author follows in the body of the book is to paraphrase or summarize the biblical text and to add at the end of the chapters notes of a more technical nature that further elucidate the text. The book is designed as a work for use in teaching the Old Testament to undergraduates. Whether it is altogether suited to this purpose the reviewer is somewhat at a loss to say. It is rather sketchy and takes too much for granted to be altogether intelligible to undergraduates. It is doubtful whether they would find the paraphrases and summaries more enlightening than a literal translation of the original such as we have in Kent's *Historical Bible*. The notes, which in many respects are the most interesting feature of the book, are relegated to the end of the chapters and are printed in exceedingly small type. If these were placed at the bottom of the page in more legible type, it would add tremendously to the readableness of the book.

Although the book is a popular presentation of the matter under discussion and is not intended to be technical, it ought at least to be in line with the latest developments of scholarship. In the notes and elsewhere there are a number of inaccuracies in this respect. Only a few of these can be noted here. There is no evidence in any known Babylonian or Assyrian inscription that "the seventh day was called *šapattu* [elsewhere correctly spelled *šabattu*] among the Babylonians" (p. 76³⁵). There is as yet no evidence anywhere that *šabattu* was applied to any day other than the fifteenth. Recent discoveries and other considerations show that Assyria had its origin altogether distinct from Babylonia and was not a colony of the latter. The Hittites are now known to be an Indo-European race. The origin of the Arameans is scarcely to be placed so early as "the early part of the second millennium B.C." The Philistines are of Cretan origin. Bel is an antiquated and incorrect name for Enlil, and likewise Ramman for Adad. More care might have been used in reading the proof. The pointing of the Hebrew leaves much to be desired, and the transliteration of Assyrian words is incorrect in several instances. The abbreviations might be improved. Muss-Arnolt's dictionary is wrongly named *Assyrisch-Englisch-Deutsches-Handwörterbuch* (p. xii). Grammatical slips like "that far" (p. 32) and "this much" (p. 37), and typographical errors like 79 A.D. for 70 A.D. (p. vi) ought not to have been overlooked.

THEOPHILE JAMES MEEK

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TEXTBOOKS FOR NEW TESTAMENT STUDY

Within the past year two books worthy of mention have been added to those available for use as college texts in the study of the New Testament.

In *The Story of the New Testament*¹ Professor Goodspeed has put into narrow compass an excellent New Testament introduction for general use. The aim of the manual is to interpret the New Testament books "in the light of the situations that called them forth." It is a concise literary history of the early Christian movement viewing the writings of the New Testament in their relation to the significant events of the period, namely, the gentile mission, the fall of Jerusalem, Roman persecution, and the rise of the early sects. The conclusions of critical scholarship are presented simply and without extended argument. Each chapter describes the occasion and summarizes the contents of a book or group of books, and brings out clearly its distinctive contribution to the history of Christianity. One might expect in the chapter on Mark a reference to Jesus' conflict with demons which was of special interest to the original readers of the Gospel, or in the discussion of Acts a statement concerning documentary sources. But such omissions may be due to the limitations of space. The style of writing is such as to attract the general reader. The questions at the end of each chapter will be helpful in individual or class use. These questions are not to be answered merely from a reading of the textbook, but call for a direct examination of the biblical text concerned. They are calculated to stimulate interest and to create a new attitude toward the New Testament. The student sees for himself that the teaching of the New Testament is not monotonously uniform, but that it has all the variety of life in the reaction of the writers on changing circumstances. He thus gains a vivid sense of the original value and the historical worth of the New Testament books. The bibliography at the end of the book is very short, perhaps because few commentaries for popular use are from the critical point of view. A simple chronological table would have added to the convenience of the volume as a textbook.

*The Work and Teachings of the Apostles*² is the sixth and concluding volume of "The Historical Bible." As indicated by the title, this book aims to cover the biblical material relating to the Apostolic age. The

¹ *The Story of the New Testament*. By Edgar J. Goodspeed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916. xi+150 pages. \$1.00.

² *The Work and Teachings of the Apostles*. By Charles Foster Kent. New York: Scribner, 1916. xi+313 pages. \$1.25.

most significant parts of the New Testament text are printed in an original translation divided into twenty-four chapters. Each chapter is followed by several pages of explanatory comment. An appendix gives questions on both text and comment, and suggestive topics for further study with explicit references to the literature of the subject. A brief but excellent bibliography is also included. The method enables the author to concentrate attention upon the parts of the New Testament necessary for a clear view of the progress of Christianity in the first century. It sacrifices in a measure the direct use of the Bible and familiarity with the New Testament writings as they stand. The difficult task of selection has been performed well in the main. It is unfortunate that no place could be found for the Pastoral Epistles and Second Peter. They might well have been taken as representative of a later stage of development in doctrine and organization. The new translation tends to justify the reprinting of the text, since it often brings out the meaning of a passage by unconventional phrasing, although it is sometimes marred by infelicities of word or construction. The paragraphs of comment present compactly but clearly the most important matters needed for the elucidation of the text. More references by chapter and verse to the New Testament would help the student to verify the interpretation and to fix it in his mind. The point of view of present-day criticism is maintained unless it be in regard to the historical accuracy of Acts. Is one warranted in speaking of Acts as a "vivid and satisfying record" (p. 29), or of "the exact historical character of the older source" (p. 38)? The surmise that Ananias and Sapphira may have died of acute heart disease (p. 43) will not appeal to those who must choose between a myth and a miracle. The theory that there were two councils at Jerusalem, one an informal conference in 47 A.D. reported in Galatians, and the other a more formal meeting two years later reported in Acts, may answer some questions, but it raises others. The occasion of the conference as given in Acts 15:1 and Gal. 2:4 seems identical. Why does not Paul refer to the second conference in Galatians, where he is giving a history of the debate? If we allow for Luke's interest and method as a church historian and for Paul's emphasis on the personal rather than on the formal elements of the story, it is quite possible to regard the two accounts as referring to the same event without sacrificing more of the historicity of Acts than must be surrendered on other grounds. Like the other volumes of the series, this book is well adapted for use in Bible classes in church or college. The series as a whole will be appreciated by the increasing number of men

who seek a critical estimate of biblical records and a satisfactory presentation of Old and New Testament history.

JOHN P. DEANE

BELOIT COLLEGE

AN INTERPRETATION OF IRENAEUS

Since Irenaeus has a fundamental place in the history of doctrine, being essentially the first theologian constructing the religion of Jesus in terms of Greek thought and the first to formulate that scheme of salvation which necessitated the Nicene-Chalcedonian dogma, a detailed study of his teaching such as is considered here¹ is interesting and profitable. Dr. Hitchcock lacks nothing in leisurely completeness of observation, and enthusiastic reverence for Irenaeus gives warmth to his exposition. He finds and enjoys a homiletic devotional quality in Irenaeus, reading him as he would St. Augustine, and making many comparisons—for the most part inapt—with the devout intuitions of Vaughan, Whichcote, More, Tennyson. The “beautiful” utterances quoted from Irenaeus have, however, an abstract metaphysical form and their value for *la vie dévote* would seem to be contributed by the piety of the student.

Dr. Hitchcock's own faith is that of the fully developed Greek dogma, and the questions occupying him in the study of Irenaeus are about the latter's relation to the later resultant form of church doctrine and institutional form rather than his place in an early historical development. The tendency to relate to modern results tempts Dr. Montgomery to an unnecessary chapter where, stimulated by Irenaeus' attack on Gnosticism, he criticizes Theosophy, Swedenborgianism, and Christian Science. This treatment, which blurs the definition of the place of Irenaeus in early doctrinal evolution, allows attention to dwell on some permanently edifying elements in the ancient father, as, for example, his treatment of the problem of evil (chap. iv). The temptation, however, to read full later meanings into earlier expressions is not escaped. Holding for himself to the enhypostatic Christology (p. 134, note; p. 155), Dr. Hitchcock reads this view into Irenaeus. It may be there virtually by implication, but it is not there as conscious reflection. Similarly, the effort is to make Irenaeus sound on the doctrine of the Trinity by the anxious tests of later times—but in vain. Irenaeus *means* to distinguish the Son and the Spirit, but he cannot

¹ *Irenaeus of Lugdunum, A Study of His Teaching.* By F. R. Raymond Hitchcock, M.A., D.D. With a foreword by H. B. Swete, D.D. Cambridge: University Press. 1914. 373 pages. 9s.

(pp. 108, 113, 119, 123, 125, notes). Dr. Hitchcock himself is refreshingly sound in intention. Scripture is absolute authority, though to be interpreted mystically (p. 191). Isa. 7:14 means the virgin birth (p. 137). When, however, the conception of divine intelligence as self-conscious, self-distinguishing, constitutes for him the truth of three persons in Deity, and when this compatriot of Martineau and Upton denies to Unitarians belief in a personal God and ascribes to them the notion of an undifferentiated unity in God, confidence in his accuracy is impaired.

The student will turn to this work for light on Irenaeus' canon of the New Testament. The impression is given that Irenaeus included in his canon all of our New Testament except the Epistle to Philemon, and nothing more. But he fails to distinguish between use of the diction of James and inclusion in a canon of Scripture, and his argument for the use of II Pet. 3:8 is not convincing (p. 230). He is silent about the reference (iv. 20. 2) to Hermas as *γραφή*, and if, as he means, Irenaeus included the Epistle to the Hebrews, then by the same warrant he included the Wisdom of Solomon.

A related question concerns the rule of faith. The problem is whether Irenaeus derived his rule from Asia Minor or from Rome or made a blend of two. Dr. Hitchcock distinguishes the rule of Irenaeus from the Old Roman rule (p. 66) and views it as nearer the Nicene form of creed (p. 77); but he does not show that a crystallized formula existed for Irenaeus. He endeavors to construct from the phraseology of Irenaeus a creed which would practically conform to the Nicene type, but it seems to be the case of compressing traditional and personal expressions into a formula which as such had no existence.

F. A. CHRISTIE

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

HOLL'S EDITION OF EPIPHANIUS

This edition of the *Ancoratus* and part of the *Panarion* (*haer.* 1-33) of Epiphanius is a welcome addition to the series of Greek patristic texts known as *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller*.¹ Several years ago Dr. Holl published a thorough investigation of the textual tradition of these two treatises,² and probably no one is better prepared than he to

¹ *Epiphanius (Ancoratus und Panarion)*. By Karl Holl. Erster Band. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1915. x+464 pages. M. 18; bound M. 20.50.

² Cf. *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, XXXVI, 2 (1910).

edit the works of Epiphanius. The text is clearly and accurately printed, the editor's emendations are indicated with an asterisk, and the *apparatus criticus* gives the principal variant readings and the most noteworthy conjectures of scholars. On p. 417, l. 14, ἀπβόλλει should be ἀποβάλλει. In the last volume the author intends to discuss in detail the principles by which he has been governed in his attempt to recover the original text of this zealous champion of orthodoxy in the East. Dr. Holl has performed a difficult and exacting task in a thoroughly satisfactory manner, and when his edition of Epiphanius' writings is completed, it will supersede that of Dindorf,¹ on which scholars have heretofore relied.

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CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND MODERN CRITICISM

One of the features of modern ethical thinking is the growing freedom with which the traditional conception of the absoluteness of Christian ideals is questioned. It becomes necessary, therefore, to construct an apologetic in defense of Christian ethics as well as in defense of Christian doctrines. Two recent books essay such a defense and present two interesting attitudes toward the problem.²

Conduct and the Supernatural, the Norrisian prize essay for 1913, is dedicated to John Neville Figgis by a member of the Community of the Resurrection who in the preface acknowledges his indebtedness to Figgis for the point of view and the conception of the book. While the intent and the style indicate the purpose of the author to give an open-minded survey, he is at the same time so conscious of being the advocate of a divinely established system that, with the best intentions in the world, he cannot understand the real significance of skeptical and secular ideals. Non-Christian opinions are interesting; they may be leading many men astray; they need, of course, to be refuted; but they do not cause the author of this book any serious uneasiness. He knows from the start that they are failures. No mediaeval churchman could be more absolutely certain of the eternal divine truth of his system.

¹ Five vols., Leipzig, 1859-62.

² *Conduct and the Supernatural*. By Lionel Spencer Thornton. London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1915. xiv+327 pages. \$2.25.

Conscience and Christ. By Hastings Rashdall. New York: Scribner, 1916. xx+313 pages. \$1.50.

"As Christians we cannot admit, even in respect of the smallest detail of human conduct, that the Christian way of life is in the least degree inadequate, unpractical, or ephemeral—either that it fails to meet all the needs of human nature, or that it is rendered obsolete by the changes which time brings" (p. 1).

In the first chapter the author traces the causes of the modern defection and finds them in the growth of a spirit of rationalism with its assumption that the natural order furnishes all the norms which life needs. He therefore sets himself the task of discovering whether the "natural" man is really competent to live a moral life. If human nature as expounded by those who set it over against the supernatural life of the Christian proves to be defective, the vindication of the Christian point of view will be easy.

One who is accustomed to take seriously the investigation of ethical problems on the basis of natural experience and reason will find the material selected by Mr. Thornton decidedly unsatisfactory. He takes certain writers who on account of literary picturesqueness are prominent in the public eye. Nietzsche, G. Bernard Shaw, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and H. G. Wells are the important spokesmen for naturalistic ethical ideals. By selecting and expounding certain salient ideas found in their writings, Thornton easily shows that the "natural" man of these more or less emotional revolutionists is lacking in important essentials, and that it would be precarious to expect a society based on the principles thus exhibited to possess enduring moral characteristics. Moreover, he discovers in their statements evidence that whatever of good they teach is better taught in Christianity.

Having thus established the insufficiency of secular ideals, Thornton assumes that we must choose between the naturalistic individualism which emerges from a study of Nietzsche, Wells, *et al.*, or we must seek "some universal sanction" for morality. This universal sanction is provided by religion for the reason that religion declares morality to originate in the supernatural will of God rather than in the shifting whims of man. An other-worldly norm and authority are needed.

The positive content of Christian ethics is set forth in a chapter entitled "The Ascetic Life." Here the author shows how everything is to be judged and used in the service of the supernatural world. Man's nature is to be transformed by grace, his "diseased will" is to be cured by Christian faith, and his thinking and acting are henceforth to be determined solely by the eternal principles of supernatural standards. The chapter reads like an echo of Augustine. The serenity of the religious

devotee is reflected throughout. Anything which is to the glory of God is self-evidently right. Those who, like St. Elizabeth, forsook husband and children to enter the cloister were following the highest ideal. "Such action, strange as it may seem to our comfort-loving civilization, was in the highest interest of marriage and the family," because it vividly proclaimed that even family life must not be an end in itself, but must be subordinated to supernatural demands.

To anyone not as serenely assured as the author it will seem that he has begged the whole question. To undertake to answer the question as to the adequacy of a naturalistic explanation of morality by a discussion of half a dozen picturesque figures in modern revolutionary literature seems rather superficial. It is not so much with Nietzsche and Wells that the Christian apologist must chiefly reckon as with the evidence furnished by anthropology, social psychology, and history concerning the behavior of man. This evidence, drawn from a careful examination of the facts of human life, Thornton almost entirely ignores.

Moreover, to discredit the "natural" ethical life of man means to hand morals over to an alien control; for the supernatural is by hypothesis alien to the natural man. And when once this alien control is established, serious ethical criticism becomes impossible. One must assume the attitude so frankly professed by Thornton on the first page, where he declares that he cannot admit the possibility of any adverse criticism of the system which he is bound to defend. But if we eliminate dogmatic presuppositions, is there anything to guarantee the morality of the "supernatural" save the good moral judgment of those who tell us what the content of the supernatural is? And can we be always certain of such good moral judgment?

The second book, *Conscience and Christ*, contains with some enlargement the Haskell lectures delivered at Oberlin Theological Seminary in 1913. Dr. Rashdall sees clearly that the only way in which to maintain the moral supremacy of Christianity is to permit moral criticism to engage in searching examination. At the outset he clearly and forcibly calls attention to the provincialism of the usual ecclesiastical attitude toward moral questions. It is assumed beforehand by theological logic that there is no need for any inquiry other than that of finding out what is authoritatively prescribed by Christ. Yet outside the realm of theology moral questions are universally regarded as problems for rational investigation, and our modern civilization is increasingly making use of experiment and research to yield material for forming moral judgments.

We thus have two standards side by side—conscience and Christ. If there is not to be moral confusion in our thinking and behavior, these two standards must be shown to be in harmony. Dr. Rashdall clears the way for his special discussion by showing that the limited experience of any individual makes him dependent on outside suggestion and instruction. Thus authority of some kind is inevitable. But at the same time no authority can retain any real jurisdiction over men unless it is approved by conscience. The authority of Christ over man's moral life is an essential tenet of Christianity. But such authority is firmly grounded, not by arbitrary claims or by miracle, but ultimately by the approval of conscience itself.

The bulk of the book is devoted to a comprehensive examination of the teachings of Jesus in order to discover whether they meet the demands of moral criticism. The most serious objection which has been raised in recent times grows out of the conclusions of historical interpretation. We must admit that Jesus thought and taught in terms of the current notions of his day. In particular, his conception of man's duty was affected by the apocalyptic view of the Kingdom of God. Is it, then, possible to hold that moral teachings so colored by an outgrown eschatology are absolutely valid for an age which thinks in terms of evolution? Dr. Rashdall meets this objection by frankly admitting that a literalistic reproduction of the gospel teachings would involve us in serious moral difficulties. At the same time, the general "principles" underlying the teachings of Jesus are applicable to human relations generally amid very various incidental conditions. We may, indeed, be compelled to admit that his conception of the Kingdom must be "to some extent" translated into terms of modern life. We must recognize that if the purely ethical conception of the Kingdom which moderns hold "was for him, in a sense, a secondary meaning, it is clear that to us it must be the primary one" (p. 66). But if it can at the same time be shown that the requirements for citizenship in the Kingdom are in principle precisely the qualities demanded by modern ethical idealism, the incidental application of principles to occasions peculiar to the ancient world need not trouble us. Even if the most radical conclusions as to the eschatological ideas of Jesus be admitted, we may ask "whether even such an admission would demand more than a slight extension of that doctrine of the limited knowledge of Christ which has now, I suppose, been accepted by all serious theologians and by most thoughtful Christians" (p. 73).

Dr. Rashdall then shows what the heart of the teaching of Jesus was, the consistent, all-embracing, resourceful practice of love for one's fellows. This ideal is set forth in such a way as to bring it into sharp contrast with any aristocratic notions of special privilege. It is specifically opposed to the formal legalism exemplified in the program of the scribes. It transcends the bounds of racial or class prejudice. It involves self-sacrifice, but only as the means to a positive achievement of social morality. It is not even limited by the form of Jesus' own teaching, but it requires development, and "can only be accepted as a final and permanent ideal for the modern world on the understanding that such a development is to be allowed" (p. 165). At the same time such development as is demanded by modern needs "can be recognized as a true and legitimate outgrowth of the Master's own teaching" (p. 239).

A large number of specific teachings and parables of Jesus are examined with the purpose of meeting objections. In each case Dr. Rashdall discovers underneath details an ethical "principle" which commends itself without reserve to the modern conscience. That there is much edifying exposition here goes without saying, although the apologetic aim is clearly in evidence. In a final chapter the Christian ideal is briefly compared with other great religious ideals so as to show its superiority. A few concluding paragraphs of more theological character attempt to transform this superiority into "absoluteness" and "finality." After the author's frank recognition of the primacy of the conscience of living men, and his insistence on development, not to speak of his admission that Jesus was definitely limited in his consciousness, this reversion to the vocabulary of a theology built on the doctrine of infallibility takes the reader into a different world. It is an interesting example of the way in which emotions may cling to theological doctrines which criticism has undermined. If it be true, as Dr. Rashdall has insisted over and over again, that we best understand the moral greatness of Jesus, not by canonizing his teachings in fixed forms, but rather by releasing the spiritual power of his ideals to enter creatively into developing moral thinking, why does he conclude the discussion by even a modified insistence on a dogmatic "absoluteness"? Does not such an attitude belong to the ecclesiastical conventionalism which he himself deplors? Does it not tend to blunt the edge of that serious moral questioning which in the main portion of the book is advocated as the true interpretation of the spirit of Christ?

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THE NATURE OF PERSONALITY¹

The problem with which this book deals is the issue between naturalism and idealism. Is the ultimate nature of reality material or spiritual? Is the world-process mechanical only, or is it mechanism in the service of rational and moral purpose? The author finds that to both of these world-views the realization of individualized personal life presents the final problem of existence. The ultimate meaning of the world is to be found in the meaning of personal life. The task to which he addresses himself is the examination of the meaning and the implications of personality, with the view of determining the ultimate nature of reality. This investigation is to be carried on upon the basis of the general scientific postulates and according to the strictly scientific method. Personality is an objective fact of the world of nature, along with other facts, and as such it must be studied. The method of procedure adopted is to trace, from the earliest point accessible to us, the life-history of personality, asking at each stage in the process what evidence the facts bring forth as to the character of the ultimate ground of reality.

Dr. Smyth finds that inorganic evolution is dominated by a "tendency" which results in the preparation of an environment adapted to the advent of life. Granting that the phenomena of living matter can be reduced to physico-chemical quantities and motions, and so to mathematical manipulation, there is still required some principle which will account for the progressively higher forms of life which appear in this mechanical process. Biologists have not been able to agree as to what that principle may be. In the higher stages of life we have the development of a highly organized nervous system made ready for the use of the human mind. Here again there is an anticipation of future utility which suggests the presence of something other than mechanism, some non-physical form of energy which directs the mechanical process. When we pass to the examination of personal experience, we unquestionably find ourselves before activities which cannot be accounted for through the operation of physical forces alone. The activities involved in feeling, thinking, and willing manifest the presence of an energy that is distinctly psychic. There are given in experience two factors, the physical and the psychical, and these are irreducible one to the other. The unity of the personal life can only be understood by assuming an interaction between these two factors. Experience then reveals an order

¹ *The Meaning of Personal Life*. By Newman Smyth. New York: Scribner, 1916. ix+363 pages. \$2.00.

of interacting energies, brought into a unity in the personal life. It is peculiar to personality that it asserts its own worth to itself, and values other things as they serve its desires and aims. In virtue of this elective activity, man arranges his own environment, builds his own world, scientific, social, and moral. In all of this there is manifested not only an "increase of psychical energy," a "creative synthesis," but also a different kind of ability from that manifested in the world without: the power to produce qualitative values and to measure their worth in relation to our aims and desires.

The personal selection of values for life is another law than that of natural selection of forms fitted to survive. This selective activity of personal life now guides the natural selection, but does not supplant it; both work together in the unity of experience. Now, since man is the interpretation of the world, the ultimate reality must also comprehend both these principles; and since the unity of personality guarantees the unity of the world, this dualism of man and nature is not ultimate; underneath all, manifesting itself in nature and in man, is the absolute spiritual Being of idealism. Such is the general argument of the book. The author believes that personality came to its fullest expression in Jesus, and he devotes much space in working out the implications of what he finds there. There is also a chapter devoted to a consideration of the arguments that may be adduced in favor of a belief in immortality.

The author has undertaken an extremely comprehensive task. The carrying out of his purpose involves a survey of the whole field of scientific knowledge, and requires a decisive answer to many problems concerning which scientists themselves are not agreed. But aside from the difficulties arising out of the unsolved scientific problems, objection may be taken to the fundamental assumption upon which his metaphysical interpretation rests. Have we a right to assume that the consciousness of man reveals the nature of ultimate reality? Just because man has this "selective activity" and exercises a "creative synthesis," the world which he builds for himself includes only a part of reality, and this evaluated by the way in which it satisfies his desires. What guarantees that this anthropocentric world truly represents the whole? This raises the question as to whether religion may not have to content itself with a less ambitious apologetic, grounding its truth-claim in a way analogous to that of science.

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A STUDY OF THE FREUDIAN WISH¹

Mr. Holt writes with the conviction that psychology should contribute to the clarification of ethics both practical and theoretical. He believes that the views held by Freud can be of such service. That which Freud has been pleased to call wish Holt regards as a key to psychology possessing finality. Yet Freud has himself said little concerning the relation of wish to ethics. Holt's purpose is to unfold the ethical implications of the Freudian wish.

The definition of wish is all-important in the discussion. Freud uses the term in a larger sense than usual. Wish is "a course of action which some mechanism of the body is set to carry out." Execution is not an essential part of wish. The important element is a motor attitude of the body. The opposition of wishes often results in suppression of a wish. Practical life renders necessary a compromise of wishes. But suppressed wishes, of which there are all shades and degrees, often emerge into consciousness and determine conduct. Of this the author gives numerous illustrations. It is true that Freud was interested only in abnormal psychology, but Holt feels that the theory is none the less valid in the normal field.

That wish which is dynamic will replace the more or less static sensation as the unit of psychology is one of the interesting inferences made. In the main, the theory of cognition is given only incidental treatment. But the outline is supplemented by the reprint of an earlier essay of the author's on "Response and Cognition." Since the publication of that essay, the sympathy of Holt with the Freudian position has become more complete. There behaviorism was regarded as a separate class of thought from the Freudian, though both are objectivist. Now, we are told with firmer words that specific response to environment, or behavior, is the same thing as the Freudian wish. Wish is precisely the same as purpose, whether intellectual or moral. It is always related to some object or fact in the environment of the living body. There is but one world, the objective; the subjective, so called, is the "subtler workings of integrated objective mechanisms." Consciousness and the subjective as such are done away with. Elsewhere the author is careful to indicate that this does not mean the facts of consciousness but consciousness as a theory. Thought becomes a latent course of action; often it is irrelevant, "a surface embroidery on action." Conscious

¹ *The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics*. By Edwin B. Holt. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1915. vii+212 pages. \$1.25.

thought is determined by unconscious thought or deeper-lying wishes. The distinction between thought and volition is minimal.

In the Freudian wish ends are excluded. Hence hedonism is excluded. The contrast is between part deed and whole deed. Morality is wisdom, for moral conduct is discriminating conduct. It is harmonious and consistent behavior toward a bigger section of the universe. Right conduct fulfils all of a man's wishes at once, suppressing none. Wrong conduct is conduct not adjusted to enough of the environment. Hence the sole moral sanction is fact. Yet these facts impose inexorable penalties. Holt does not hesitate to call this ethics from below, as contrasted with ethics from above with supermundane sanctions, but is convinced that it makes for a higher type of morality. It makes for sanity of life. Sanity, wisdom, goodness, freedom, all demand the absence of suppressed wish in life.

Holt is aware that the word "wish" is unfortunate. It does involve the idea of an end which he is careful to exclude. Freudian ethics is not concerned in abstractions. Neither does he profess to offer a system of ethics, but only a formula "more clear, exact, and concrete" than any previously at hand. Unlike the Aristotelian mean, the Freudian wish excludes compromise. Unlike Hegel, it places emphasis upon synthesis rather than upon conflict and opposition. It is Socratic in its identification of wisdom, virtue, and freedom. But where the Socratic doctrine is general, the Freudian ethics makes particular applications. Academic ethics are imposed from above, however the "good" or "value" may be defined. They have no genuine relation to life. Every attempt to bring the good down to the masses suppresses aspiration and is harmful. Hence ordinary ethics has no practical significance. For instance, it has no relation to politics or statecraft. But the Freudian ethics is dynamic. It grows and becomes a part of the evolution of the universe. While Holt recognizes that much remains to be learned concerning the Freudian wish, he believes that, in what he is pleased to call the "suppression-discrimination formula" for wishes, we have a talisman.

Holt has given an important suggestion in the field of ethics. He has pleaded the case with enthusiasm. And yet he has been cautious in his claims. One will await with curiosity the construction of a system upon the basis of the formula suggested. What relation may be established between this ethics of the dust, as Holt terms it, and the domain of religion at present is not touched upon. It is not apparent that it need be an atheistic ethics, for it is

to involve behavior integrated, harmonious, consistent. It would be a pity were not so suggestive a discussion followed to its conclusion.

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HISTORY OF THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY

The two volumes bearing this title¹ embody the course of lectures given by the late Professor Briggs the year before his death. The illness which attacked him before the close of the year prevented him from giving final form to the manuscript. The preface of the editor shows the care and piety with which she has prepared the work for the press. Dr. Briggs supplemented his lectures by interchange of views with his students, and filled out much which is here given in outline only. What the author proposed to himself was to trace the evolution of Christian scholarship from the Apostolic age until the present time. To do this in a single course of lectures, or in two small volumes, is impossible without great condensation. The indexes show that more than fifteen hundred names are mentioned, and for a large number of these the limits imposed allowed only a brief paragraph. As an outline history of Christian literature, however, the work will be useful to students, and its use is facilitated by the excellent indexes. A bibliography is appended which gives the most important works on the subject, and which will also be of value.

The extent of Professor Briggs's erudition is too well known to be emphasized here, and it is abundantly in evidence in the work before us. No one in his generation was better fitted for a task of this kind. To discuss details is beyond the scope of this notice, but one or two points may be adverted to.

Prelatical readers will rejoice at the author's frank adoption of tradition, indicated by his assertion that Christian institutions cannot be built upon the teaching of Jesus. If based upon the teachings of Jesus, they must be based on teaching not recorded in the Gospels (I, p. 31). The characterization of Jesus as the most learned Rabbi of his time will come as a surprise to many readers (I, p. 24). The author's attitude toward some current theories is indicated by the sentence, We are inclined to give St. Paul too much credit for the establishment of Chris-

¹*History of the Study of Theology*. By Charles Augustus Briggs. Prepared for publication by his daughter, Emilie Grace Briggs. "Studies in Theology" Series. New York: Scribner, 1916. Two vols., xi+217 pages; iv+230 pages.

tianity in the world (I, p. 36). And in this connection I may quote the following:

There is a profound truth in the saying of Clement of Alexandria that Greek philosophy was a preparation for Christ as was the Law of Moses. It was indeed necessary for the religion of Christ to take on the robes of Greek philosophy in order to conquer the world. It is the fashion to exaggerate that influence, as though it had not only transformed but changed the substance of the Christian religion. But, in fact, all that Christianity assumed from Greek philosophy was method, literary form, and logical principles of construction, which to no appreciable degree affected the sacred substance of Christianity as given by Christ and his apostles.

That Dr. Briggs's whole soul was absorbed in the study to which he had given his life—the study of theology in its whole extent—is evident on every page of this work. The description of Origen as a teacher, which he quotes from Gregory Thaumaturgus, shows his ideal. The passage is too long to quote here, but may well be commended to those who are called to the chair of theology in any age. Interesting from any point of view is the chapter on the revival of learning. The author's breadth of sympathy is seen in the full credit which he gives to the educational zeal and efficiency of the early Jesuits (II, 136ff.). At the same time he is not blind to the later decadence of the order. Coming down to our own time, he warmly advocates the affiliation of the theological seminary with the university—something which he did much to promote in his own seminary. The closing paragraph of the book is a glowing reaffirmation of the author's faith that the study of theology is the highest, the most comprehensive, the most difficult, and the most important of all studies, for it is the study of God and of all things in their relation to God.

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NORTH AMERICAN MYTHOLOGY

As the author of this work¹ is himself well aware, the recording and comparative study of the mythologies of American Indians, while proceeding rapidly, are as yet so incomplete that any work dealing with the subject is in the nature of the case temporary and superficial. It is high praise, therefore, when, as in the present case, one can say that

¹ "*The Mythology of All Races*," Vol. X, *North American*. By Hartley Burr Alexander. Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1916. xxiv+325 pages. \$6.00.

an attempt in this field is admirably carried out, and the selection and arrangement of the material betray discrimination and good judgment.

The main body of the work is divided into sections on "The Far North," i.e., the Eskimo; "The Forest Tribes"; "The Gulf Region"; "The Great Plains"; "Mountain and Desert," including Salishan, Shahaptian, Shoshonean, southern Athapaskan, Piman, and Yuman peoples; "The Pueblo Dwellers"; "The Pacific Coast, West," i.e., the tribes of Oregon and California; and "The Pacific Coast, North," the canoe peoples of the North Pacific. The only feature strange to an ethnologist is the treatment of the northern Athapascans under the chapter on "The Great Plains." Lengthy supplementary notes with references to authorities, and a bibliography close the volume.

In a work of this character it is of course inevitable that errors should occur. Thus, Professor Alexander speaks of Lafitau's description of the sun-cult of the Natchez as "perhaps the earliest account," while in fact it was antedated by those of Gravier, and Charlevoix, and probably others. Elsewhere the Cussitaw Indians are identified with the Creeks, when in fact they constituted only a part, albeit an important part, of the nation. It may be noted, though Professor Alexander was not in a position to know this, that recent investigations have rendered the American origin of many stories of the Rabbit cycle less certain than had been supposed. Probably through inadvertence the author has omitted from his bibliography under the heading "Collections and Periodicals" the "Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association" and the "Anthropological Publications of the University of Pennsylvania." The first of the latter series, Dr. Speck's *Ethnology of the Yuchi Indians*, should also have been mentioned as one of the authorities on Yuchi mythology, and the same writer's *Indians of Taskigi Town* in the former should have been placed among the works cited for the Muskogean tribes. Adair's *History of the North American Indians*, Du Pratz's *Histoire de la Louisiane*, and Dumont's *Mémoire sur la Louisiane* might very well have been noted. In the list of works covering the North Pacific coast those of Veniaminoff and of Krause ought to have found a place, and perhaps the Alaska volumes for the censuses of 1880 and 1890.

In his short introduction Professor Alexander discusses the whole field of North American mythology in a broad and temperate manner, discriminating in what is said and what is left unsaid. Most students of American mythology would not press cosmologic interpretations of Indian stories as far as the author sometimes does, but it must be remem-

bered that—with the exception of philological resemblances—there is no will-o'-the-wisp more seductive and treacherous than the one which presides over the interpretation of myths.

Professor Alexander has shown independence of thought in reintroducing the "Great Spirit" as a cardinal factor in Indian belief. The wisdom of this may well be doubted, though it must be recognized that in most parts of North America the conception with which this term is associated contains an integral native element. At the same time the term has been employed so loosely and has become associated with so many ideas of European origin that it has ceased to convey any real significance so far as aboriginal beliefs are concerned.

Taken as a whole, this work fills a definite need in a worthy manner; it should also prove of value as a textbook, although the price is likely to be a stumbling-block to extended use for such a purpose. The selection of the illustrations and the general execution are admirable.

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A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY

This book¹ is a translation of *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Le Système totémique en Australie*, by the well-known editor of *L'Année sociologique*. The subtitle has been changed and the tribal map of Australia omitted. The lack of a map is a distinct loss to those who may desire to follow out in detail the author's description of totemism in Australia, which takes up a large part of the book and upon which his conclusions are largely based.

Professor Durkheim has long been known for his writings on ethnology, sociology, and sociological method. As editor of *L'Année sociologique* he gained quite a following, and his influence upon sociological thought has been considerable. He has made a special study of the native Australians, and had already published several notable articles before the appearance of this book. He is well able to give us, therefore, a detailed and thorough analysis of the facts relating to that area, so far as they have been investigated and described. To this field he applies his sociological method, and develops his theories, which relate, not only to the origin of religion, but even to the origin of thought itself.

¹ *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. A Study in Religious Sociology.* By Emile Durkheim. Translated from the French by Joseph Ward Swain. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xi+456 pages. \$3.75.

"In this book," he says, "we propose to study the most primitive and simple religion which is actually known, to make an analysis of it, and to attempt an explanation of it." There must be certain fundamental conceptions and ritual attitudes at the basis of all religions. These are the permanent elements of religion, the "objective contents of the idea." How is it possible to pick them out? We must go to the most primitive, the simplest, where we can best discern "the ever-present causes upon which the most essential forms of religious thought and practice depend." This study also throws light on the problem of knowledge. "When primitive religious beliefs are systematically analyzed, the principal categories [of thought] are naturally found. They are born in religion and of religion; they are a product of religious thought." Both are the products of society, which "is a reality *sui generis*," and has its own peculiar characteristics. There are doubtless germs of rationality in the individual consciousness, but these become something different through the action of society. "Between those indistinct germs of reason and the reason properly so called there is a difference comparable to that which separates the properties of the mineral elements out of which a living being is composed from the characteristic attributes of life after this has once been constituted." Reason as well as religion is thus a product of society. What, now, is religion?

All religions, according to Durkheim, have one common characteristic: "They presuppose a classification of all things, real and ideal, of which men think, into two classes or opposed groups, generally designated by two distinct terms which are translated well enough by the words profane and sacred" (*profane, sacré*). Granting this, "a religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a church all those who adhere to them." This definition is largely objective. Rites are necessary as well as beliefs, and these beliefs are held and rites practiced, not by an individual, but by a social group. Magical beliefs and practices are thus excluded as pertaining only to individuals.

After a critical discussion of the animistic and naturistic theories, Durkheim dismisses these as unable to account for the origin of the idea of the divine, the sacred, as distinct from the profane. "Since neither man nor nature have of themselves a sacred character, they must get it from another source," a "cult more fundamental and more primitive" than the animistic or naturistic. He finds this in totemism, and regards Australia as offering the most favorable field for its study, which, he

declares, must be intensive rather than comparative. This, however, does not prevent him from drawing numerous facts from the conditions among the North American Indians when he does not find what he wants in Australia.

Australian totemism is chosen because here, he says, the civilization is the most rudimentary and the organization the simplest, being based on the clan.

The clan, then, is the fundamental thing, the simplest form of human society, and the religion associated with it the most primitive. All members of the clan regard themselves as related, belonging to one family. They also have a common name, the name of some object, usually an animal or plant, which is known as their totem. This totem is represented by some emblem. Both the totem and the emblem are sacred, so also are the members of the clan, who bear the name of the totem. All these, with their totem and emblems, form a group distinct from the other clans with their totems and emblems. Each clan has its own particular cult, but each recognizes the others as necessary to the general system.

Totemism, therefore, has all the elements of a religion. If we can discover the origin of these beliefs "we shall very probably discover at the same time the causes leading to the rise of the religious sentiment in humanity." There are two phases in the life of the clan. Usually it is broken into small groups, each engaged in the ordinary occupations of hunting, fishing, etc. At certain times these groups gather together at determined places for special ceremonies, which may continue for days. The clan as a group feels the necessity for an objective symbol and a name, and chooses the animal or plant common in the region where the ceremonial gatherings take place. During the ceremonies there are numerous images and emblems of this object (always a class, not an individual), which we call the totem, on every side. The members of the clan in the ceremonial activities stimulate each other almost to frenzy, and regard themselves as acted upon by an external power. "A man does not recognize himself; he feels himself transformed and consequently he transforms the environment which surrounds him. In order to account for the very particular impressions which he receives, he attributes to the things with which he is in most direct contact properties which they have not, exceptional powers and virtues which the objects of everyday experience do not possess." Thus above the real is the ideal, the sacred. Surrounded as he is by the emblems of the totem, this power and sacredness is ascribed to them, and hence to the totem itself.

Also the members of the clan bearing the same name are regarded as sacred, though to a less degree. All these are not so much sacred in themselves as because of a mysterious and impersonal force which abides in them, and manifests itself through them. To this mysterious power, which Durkheim calls the totemic principle, the native ascribes the sensations and emotions which he feels so strongly during the ceremonies, and which are so different from his everyday experiences. "So it is in the midst of these effervescent social environments and out of this effervescence itself that the religious idea seems to be born." This totemic principle Durkheim regards as the forerunner of the idea of a great mysterious power pervading all life, such as the *wakan* and *orenda* of the North American Indian, and the *mana* of the Melanesians.

The totemic principle is incarnate in the totemic animals, also in the members of the clan. The soul is then an individualized portion of the totemic principle, which preserves its individuality and may be reincarnated time after time. This explains the very common belief of reincarnation in animals. Permanently disembodied souls, especially those of the original ancestors, become spirits and acquire local habitations. Gods and divinities easily follow. Rites as well as beliefs are necessary to religion, and Durkheim undertakes to classify the most general forms of primitive rites and to determine their origin and significance. He treats more especially of negative, sacrificial, imitative, representative, and piacular rites, all of which are represented in the Australian cults.

In the conclusion, after briefly summarizing the results of his study as to the origin of religious beliefs and cults from social organization, he emphasizes the fundamental reality of these beliefs from their universality, and develops more fully his theory of the dependence of the fundamental notions of science and thought, to which he has referred several times before, on religion and society. "At bottom the concept of totality, that of society, and that of divinity are very probably only different aspects of the same notion."

In such a comprehensive study as this of Durkheim's it is possible to touch on only a few points. In spite of the keenness of its analysis and the force of the closely reasoned argument, this frequently rests on assumptions rather than on proved facts. Both religion and reason, he says, rest on the clan organization of society. Thus, before there was a social organization of this character, man was not yet human, being without religion or reason. It is by no means proved, however, that the

clan is the most primitive form of society. There are many kinds of clans, some among peoples rather high in the social scale, and there are many primitive peoples, such as the Eskimo, who show no indications of clans or totems, or of ever having had such an organization. It does not follow, as he says, that because the material culture of the Australians is simple (primitive?) the social organization must be primitive. It is certainly not simple. Nor is it necessary that the simplest religion be associated with the clan, nor that this be totemism, if totemism be a religion. His conception of totemism ignores the more recent studies, which show its complex nature and the probability that its various elements are derived from different sources, that it is not uniform in character, and that the origin of these different complexes which are generally known as totemic is doubtless different in different places. We should certainly not regard totemism as the simplest religion.

Exception might also be taken to his definition of religion as including too much and as assuming a definiteness of organization, especially in the "moral community," far in advance of the most primitive. And why must religion be entirely due to social causes? Primitive man most certainly stands in awe of, and experiences a high emotional thrill in the presence of, what he regards as supernatural, and it does not require the ecstasy of some social dance or other ceremony to make him conscious of something different from the ordinary affairs of daily life. What of the hermits and of the solitary lives of many who have thus been inspired, as it were, to the advancement of religious thought? Surely we must consider individual psychology as well as social.

Durkheim claims a great advantage in his method, which is inductive rather than deductive or comparative. His criticism of many who have used the comparative method is doubtless justified; but in assuming that one case proves all, that if a thing is true of Australia it must be true everywhere, he is certainly assuming what has yet to be proved. Granting the evolution of culture and religion, it is far from being proved that all cultures pass through the same stages in their development. There is good evidence, in fact, to the contrary. He has given us a definition of religion that fits Australia, and has drawn many interesting conclusions from his study of that region; but further than that his arguments, however interesting, rest on too many doubtful assumptions to carry conviction.

While we may refuse to follow Durkheim to his final conclusions, the necessity of considering the social side of these problems must be

admitted. Durkheim has done good service in emphasizing the influence of society, and his work deserves most careful study from this point of view.

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HASTINGS' ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS*

The latest volume of this monumental undertaking, like those which have preceded, will awaken in the reader a new appreciation of the extent and the significance of the realm covered by the terms religion and ethics. Seemingly there is almost nothing of importance in human life which does not have its direct or indirect bearing on these subjects. The obvious difficulty which meets the editors is to secure articles written by experts and at the same time to keep in mind the real purpose of the encyclopedia. It is the easiest thing in the world to allow a discussion of certain philosophical or anthropological theories to proceed without definite relation to the bearing of it all on the problems of religion or ethics. On the whole, the editors have succeeded remarkably well in this difficult task, although occasionally one feels that no actual contribution to the main theme of the encyclopedia has been made.

An even greater difficulty is found in the almost inevitable doctrinal or ecclesiastical attitude found in those selected to write on Christianity. A theological professor or a clergyman is usually an advocate, and with the best intentions in the world will interject into a historical discussion a reference—religious rather than critical—to “the teaching of our Lord on this subject” (e.g., p. 438). It must be confessed that there is sometimes a noticeable difference between the treatment of a phase of belief or of practice in other religions and the treatment of it in Christianity. For example, in the article on “Marriage” in this volume, while the author, W. M. Foley, gives an admirable historical survey of actual Christian beliefs and practice, he finds it impossible to avoid the feeling that he ought not only to give us information, but also to indicate authoritatively what the Christian doctrine is and to refer to the divine sanctions in marriage. That he so largely subordinates this doctrinal interest to a fair-minded historical presentation is an indication of the

**Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. Edited by James Hastings, with the assistance of John A. Selbie and Louis H. Gray. Vol. VIII, “Life and Death—Mulla.” New York: Scribner, 1916. xx+910 pages. \$7.00.

wholesome influence of the comparative point of view necessitated by the appearance of his article alongside of others which must necessarily eliminate doctrinal prejudices. The article on "Miracles," by J. A. MacCulloch, is much less successful. Here the reported miracles in non-Christian literature are discussed dispassionately and critically. But the miracles of Christianity are to be defended, although criticism makes necessary certain cautionary statements here. The apologetic portion of the article consists of a clever dialectic seeking to make possible the retention of the word "miracle" in connection with a modern world-view which makes no natural place for the concept.

The present volume contains some unusually valuable discussions. The opening article on "Life and Death" is especially interesting. Here the treatment of Christian ideas incorporates a gratifying amount of historical material drawn from the general environment of early Christian thinking. The article on "Magic" is well worked out. Especially valuable are the sensible critical remarks of Marett in his introductory section, in which he exposes the prejudices which have led so many writers to strain and labor to exclude magic from real religion. Just because we moderns regard magic as something unworthy, we feel that it must somehow be shown to have no rightful positive place in the history of religion. Marett suggests that if we should use some neutral word like "cult" or "ritual," we should be able to deal more impartially with the content of early religion. By the way, it is noticeable that while Babylonian, Buddhist, Egyptian, Greek and Roman, and Jewish religions (to mention only a few of the sections) all have definite magical doctrines and practices, the reader who is curious to know whether Christianity developed any similar conceptions is referred to the article on "Charms and Amulets." It is to be regretted that this somewhat incidental way of discussing so important a matter should have been adopted.

Except for the tendency to deal tenderly with Christianity, so as to secure doctrinally desirable conclusions, the encyclopedia represents that spirit of exact and sympathetic historical study which is characteristic of the modern study of religion. The difficulties to be overcome in this pioneer undertaking are enormous. To exhibit the religious and ethical phases of all human life in this broad fashion is a task calling for rare catholicity; and it is a cause for gratitude that such abundant material is being furnished with so large a degree of historical accuracy.

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A GREAT RELIGIOUS LEADER

Much of the abundant literature of reminiscence, for which the public is always eager, serves little other purpose, nevertheless, than to amuse and entertain with trivial incidents, dubious anecdotes, and malicious gossip regarding famous or infamous people. It has its day of success, when it is talked of as "quite indispensable to an intimate knowledge of the time," but the wary historian, if he notices it at all, handles it with critical caution, making allowance for infirmities of memory and for the warping of prejudice. But here is a book of reminiscences¹ which is candid and trustworthy from cover to cover. When a man of affairs like Dr. Abbott, distinguished for his good works, and loved and trusted by his generation, is at the pains to relate frankly and in detail "the story of his life from year to year," he makes a contribution of quite inestimable value to the historians' "original sources." Dr. Abbott, writing in his eightieth year, tells of ways and manners which appear to us incredibly remote. He recalls the Puritan Sabbath, when people who never went to church were regarded with dark suspicion; when the minister wore knee-breeches in the pulpit, and made the "long prayer" in its meticulous petitions answer the purpose of the personal-intelligence column of a local newspaper; when the first interminable sermon was quickly followed by a second. He recalls life in New York City in 1850, when the best residential region ended at Fourteenth Street, and what is now Central Park was a wilderness "peopled by squatters and overrun with goats"; when the godly, to whom the theater was forbidden, attended Christy's Minstrels, and the "lecture-room" of Barnum's Museum; when Macaulay's *History of England* was in course of publication, and Dickens' novels were appearing in monthly parts. It is fairly unbelievable that the time is within the memory of living men, our boys and girls will be inclined to say, when *David Copperfield* was read for pure enjoyment and not as a school task. Since Dr. Abbott entered manhood he has witnessed the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, the hardly less momentous extension of the public-school system throughout the nation, the foundation of state universities and of colleges for women, the building of the transcontinental railways, the varied applications of electricity, the revolution wrought by the doctrine of evolution, in science, philosophy, history, and theology, and fierce competition between combinations of capital and combinations of labor. From

¹ *Reminiscences*. By Lyman Abbott. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915. ix+509 pages. \$3.50.

none of these movements has he stood apart, a merely curious and disinterested spectator; but in the discharge of the particular responsibility laid upon him or in the use of the offered opportunity he has endeavored, to use his own phrase, "to interpret to itself the growing thought of the age." An extraordinary success has attended this endeavor. From the preaching in his Terre Haute pulpit of his first political sermon, on "the condition of the country," in the anxious winter following the election of Abraham Lincoln, through his subsequent pastorates and editorial service, Lyman Abbott has been more and more widely recognized as a lucid and persuasive interpreter of the moral, political, and religious problems which trouble the minds of everyday people. Plymouth Church pulpit and *The Outlook* have been among the most powerful influences for good and the most serviceable agencies working for right thinking and right living in the history of this country. If this language appears extravagant, consider only what Dr. Abbott has done to popularize and commend the conclusions of the higher criticism and the new theology during the half-century since they began to excite alarm. No doubt the alarm was quite unfounded. No one was really undertaking to overthrow the faith. The critics and the theologians were misunderstood and misrepresented. But the apprehension was very serious, nevertheless—the more so that the scholars engaged in "research" and "investigation" were in general too much absorbed in their task to enter sympathetically into the distress of the Christian men and women whose theological and biblical props and underpinnings they were knocking out. There was urgent need of mediation. Dr. Abbott was foremost among those who saw the danger and came to the rescue. "The common people," he says, "can understand the essential principles of the higher criticism, if it is explained in simple language." In the ability to do what seems very easy, but is in fact very difficult—to explain in simple language the question lying at the heart of embittering controversies and to clear away the obscurities arising from technical phrases—few indeed have been the public teachers who have equaled Dr. Abbott. The welcome given to his apologetic books, *In Aid of Faith*, *The Theology of an Evolutionist*, *Life and Literature of the Ancient Hebrews*, eloquently testifies to his success in this endeavor.

But quite apart from this valuable service, and assuredly not less important, has been Dr. Abbott's ministry from the pulpit to the everyday and therefore the most urgent needs of everyday people. The men and women who filled Plymouth Church were not drawn by the announcement of a sensational theme, but simply by the expectation that

a sermon by Lyman Abbott, whatever the particular theme, would lead them to higher ground and offer them a wider and a cheering prospect. "In my morning sermons," to quote the *Reminiscences*, "I rarely discussed political or sociological topics. The first winter I was for a while called up every Sunday morning on the telephone by a New York paper with the question: 'Did Dr. Abbott preach on anything particular this morning?' My children always answered the telephone; and as they always cheerfully replied, 'Nothing particular,' after a few months the telephone calls ceased." What these "nothing particular" sermons were about, we are told in the succeeding paragraph, and here is homiletical counsel that goes to the root of the matter. "I believe that if a pastor desires his church to be a working church, his first aim must be to inspire it with a spiritual ambition. My sermons were therefore spiritual rather than theological or merely ethical. If the reader asks what I mean by saying that they were spiritual, I reply: Their object was to inspire directly the conscience, the reverence, the faith, the hope, the love of the hearers." It is not by this method, more is the pity, that the pastor today, troubled by a newly awakened social conscience and oppressed by the social needs of the community he serves, is endeavoring to fashion a working church. The short cut for him and not the laborious process of "inspiring his church with a spiritual ambition!" He pins his faith rather to the most recent efficiency devices and to a more thorough organization. His "working church" is not a fruit-bearing orchard, but a cleverly constructed machine. It "works," to be sure, as a machine may, but in the end to how little purpose!

"Of all things, I should dislike most," Lyman Abbott wrote, when he was considering the question of entering the ministry, "being obliged to preach when I had nothing to say." Plainly, he has never been in the grip of that embarrassing necessity. Always he has had something to say—something sensible, pertinent, heartening, enlightening. His readers (may they be many!) will find that he has something to say which they could ill afford to miss in every one of the five hundred pages of this captivating volume. It is pre-eminently one of the books for which "skipping" is forbidden. It demands to be read steadily and continuously, from cover to cover. The reviewer, who would gladly have made generous quotations, or have selected chapters which must by no means be overlooked, must content himself with saying, Read it all. But he cannot be denied the satisfaction of quoting at least the paragraph with which the book closes. It deserves to be cited as a notable example of the impressive simplicity of style in which Dr. Abbott is

used to deal with the largest themes. And it is of great value further, in that it offers a clear testimony to the hope of personal immortality, the more significant in this day, when distinguished theologians are disposed to dismiss the matter as merely an interesting but negligible speculation.

And I look forward to the Great Adventure, which now cannot be far off, with awe, but not with apprehension. I enjoy my work, my home, my friends, my life. I shall be sorry to part with them. But always I have stood in the bow, looking forward with hopeful anticipation to the life before me. When the time comes for my embarkation and the ropes are cast off, and I put out to sea, I think I shall still be standing in the bow, and still looking forward with eager curiosity and glad hopefulness to the new world to which the unknown voyage will bring me.

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BRIEF MENTION

DOCTRINAL

MERZ, JOHN THEODORE. *Religion and Science. A Philosophical Essay.* Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1915. xi+192 pages. 5s.

A discussion of religion by so competent a student of modern philosophical and scientific thought cannot fail to be valuable and suggestive. Yet there is nothing startling in this essay. It attempts no philosophy of religion. It rather seeks to examine and to interpret what might be called the common-sense view of religion.

The starting-point of the discussion is the familiar distinction between the "inner" world of our experience and the "outer" world of things existing in time and space. Science seeks to elaborate this outer world into a complete and all-inclusive system. But this ideal unity is secured only by filling in the many gaps in our perceptions by hypothetical substances and laws. Thus the completeness of nature is achieved only as the creative imagination belonging to the inner life supplies material of its own. The outer world is really less of a *continuum* than is our inner experience. And even the conception of nature which we attain is due largely to sharing the ideas and hypotheses of other persons, rather than to actual perception. It is a perverted notion, therefore, that the inner life should be subordinated to the outer world.

Merz suggestively calls attention to the permanent value of great literary or artistic interpretations of life as contrasted with the ephemeral character of scientific books. In spite of its vagueness from the scientific point of view, the inner life has a relatively stable form of existence. Thus religion, notwithstanding its inability to give an exact scientific account of itself, is secure in its place. If once this view of the significance of the inner life be admitted, religion can affirm things beyond the domain of science. Thus the transcendence of God and the ideas of revelation and miracle are explained and justified.

This apologetic is familiar, but it is here set forth with an absence of philosophical pretensions which will commend it to the "common-sense" man.

G. B. S.

William Newton Clarke: A Biography with Additional Sketches by his friends and colleagues. New York: Scribner, 1916. viii+262 pages. \$2.00.

Few men reveal themselves so fully in their books as did Professor William Newton Clarke. Especially in that fascinating spiritual autobiography, *Sixty Years with the Bible*, were his rare traits of character and of intellect disclosed with a candor which was extraordinary for its complete absence of egotism. The memorial volume here noticed simply reinforces the impressions already made by Dr. Clarke's published works. But one never tires of contemplating so beautiful and so fruitful a life.

The biography is unsigned, but a few "we-passages" reveal the testimony of Mrs. Clarke. She tells the story with a quiet restraint and a power of objective portrayal which is extremely effective. Taken in connection with Dr. Clarke's own *Sixty Years with the Bible* it sets forth the growth of a devout and honest soul from the traditional tenets of orthodoxy to the great-hearted, free-thinking prophet of modern Christianity. It was because he had lived vitally through the great transformation of belief that he was so exceptionally equipped to guide perplexed minds.

Appreciations of Dr. Clarke as a friend, as a religious leader, as a teacher, and as a theologian are contributed by eleven men who had been in intimate touch with him. The volume is a welcome and worthy tribute to one who was before his death the most influential theologian in American thinking.

G. B. S.

RHINELANDER, PHILIP MERCER. *The Faith of the Cross*. New York: Longmans, 1916. xiii+144 pages. \$1.20.

This book consists of six lectures given at the General Theological Seminary on the Bishop Paddock Foundation. The author feels that the doctrine of the Cross has not been given the place in contemporary theological literature which belongs to it by right. It is his purpose to show that the "faith of the Cross" as held by the apostles is the whole of Christianity. His exposition of the matter consists of a clear and fresh statement of the traditional doctrine of the atonement, without discussing any of the criticisms of it that have been made in recent years.

F. A. S.

WEBER, H. E. *Historisch-kritische Schriftforschung und Bibelglaube*. Zweite bedeutend erweiterte Auflage. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1914. xii+250 pages. M. 4.50.

That this discussion has met a real need is evidenced by the speedy demand for a second edition. The problem here faced is one which is acute wherever there is the desire to retain the divine authority of the Bible and at the same time to recognize the full rights of critical historical scholarship. Can the two exist side by side? The author of this carefully wrought argument believes that they can. He argues that religious faith finds in the Bible God's revelation in history. Thus faith discovers a super-historical factor. Since the content of the Bible itself witnesses to the activity of the transcendent God, an unprejudiced historical criticism will make room for the idea of revelation. Weber recognizes that the presupposition of orthodox faith is an a priori factor. But he insists that the "immanence idea" which dominates radical historical criticism is also an a priori dogma. We cannot eliminate presuppositions. We can only critically determine what presupposition is most in harmony with the

facts. To Weber supernaturalism is a presupposition which is reinforced by both practical faith and by the message of the Bible. Historical criticism cannot of itself negate this presupposition. It is only as some other philosophy appears that denial is possible.

Thus it comes eventually to a controversy between philosophies. Weber has conceded much in this position; for critical analysis must judge philosophies. Thus the dogmatic method gives way to the critical method. Orthodoxy is adopting a kind of apologetic which is of real value.

G. B. S.

DUNKMANN, PROF. DR. K. *Die Nachwirkungen der theologischen Prinzipienlehre Schleiermachers*. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1915. 200 pages. M. 4.

There is a renaissance of the study of Schleiermacher in Germany which is not without its echoes in the rest of the Christian world. Professor Dunkmann, of the University of Greifswald, contributes to this movement in his study of the effects of the principles of theological *method* laid down by Schleiermacher upon German theology. His conclusion is that down to the present century there have been no effects of Schleiermacher's *methodology*, since it was not understood, and the attention both of his disciples and his critics was taken up with specific teachings of the great theologian, and particularly his concept of religion as the feeling of absolute dependence. The author undertakes to state Schleiermacher's principles of method, and expresses his conviction that a right understanding of them is the only hope of this century for advance and new life in theology, but the discussion of them and their consequences for theology is reserved for a later issue of the *Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie* to which this belongs. This number reviews the criticisms made upon Schleiermacher by representatives of the main movements in theology contemporary with and since Schleiermacher, with the result referred to above. Its interest will be principally for students of the *history* of doctrine or those particularly interested in Schleiermacher, while the later discussions may be expected to be of direct interest to the systematic theologian.

E. A. C.

MAINAGE, TH. *La Psychologie de la conversion*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1915. xii+434 pages. Fr. 4.

Perplexed students sometimes ask, Where does psychology end and the work of the Holy Spirit begin? The same confusion with reference to the proper field of the psychology of religion seems to appear in this book. Its title might better be "The Theology of Conversion," for while the author discusses psychology, he is mostly concerned to defend his position from psychological attack. He defines conversion in terms of complete and enduring acceptance of all that Catholicism involves. He strongly objects to the term being applied to such a change of life as is involved in the sudden sobriety of the drunkard. Yet surely the psychological process by which such a change takes place may have many points of similarity with the religious conversion.

The method here employed is the examination of the autobiographies of converts. The author asks first whether their conversion is the result of intellectual inquiry. He finds that the converts feel that it is more than that. Was it an effort of will? They feel that they were impelled by a power not their own. Was it the result of social affections? Helpful as these were, they were not the controlling force. He then discusses Le Bon's psychology of the crowd, James's psychology of the subconscious,

the theory of double personality, the conditions of nervous pathology, and finds none of these sufficiently explanatory. What then is the cause of conversion? It is the power of God upon the human heart. And if Protestant converts seem to have much the same experience, it is still the power of God which is seeking to bring them to the Catholic faith, but which, owing to their obstinacy, cannot accomplish the complete process.

Evidently this is not psychology at all, but religious faith. Psychology of religion, in the nature of the case, cannot find or exclude God. Its concern in such a problem as this is with the analysis of the conscious experience of the religious convert. It is a pity that lectures at the Catholic Institute of Paris should not make this distinction clear. It should be said that the author is aware of the criticism and attempts to defend himself in his preface. He is certainly correct in his claim that it is desirable to make a study of Catholics to supplement the American studies which have been concerned with Protestant experience.

T. G. S.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

SACHSSE, EUGEN. *Einführung in die praktische Theologie. Eine zeitgemässe Erörterung neuer Probleme und brennender Fragen.* Bonn: A. Marcus u. E. Weber, 1914. 111 pages. M. 2.80.

Among theological disciplines practical theology has been that which is concerned with the preaching and teaching functions and with the organization of the church. Recent developments have very much enlarged its scope. This volume indicates that the same enlargement is taking place in Germany with which we are familiar in America. Practical sociology and the psychology of religion are so intimately connected with the problems of church life that they inevitably come into the survey of practical theology. But while recognizing this enlargement, Sachsse carefully scrutinizes all modern developments and brings them into the orthodox scheme. His discussion of social problems lays emphasis upon the restriction of the church to the preaching of general principles of love and brotherhood, and upon the duty of philanthropy. One misses that note of social justice which belongs to the forward church of today. And the discussion of the relation of the church to the Kingdom of God in which this might have been brought out is almost entirely theological and exegetical. The psychology of religion, in which the author seems to be unaware of the significant contributions made by American scholars, is accepted with hesitation and with the insistence that it cannot explore the spiritual life.

The name practical theology has sometimes seemed out of place as a description of the science which deals with the activities of the church. But in this volume it is abundantly justified, for the discussion is predominantly theological. Questions of sacrament and sacrifice, the formulae of prayer, including a consideration of the relation of the Son to the Father, the practical matters of leading the youth and the unevangelized into the religious experience, questions of worship as related to the persons of the Trinity—all are discussed theologically and exegetically. One misses the quality of reality in a consideration of the activities of the church as a social institution in the modern world.

A strong and helpful feature of the volume is the constant insistence upon the pre-eminence of love in the work of the church and in its influence upon society.

T. G. S.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

WHITEHEAD, HENRY. *The Village Gods of South India*. Oxford: University Press, 1916. 172 pages. 2s.6d.

This is the first of a series of volumes on the religious life of India now being edited by J. N. Farquhar, M.A., literary secretary of the National Council, Y.M.C.A., India and Ceylon. The author, Bishop Whitehead, is well known as a thoroughgoing and original student of missions. He has here given light on a problem scarcely touched by conventional works on Hinduism, namely, the actual religious life of village communities in India. The book aims at description rather than theory. Ninety female and eighteen male deities are listed—of whom less than a dozen appear in Monier-Williams, Dubois, or Farquhar—and their worship is discussed in some detail. The animal sacrifices, running into thousands at the larger feasts, the offerings of cereals, and such weird rites as walking unharmed with bare feet over glowing beds of coals are described at length. Added chapters on "The Folklore of the Gods of South India," "The Probable Origin of Their Worship," and an estimate of the social, moral, and religious value of these cults, complete the book. The author thinks that the Christian attitude toward them should be "the same attitude that the Jewish prophets took toward the local Semitic cults in Palestine, with all their idolatrous and immoral associations."

The materials are either such as were collected by the author in his work among the Telugus, Kanarese, and Tamils, or else were the reports of eyewitnesses.

This book will be an invaluable aid to the understanding of Indian village life, and gives a mass of new material for the study of comparative religion.

W. D. S.

JORDAN, LOUIS HENRY. *Comparative Religion—Its Adjuncts and Allies*. London: Oxford University Press, 1915. xxxii+574 pages. 12s.

JORDAN, LOUIS HENRY. *Comparative Religion—Its Range and Limitations*. London: Oxford University Press, 1916. 15 pages. 1s.

Mr. Jordan has long been an ardent advocate of the science of comparative religion as "a separate and self-governing discipline." He has written extensively with the purpose of defining the field, the task, and the method of the new science. The present volume, *Comparative Religion—Its Adjuncts and Allies*, of which the pamphlet forms one chapter, serves two purposes. In the first place it attempts to define the field of comparative religion by a consideration of those studies which are closely related to it, but which can be shown not to be identical with it. On the other hand, by an examination of these related studies the author is able to show the avenues of approach to his own field and the sources from which its material can be drawn. In carrying out his purpose he has considered anthropology, ethnology, sociology, archaeology, mythology, philology, psychology, and the history of Religions. In each case a selection from recent publications has been made of books that bear in some way upon religion. The more important ones are reviewed at some length. In this way the author shows the contributions which these sciences make to the study of religion and at the same time points out that there is one aspect of the matter with which no one of them is competent to deal, and which should be reserved for the science that is to be—comparative religion. There is also included a list of publications issued by various congresses and learned societies, as well as a survey of periodical literature which deals more or less with the subject of religion.

Perhaps the chief value of the book for the student of religion lies in the fact that it presents a select bibliography of the subject for the years 1910-14.

F. A. S.

STUNTZ, HOMER C. *South American Neighbors*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1916. x+212 pages. \$0.60.

This book, although confessedly written "in the crowded hours of a busy year," accomplishes very well the purpose of the author, namely, to present for the use of mission-study classes the great problems lying before our missionaries in the South American field. The book is neatly divided into eight chapters of twenty-five pages each. Because of this mechanical division, certain important phases of the subject, such as social factors, present-day religious problems, and education, receive less attention than they should. At the back of the book are valuable statistics of Protestant missions, population and school statistics, a full bibliography, a list of mission boards and correspondents, and a very good small map of the continent.

Although necessarily brief and incomplete, the author very interestingly reviews the resources of South America, its fascinating history, the reasons for its slowness of development, some of the great missionary pioneers, and the outstanding problems of religion, education, and morals which are confronting statesmen and missionaries alike. He shows the inadequacy of the prevailing religion, and brings out clearly the paralyzing effects of the system of vast landed estates and the low position assigned to woman in society. He presents also some very interesting comparisons between North America and Latin America in history, purposes, and life.

Toward the close of the book the author outlines a program of mission work for the continent. He raises many questions, political, educational, industrial, religious—questions which many people have not realized, and which are yet deserving of careful study. Dr. Stuntz is to be commended for bringing them to the attention of those who are eager to see clearly the great forward steps which remain to be taken to win this continent for Christ.

L. T. H.

MISCELLANEOUS

CARUS, PAUL. *The Venus of Milo. An Archaeological Study of the Goddess of Womanhood*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1916. 182 pages. \$1.00.

This little book begins with an account of the discovery in 1820 of the statue commonly known as the Venus of Milo. This is followed by an aesthetic appreciation of the statue, a discussion of possible restorations, and other such matter. The first third of the book is thus occupied. The remainder is devoted to the meaning of Aphrodite to the Greeks, to the supposedly kindred myths and cults in other lands, and to ideas entertained by various peoples in regard to the origin of woman. Here the wide reading of the author is impressively displayed. The present reviewer, being unversed in some of these fields of knowledge and speculation, can only report that those portions of the book which are concerned with Greek religion and Greek archaeology had better not have been written. Inadequacy and error are on every page. It is a pity.

F. B. T.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

- Bizzell, William Bennett. *The Social Teachings of the Jewish Prophets*. Boston: Sherman French, 1916. 237 pages. \$1.25.
- Olmstead, Albert Ten Eyck. *The University of Missouri Studies. Social Science Series, Vol. III, No. 1, Assyrian Historiography*. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri, 1916. vii+66 pages. \$1.00.

NEW TESTAMENT

- d'Alès, Adhémar. *Lumen Vitae*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1916. 283 pages. Fr. 3. 50.
- Bowen, Clayton R. *The Gospel of Jesus*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1916. 235 pages. \$1.00.
- Dean, Joseph. *The New Testament. Vol. I, Part II. The Gospel according to St. Mark (The Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures)*. New York: Longmans, 1916. xvii+84 pages. \$0.50.
- Gigot, Francis. *The New Testament. Vol. IV, Part III. The Apocalypse of St. John (The Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures)*. New York: Longmans, 1915. xxiv+54 pages. \$0.50.
- Husband, Richard Wellington. *The Prosecution of Jesus*. Princeton: University Press, 1916. vii+302 pages. \$1.50.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Briggs, Charles A. *History of the Study of Theology. 2 vols.* New York: Scribner, 1916. xii+217, 230 pages. \$0.75 each.
- Workman, Herbert B. *The Foundation of Modern Religion*. New York: Revell, 1916. 249 pages. \$1.25.
- Worrell, William H. (editor). *The Coptic Psalter in the Freer Collection*. New York: Macmillan, 1916. xxvi+113 pages.

DOCTRINAL

- Bridges, Horace J. *Some Outlines of the Religion of Experience*. New York: Macmillan, 1916. xv+275 pages. \$1.50.
- Brown, William Adams. *Is Christianity Practicable?* New York: Scribner, 1916. xvi+246 pages. \$1.25.
- Forsyth, P. T. *The Christian Ethics of War*. New York: Longmans, 1916. x+196 pages. \$2.00.
- Johnson, William Hallock. *The Christian Faith under Modern Searchlights*. New York: Revell, 1916. 252 pages. \$1.25.
- Jones, Rufus M. *The Inner Life*. New York: Macmillan, 1916. xii+194 pages. \$1.00.
- Kirk, Harris E. *The Religion of Power*. New York: Doran, 1916. 317 pages. \$1.50.
- Martin, Alfred W. *Faith in a Future Life*. New York: Appleton, 1916. xvii+203 pages. \$1.50.
- Merrington, Ernest Northcroft. *The Problem of Personality*. New York: Macmillan, 1916. x+229 pages. \$1.30.
- Rashdall, Hastings. *Conscience and Christ*. New York: Scribner, 1916. xx+313 pages. \$1.50.
- Rightmyer, Levi. *The Light of Truth as Revealed in the Holy Scriptures*. Boston: Sherman French, 1916. 967 pages. \$2.75.
- Smith, Gerald B. (editor). *A Guide to the Study of the Christian Religion*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916. x+759 pages. \$3.00.
- Wilkinson, William Cleaver. *Concerning Jesus Christ, the Son of God*. Philadelphia: Griffith and Rowland Press, 1916. 233 pages. \$1.00.
- Wright, Henry Wilkes. *Faith Justified by Progress*. New York: Scribner, 1916. xv+287 pages. \$1.25.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

- Fox, William Sherwood. *The Mythology of All Races. Vol. I, Greek and Roman.* Boston: Marshall Jones, 1916. lxii+354 pages. \$6.00
- Jaini, Jagmenderlal. *Outlines of Jainism.* Cambridge: University Press, 1916. xl+156 pages. \$1.25.
- Moore, Clifford Herschel. *The Religious Thought of the Greeks.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916. ix+385 pages.
- Warne, Frank W. *India's Mass Movement.* New York: Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1915. 64 pages.
- Webb, Clement C. J. *Group Theories of Religion and the Religion of the Individual.* New York: Macmillan, 1916. 208 pages. \$1.75.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Cope, Henry Frederick. *The Modern Sunday School in Principle and Practice.* New York: Revell, 1916. 206 pages. \$1.00.
- Scroggie, W. Graham. *Method in Prayer.* New York: Doran, 1916. 172 pages. \$1.00.
- Shannon, Frederick F. *The Enchanted Universe and Other Sermons.* New York: Revell, 1916. 204 pages. \$1.00.
- Warfield, Benjamin B. *Faith and Life. ("Conferences" in the Oratory of*

Princeton Seminary.) New York: Longmans, 1916. ix+458 pages. \$2.00.

MISCELLANEOUS

- Bourne, Randolph S. *Towards an Enduring Peace.* New York: American Association for International Conciliation, 1916. xv+336 pages.
- Foulon, E. *Arras sous les obus.* Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1916. vii+124 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Goodwin, William McAfee. *The Christian Science Church.* Washington, D.C.: Goodwin, 1916. 165 pages. \$1.50.
- Husik, Isaac. *A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan, 1916. l+462 pages. \$3.00.
- Johnson, James W. *The Meaning of War and the Basis for Permanent Peace.* New York: Lewis R. Kantner Press, 1916. 35 pages.
- Osmun, George W. *The Undiscovered Country.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1916. 330 pages. \$1.25.
- Rockwell, William Walker. *Armenia—A List of Books and Articles.* New York: The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, 1916. 8 pages.
- Rust, John B. *The Life and Labors of the Rev. Herman Rust, D.D.* Cleveland: Central Publishing House, 1916. 287 pages.
- Zu Reventlow, E. *The Vampire of the Continent.* New York: Jackson Press, 1916. xiii+225 pages. \$1.25.

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
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
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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

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THE PREACHABLENESS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

CARL S. PATTON
Columbus, Ohio

The New Testament has always been the great storehouse of Christian inspiration and guidance. It has always been preached. If any question arises about its preachableness at the present time, there must be some reason for such question.

That reason is not unlike that which led to the very wide raising of a similar question concerning the Old Testament a generation ago, when George Adam Smith gave his Lyman Beecher Lectures on "Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament." It lies in certain changes that have come over our conception of the authority and the content of the New Testament teaching.

First, as to the authority of the New Testament: The change in our conception of this authority has set us free from one difficulty which preachers of an earlier generation experienced. So long as it was felt to be the duty of all Christian people to believe for themselves what could be clearly shown to be in the New Testament, preachers were compelled either to make their own teachings conform in all details to the New Testament teachings, or (what more commonly happened) to twist the New Testament to make it agree with their own beliefs.

For example, it has long been difficult for modern people, preachers or laymen, to think that diseases of any sort are or have

ever been caused by the presence of demons in people's bodies. Upon the older idea of the authority of the New Testament it was necessary either that preachers should believe that certain diseases were thus caused, or that there was a disease which of itself should be called "demoniacal possession," and to teach this to their people, or that they should show that no such idea was in the New Testament. Especially did they feel obliged to show that Jesus held no such conception, but that all acts and words of his that might lend countenance to such an idea were to be interpreted as mere accommodation on his part to ideas of his time which he did not share. Most of us no longer feel ourselves confronted with these alternatives. We feel perfectly free to say that demoniacal possession is a New Testament idea, and equally free to say that this idea does not correctly represent the facts. We are delivered from the dilemma of either believing it for ourselves or denying it in the New Testament.

A second illustration of the same thing is found in the doctrine of the atonement. How many preachers of an earlier generation—one thinks of Bushnell as a shining example—who had worked themselves out to a conception of the atonement that seemed to satisfy them and to meet the ethical and spiritual requirements of their generation, were then under the added necessity of showing that the apostle Paul agreed with them! Many of the Pauline statements concerning the death of Jesus, a good while ago became extremely hard to preach. On the surface and in their apparently plain meaning they did certainly sound "forensic" and "substitutionary," and had come into quite open conflict with growing Christian ideas of divine justice and forgiveness. Such being the case, the preacher had either to accept such doctrine of the atonement as seemed to be clearly taught in the New Testament—which in this case meant the Pauline epistles—and preach it whether it seemed to fit the mind of his generation or not, or he had to "interpret" the New Testament statements to suit his own conception. Either way it was difficult—difficult to make people retain ideas which had really been outgrown; difficult to make Paul a modern theologian. Intelligent and progressive preachers did the best they could with it, but it was a hard dilemma, from which we are happily set free.

A third illustration of the same thing may be seen in the eschatological field. A certain number of Christian preachers have always held to the belief in the speedy coming of the end of the world. They have based this belief upon the New Testament, the teachings of Paul, the predictions of the Apocalypse, and the apparently explicit utterances of Jesus recorded in the Synoptic Gospels. Those preachers to whom such a belief, for their own generation, seemed impossible and absurd felt compelled to deny that the New Testament Christians entertained it. They "spiritualized" and explained the New Testament utterances that were capable of such treatment and ignored the rest. The preacher of today may frankly admit that the expectation of a speedy coming of the end of the world was characteristic of New Testament thought, and yet he himself may quite decline to hold any such expectation. This change in our conception of the authority of the New Testament is not only a great personal convenience to preachers who can neither accept nor preach all ideas found in the New Testament; it is also (and much more important) a great encouragement to honest New Testament study. One does not have to promise himself beforehand that he will find no results except such as he can personally agree with.

But though the decay of the older conception of the authority of the New Testament may be a relief to the preacher, it is sometimes also a difficulty for him. He may find his people confused by it and saying to themselves: "So long as everybody took the whole New Testament just as it stood, we knew what to believe. But in these days of private interpretations, when the Book does not mean what it seems to say, and one man's interpretation of it is as good as another's, we do not know." He will find men who feel that with the decay of the purely authoritative standard in the New Testament all reasonable certainty in religious faith has been lost. It thus becomes obvious to the preacher that if he is to preach the New Testament at all he must preach it in some larger, more comprehensive, and more fundamental way.

Secondly, this necessity is further forced upon the preacher by changes in our conception of the content of the New Testament teaching. If one's study of the New Testament reveals to him there only secondary and incidental ideas which he cannot

personally accept, no great difficulty is felt. But if, from a revision of his ideas as to the actual content of the New Testament, one begins to feel that the New Testament ideas with which he is at variance are more or less fundamental, then one's sense of difficulty becomes much more acute. To take an illustration already used, we do not believe in these days that diseases are caused by the indwelling of evil spirits. We do not even believe that they were so caused in New Testament times; but we admit that it was generally so believed by the New Testament folk. So far our personal divergence from a New Testament point of view gives us no trouble. But if we push the matter one step farther and ask, Did Jesus himself believe in demoniacal possession? we raise a much more serious question. Many readers of the New Testament may be able to persuade themselves that he did not. Many others will feel that he did. If he did, and if we do not, then not only are we at liberty to differ with Jesus, but we are obliged to conclude that he was mistaken.

This case in itself will hardly cause any serious perplexity. But it points the way to difficulty. The crux comes when we see in how many points and at what vital points the ideas of Jesus differed from those of modern Christians.

For the sake of argument I may put the matter hypothetically, but in its extreme form. Suppose, in the first place, that all the differences that have been alleged by modern scholars between the Synoptic Gospels and the Fourth Gospel be allowed. Suppose it be admitted that if Jesus spoke as he is represented as speaking in the Synoptics, he cannot have spoken as he is said to have done in the Fourth Gospel. Suppose, in consequence, that the utterances of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount and in the parabolic teaching of the Synoptics be taken to represent his real mode of teaching, but the long discourses in the fourteenth and succeeding chapters of John be regarded as unhistorical, that is, the early Christian idea of what Jesus might have said, not the accurate record of what he did say. Suppose, on the same basis, that the total picture of Jesus drawn in the Fourth Gospel cannot be harmonized or reconciled with that drawn of him in the Synoptics, and that intelligent readers of the New Testament must choose between the two.

Suppose, in the second place, that in many instances even in the Synoptics we have no means of being sure of the exact words of Jesus. Where Matthew says, "Blessed are the poor in spirit," Luke says, "Blessed are ye poor." Where Matthew says, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness," Luke says, "Blessed are ye that hunger now." In Matthew's conclusion to the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus says that the man who hears his words and follows them is like one who builds his house upon the rock; whereas one who hears and follows them not, is like one who builds upon the sand. In reporting the same saying Luke represents Jesus as making no reference to different kinds of soil, but only to the fact that one man builds with a foundation and the other without one. In instances such as these, the words being reported in Matthew and Luke only, no comparison with Mark or John is possible. But in the only Gospels that report them the words are differently reported. If one will spend hours with a Greek lexicon he may be able to convince himself that he knows which of these forms of words really goes back to Jesus, but he will hardly convince anyone else, and in many instances he cannot even assure himself. Suppose, in other words, that in many instances, and sometimes where we are dealing with the most fundamental teachings of Jesus like those in the Sermon on the Mount, we find ourselves unable to be sure precisely what Jesus did say.

Suppose, in the third place, that even in the Synoptics one has to admit the insertion into the mouth of Jesus of some later ideas. If one should take, for instance, the little parable in Luke's eighteenth chapter, of the Unjust Judge, closing with the words, "Nevertheless, when the Son of Man cometh, shall he find the faith in the earth," and should be convinced that these last words do not come from Jesus, that as a part of the parable they mean nothing, and are quite out of place in the mouth of Jesus while he was living and as yet did not even look forward to death. Suppose that one concludes that they come from Luke, who, after relating the parable and reflecting upon all the hardships and persecutions which the Christians of his day had to endure, wondered whether the new faith would live till the return of Jesus. Suppose one should carefully compare all the passages in the Synoptics in

which Jesus refers to himself as the "Son of Man," and should find that in practically every instance the phrase is either lacking in Matthew where it is present in Luke, or lacking in Luke where it is present in Matthew; or occurs in a verse that seriously interrupts the connection and may reasonably be suspected of being a gloss, or even in a verse which is lacking in the best manuscripts; or that the phrase is so used as to cause confusion in the persons of the verbs and pronouns, or even to lead to a sadly twisted sentence, as in Mark's story of the paralytic let down through the roof; or so as to render the context meaningless, as where Matthew, by inserting the phrase where Mark does not have it, makes Jesus answer his own question in asking it, "Who do men say that I the Son of Man am?" Suppose that for one reason or another the phrase is open to suspicion wherever one finds it, and in consequence one comes to feel that in all probability Jesus did not call himself the Son of Man, but that the title is a messianic one that was developed after the death of Jesus, and was then read back into his mouth by the writers of our Synoptic Gospels or by the community to which they belonged.

Or, to put the most extreme case, suppose it to be true, as many New Testament scholars are these days maintaining, that Jesus did expect the end of the world either during his own lifetime, or at least during that of the generation to which he belonged. The Pauline epistles are certainly full of this expectation. The Synoptic Gospels in more than one place carry back this idea into the mind of Jesus and make him predict in so many explicit words his own parousia. Not only are such words found in "the Little Apocalypse," where they might be explained as part of a document not originally Christian, but very explicitly, when he sent out the Twelve, Jesus explained to them that they were not to go outside the cities of Judah, because there would not be time "before the Son of Man should be come." In other passages in all three Synoptics he is represented as warning his hearers to be on their guard, since they know not the day nor the hour when the Son of Man shall come; "there are some of you standing here," he said, "who shall not taste of death till all these things be fulfilled." It is possible, of course, to remove all these ideas from the mind

of Jesus by attributing them to a later time, as suggested above. If one does this, the difficulty of preaching these utterances, and of explaining to a congregation of Christian worshipers that Jesus did not really say such things, but that they were later ideas read back into his mind by the evangelists, is certainly not a slight one. Moreover, if this alternative be taken, and it be concluded that none of these sayings go back to Jesus; if, on the contrary, he entertained concerning the end of the world and his own parousia quite the opposite opinion, then one must explain not only how such explicit utterances, so contrary to his real expectation, became so confidently attributed to Jesus, and why no word of his was preserved expressing the opinion which he actually held; but one must also explain why there are so many of the ethical teachings of Jesus that seem to fit exactly this expectation of the quick coming of the end. For it is the contention of some New Testament scholars that this expectation was not only clearly expressed by Jesus on various occasions, but that it colored much of his ethical teaching, and has made some of that teaching at least inapplicable to the modern world. "Take no thought for the morrow"; "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon the earth"; "If anyone will take away thy cloak, let him have thy coat also"; "Resist not the evil man"; have not men who expected the end of the world always talked in this way? Except in the case of Jesus, has not their expectation been recognized as vitiating their moral maxims? And does not this expectation, in the mind of Jesus, explain that unworldliness, or other-worldliness, that disregard of property and progress, and even of some of the sacred ties and relations of life which are found in some of the teachings of Jesus? Upon the eschatological hypothesis Jesus' advice to the young man to sell all he had and give it away in alms, or to the other young man to let the dead bury their dead, or his more general statement that no one could be his follower who did not hate his own father and mother, is quite natural and proper. If the end is coming so soon, this is the way one would naturally feel about all merely earthly matters. But why (so it is asked) should we try to enforce upon a world which is to continue, a system of ethics devised for a world which was to pass away?

I have put all this in a hypothetical way. I do not care to argue strongly for all the suppositions I have made. Yet I have made none except such as are now earnestly supported by a considerable body of New Testament scholars. Unless all these suppositions are false, there is certainly some basis for raising the question about "the preachableness of the New Testament." What is now to be said to that question?

If it be asked, as a preliminary question, whether, under the circumstances, it would not be better to preach general moral and religious truth, to fall back upon principles universally accepted, and to apply those principles with all possible earnestness to our modern life, but to let the New Testament alone, I reply that it would not be better. It would be decidedly worse. The New Testament is the great textbook of the Christian religion. Many of its principles may be found stated in other sacred literatures. All of them, I suppose, are written in the human heart. But it is not enough that Christian people should be filled with sentiment actually Christian and animated by admittedly Christian principles of conduct. It is further necessary, if Christianity is to be an intelligent and virile force, and is not to degenerate into mere moralism, that this great textbook of Christianity should be constantly studied, explained, and taught from the pulpit—its obscurities cleared up, its principles differentiated from the mere generalities of the moral life, and all that is distinctive of it kept living and clear before the Christian people. A Christian church which is ignorant of the New Testament, which is permitted to regard it as antiquated and superfluous, even though to that church much of the moral and religious substance of the New Testament should have been preached, would be in every way far below a church educated upon the New Testament.

Among general considerations, also, the preacher may well urge the fact which people are so slow to see and so quick to forget, that Christianity did not grow out of the New Testament, but the New Testament out of Christianity. Only after Jesus had lived and died, only after the first church had been gathered in Jerusalem, and many missionaries from it had carried the new gospel into many lands, only after Paul had transferred Christianity from Asia

Minor to Southern Europe, and had taken it out of a decaying civilization and planted it firmly in the great centers of the ongoing Greco-Roman culture—only then did the New Testament arise. There was Christianity before the New Testament was written.

He may also well urge the other fact that religious authority, to anyone who stops to think the matter through, can never rest in any book, New Testament, gospel, or any other, nor even in the words of Jesus, but in the soul of the believer. Even if one attributes a unique and final authority to the New Testament, he can do so only by the appeal to his own mind. It is his own mind that decides the matter, and therefore his own mind that is the ultimate authority, even though his own mind may posit authority in something, book or other, outside itself. God has no way of speaking except through the human soul. Whatever is in the New Testament is there because it was at an earlier time in the soul of some man. The only religious authority is a spiritual authority. If the newer ideas about the New Testament help to drive home this all-important truth, they will have accomplished one great spiritual benefit.

It may also be maintained that considerations against the validity of some of the words attributed to Jesus, and all other results of New Testament criticism, leave the moral principles enunciated in the New Testament quite untouched. The Golden Rule is just as true for a world which is to continue indefinitely as for a world whose end is momentarily expected. The story of the Prodigal Son is as attractive a picture of God's attitude toward men upon one hypothesis as upon another. Whatever may have been the exact words of Jesus, and however much was or was not read back into his mouth from a later time, it is still true, and equally true, that a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things that he possesseth. What Jesus held or did not hold about medical and scientific matters, or even about his own parousia, does not affect the fact that he that exalteth himself shall be abased, but he that humbleth himself shall be exalted. Whatever content Jesus put into the phrase the "Kingdom of God," whether he looked forward to a speedy establishment of that kingdom by the divine intervention, as his forefathers and contemporaries did, or anticipated its

slow coming through the centuries by the operation of natural spiritual laws as we do, it is still true, as Jesus said, that in that kingdom he that would be first must be servant of all. Whatever was Jesus' indebtedness to the thought of his own time, in these or in any other items, no single piece of human literature of the same compass contains one-tenth the spiritual insight and the permanent religious truth to be found in the Sermon on the Mount. The story of the Prodigal Son is *true*—true to human nature, true to the spiritual instincts and needs of man—upon one hypothesis as upon any other. These things are not merely "preachable," they are the substance of all good preaching.

If it be said, on the other hand, that this is not quite true of some of the other teachings of Jesus, which are suspected of having been much influenced by his eschatological expectation, such as the teaching about non-resistance, the exhortation not to take thought for the things of tomorrow, or the advice not to lay up treasures upon earth, it should be frankly replied that some of these teachings have never been very preachable. They are as much so now as they ever have been. But it has always been necessary, in preaching these maxims of Jesus, to explain that they did not mean precisely what they said; to regard them as idealistic utterances, "counsels of perfection," too high to be attained by ordinary Christians—as a far-off ideal to be approximated, in the life of the world or of the individual, only slowly and imperfectly. If one is convinced that some of these teachings did come from Jesus' eschatological hope, which we no longer share, this will not make these teachings any less or any more "preachable" than they have always been; it may permit the preacher to leave on one side some of these exhortations without a sense of disloyalty to Jesus or to the New Testament.

These more general considerations may show that the New Testament is preachable in spite of all changes in our conception of its authority and its content. Such a result would be only negative. Far more important, however, are the positive advantages in the preaching of the New Testament which those changes have made possible.

First, one can now preach the New Testament in the historic spirit. If he preaches about some scene in the life of Jesus which involves the healing of a man possessed with demons, he may not merely admit that Jesus probably believed in these demons though we do not; he can show why people in Jesus' day naturally and necessarily believed in them. Instead of permitting his people to regard the whole belief in Jesus' time as a mere piece of superstition, as the crude rationalism of a few years ago declared it, he can show the historical necessity of it and its place in the total of first-century spiritual conceptions. Without committing himself to Pauline conceptions of the atonement, and without explaining away the things that Paul tried to insist upon, he can show how and why these conceptions arose in the mind of the apostle, how inevitable they were in his time, and how absurd it would be to demand of him that he should hold our modern ideas.

Secondly, he can show, as consequent upon this same historic point of view, how the Christian ideal is not to be entirely identified with any or all of the utterances of the New Testament, but has grown ever since the first century and is still growing. Some elements of the modern Christian ideal, such as the emphasis upon one's service of the world by his daily work, or the ambition for discovering and proclaiming the truth, may be practically absent from the New Testament, or passed over in that book as merely incidental and unimportant. They are nevertheless a very vital part of the modern Christian ideal. In the same way some items may be overemphasized in the New Testament, as, for example, the item of self-sacrifice compared with the item of self-realization. The point is that the Christian ideal is forever growing. It is not to be identified with the ideal of the New Testament times. If it can be shown that the New Testament people were "world-despisers," we are none the less Christian because we are not. If it can be shown that the New Testament emphasis upon the intellectual and artistic sides of life is extremely slight, that emphasis is none the less a part of the Christian ideal of today. Here, as elsewhere, the New Testament is not the end but the starting-point.

Thirdly, as already implied, this newer attitude toward the New Testament permits the preacher to preach not merely on isolated texts of that book, but much more than ever before, and in a larger and more comprehensive way, upon the literature itself. People can now be interested in the growth of that great literature, in discussions about how it came into being, what portions of it are older and what more recent. They can be made to appreciate the differences between the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel and to see the growth in Christian thought revealed in those differences. They can be shown the earliest form of the Christian tradition as it appears in Mark and be made to appreciate the additions to that tradition made by Matthew and Luke. They can be taken into the secret of how the sayings of Jesus were first recorded and how they now come to be combined by the later evangelists with the outline of the life of Jesus as told by Mark. All this can be done, not in the technical and purely scientific manner of the theological classroom, but in a way to show intelligent Christian laymen that the New Testament literature grew out of a great seething movement of Christian thought and to reveal to them the living spirit behind and beneath the process which gave that literature to the world. The New Testament as a whole and as a literature unique in the spiritual history of the race is much more preachable now than for many years.

Fourthly, the modern preacher can show that, if the older idea of the authority of the New Testament has decayed, there is a larger sense in which the New Testament carries a spiritual compulsion into the soul of every man who is acquainted with it. Granting that religious authority is in the soul of man, and of every particular man, yet wherever one opens the New Testament, whether he goes to the words of Jesus or considers the assemblies of men to whom Paul wrote his letters, everywhere throughout the New Testament the reader will feel himself in the presence of a life lived in the pursuit of certain well-defined ideals. The ideal of faith, of quietness, of an absolute trust in God, of patience, of peace, of unworldliness, of personal purity, of service for others—the ideal of military glory has not more truly moved Germany for the last thirty years than these ideals ruled the life of the New

Testament people. These ideals are not affected by biblical criticism. But on the other hand, in the New Testament they are not merely ideals; they are ideals vitalized, in process of realization, working mightily in the heart of a whole generation, and issuing in a movement unique among the spiritual movements of history. The weakness of moralism is its abstraction. The strength of religion is its concreteness. It is not difficult to find great ideals stated in beautiful words in many ancient religious literatures or in much modern literature. But the thing that stirs the hearts of Christian men and women, that takes all this idealism out of the realm of the intellectual and the doctrinaire, and makes it living and powerful, is the picture of that time when in one particular part of the world, under the immediate influence of Jesus and his own generation, and under conditions less complicated than those that have since come upon Christendom, these ideals can be seen working and controlling and actually embodied in the life of a community of believers. All this would be lost if the New Testament were not studied and preached, even though the separate items of the New Testament ideal should be enforced from the pulpit. The New Testament is the great fountain of spiritual religion. Its inspiration for our own time, or for any and all other times, is not affected by changes of opinion concerning its authority or content; it lies in the character of the Christian movement. And that Christian movement is described for us in the New Testament and nowhere else. It is not merely preachable. It is the most preachable of all things. Nor was there ever a time in the history of Christendom, despite all our progress, which stood in more danger of forgetting or ignoring precisely those ideals by which the New Testament people lived than just this age of ours. It is just now the time of all times to preach the New Testament.

Finally, there is the sublime figure of Jesus, theme of the world's best preaching in all the ages—is he still preachable? Yes; more and more so with every generation, though not always in the same identical way, to be sure. Modes of preaching Jesus have changed more than once. Lecturing at one time from the text "I determined to know nothing among you save Christ and him crucified," Professor Park maintained that the preacher had no particular

concern with anything in the life of Jesus except his death; that was the one thing which he was continually to preach; which meant, of course, that he was to confine his preaching practically to Professor Park's theory of the atonement! For the purpose of many preachers, not many years ago, it would not have made much difference what Jesus said, how he lived, how he treated various classes of men and women, what ideals he cherished, and how the life of his own spirit ran, only so he had died on the cross. It is the advantage of the newer studies in the New Testament that, even when they are more or less radical and require many modifications of preconceived ideas, they do yet make the apostolic generation and the figure of Jesus living and real. Most Christian preachers are now preaching, not merely the death of Jesus, but the ideals by which he lived, the great purposes which animated him, the circumstances of his life and death, and all that went to make him the supreme character of human history. Whatever helps us to make all this real to ourselves and our people is certainly a contribution to the preachableness of the New Testament.

FROM LEO XIII TO BENEDICT XV

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I. THE CENTRALIZATION OF POWER

The importance of Pius X's pontificate lies neither in his struggle against Modernism nor in his attempt at a religious revival of the Catholic spirit. In dealing with the contemporary popes we are very likely to forget that in the history of the papacy the institution has shown itself far greater than the men. Whatever the intentions and the immediate goal of the activity of a pope, his importance historically depends on this only in part, since the value of a pontificate must be judged from the higher standpoint of historical continuity in the realization of the purpose of the church.

The intentions and the personal program of a pope may be in real antithesis to the natural course of the events in the life of the church, and then the importance and the historical value of such a pope cannot actually be found in what he deemed the most important part of his activity, but exactly in what seemed to him only secondary and less valuable. This criterion, however, can hardly be applied to the history of a contemporary pope, because we are inclined to judge the institutions through the personalities rather than the personalities through the institutions.

The pontificate of Pius X offers a good illustration of these cases of historical misrepresentation. It was boasted at the very beginning of his pontificate that Pius X was to be a religious rather than a political pope; he himself announced that this was exactly his ideal; he outlined a program with such a basis; he worked sincerely with such a purpose.¹ And we believed in him; we came to discuss

¹ "With the help of God, putting our hand to work in the administration of the Church, we declare that this will be our sole purpose, namely, that *Christ is to be in everything and for everyone*. Certainly there will be some people who, measuring things divine by human standards, will endeavor to distort our intentions and turn them to earthly uses and to the interests of parties. To destroy this hope at once

the acts of his pontificate from this point of view, and we wrote the new chapter in the history of the Roman church under the title "The Religious Pontificate of Pius X." And yet this is perfect nonsense; under the spell of personality we forgot the institution, and we failed to realize that in the last analysis the pontificate of Pius X was neither more religious nor less political than the pontificate of Leo XIII.

The starting-point of the history of the modern Catholic church is the Vatican Council and its definition of the infallibility of the pope. It was the culminating point toward which converged the whole development of the historical papacy for many centuries; but to us it became a starting-point and the new factor which was bound to shape the new profile of the church. In the past it was a goal; now it is the cornerstone, the new historical and juridical ground on which the life of the church must logically be built up in the future.

We cannot fail to recognize that the admirable organization of the Roman church develops within itself, almost instinctively and in due time, the necessary means to face a new situation. The dogma of infallibility proclaimed on the very eve of the fall of the temporal power of the pope was a great achievement. Those theologians of the Council who, hostile to the dogma, had predicted the ruin of the church as a consequence of it were wrong, and the Curia Romana, which insisted energetically on having it, was right. The church, deprived of its temporal support, had to face the problem of a new internal reconstruction. Such a task required a revival of the principle of authority and the steady, solid basis which only the dogma of infallibility could furnish.

But this theory of the nature of the church, which found its higher manifestation in the doctrine of the infallibility, implies in practice a whole system of strongly centralized government. An infallible pope in the doctrinal realm means in practice a theocratic

we strongly affirm that we are, and with God's help we will be, nothing else but *ministers of God*, whose authority we represent. God's cause is our cause; to it we have decided to dedicate all our strength and our very life. Therefore if a motto is asked of us which shall make clear our intentions we will always give: *Innotuere omnia in Christo*."—First *Encyclical* of Pius X, October, 1903.

power beyond the control of either personal or collective authority.¹ Furthermore, a centralized government, to be efficient, requires fundamental unity of method, and unity of method calls for unity of mentality. The mental unification of the Catholic clergy, through common methods of education and common philosophical doctrines, was the great task of the pontificate of Leo XIII. All his vaunted political activity, all his dreams of a new temporal kingdom, all that in his judgment was preparation for a high place in the history of the papacy, was but useless dispersion of energies, even a dangerous adventure in the light of the real interests of the Roman policy. This part of his personal program was destined to failure because it was not in accord with the natural and logical development of the life of the church. But what he accomplished toward the unification of the clergy and the organization of the Catholic laymen was the most effective, although the least apparent, achievement of his pontificate.²

On the contrary, Pius X, who desired a religious pontificate, was constrained by the events of his reign to spend most of his energies in political struggles, all of which ended in defeat. And yet these defeats helped him to continue the unifying work of his predecessor. Only through the failure of his French policy could Pius destroy forever the last remnants of the old liberties of the Gallican church; and through a series of apparent failures and blunders in his admin-

¹ Catholic theology limits the concept of infallibility exclusively to the definitions *ex cathedra*. There is no doubt about the doctrine; but the pope practically claims the right to interfere with social, political, and national matters of the believers and does ask full obedience in these matters as well as in question of faith. Pope Pius X, in his address to the French pilgrims, April, 1909, said: "Those who are rebels to the authority of the Church, assuming that the Church invades the dominion of the State, they impose limits to the truth." And Benedict XV in his first *Encyclical* says: "No private person, either in books or in daily papers, or in public speeches, has a right to act as a teacher in the Church. It is well known by all who is the *One* to whom God confided the magistracy of the Church: let then the field be free for him, so that he may speak when and how he thinks suitable to speak. It is the duty of all to listen to him with obsequious devotion and to obey his words" (November 1, 1914).

² On the activity of Pope Leo XIII toward the unification of the clergy through a common system of education, and of the Catholic laity through the organization of a Catholic political party, see the article "A Review of Italian Modernism," *Harvard Theological Review*, October, 1914.

istration he succeeded in preserving the unity of the clergy by eliminating all dissidents; in starting the codification of the Canon Law, in attempting a reform of the Roman congregations, and, above all, in curtailing the authority of the bishops to the advantage of the Curia.¹

This last feature of the pontificate of Pius X has passed almost unnoticed by the historians of the contemporary Roman church; and yet it is perhaps one of the achievements which will have remarkable consequences in the history of the papacy.

During the old régime, about a century ago, the bishops were still the henchmen of kings and of governments; they were scarcely representatives of their churches. The handling of a diocese in many European countries was in some respects a political rather than a religious function. In the last analysis the famous alliance of the throne and the altar had ceased to be on equal footing—at the expense of the altar. The gradual breakdown of all the temporal ties binding the church to the peculiar interest of international policy paved the way for a transformation.

With the new régime, and especially during the pontificate of Leo XIII, the bishops became the henchmen of the pope. In this change they did not gain anything in autonomy; perhaps they lost something, but doubtless they gained very much in self-respect and public esteem; for between the two masters, the king and the pope, the latter was at least the legitimate one. Evidently the one who made the greatest gain was the pope himself. But Leo XIII was a great diplomat; in his personal dealings with bishops and prelates he was tactful; and the charm and the majesty of his manners, the authority of his words, were so imposing to all his visitors that the Catholic bishops felt rather fortunate in having such a master. It is true that they did not enjoy great liberty in the administration of their dioceses, but at least no attempt was made against their prerogatives of honor, and the traditional

¹ The true history of the breach between the Roman Curia and French Republic has not yet been written. From the French side the best book is still *La politique religieuse de la République Française*, by Andrieu Mater (Paris, 1909). From the side of the Curia there are a number of articles and pamphlets, but the most interesting is the simple *White Book* published by the Vatican.

forms of respect were carefully observed by Rome in dealing with them.¹

The coming of Pius X with his ideas of reformation swept away even those last remnants of episcopal grandeur. Simple priests and friars who enjoyed the confidence of the pope were sent to the various dioceses, with the title and the prerogatives of "Apostolic Visitors," to make careful inspections of the episcopal administration. Old bishops and archbishops who during the pontificate of Leo XIII had been highly praised, and even some cardinals, were obliged to bow before these parvenus, and to allow them to scrutinize everything at their leisure, even private and personal affairs. As a consequence of these inspections some bishops were obliged to resign, others to receive coadjutors; all of them were deeply humiliated and terrorized. From that time the bishops became the henchmen of the Curia, and unfortunately enough the Curia at that moment was impersonated by a few anachronistic survivals of the Spanish Inquisition.²

The same spirit and tendencies led the pope and his advisers to the refusal of the French law concerning church organization, although the bishops of that country had voted for its acceptance. It was a terrible blow, for the French church was reduced at once to mendicity, losing even the property of the sacred edifices themselves. But such a loss was of no importance to the pope in comparison with the advantage of having at least the French episcopacy at the mercy of the Curia without further interference either by the government or by laical corporations. The history of the French Catholic church is for centuries the history of the quarrels between the national governments and the papacy for the

¹ During the pontificate of Leo XIII the cardinals with dioceses enjoyed a great authority in the appointments of the new bishops of their provinces and near-by churches; they were regularly consulted and invited to present some candidate of their own choice. With Pius X frequently they were not even consulted! In a Sicilian diocese a bishop with power to ordain priests of the Greek rite was appointed and ordained without any knowledge of the archbishop of the same diocese where the new bishop was supposed to exercise his power.

² In Sicily alone, after these "apostolic visits," three bishops were requested to resign. An archbishop was put under secret trial at Rome, another one severely reprimanded.

control of the episcopacy, and through the episcopacy of the church itself. The papacy could not forget all the troubles and the humiliations that those quarrels had brought to the Vatican, and the opportunity was too unique to be passed by. After all, the heavy price was to be paid by the French church itself, and that might well be considered an expiation for the sins of the old Gallican church against Rome.

Several attempts were made to terrorize the German bishops, but because of their political connections with the German government and with the powerful Catholic party of the Reichstag, these attempts failed, not, however, so completely but that the German bishops were deeply impressed.¹

The American church, considered until a short time ago a missionary church, had enjoyed special privileges and a kind of autonomy in its internal organization. A series of papal ordinances and decrees gradually brought the American church under the common law, and the observance of the Council of Trent was made obligatory for this country.²

In this way, with the traditional perseverance of the Roman Curia in seizing all opportunities, the papacy during this last period of its history has accomplished one of the greatest tasks and realized one of the principal ideals of the Roman policy: a real and efficient concentration of all the ecclesiastical powers in the hands of the Curia. This work must be continued, completed, and preserved

¹ The attacks against German bishops were made rather indirectly and especially through the famous *Corrispondenza Romana*, a periodical edited by Mgr. Umberto Benigni, at that time substitute secretary in foreign affairs department of the Vatican. The *affaire* of the petition made by a great number of German Catholic scholars and priests for the abolition of the *Index Librorum prohibitorum* was one of the most striking incidents of that period. But German bishops presented their remonstrances to the pope in such a way that Pius X was deeply impressed, and to give them satisfaction sent away Benigni from the political office of the Vatican, appointing him professor of church history at the Pontifical Academy of the "Nobili Ecclesiastici," the pontifical school of diplomacy. Important articles on German troubles may be found in the *Revue Moderniste*, published in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1911 and 1912.

² The Catholic American church was organized as a missionary church under the jurisdiction of the Congregation of *Propaganda Fide*. Now, according to the reform of Pius X, the authority of the *Propaganda* over the churches of the United States is abolished, and these churches are supposed to live in conformity to the common rules of Canon Law.

in the future; whatever the names and the personal programs of the popes may be, they will follow the same policy. The difference will be in words and tactics only, but the goal will be the same, and the most important instrument of action will be substantially identical throughout.

II. THE REACTION

Naturally enough this program of the papacy found strong opposition and resistance within the church itself. What else, in the last analysis, was Modernism but a centrifugal tendency, an attempt to break the iron circle which was becoming narrower day by day and threatening the very existence of the individual spiritual life under the all-absorbing tentacles of an absolute theocratic principle of authority?

The last year of the pontificate of Pius X witnessed the most striking episode of this struggle between the harassing Curia and the institutions of the church which resisted it. The system of denunciations had reached its climax, and the persecution of Modernism had already degenerated into general persecution against everybody who was suspected of thinking in a different way from the Curia. The hunting of heresies had become a fruitful and delightful occupation of many zealots, and heretics were easily found everywhere. Books written by Catholic scholars, which for many years had been allowed to circulate freely among the clergy, indeed had been considered genuine products of orthodox Catholic science, were at once denounced as containing doctrines which were poison for Catholic minds. The *Index* was decorated with lists of names, some of which had merited years before the felicitation of the pope himself, with the title "pillars of Catholic science and Catholic faith."¹ Dissatisfaction and fear invaded all spheres of Catholicism, ecclesiastical as well as laical, but nobody dared to manifest the deep affliction of sincere souls.

¹ A striking instance of this recrudescence of the *Index* was the condemnation of the well-known book *L'histoire ancienne de l'Eglise* by Mgr. L. Duchesne. That history had circulated among Catholic students in lithographed copies since 1876, was corrected and amplified by the author in 1906, and published in France. The attacks were started by a series of articles by the Jesuit review *La Civiltà Cattolica* (Rome) when an Italian translation of the book began to appear, and it was put in the *Index* in 1912.

An opportunity was offered by an incident that at first seemed to be of no interest. In Germany first, and afterward in France and in Italy, the Catholic organizations of workmen, after various experiences, came to the decision to accept the Christian syndicates which had been started by the workmen themselves with a strictly economic purpose, and which were independent both of the Catholic political organization and of the control of the Catholic clergy.¹ But the conservative party among the Catholics, deemed these free syndicates to be dangerous for the church and to oppose the very spirit of Catholic doctrine and traditions. Catholicism is an integral system of doctrine and practice; there is no possibility in Catholic life for a separation of the economic problem from its political and religious connections. In such a system nothing can be left out, nothing can be added which does not conform to the tradition, without imperiling the very essence of Catholicism itself. Holding this principle, the conservatives took for themselves the title of Integralists, in opposition to the Syndicalists.

But the Syndicalists were numerous and well organized. In Italy they had the control of several Catholic banks, and economic institutions and many bishops and cardinals sympathized with them openly. Even the Italian government did not look with disfavor on their organization.

In France many Catholics known as leaders in social and political activities were Syndicalists. In Germany—the cradle of Christian Syndicalism—they were supported by the imperial government, which found in their organization a useful force against revolutionary socialism.

The Integralists were in the minority, but they had with them the Vatican and the pope himself. To support their claims they developed an Integralist theory as an essential part of the Catholic doctrine. Integral Catholicism does not admit compromises of any sort with opposite parties and bases its program of action on the assumption that the authority of the pope, true vicar of God on

¹ On Christian Syndicalism the best study is *Le Syndicalisme chrétien en Allemagne*, by Maurice Kellershohn, avocat à la Cour d'Appel de Bordeaux (Paris: Bloud, 1912). An account of the last events of Christian Syndicalism before the death of Pius X is to be found in "Vitalità e vita nel Cattolicesimo-Cronache" by E. Rutili, in *Bilychnis*, December, 1914 (Rome)

earth, is not to be restricted in practice to the religious field, but, on the contrary, is to be recognized the supreme authority in political and social matters as well. Every good Catholic is obliged, under penalty of sin, to follow the pontifical directions in every sense, unconditionally and without reserve. Furthermore, much stress was laid upon the absolute necessity of the temporal power of the papacy and upon the moral duty of the Catholics of the world to work for its restoration. Amazing and exaggerated as these doctrines may seem, they are none the less logically deduced from the inflexible Catholic system, and they represent the genuine thought of the Vatican circles.¹

The antagonism between Integralism and Syndicalism, which at the beginning seemed confined to a mere question of detail, assumed wider proportions as a consequence of a remarkable incident that happened in Austria. At the Catholic Congress of Linz, July, 1913, the editor of an Integralist paper and president of a juvenile association, proposed a vote in favor of the re-establishment of the temporal kingdom of the pope. The chairman of the meeting, following the instruction of the Archbishop of Vienna, refused to discuss the matter or even to consider the proposition of the violent Integralist leader. The result was a vehement campaign of the *Sonntagsblatt*, the Integralist paper, against the Archbishop of Vienna. The local quarrel spread to other countries; other bishops were denounced as holding liberal tendencies, and a general conflagration started within the church. Laymen without commission, obscure friars from provincial convents, all animated with the best Integralist zeal, arose to call bishops and prelates before their tribunal, accusing them of treachery and felony toward the Church of Rome. And Rome kept silent.

¹ Pope Pius X, in his address to the new appointed cardinals, May 27, 1914, said: "When you go back to your dioceses, if you meet people who boast their faith and their devotion to the Pope, and who call themselves Catholics, but who would consider it an insult to be called 'Clericals,' tell them, in the most solemn way, that devout sons of the Pope are only those who obey his words and follow him in everything, and not the others who try to elude his orders with stubbornness worthy of a better cause, in order to obtain exemptions and dispensations which are as painful to us as they are dangerous and scandalous to the Church." Notice that the name of "Clericals" is given in Italy and France to those who follow the political directions of the pope, especially regarding the aspirations toward the re-establishment of the temporal kingdom.

But at this point something happened that was almost unprecedented in the history of the Roman church. In a meeting of the Pius-Verein, the most important Catholic association of Austria, the Jesuit Fr. Kolb made a strong attack on Integralism, branding as infamous the campaign against the bishops, and concluding that the Integralists were not even to be considered Christians. Almost at the same time the famous review of the Italian Jesuits, *La Civiltà Cattolica* of Rome, published a series of articles in which, commenting on the proceedings of the Catholic Congress of Münster, it approved the Syndicalist unions and outlined a broad program for Catholic social work. In Germany the Jesuit review *Stimmen aus Maria Laach* published a striking appeal for unity against the menace of Integralism, signed by all the members of the editorial staff. It was evident that the Society of Jesus did not share the views of the pope and had taken its place of combat with the opposition. It was amazing.

The Jesuits had supported Pius X with all their strength in his struggle against Modernism, in his attempt at a reformation of the ecclesiastical discipline, even in the odious work of hunting heresies and heretics. Why did they change their attitude? It is not difficult to solve the mystery. They had come to realize that the pope had fallen completely under the control of a few narrow-minded and ignorant men of his environment, and now they were afraid that the reign of terror would disorganize the church and the anti-episcopal movement would pave the way for a possible schism. Evidently in their judgment Pius X had reached the summit of his reactionary policy, and now a decline was to come. The constructive period of his pontificate was past; now it was necessary to prevent him from destroying through his own excesses what he had previously done for the church. The pontificate of Pius X was virtually past and the Jesuits wisely began to prepare the way for the pontificate to come.

It seems that Pius X was deeply affected by the new attitude of the Jesuits; the chief editor of *La Civiltà Cattolica* was asked to resign, and the place was filled with the most conservative of the Italian Jesuits, a personal friend of the pope.¹ But a renewal of

¹ The appointment of the editor of the *Civiltà Cattolica* is the exclusive prerogative of the pope. The editor who was asked to resign was Fr. Brandi, and the newly

the fight came from France. The Jesuit review *Les Etudes*, in an article of January, 1914, under the title "Critiques negatives et tâches nécessaires," gave an appalling picture of the dangers of Integralism, and especially of the frightful consequences of disparaging the episcopal authority and of terrorizing the clergy with the system of suspicions and denunciations. The Integralists, on the other hand, conscious of the support of the pope, were not discouraged and accepted the challenge of the powerful society. "We do not care," wrote the *Unità Cattolica*, an Italian Integralist paper, "what the Jesuits think about Integralism: the Jesuits after all are not the Church" (January 29, 1914). At this point the debate degenerated in many cases into personal quarrels, and both sides indulged largely in daily insults and recriminations. The confusion was at its height.

Then the pope, who had not made any official statement, but had manifested his Integralist sympathies only in private and personal utterances, judged it opportune to intervene and stop the quarrels with the authority of his official words. In the consistory of May 24, addressing the new cardinals, Pius X complained in a rather pathetic way of the conduct of Syndicalists, who had failed to understand his wishes and to follow his directions. "Among so many perils," said the pope, "I did not fail to use my voice in order to recall the errants, to admonish about the dangers, and to trace the road that ought to be followed by all the Catholics. But my words, though so clear and precise, were neither always, nor by all, heard, and were frequently misunderstood." As for the Syndicalist unions, the pope said that they were to be permitted only in exceptional circumstances, but that he personally would prefer and favor the Catholic denominational unions with complete exclusion of heterogeneous elements.

The intervention of the pope did not bring peace; there was still room for difference of interpretation of his words, and the appointed was Fr. Chiaudiano, both of them now dead. Fr. Brandi, whose death was announced a few months ago, was for a long time connected with the Catholic Church of America. He lived in this country for almost thirty years, teaching in several Catholic colleges of the Jesuits. By Leo XIII he was appointed a member of the commission to examine the question of the validity of Anglican orders, and he wrote on that topic an extensive memorandum which decided the commission to give a negative answer to the question. Fr. Brandi's death passed almost unnoticed by American Catholic papers.

quarrels grew more bitter. The pope realized then that he was not obeyed and understood that he had been left alone in a frightful solitude. But he believed in his divine mission, and overcoming the last hesitation, with a decree published July 15, 1914, he formally condemned the Syndicalist unions. It was his last condemnation; a month later the great European war began and the heart of the old pope was broken.

III. BENEDICT XV

The election of Cardinal Della Chiesa was unexpected in so far as it concerned him personally, but its significance was anticipated. Benedict XV is the first pope educated in an Italian Royal University under the new régime. Leo XIII was a pupil of the Jesuits; Pius X was a student of a small provincial clerical seminary. Pope Benedict studied in the Italian public schools and was graduated as Doctor in Law from the Royal University of Genoa in 1875. Afterward he embraced the clerical career and was initiated by Rampolla into the pontifical diplomacy. When Rampolla left his office, Della Chiesa kept his place as vice-secretary of state for two years, until he was appointed archbishop of Bologna. During the seven years of his episcopal career he experienced personally all the humiliating conditions imposed upon the bishops by the policy of Pius X, and he realized also all the dangers of Integralism.

Following the impulse of a sincere reaction, Benedict XV in his first *Encyclical* condemned the flippancy of the Integralist papers and recommended to all Catholics obedience toward the bishops, whose authority, he says, "is of divine origin." The Catholic theologians, who have discussed for centuries whether the episcopal authority is of divine or ecclesiastical institution, have now a new text to quote, but not being a definition *ex cathedra*, it will not solve the question. The Catholic Syndicalist papers which had been barred from all clerical institutions by a circular letter of Merry del Val, the secretary of state of the late pope, now received words of encouragement and praise. The pious Society of St. Jerome for the Diffusion of the Gospel, which had been practically dissolved by Pius X and had seen two of its most remarkable pub-

lications catalogued in the *Index*, was reorganized and highly recommended by the Pope in a public letter.¹ The nightmare of the black reaction was past; the church breathed again with a sense of relief. Cardinal Mercier expressed his satisfaction in his Lenten Pastoral. He says:

It was not enough for those self-appointed knights of orthodoxy to profess one's self a faithful Catholic; in order more religiously to obey the pope they pretended it to be necessary to challenge the authority of the bishops. Journalists without commission dared to excommunicate those who refused to pass under the Caudine Forks of their Integralism. Fear had invaded every religious soul, and honest consciences were suffering, but they could not speak.

Having thus reproved the methods of Pius X and reassured scandalized Catholic consciences, Benedict XV formulated his own program of work, from which it appears that a change of methods does not mean a change of purpose. Catholics are urged to obey without discussion, and triumph is promised only to the obedient: "Vir obediens loquitur victoriam." With respect to Modernism, Benedict XV confirmed without discrimination the anathemas of Pius X: "Nihil innovetur quod traditum est."

Confronted with the difficult task of keeping the Holy See within the narrow limits of neutrality in the present war, Benedict XV is displaying remarkable qualities of prudence and diplomacy. The problem which confronts the Vatican in connection with the European war is twofold, religious and political. There are on both sides of the warring people Catholic soldiers dying in the trenches, Catholic families suffering at home, and each side has its Catholic hierarchy. Both sides assume that they were obliged to take arms for self-defense and to fight for justice and liberty;

¹ Letter of Benedict XV to Cardinal Cassetta, president of St. Jerome's Society for the Diffusion of the Gospel: "We rejoice at your zeal in spreading the book of the gospel, not only in a great number of copies, but also in a more accurate edition. We desire most earnestly and we hope fervently that you may receive from your admirable zeal not only this result, namely, a very wide diffusion of the book of the gospel, but that you may furthermore obtain another advantage, which would realize one of our ideals, that is to say, that the holy word may enter the bosom of every Catholic family and be there like the drachma of the gospel, which all seek diligently and jealously to guard, so that the faithful may accustom themselves to read and to comment upon it every day, thus learning to live a holy life in conformity with the divine will" (November 6, 1914).

all of them, priests and bishops at their head, invoke God with the same words of the Catholic liturgy; all of them ask for the blessing of Rome. Even if the pope had had in his hands all the necessary elements to judge the right and the wrong of the case, it would have been a dangerous undertaking to side with one of the parties. From a political point of view the best thing to do was to remain silent as Benedict did.¹ But silence itself was not without danger.

Much has been written about the moral bankruptcy of the papacy because of the pope's failure to protest against the invasion of Belgium. It was assumed that Leo XIII and even Pius X would have followed a different line of conduct if such an event had taken place under their pontificates. It is very likely that Leo XIII, with his love of dramatic deeds and his well-known Francophile tendencies, and Pius X, with his impulsive character, would have protested against Germany, thereby creating a very difficult situation for the Catholics of the central empires. But Benedict XV does not pretend to be a political genius like Leo XIII; far less is he a man of impulsive character like Pius X. The danger of a new schism in the German church was not entirely unreal; it is not to be forgotten that Modernism had found in Germany a very large assent and that the "Los von Rom" movement is in Austria stronger than ever.

On the other hand, the French bishops who by the anticlerical persecutions of the past years had been put in open opposition to the government of their own country, and who by the policy of Pius X had been made completely subservient to the will of Rome, now in the supreme danger of their fatherland found again those national feelings and that unity of interests with their country which had been weakened, if not destroyed, in their consciences. Among the European clergy as well as among the people national

¹ In his address to the cardinals in the consistory of January 22, 1915, Pope Benedict condemned with general words all the wrongs of the war, but he was very careful in avoiding discrimination between the two parties. "To proclaim," he said, "that nobody is allowed on any account to act against justice is undoubtedly a special duty of the Roman Pontiff, who by God is constituted supreme interpreter and vindicator of the eternal law, and we frankly proclaim it, greatly reproofing all injustice on whatever side it may have been committed. But to involve the pontifical authority in the quarrels of belligerent nations would be *neither suitable nor useful*" (*neque conveniens foret nec utile*).

passions and racial hatred have for the time being effaced the feeling of Christian brotherhood. When the pope sent to the bishops of the warring nations his prayer for peace, all of them delivered it from their episcopal thrones, but with a comment which was neither in the words nor in the intention of the pope. "We pray for peace," they said, "but peace with victory and after victory, not for peace at any cost."

In these last months we have seen French and Belgian bishops commenting angrily upon words and deeds of their German colleagues, and Cardinal Mercier criticizing bitterly Cardinal Hartmann, of Cologne, and Cardinal Hartmann protesting against Cardinal Mercier.² The pope's secret intervention compelled both sides to silence, but Benedict could not fail to realize that the Vatican policy of centralization of power is receiving a terrible blow, and that the spirit of Catholic Romanism as against the spirit of nationalism may be almost lost in this tremendous outburst of racial hatred. Even the Italian bishops, who a short time ago considered it their duty to despise the authority of the Italian

¹ Cardinal Amette, Archbishop of Paris, thus commented on the appeal of the pope for peace before reading the pontifical prayer from the pulpit of Notre Dame: "The Sovereign Pontiff reproaches all injustice and violation of rights: that is to say, that the re-establishment of those rights will be the prime condition of peace. Who then violated all rights? Who invaded innocent and peaceful Belgium? Who then attacked our beautiful France, which did not desire war? Who multiplied beyond what was necessary the outrages committed in the invaded territories? Who then tortured women, children, and priests? Who then destroyed our cathedrals? The Pope knows all these things, and God knows them also. The peace which the Pope desires will not be confirmed until all these acts of injustice shall have been made good. And that can only be through the victory of our arms and of our allies."

The same day Cardinal Hartmann, of Cologne, commented on the same papal document in this way: "We have confidence in our just cause, in our brave troops, and in our noble emperor, who unites in his person all the virtues of his ancestors of the Hohenzollern family, but first of all we trust in God, Lord of battles, to whom we pray faithfully and earnestly." (*Lokal Anzeiger*, February 8, 1915.)

² See *La guerre Allemande et le catholicisme*, published by a committee of French Catholics, and the German reply, *Der Deutsche Krieg und der Katholizismus. Deutsche Abwehr französischer Angriffe*. Of a special interest is the *Letter of the Bishops of Belgium to the Bishops of Germany, Bavaria, and Austria-Hungary* of November 24, 1915. See also *Catholic Monthly Letter*, published by the committee for the defense of German Catholic interests during the war; responsible editor, Dr. E. Krebs, professor at the University of Freiburg, i. B.; also the book, *Die Kirche nach dem Kriege*, by M. Rade (Tübingen, 1913).

government, calling it "the government of the revolution," and applying to themselves the famous words of the Vatican: *Sub hostili dominatione constituti*, even they experienced the awakening of national feeling in their souls, and many of them manifested these feelings in such a noisy way that the Vatican recommended moderation of their enthusiasm.¹

This new attitude and these new conditions of the Catholic mind and conscience, throughout Catholic Europe, have created a very difficult and dangerous situation for the Vatican religious policy. The prudent but not inactive silence of Benedict XV may be acknowledged frankly—in so far as we are allowed to judge at this time—as the best way of dealing with such a complicated and delicate situation.

But there were other reasons which may have led Benedict XV to this policy. This is only the third pontificate since the fall of the temporal power, and the prospect of its possible restoration is still alive in Vatican circles. Certainly the pope himself is fully convinced that a return to the conditions of fifty years ago is practically impossible; but he may cherish the hope of other valuable compensations in order to settle the Roman question. A skilled politician like Benedict XV could not fail to understand that this war was offering him an extraordinary opportunity for attempting a solution of the question.² Moreover, it was clear enough that

¹ See the editorial articles in the *Osservatore Romano*, the official organ of the Vatican (October 8, 1914), and in the *Unità Cattolica* (March 26, 1915).

² In his first *Encyclical* Benedict XV expressed his desire that the coming peace should bring back to the pope his old temporal power. "With fervid and insistent prayers," he says, "we invoke the end of the present most disastrous war, for the good of human society, as well as for the Church. For the good of society, in order that when peace shall have been obtained, it may go forward in every branch of progress; for the good of the Church of Jesus Christ, in order that, freed of any further impediment, it may continue to carry comfort and salvation to the utmost parts of the world. It is only too true that the Church has for a long time not enjoyed the liberty which it needs, that is to say, since its head the Supreme Pontiff lost that support which, by the divine decree of Providence, it had obtained in the course of centuries as guardian of its liberties. Therefore, to the desire of an early peace among the nations we add the desire that the abnormal condition in which the head of the Church finds itself should cease." The importance of this pontifical document, and the danger for Italy suggested by its words, were pointed out in a remarkable article by G. Amendola,

the pope could expect nothing in this direction from the allies. Neither schismatic Russia, nor Protestant England, nor anti-clerical France, in case of their victory, would think of helping the papacy in its claims against Italy, whereas much might possibly come from the central empires. The original plan of the Vatican was simple and logical. A victorious Germany and a neutral Italy were the assumptions. Catholic Austria and the half-Catholic Germany, when in condition to dictate terms to Europe, both to satisfy the demand of their Catholic people and to punish Italy for its neutrality, would propose to the peace congress the settlement of the Roman question at the expense of Italy. On the other side, the allies, in order to have something more to concede without further sacrifice of their own, would be glad to accept the proposition. Italy, alone in its ill-fated neutrality, would be obliged to bow before the will of all the world and to go to a new Canossa at the mercy of the Vatican.

To protest against the invasion of Belgium would have been to destroy from the very beginning all this plan of pontifical restoration, and such a blunder was not to be expected of the cold, reflective mind of Benedict XV. Thus while the words of the pope and the official communications of the secretary of state proclaimed absolute neutrality, the Italian Catholic papers, inspired by the Vatican, did not conceal their sympathy for the German cause and their hopes for a German victory. "The victory of the allies will be the victory of freemasonry in Western Europe and the victory of the Holy Synod in the East; both will jeopardize the very existence of the Roman Catholic Church." This was the *leit-motif*

"La portata politica del documento pontificio," published in the most authoritative Italian liberal-conservative paper, *Il Corriere della Sera* (November 17, 1914). "In this crucial moment," Amendola says, "the Pope protests against Italy and expresses his hope that the coming peace, while bringing inestimable advantages to all mankind, shall give back to the Church the old temporal kingdom. . . . Undoubtedly this pontifical document has great importance and deserves consideration, not only in regard to the problems of the church itself, but also in regard to the direction which Italian policy is to take under the present circumstances. If the Holy See does not forget, Italy too cannot and, above all, must not forget." On relations between Italy and the Vatican before Italy's entrance into the war, see the very useful little book *Il Papa l'Italia e la Guerra*, by Guglielmo Quadrotta-Milano (1915).

of articles and pamphlets and speeches authorized by the Vatican¹ and supported by the finances of the German propaganda.

The participation of Italy in the war on the side of the allies was a severe blow to all these dreams of the Vatican policy. It would not be correct to say that the Italian government broke its neutrality simply to demolish the Vatican plan of action, but it would be also untrue to say that this thought was without influence in Italy's decision for war. The pope did what he could to avoid the Italian adventure; his directions to the Catholics were clear enough, his attempt to create complications in raising the question of the ambassadors accredited to the Holy See, his bitter words when the attempt failed and war was decided, manifest how deeply he was impressed by the ruin of his cherished hopes.

His failure was due to the Italian Catholics who did not understand, or, if they understood, did not follow, his wishes; siding with the war party, they showed clearly that they will never consent to the re-establishment of the temporal papacy at the cost of a national humiliation and of new internal divisions. It was the first time since the fall of the temporal kingdom that the Vatican tested in a real and vital circumstance the efficiency of its power over the Italian Catholics, and it was a failure which undoubtedly will affect deeply all the Vatican policy in the near future and will suggest to the pope new lines of conduct and new plans of action.

¹ Letter of Cardinal Gasparri, secretary of state, to Cardinal Sevin, of Lyon: "The Holy See gave peremptory orders to the Catholic press in Italy to keep neutrality" (*Corriere d'Italia*, December 20, 1914). Count Della Torre, president of the central board of the Catholic associations in Italy, in his address—authorized by the pope—to the Circolo di San Pietro, in Rome, February 5, 1915, announced again that neutrality was the duty of Italian Catholics. The same idea was expounded in several articles and speeches by Meda, who afterward became a strong supporter of the war party, and is now secretary of state for the treasury in the present Italian coalition cabinet. See especially his letter to *L'Idea Nazionale*, December 11, 1914.

THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE SECOND CENTURY

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The purpose of the present essay is twofold: first, to set forth a general presentation of the doctrines of eschatology as they are to be found in the writings of the second century, including, not only the works of those whom later history has looked upon as the theologians of that period, but also the less authoritative documents, some of which were either contemporaneously or later pronounced heretical—thus acquiring a view, if possible, of the faith of the great mass of Christians throughout the Roman Empire; and secondly, to suggest a solution of the problems involved in the following special questions: Is the eschatology of the second century a continuation of the primitive Christian eschatology? To what extent is it a new development, under new influences, Greek or Hellenistic, to which the church was subject in its new environment ("gentile Christianity")?

How are we to account for the phenomenon of Chiliasm? Did Chiliasm represent the primitive Christian eschatology?

The importance of the eschatological question for the interpretation of the New Testament writings, and especially the Gospels, is now generally recognized. A similar importance is to be attached to the bearing which it has on the writings of the period following that of the New Testament literature. Granted that Christianity arose in the environment of apocalyptic Judaism, whose mental, moral, and spiritual atmosphere was charged with fervent messianic expectation, and that so strong was this influence upon the new religion that from at least one point of view its specific original content was simply the conviction of the nearness of the judgment and the identification of Jesus with the Messiah, then what became of this Christian messianic hope in the second century? There is also to be considered the reflexive bearing of

the state of these beliefs in the second century upon their state in the first. If, for example, it should appear that eschatology completely disappeared in the second century, our conception of what was fundamental and essential in the primitive Christian message and in the gospel of our Lord must somehow be altered. Happily, the facts in the case do not warrant such a hypothesis. But the course of eschatological thought and feeling in the second century cannot be without significance, not only for the general history of primitive Christianity, but also for the history of such thought and feeling in the first century.

The sources with which we shall have to deal are not all contained within the period 100-200 A.D. But sources outside this century are chosen simply to illustrate, as far as possible, the common faith of the generality of Christians in the second century. Roughly, the present field of investigation begins where the New Testament leaves off, and ends with Irenaeus; but for the sake of illustration either of the common faith or of special tendencies, it will be widened to include Origen and Hippolytus.

I

As in the Jewish apocalyptic literature, though in less elaborate form, there is an eschatological *interpretation of contemporary history*. This appears more prominently in the earlier part of the century, which was the more strongly influenced by the thought-world of apocalypticism, than in the later. According to Barnabas, τὸ τέλειον σκάνδαλον ἤγγικε; and Hermas looks forward to immediate tribulation as a prelude of the end. The Didache undertakes a formal description or program of the final events, felt to be near at hand.¹

But later, owing perhaps to the influence of the apologists, or on account of the social-political atmosphere and the more satisfactory

¹ Cf. Barn. 4:1; 5:3; 10:11; 11, etc.; 21:3; Hermas, *Vis.* 2:2:7; 3:8:9; 3:9:5; 4; Did. 16:1 ff. Barnabas represents the world as under the dominion of the adversary, 2:1, 10; 4:1, 9; 18:2. And the primitive view (as represented in the New Testament in I John, II Timothy, Hebrews, etc.) of the end as approaching and near at hand is to be seen in I Clem. 28:1; 34:3; 58:1; Ignatius, *Eph.* 11:1 (note the emphasis in the brief watchwords, ἑσχατοὶ καιροί, and the warning against "the wrath to come"); II Clem. 7:1; 7:5, "the contest is at hand"; 19:4; Hegesippus, in Eusebius, *H.E.* 2:23; and Montanus.

position of Christians in the Empire (though this cannot be stressed, remembering the persecutions in Lyons and Vienne, and elsewhere), this sense of the immediacy of the end gives way to a sense of indefiniteness. An example of this is Irenaeus' inconclusive and alternative interpretations of the number of the beast in the Apocalypse of John: *Euanthas, Lateinos, Teitan*. According to Hippolytus, who is dependent upon Irenaeus, the end is to come five hundred years after the birth of Christ.¹

Chiliasm, bringing with it the notion of six world-periods of 1,000 years each, may have conduced to the deferment of the "consummation" in the minds of believers; though we know very little of the state of historical chronology among the Christians of the second century. So far had this tendency advanced (in the great centers; distant and provincial regions, like Phrygia, Gaul, Arsinoë, were more conservative) that Montanism came into the experience of the church at large as a revival.

But there is no such interpretation of contemporary events as we see, e.g., in the Jewish apocalypses, Daniel, Enoch, IV Ezra, etc., or in the early Christian Apocalypse of John. Hermas marks the nearest approach to this in the remaining literature of the century; but Hermas' interests were almost wholly intra-ecclesiastical. Unfortunately the early Christian apocalypses, with few and fragmentary exceptions (e.g., Apoc. Petri), have perished; many of them fell under the later ban against heresy.

The main source for eschatological doctrine was found in *the Old and New Testaments*. Outstanding in their significance, of course, were Daniel and the Apocalypse of John, together with the eschatological sayings of our Lord, though the relative infrequency of citation from the latter is notable. But also the prophets, Paul, and even the Law and the Psalms were examined for hints and indications of "things to come." It was an accepted principle that God had known and foreseen all things from the very first, and the "things to come" were known to him long before. It was only natural, therefore, that he should have given hints and foreshadowings of

¹ Iren. 5:30; Hipp., *Fragm. Dan.* 2:7 (*Antio-Nicene Fathers*, 5. 179b); Melito, in Eus., *H.E.* 4:26:7 f. However, cf. Iren. 3:11:9; 5:29:1; and even Clem. Alex., *Paed.* 2:9.

these in the sacred writings which had been inspired by "the prophetic Spirit." More clearly and openly were these hints to be discerned in the apocalypses than elsewhere, for these were avowedly revelations of things to come, and needed only to be interpreted to lay before men the secrets of the future.¹ Various reasons were suggested to account for the obscurity of these predictions; perhaps the most common one was that which historically and psychologically lies back of the whole phenomenon of apocalyptic literature, the desire for secrecy.²

On the other hand, it was felt that God would make, or was making, a change in this original plan: He arbitrarily "shortened the time" of tribulation for his elect's sake; or he delayed the consummation that the number of the elect might be completed, or that the world might not yet perish (through the removal of the Christians, for whose sakes it consists; cf. the apologists and *Epist. ad Diog.*), and that opportunity might still be afforded the heathen and wicked for repentance (cf. *Hermas*). Such a conception was not without justification in the gospel, however (cf., e.g., *Matt.* 24:22).³

Elaborate efforts were not made until later to combine all the data of the Old and New Testaments into a complete system (e.g., by Hippolytus). Still the beginnings of this movement are to be traced in Irenaeus, and even earlier in the *Didache*. It was inevitable, and must come sooner or later.⁴

¹ Cf. *Barn.* 1:7; 5:3; 17:2.

² Ignatius presupposes the New Testament eschatology (cf. *Eph.* 11:1; 16:1 f.; *Philad.* 3:3); and *Did.*, chap. 16, is based upon the synoptic apocalypse, *Mark*, chap. 13 and parallels. Daniel is presupposed in *Barn.* 4:4, 5; Justin, *Apol.* 32:3; *Dial.* 109; 110:2; 113, and *passim* (*Apoc. John* in *Dial.* 81); *Iren.* 5:25 f. (*Dan.* chap. 7, and *Apoc. John*), for example. Especially valued was the principle, "The day of the Lord is as a thousand years," found categorically stated in the Scriptures (*II Pet.* 3:8; *Ps.* 90:4), and adopted by Barnabas, Papias, Justin, and Irenaeus (cf. 5:28:3).

³ Cf. Justin, *Apol.* 45; *App.* 7; *Hermas*, *Sim.* 10:4: where the delay is occasioned by the sins of believers.

⁴ Irenaeus' eschatological "program" is apparently outlined in 5:30:4: "But when (a) this Antichrist shall have devastated all things in this world [cf. 35:1; including and beginning with, no doubt, the great apostasy (ca. 25), and the dissolution of the Roman Empire (ca. 26)], (b) he will reign for three years and six months, and sit in the temple at Jerusalem; and then (c) the Lord will come from heaven in the clouds, in the glory of the Father, (d) sending this man and those who follow him

On the basis of the Scriptures, various conceptions of *the end of the world* (i.e., the physical universe) were entertained. It would either "wax old as doth a garment" and fall into decay (Melito, Origen), or be consumed by fire (Justin and others), or be transmuted into a paradisiacal condition to be the home of the redeemed and the kingdom of the saints ruling with Christ (Barnabas? Papias, Irenaeus). No doubt the second conception (which was consonant with the first; see Iren. 4:3, and Melito) was influenced by the Stoic eschatology (which Justin distinguishes from the Christian), just as the last-named conception (chiliastic) was influenced by the Jewish eschatological concepts. This influence, which was external to the primary creative and sustaining influence of the sacred writings (II Pet., chap. 3; Rev., chap. 20), though operating simultaneously therewith after the conception had once fairly found lodgment in the Christian consciousness, was perhaps effective through the medium of converts from paganism and Hellenistic Judaism. These brought with them a predisposition in favor of this conception equally as important as the contact of Christian writers with heathen philosophers in the great intellectual centers.¹

into the lake of fire [= the Judgment]; (e) but bringing in for the righteous the times of the Kingdom, i.e., the rest, the hallowed seventh day; (f) and restoring to Abraham the promised inheritance, in which the Kingdom of the Lord is declared, that "many coming from the east and from the west should sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob" (cf. 3:12:13: "an eternal Kingdom in Israel received from his Father"). According to Didache, chap. 16, the following is the scheme of the last things: (a) the appearance of false prophets and corrupters; (b) increase of iniquity and persecution; (c) appearance of "the world-deceiver as Son of God," with signs and wonders, and heretofore unknown *ἀθεμύρα*; (d) the fire of trial, when many shall stumble and perish; (e) the signs of the truth, "a sign of spreading forth in heaven," sound of the trumpet, and resurrection of the dead; (f) the Lord coming on the clouds of heaven. It is obvious that at least the chief items of these programs are taken from the New Testament. Such additional details as we find, e.g., in Montanism (wars and disturbances to precede the end: Eus., *H.E.* 5:16:18), are simply a repetition of the primitive eschatology attested by the New Testament, or its continuance in tradition.

¹ Traces of the doctrine of a final conflagration are apparent even among the Chiliasts: Justin, *App.* 7; *Apol.* 20:4; Melito, Syr. remains, *Ante-Nic. Fathers*, 8, p. 755a (cf. *Orac. Sib.* 3:83-92). It appears also among the Valentinians (Iren. 1:7:1); and in Irenaeus (5:29:2). According to Barnabas, the sun is to cease (5:10) and all things are to be destroyed, including the evil one (21:3); Hermas says that "God will remove the hills" (*Vis.* 1:3:4). Cf. also I Clem. 27:4.

We return to a specifically Christian conception (in its second-century form) in the doctrine of *Antichrist*, whose activities were to precede the Parousia and Last Judgment. He was thought of as a great world-deceiver, subject to Satan and endowed with powers of magic. Irenaeus warns his readers (5:28:2), "Let no one imagine that he performs these wonders by divine power, but by the working of magic. We must not be surprised if, since the demons and apostate spirits are at his service, he through their means performs wonders, by which he leads the inhabitants of the earth astray." Barnabas, who considers the world at present under the power of the adversary, understands by the Danielic prophecy that his reign is to be for 350 years; Irenaeus, looking forward to his coming in the future, computes upon the basis of the same passage a reign of $3\frac{1}{2}$ years in the temple at Jerusalem. He is to be the recapitulation in himself of all apostasy and lawlessness.¹

The doctrine of *the second advent of Christ* was a permanent and indispensable element in the eschatology of the second century. Though we should not be prepared to say with Dorner that "the Christian hope of the coming one grew entirely out of faith in him who had come,"² yet the motive, the source of this hope, was undoubtedly faith in Jesus. Without Jesus there would no doubt have been an eschatology. The temper of men's minds in that age, both in Hellenism and in Judaism, demanded it. But such a phenomenon as Christian eschatology would have been unknown—that combination of Jewish eschatological hopes, with a transcendental messianism, and pagan speculations (world-Sabbath, final *ἐκπύρωσις*, etc.), under the overpowering sense of the immediacy of the end.³

¹ Cf. Did. 16:3 f.; Barn. 4:3?; 4:4 f.; 4:9 ὁ μέλλας; Justin, *Dial.* 32; Iren. 5:25, 28, 29:2.

² *Doct. Pers. Chr.*, I, 145. This is said in criticism of Baur, who equated primitive Christianity and Ebionism. A similar *granum salis* is to be taken with his statement that the eschatology of the early church was a manifestation of the spirit of assurance that Christianity was to triumph over the heathen world. No doubt such assurance was involved in the Christian hope; but the primitive eschatology was no philosophical development of this conviction in terms of apocalyptic thought, nor was this conviction a conscious motive in any such "development."

³ Cf. Polycarp, *Phil.* 2:1 f.; II Clem. 12:1, "the epiphany of God." Is the obscure passage, Did. 16:6, a reference to "the sign of the Son of Man in heaven"?

We see traces of the specific formulation of this in the doctrine of the two advents (Justin, *Mur. Fragm.*; Irenaeus), and especially in Irenaeus' improvement of the terminology of the doctrine (1:10, *ἔλευσις, παρουσία*). The fact itself, Christ's coming in glory to judge both quick and dead, was nowhere questioned save among the Gnostics; to deny "the hope of his coming" was to cease to be a Christian, even as in the first century. For this reason the Gnostics were looked upon as blasphemers (Justin).¹

The *resurrection* and *last judgment* were similarly unquestioned elements in the eschatology of this century. Particular stress was laid upon the resurrection of the flesh in all its completeness, as the assurance of personal identity at the judgment and afterward (apologists; Irenaeus). The deeds done in the body should be rewarded in the body: how justly, otherwise? The flesh should be revived even as it was created—out of the elements of nature (Justin and others), or vapor (Tatian), or by the reclothing of the naked bones (Tertullian; Odes of Solomon). This was necessary also, that the promises to Abraham and through Abraham to the faithful might be fulfilled, and the promises of Christ to the disciples about eating and drinking in the Kingdom (Irenaeus and the Chiliasts). The last judgment was to be pronounced upon the wicked demons as well as upon men (Justin, Tatian).²

It has usually been translated "flying-forth," as referring to the angels of the Son of Man, thus making the three "signs of the truth" parallel to the stages in I Thess., chap. 4. Is it not equally possible to parallel this with Matt. 24:29-31, which passage the author undoubtedly had in mind in this verse? The chief difficulty, however, is with the first "sign." In Matt. 24:29, the first sign is *ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς*, decidedly. May we suppose that the unintelligible ΕΚΙΗΤΑΣΕΩΣ was originally ΕΚΙΠΤΩΣΕΩΣ, from the Matthean phrase *ἀστέρες πτερύραι ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ*?

¹ Cf. Justin, *Apol.* 52:3; *Dial.* 117:3; *Mur. Fragm.*, ll. 16-26; Iren. 2:33:5; 3:19:3; 5:26. Jesus is to come in the flesh in which he suffered (Iren. 3:16:8), accompanied by Elias (Justin, *Dial.* 49:3); according to Barnabas, he is to wear a scarlet robe (7:9).

² Though Christ's resurrection is the ground of Christian hope in personal resurrection (I Clem. 24:1; 42:3; Ign., *Trall.* 9:2; Polyc., *Phil.* 5:2), yet philosophical and scriptural arguments are adduced to prove it, especially by the apologists (I Clem. chaps. 23-25; Athenagoras; Theophilus; Iren. 5:2-15). The Hebraic character of Did., chap. 16, may be indicated by its teaching that only the saints are to rise again (6 f.); elsewhere in the writings of the century this view is repudiated: a resurrection of all men is the necessary prelude to the general judgment (Aristides, Justin

The *final state of the blessed* is in communion with God (Irenaeus), and in company with Christ, reigning with him (Ignatius, Polycarp; *et al.*) in everlasting felicity. There is no toil, but an endless advancement in knowledge and in bliss (Irenaeus, Origen), as "the presbyters" affirmed, "through the Spirit to the Son, through the Son to the Father" (Iren. 5:36).¹

The exact relation of the *millennium* (according to the Chiliasts) to the general judgment and the final state of the blessed and condemned is not made clear, that is, whether those who are raised from the dead to enjoy the thousand-years' reign of Christ on earth will thereafter be judged; or whether this state of happiness merges into that of final bliss (Barnabas: "The beginning of the other world"; Irenaeus: "The commencement of incorruption"?). But neither was it made clear in the Apocalypse of John. In affirming the doctrine of the millennial reign, Irenaeus insists that the promises of Christ could not be fulfilled in a "super-celestial place," and therefore must require a fulfilment upon earth, i.e., upon the renewed earth to which Christ will return. Evidently "the super-celestial place" was the common conception of "heaven" (so "the presbyters") as the place of eternal bliss. To this may be compared Origen's conception of the intermediate place (seven heavens) and the words of Mart. Polyc., "the martyrs

[cf. *Dial.* 81:4], Tatian, Irenaeus [3:16:6]). By resurrection was uniformly meant and understood the resurrection of the flesh (i.e., of "both body and soul": Mart. Polyc. 14:2; Ign., *Eph.* 11:2, he would pray to be raised in his bonds; II Clem. 9:4 f.; Tatian, *Orat.* 6:2; 25; *Epist. of Ches. in Lyons and Vienne*, Eus., *H.E.* 5:1:63, the hope of palingenesis; Iren. 5:31:1, "universam . . . resurrectionem," etc.). The Pauline doctrine of the resurrection seems to have fallen into the hands of the Gnostics and, subject to their interpretation, to have made little impression upon the faith of the second century; see Bigg, *Christian Platonists of Alex.*, 2d ed., p. 61. In general, though not consistently, Jesus (rather than the Father) is thought of as the Judge: Polyc., *Phil.* 2:1 f.; Did. 16:6 ff.; Barn. 4:12; 5:7; 7:2, 9; 21:6; Hermas, *Sim.* 9:12, figure of inspection of the tower by the Son of God; II Clem. 4:5; 16:3; 17:6 f.; Aristides, *Apol.* 17:8; Justin, *Apol.* 52 f.; *Epist. ad Diog.* 7:6; 10:7; Iren. 3:16:6.

¹ Cf. Mart. Polyc. 2:3, the martyrs have entered into the good things of God, and are "no longer men, but angels"; Justin, *Apol.* 10:2, those who are worthy shall "reign with God, being delivered from corruption and suffering"; 20:4; *Dial.* 46:7; *Apoc. Petri*, "a great place outside this world, exceeding bright with light"; *Epist. ad Diog.* 6:8, "incorruption in the heavens"; Iren. 5:27, "communion with God, which is life and light, and the enjoyment of all the benefits which he has in store."

are no longer men, but are already angels." Very striking is the frequency with which I Cor. 2:9 is quoted in this century. It seems to have been a favorite description of the future bliss: "The things which eye hath not seen nor ear heard, and which have not entered into the heart of man—the things which God hath prepared for them that love him."¹

In Barn. 15:4, the age of the world is fixed at 6,000 years, on the basis of the creation narrative in Genesis, interpreted by the rule, "One day is with the Lord as a thousand years." This is very similar to the interpretation of II Enoch, chap. 33, which Professor Charles dates in the first half of the first century and locates in Alexandria as the work of a Hellenist Jew.² The likeness is not strong enough to imply a direct relationship, however. In the following verse (5), Barnabas interprets the statement, "And on the seventh day he rested," in this way: "This means, when his Son shall come and destroy the time of the wicked one and judge the ungodly and change the sun and the moon and the stars, then shall he truly rest on the seventh day." According to 5:10, the sun is to cease to exist, but yet (6:17) the earth is to be inherited and dominated; therefore, according to the author, the only change to come in the end is a change in the heavenly bodies, the destruction of lawlessness, the resurrection, and the judgment. Consonant with this would be the doctrine of the renewal of the earth (Chiliasm), which seems to be suggested in vs. 7, "Lawlessness no longer existing, and all things being renewed by the Lord." However, there is no logical development of this thought: we might expect a chiliastic treatment of the thousand years representing the seventh day, but this is not once suggested. On the other hand, the *eighth* day is *ἄλλου κόσμου ἀρχή*. It is extremely difficult to see any definite Chiliasm in this. His primary concern is with the obedience of Christians to the command to sanctify the Sabbath. In the end (vs. 9), he justifies the Christian observance of the eighth (i.e., first) day of the week. If his motive were

¹ Polyc., *Phil.* 11:2, "sancti mundum judicabunt"; 12:2; 9:2; Barn. 6:17, "live and have dominion over the land"—which is not, however, to be understood as thoroughgoing realism (cf. Matt. 5:5), but is a spiritual interpretation of the promise in Exod. 33:1 ff., and is equated in vs. 19 to "inheritance of the covenant of the Lord."

² Charles, *Eschatology*, 2d. ed., p. 315; *Apoc. and Pseudep.*, II, 426, 427, 429, 451 n.

chiliastic (i.e., eschatological), we should have clear evidence thereof right here. But nothing whatever is made of the seventh day, except God's displeasure at the Jewish Sabbath. The seventh day is simply the time of the Parousia (vs. 5), the destruction of the wicked one, the judgment, and the change in the heavens. We might even suppose that the author believed himself to be living in the "seventh day." What he presupposes is the common Christian interpretation (borrowed from Hellenistic Judaism?) of the six days of creation as symbolic of the ages of the world. But there is no hint of the chiliastic reign of Christ upon earth *before* the judgment. Is it possible that this represents a stratum of the older eschatology lying back of the Apocalypse of John and Papias? Here, the season of the wicked one is "abolished" (21:3); there, limited or temporarily proscribed. Here, the judgment of the ungodly takes place; there, it is deferred until the end of the millennial reign. Here, the sun, moon, and stars are changed; there, only Jerusalem is re-erected as the seat of Christ's millennial government. So little of any real Chiliasm is there in his mind that the author has in the end to place the true Sabbath in the other world, the beginning of which is the eighth day, the Christian's Sabbath. Such confusion as this could not long be maintained. Chiliasm was the logical development of these premises, the combination of two conflicting eschatologies, one with a temporal kingdom, the other with an eternal, combined upon the hypothesis of a world-Sabbath.¹

Papias (Eus., *H.E.* 3:39:11 f.; cf. Iren. 5:33:3 f.) has been looked upon generally as the foster-father of this doctrine in the second century. Was he indebted for it to mystical exegesis of the creation narrative in Genesis? Anastasius Sin. seems to have held this opinion, for he says of Papias that "he interpreted the whole hexaëmeron of Christ and the Church," and likewise "the teachings concerning paradise."² Papias is probably a representative of that cluster of apostolic men, *μεγάλα στοιχεῖα*, mentioned by

¹ Cf. the collection of material for the history of this idea in Bousset, *Rel. des Jud.*, 2d ed., pp. 330-33; also Volz, *Jüd. Esch.*, p. 236; pp. 62 f.

² I.e., Eden, not the future state; cf. Gen. 2:8 LXX. Anast. quoted in Gebh.-Harn.-Zahn, *fragm.* vi, vii.

Polycrates in his letter to Victor.¹ Their Jewish customs may be noted: John was a priest and wore the *petalon*, and they kept Easter on "the fourteenth day . . . according to the gospel." This may be sufficient to connect him outwardly with Jewish traditions and Jewish apocalyptic hopes. (Cf. below, on Chiliasm).

Cerinthus was later accused of teaching a carnal and perverse Chiliasm (Eus., *H.E.* 3:28:2, 4 f.), but such an accusation hardly accords with Irenaeus' representation of his teaching (*adv. haer.*, 1:26:1; cf. Hippolytus, *Philos.* 7:21), according to whom it was gnostic (docetic), and hence left no room for eschatology, in the received sense.²

Justin acknowledges that in his expectation of the restoration of Jerusalem he does not represent the whole church (*Dial.* 80; cf. 109; 113; 119:5). Irenaeus undertakes to establish by philosophical considerations and by exegesis what he had received from the presbyters as the Christian tradition on the subject (5:32, 33:2). It is his final conclusion that "John . . . did distinctly foresee the first 'resurrection of the just,' and the inheritance in the Kingdom of the earth; and what the prophets have prophesied concerning it harmonize (with his vision). For the Lord also taught these things, when he promised that he would have the mixed cup new with his disciples in the Kingdom." The realization of these promises means the unity of the world under one God, the Father, through his Son, through whom the "creature" ascends to the Father, passing beyond the angels, being made after the image and likeness of God" (5:36:3).

The *final state of the condemned* is one of punishment, in fire and torment, and everlasting death. The wicked retain sensation forever, or are endowed with it even in death (Justin). This punishment is pictured luridly in certain instances (e.g., Apoc. Petri) as a pain of sense; doubtless this was the popular view, though such apocalypticism was always ethical, and pervaded with a sense of the inevitableness of just retribution. In one passage, unique in the century, Irenaeus rises to a more spiritual conception:

¹ Eus., *H.E.* 5:24; and cf. *Chron. pasch.*, Olymp. 235b, Gebh.-Harn.-Zahn, *fragm.* xvii.

² Cf. Krüger in *PRE³*, III, 777.

eternal punishment consists in eternal loss, *poena damni*, exclusion from communion with God.¹

The *intermediate state* is not a universal belief. Certain statements of the earlier writers of this century (e.g., Ignatius) seem definitely to exclude it. As the century advances, it becomes clearer; though we cannot argue that this is a case of "progress of doctrine," as our sources are too scanty. Neither can we make too much of an argument from silence (in the earlier decades of this century), for the same reason, and also because traces of the doctrine are to be found in the New Testament. Perhaps it is best viewed as the answer to the natural query, "With the judgment still deferred, what of those who have died and entered into rest?" Certain of the Gnostics taught metempsychosis; others, a "sleep of the soul"

¹ *Adv. haer.*, 5:27. Cf. Ign., *Eph.* 16:2, unquenchable fire; Mart. Polyc. 2:3; 11:2; Barn. 20:1; Herm., *Vis.* 2:3:2; Justin, *Ap. 7*, "wicked angels and men shall cease to exist"; it is not easy to harmonize this with *Apol.* 52, according to which they shall not cease to exist, but shall be endowed with "eternal sensibility," though the "fire of judgment" may be "everlasting," i.e., hell (*Apol.* 19:8). This inconsistency is found even within the *Apology*, where (20:4) it is said that "the souls of the wicked, being endowed with sensation even after death, are punished, and those of the good, being delivered from punishment, spend a blessed existence." In *Dial.* 5, souls are "begotten," and therefore "both die and are punished." This perhaps sheds some light upon the difficulty; though in the *Apology* a resurrection of all men was essential. Cf. also Tatian 13:1, "death by punishment in immortality"; 14, demons to be punished more severely than men; Apoc. Petri, a picture of Tartarus; *Epist. Eccl. Ly. et V.*, Eus., *H.E.* 5:1:26, Gehenna; Iren. 3:4:2. The doctrine of the final state of the blessed and condemned naturally fits in with that of the resurrection of the flesh. The Christian teachers of the second century were busied in establishing this latter doctrine, in the face of prevalent heathen and gnostic beliefs regarding the immortality of the soul and the destruction of the body, not merely because this doctrine was embedded in the New Testament and the primitive tradition, let alone on account of Chiliasm, but also because it was felt that the denial of the resurrection struck Christian ethics and the doctrine of the sacraments squarely and mortally (cf. Iren. 2:29:2; 33:4; 5:2; 5:6; 5:8). No part of the primitive Christian eschatology is merely eudaemonistic, but is dominated by an ethical motive throughout. And, on the other hand, the fearfulness of hell (e.g., cf. Hippolytus, especially the end of the *Phil.*) represents simply the sovereignty of ethics asserted in the field of eschatology. It is not a question of the adoption of certain Jewish or Greek eschatological ideas, or of their survival, but rather, Why were they adopted? Why did they survive? Harnack well says (*DG*, 4th ed., I, 194), "Die furchtbare Vorstellung von der Hölle, weit entfernt einen Rückschritt in der Geschichte des religiösen Geistes zu bedeuten, ist vielmehr ein Beweis dafür, dass er die sittlich indifferenten Gesichtspunkte ausgeschieden hat und im Bunde mit dem sittlichen Geiste souverän geworden ist."

(cf. Irenaeus; according to Origen, this was taught by certain Arabians); both doctrines were rejected by orthodox believers. It is doubtful if they influenced any but a narrow circle of the Gnostics.¹

Noteworthy is the doctrine of the intermediate state as developed by later writers. Tertullian, already under the influence of Montanism, and a Chiliast (*Adv. M.* 3:25), holds that the resurrection is to be gradual: an immediate resurrection for those prepared for it, a deferred resurrection for the more guilty, who must make amends by a longer course of purification in the underworld (*De an.* 58; *De res. carn.* 42). On the other hand, Origen, who denied all materialistic eschatological expectations and dismisses contemptuously the chiliastic eschatology (*De princ.* 2:11:2), holds that the resurrection is to be in a different, i.e., a changed, world, and therefore in a different body from that body of flesh in which the soul formerly lived upon earth (so he understands Paul; cf. *Cont. Cels.* 4:57; 5:18; 5:23); and also that the saints dwell in the air (*De princ.* 2:11:6) and increase in knowledge (*ibid.* 5; cf. 1:6:3; 2:3:3; 3:1:21; Clem. Alex., *Strom.* 6:13 ff.). Apparently he believes in a future probation, though in some respects his teaching approaches very near to that of the mediaeval church (cf. *Catech. Conc. Trident.* 1:6:3). We cannot here enter into the history of the doctrine of purgatory, though it has its roots in the present period, and even deeper still in the past: cf. I Enoch 22:9 ff.

Chiliasm stands as the great monument to the apostolic doctrine of the ἀποκατάστασις πάντων in this century (on Chiliasm, cf. *infra*).

¹ Cf. Polyc., *Phil.* 9:2, departed saints are with the Lord; Mart. Polyc. 2:3; Justin taught, as we have seen, that "souls are endowed with eternal sensibility"; the Valentinian doctrine of the intermediate state was simply a part of their metaphysical-ethical system; cf. Iren. 1:6:4; 7:1. Irenaeus summarizes his own belief in 2:34:1, "By these things it is plainly declared that souls continue to exist, that they do not pass from body to body, that they possess the form of a man, so that they may be recognized, and retain the memory of things in this world; moreover, that . . . each class [of souls] receives a habitation such as it has deserved, even before the judgment." (This is hardly to be confounded with Tertullian's doctrine of the corporeality of the soul, *De an.* 7). Irenaeus is a theologian, and a biblical theologian at that; he is also a thoroughgoing traditionalist (3:2-4). Hence his teaching no doubt represents the common belief of Christians in his day, and is valuable for second-century doctrine as is Aquinas for the doctrine of the Middle Ages: the conservative spirit of both is a guaranty that they stand on commonly accepted ground.

However, outside the chiliastic movement (i.e., the movement *technically* known as Chiliasm, representing a belief in a thousand-years' reign of Christ on earth), we find some traces of a belief in the renovation of the earth (Barnabas; Odes of Solomon, etc.). It is extremely doubtful if this represents a view very far removed from, or, if later, uninfluenced by, Chiliasm. It is only where we see the (Stoic-Sibylline-II Petrine) doctrine of *ἐκτίρωσις* in complete possession of the field that the doctrine of the apocatastasis is excluded. Their full harmonization was possible only by transferring the restoration of all things from the chiliastic Seventh Day of a thousand years to the "new heaven and new earth" following the judgment and the destruction of the present world (Apoc. John 21:1); for the destruction of the present world was understood to take place by fire (comparable to the deluge, according to the apologists), which should be for the purpose of renovation and renewal.¹

II

The eschatology of the second century is definitely a continuation of the primitive Christian eschatology, and with much less change introduced into it than we are sometimes led to suppose. The Christians of this century possessed a norm, viz., the writings gradually being incorporated into *the New Testament* and the Sacred Scriptures of the Old Testament, upon which in turn the New Testament writings were in large measure based (cf. Apocalypse of John and the Old Testament). The principle of interpretation seems generally to have been to prefer a literal interpretation where possible; where impossible, to choose a figurative, or "mystical." Both kinds of interpretation are common (cf. Barnabas and Irenaeus). In one sense or the other, the Scriptures (and

¹ Cf. Barn. 15:7; Papias, in Iren. 5:33:3 f., *venient dies . . .* Papias' teaching may be due to oral tradition (Eus., *H.E.* 3:39:3 f., 11), but is closely parallel to II Bar. 29:5; Professor Charles thinks that this represents a fragment of some old apocalypse (*Apocrypha and Pseudep.* II, 497). Cf. Justin, *Dial.* 113:5; Iren. 5:34 f. The true primitive apocatastasis is represented in the "new heaven and new earth" of Rev., chap. 21. Chiliasm attempted in the second century to identify the apocatastasis with the increased fruitfulness of the earth during the millennial era (Rev., chap. 20); but this was foredoomed, as it did not harmonize with the Apocalypse, and because it confused two mutually exclusive eschatologies.

especially the prophets) were thought to contain predictions of "things to come." Aside from the Old Testament and New Testament there was some *contact with Judaism* through the pseudepigraphical works (especially the Enoch and Baruch literature, and, in Jewish dress, the Orac. Sibyll.), though this contact is very difficult to trace. However, it does appear in some places unmistakably. So great an appeal was made to the pretended oracles of the Sibyl that Celsus applied to the Christians the epithet "Sibyllists" (Origen, *Contra Cels.* 5:61). *Tradition* also, viewed apart from the Old Testament, the New Testament and the apocalyptic literature, exercised its influence, though our chief example is Irenaeus, late in the period. Numerous agrapha occur in earlier writers, testifying to a living stream of faith, not mediated through our documents, reaching back to the apostles, and through them to the Lord. *Private speculation* (or apocalyptic) does not seem to have exercised any great influence; certainly nothing like the influence upon Judaism (and Christianity) of the creative geniuses whose dreams and speculations are contained in the Jewish pseudepigraphical literature. Montanus and his school seem to form the sole exception. The speculative thinkers of this century were the Gnostics; their tendency, however, led them away from the region of eschatological interests, and their efforts do not seem to have disturbed the eschatological faith of the multitude of Christians. The church in the second century was a close communion, closer than we often assume, and heresy more than a nickname for mild dissent (cf. Justin; Irenaeus). *Heathen sources* do not seem to have had any great influence upon the writers of this century. Undoubtedly the Greek influence was strongly present; e.g., the Stoic eschatology (justified, however, by II Pet., etc.), and the popular concepts of Tartarus (Apoc. Petri; Hippolytus, with whom, however, it is largely a matter of etymology: the conception itself is derivable from the Old Testament and Christian sources). The apologists demonstrated the follies of popular (Greek) heathenism, and so to some extent guarded against this influence; but they minimized their work by admitting that the philosophers borrowed their wisdom from the sacred writings of Moses, David, and the prophets. It is not to be doubted that

Gentiles who became Christians brought with them a bent for eschatological thinking: the existence of faith in the Sibyl, the fourth Eclogue of Vergil, the popularity of Stoic teachings, etc., indicate the mood of late Hellenism, certainly in some measure true of the beginning of our century. As the religious influences originating in Persia and the East increased, this mood was destined to deepen. As an example of this, the chiliastic world-Sabbath is really much older than the Apocalypse of John. And it is possible that Montanism to some degree responded to this ethos of the age, and does not represent a pure revival of the primitive eschatological temper in an alien environment, under the sole influence of the New Testament, that is, through a literary medium (the illiteracy of the Montanist constituency renders this hypothesis difficult). It is not clear that this state of mind is due, as has been suggested, to economic conditions under the Antonines. If such were the case, we should expect hostility to Rome, especially among those who adopted Chiliasm (as did the Montanists; e.g., Tertullian) under the influence of Apoc. John 17-19. But it is significant that the only indication of hostility to Rome is found in Irenaeus (cf. his interpretation of Daniel, the division of the Empire into ten parts, and his suggested explanation of the number 666 as *Lateinos*), and here it is anything but explicit. The apologists may be represented by Melito, to whom, as to Paul, the Empire is a bond of security and peace and public order.

Without any question, Chiliasm is due, formally, to the twentieth chapter of the Apocalypse of John. But essentially it is a continuation of the old apocalyptic speculations of Judaism. How are we to account for this, the existence of a school of eschatological thought, if it was such, in Asia Minor in the second century?

It has been suggested that this was an intellectual movement¹ or that it was in opposition to Gnosticism.² But such suggestions

¹ Cf. Dorner, *op. cit.*, I, 413, "Chiliasm was the form in which Christianity first gave conscious expression to the conviction of its destiny to rule the world." But there was nothing "conscious" in this; the motive is not a historical one, but merely represents Dorner's semi-Hegelian philosophy of the history of doctrine.

² Cf. Professor George Cross, in *Bib. World*, July, 1915, p. 5, "The spiritualism of the Gnostics was met by Jewish realism."

are not convincing. Our problem is not to account for Chiliasm (i.e., the technical doctrine of the thousand-years' reign of Christ on earth, which is easily derivable from the Apocalypse of John), but for the survival, in the far-off region of proconsular Asia, of ideas and modes of thinking indigenous to Palestine before 70 A.D., i.e., genuine Jewish ideas; and an intellectual movement does not satisfy the demands for explanation raised by this phenomenon.

More significant for the final solution would be a consideration of the presence of large Jewish populations in Asia Minor (cf. Schürer, *GJV*⁴, III, 15-17; Hasting's *DB*, V, 93), in Ephesus, Smyrna, Hierapolis, etc. The numbers of Jews already in residence in these cities were increased by the settlement among them of refugees after the fall of Jerusalem. No doubt there were many Christians among them. The flight from Jerusalem (and Palestine) took place at a time when Christian Jews still had more in common with other Jews than with gentile Christians. Many of the cities occupied by Jews were also Christian centers (e.g., Ephesus, Hierapolis, Colossae, Laodicea, etc.). At any rate, "from this time forward, it is neither to Jerusalem nor to Pella (whither the Christians fled before the fall of Jerusalem), but to proconsular Asia, and more especially to Ephesus as its metropolis, that we must look for the continuance of Apostolic doctrine and practice" (Lightfoot, *Sup. Rel.*, p. 91). Eusebius (*H.E.* 3:39) gives the tradition regarding Philip and John the Apostle, who came here after the fall of Jerusalem, and also the tradition regarding Matthew's compilation of the Logia in Hebrew, handed down by Papias. The Jewish customs of the Christian community there are clearly indicated in Polycrates' letter to Victor (*v. supra*).¹

It was natural for this period to be full of apocalyptic activities, of the study of Scripture, tradition, and apocalyptic works, and of renewed speculation; the whole temper of thought for a while after the fall of Jerusalem was bound to be apocalyptic. It was at this time and in this environment that the Apocalypse of John was written, which makes use of previously composed or collected Jewish materials, as so many scholars suppose. And it was in this

¹ Cf. the clear and careful rationale of Quartodecimanism given in Stanton, *Gospels as Historical Documents*, I, 175 ff.

region and in this environment that Chiliasm arose.¹ In the second century Papias was only one representative (the last?) of this Judaic apocalyptic "school of thought," which seems strangely out of place in the decades about 140 and outside Palestine, in a center of gentile Christianity, but which can be definitely traced back to the apostle John and to the most primitive Christianity. This "school" of apocalyptic had remained stationary and unproductive for a generation or more when Papias produced his *Exposition of the Divine Oracles*,² and even then it appears that his work was not itself of an apocalyptic nature. In other words, Chiliasm represents the persistence of the primitive traditions and expectations in Asia Minor, whither they were transplanted by the body of Christian-Jewish refugees who came there after the fall of Jerusalem, and constituted the *μεγάλα στοιχεία* to which Polycrates referred. This does not imply a peculiar "Asia Minor theology" (Harnack, *DG*, 4th ed., I, 168 f.); but it implies a peculiar conservatism due to Jewish modes of thought transferred to Christian hopes. These primitive expectations and these Jewish modes of thought both found their norm in the Apocalypse of John. Hence it was that the battle with Chiliasm as the representative of both was waged on the field of the authenticity of this writing. And to the early acceptance of this writing is due the prevalence of Chiliasm (i.e., technical Chiliasm, not the primitive *æschatology* in general). Professor Harnack (art. "Millennium," *Encyc. Brit.*, 9th ed.) states that it is a proof of the prevalence of this doctrine that a philosopher, Justin, should accept it; but Justin himself tells us that he accepts it on the ground of John's Apocalypse (*Dial.* 81:4). Irenaeus accepts Chiliasm as part of the tradition from the Asia Minor "presbyters," unquestioningly and implicitly (cf. Zahn, art. "Iren.," in *PRE*, IX, 410). Bethune-Baker's view, that "millenarianism was too widely accepted in the Church to be characteristic of any particular school of thought" (*Int. to Early Hist. of Chr. Doct.*, p. 66; cf. Gieseler, in Hagenbach,

¹ "It is probable that millenarianism prevailed throughout that part of Asia Minor where the memory of St. John was preserved." Tixeront, *Hist. des Dog.*, I, 218.

² It is probable that he collected his materials before or about 110, and wrote after 130; cf. *PRE*, XIV, 645.

Hist. of Docts., 1861, I, 215), is true only in a sense; and that is simply the sense in which it is impossible to speak of the influence of the Apocalypse of John as producing a school (for its influence passed far beyond the circle of western Asia Minor communities). No doubt that is a true sense; but is it a true interpretation of the facts to speak of the chiliastic eschatology as the universal primitive eschatology (as Zahn also does, *loc. cit.* Cf. Harnack, *DG*, I, 187: "Chiliasmus . . . findet sich überall, wo das Evangelium noch nicht hellenisirt ist)? The error seems to consist in using the term Chiliasm to cover more than it technically means, viz., to represent all the materialistic elements in the primitive eschatology. It is a mistake to credit every reference to the resurrection of the flesh, or to the *restoratio omnium*, or to the reign of the saints, or to the inheritance of the earth, to Chiliasm, the doctrine of the reign of Christ in Jerusalem with his risen saints for the thousand-years' interim between the Parousia and the final judgment. Yet this mistake has been handed down from generation to generation in the nomenclature of doctrinal history. Surely Chiliasm is not a doctrine universally taught in the New Testament; and yet the New Testament expressly teaches the resurrection of the flesh, the restoration of all things, the reign of the saints with Christ, etc.

The history of the decline of Chiliasm would take us outside our period. However, none of the reasons frequently alleged seem sufficient to account for it (adoption by the Montanists, the ban against Judaism, the "moralistic spiritualism" of the church, Alexandrian theology, the political obedience of Christians, etc.), unless taken together. With the leaders of the church, Origen's theology had most influence; with the common people, the gradual and slow shifting of the point of view of Christianity, from world-rejection to world-acceptance, a process carried out only after several generations had passed. (Cf. Tixeront, *HD*, I, 220).

RITSCHL'S CRITERION OF RELIGIOUS TRUTH

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There seems to be no extended treatment in the literature of Ritschl's conception of the criterion of truth. And yet a man's criterion of truth is the key to the understanding of all his thought. If we know that a man will view as true only the laws of formal logic and what can be cogently deduced by these laws from rational principles, then we know all we need to know about the type of religious construction of which that man will be capable. Again, if we know that he will believe nothing that he cannot verify in sense experience, we are already in possession of the main outline of his thought, beyond which he cannot wander and remain coherent. We know too that a theologian who approaches the Scriptures with the assumption of their infallibility, or with any other dogmatic presupposition, has a criterion that will drive him to certain conclusions and effectually bar him from certain others. Some criterion predetermines all thought-construction that is not merely haphazard.

It was the great merit of Ritschl to have been aware of the need for clearness on this fundamental matter. It may be that he did not succeed in attaining it to our satisfaction or his own; but it has been his misfortune that what he has said has not been adequately evaluated.

The objective study of this side of Ritschl's thought is rendered unusually difficult by two more or less current presuppositions: first, the very term Ritschlianism suggests that our theologian's system was a rather closely knit, logical unity, a system in the strict sense; secondly, the center of Ritschl's thought on the criterion of truth is commonly supposed to be the value-judgment. As a matter of fact, each of these presuppositions is misleading.

It is far from accurate to think that Ritschl had one consistent and unified theological view. We are indebted for a detailed

knowledge of the fluid condition of Ritschl's thought to Fabricius,¹ who has compared the texts of the successive editions of all the important works. This typical case of German *Kleinarbeit* affords us the best material extant for a study of the many changes in the thinking of our theologian. His early transition from the Tübingen school to an independent position is well known. But he did not stop growing. Fabricius rightly says that "he who in the future undertakes to write the history [of theology] ought not to pass heedlessly by the reconstruction in Ritschl's thinking from 1874 to 1889. . . . There is in the development of Ritschl's theory of fundamental principles a constantly increasing retrenchment of ethics in favor of metaphysics; a retrenchment of ethical rationalism in favor of an orthodoxy that believes in revelation; and occasionally also a shifting of the ground of our knowledge from the ideal of the Kingdom of God to the historically given life of Christ" (pp. 134, 136). Ritschl was constantly becoming less of an apriorist, less of a Kantian, and more of a believer in the orthodox faith. His tendency was away from the abstract and general toward the concrete and historically given.

With reference to the second presupposition, so much is true, that the emphasis on value-judging has been a suggestive aspect of Ritschl's work. But the term has practically disappeared from contemporary neo-Ritschlian discussion in Germany; and for Ritschl himself it had a status by no means unambiguous. In any case, whatever value-judgments may signify for him, they are not central. In his chief work, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*,² he does indeed lay stress on values, but not so much stress as he lays on other ideas, such as the community, the revelation in Christ, the Kingdom of God. He wrote a three-volume polemic against pietism without reference to value-judgments; he could hardly have done this had he viewed them as of central significance. Nor did he originate the theory. There are conflicting views as to the source of its prominence in the Ritschlian movement. Fabricius attributes it to Julius Kaftan; Otto Ritschl, son of our

¹ Caius Fabricius, *Die Entwicklung in Ritschl's Theologie von 1874-1889* (Tübingen, 1909).

² Hereafter referred to by the abbreviation *RV* (third German edition).

theologian, in his pamphlet on *Werturteile*, asserts that Wilhelm Herrmann, of Marburg, was the first to use it; so also does Boutroux in his *Religion and Science*. But on the personal authority of Professor Herrmann, to whom the writer owes a debt of gratitude for assistance and direction in the study of Ritschl, it may be stated that the use of the term by Ritschlians is not due primarily to Ritschl, Kaftan, or Herrmann, but to the influence of Rudolf Herrmann Lotze, their common source. Ritschl's exposition popularized a borrowed idea. We shall later consider the place of that idea in his system.

What then was his central logical motif? Ritschl often and explicitly states his views as to the nature of theology. He says repeatedly¹ that it is a science: "It is not devotion, but as science, is disinterested knowledge." It aims to discover laws; it must be a self-consistent system, so that no theological definition can be formulated save in the connection of the whole system. Like other sciences, it has a limited subject-matter, which, in its case, is the faith of the Christian community that it stands in a relation to God essentially conditioned by forgiveness of sins. Christianity as experienced in the community was for Ritschl "given" as true in much the sense in which Kant viewed natural science as "given." Hence, the task of theology is simply to formulate faith; theological theory has value only in so far as it corresponds to faith;² nothing should be incorporated into dogmatics that cannot be used in the pulpit and in Christian life.³ Theology, then, is disinterested, objective science, the subject-matter of which is the faith of the Christian community, and the logical method of which is that of all other sciences.

But in many other discussions, especially in the latter part of his life, he seems to deny to theology a scientific character. An objective account of Christianity, he tells us, is neither exhaustive nor satisfactory; indeed, the more objectively the truths of Christianity are narrated, the nearer we are to skepticism.⁴ Objectivity, in the sense of an even momentary indifference to the Christian religion, serves to undermine Christianity. Christian faith sur-

¹ RV, I, 616; II, 1, 4; III, 2, 15, 17, 203.

² RV, III, 573.

³ *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, First Series, p. 133 (in 1869).

⁴ RV, III, 34, 187.

vived scholasticism, Roman and Protestant, not because of, but despite, its scientific doctrine of God. When theology becomes scientific, as in the Eastern church, it is not Christian, but a secularization of Christianity. True Christian theology is not essentially scientific; it is essentially religious. A Christian theologian must genuinely belong to the Christian community¹ and must start from the presupposition of the truth of the community-faith in Jesus.

If these two formally contradictory standpoints are to be reconciled, it can only be on the assumption that while theology has a scientific form, that form is something foreign, nonessential, literally *pro forma*. The truth of theology lies in its content, the "religious knowledge" or "confidence" of the community, the social experience of God in Christ by Christians living in the stream of the historical tradition.

This suggests as the sole criterion of a religious truth the fact that it is believed or experienced by the Christian community. Not the *consensus gentium*, but the *consensus ecclesiae* becomes the guide to truth. This is indeed Ritschl's most characteristic criterion. Not an individualistic, subjective theory of values is his great contribution, but a social, objective interpretation of the community. As between James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* or *Pragmatism*, and Royce's *Problem of Christianity*, he is much nearer Royce, in spite of Ritschlian anti-metaphysic. Ritschl's interest is in the Beloved Community rather than in cash values.

If we examine the details of Ritschl's system more closely, we shall find a great many cases in which this community-criterion is employed. The entire *Geschichte des Pietismus* is a protest against pietistic individualism in favor of the norms and traditions of the community. No subjective experience of repentance with the good old Lutheran *terrores conscientiae*, and no conversion (woe to him who, with "Pietists and Methodists," insists that this event must be dated!) carries with it the guaranty of its own validity. Much less can objective reflection establish or overthrow that validity. The experience can be guaranteed as Christian and as

¹ RV, III, 1-4, "Unterricht in der christl. Religion," 20c.

true only in its relation to the faith of the community imparted to its members through education in the Christian tradition.

Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung is in large measure a polemic against Thomasius, Philippi, Hofmann, and Lipsius, who took as their starting-point the religious need of the individual, and made subjective experience the logical foundation for the truths of theology.¹ These men might pass as Ritschlians, if the value-judgment were Ritschlianism; for they found ultimate religious truth in their own satisfactory and worthwhile experience. Ritschl's objection to them is not based on the consideration that such individualism is not valuable, but on the fact that it is not social. He rejects the idea that the individual experience of one or two theological professors shall pass as the standard for the church² and he points out that even among professors there are differences in experience. Theology must have a churchly, a community, character; and it must be saved from fanatical individualism by turning to its objective historic source, which is a spiritual movement common to all, founded by Jesus Christ.³

In this connection, the treatment of the *testimonium spiritus sancti* is very instructive. The doctrine is one of the most precious historical treasures of the church. How does Ritschl treat this item of the community-faith? He tells us that the doctrine as formulated is untrue, because it views the divine Spirit as active, and the human as passive; whereas Kant teaches and all well-trained philosophers understand that the essential characteristic of the human personality is self-conscious activity. This argumentation moves in the scientific thought-forms of Lotzeanism, not in the religious realm of community-faith. But this is incidental. His fundamental objection to the doctrine runs as follows: The Spirit is really never given to the individual as such, but only to the individual as part of the community. The Holy Spirit, God's knowledge of himself, and the knowledge of God in the community are different names for the same fact. This view identifies the witness of the Spirit with the social consciousness of the community. In other words, he modifies the traditional doctrine in the interest of his social criterion.

¹ RV, I, 641 f.; II, 7.

² RV, I, 642.

³ RV, II, 7 f.

In the many attacks on mysticism, in the definition of revelation as any complex of ideas held as true by a religious community, in the assumption that community-tradition preserves accurately the portrait of Jesus, in the teaching that community-revelation is except in the case of Jesus unconditionally superior to the individual conscience and is not to be proved or disproved by the use of reason, in the interpretation of Christ's existence for us in terms of the Christ-ideal in the community, and in the later acceptance of the actual present personal existence of Christ with God as a "mystery"—in all these characteristic teachings Ritschl makes the community the ultimate norm, in general emphasizing in his earlier writings the community-experience, in his later writings the community-doctrine.

This criterion Ritschl employs in connection with his exposition of nearly every doctrine. He recognizes that the view has its difficulties and seeks to face them. How, for instance, can the community's faith in Christ be the criterion, when the community has not always been faithful? He would reply that the community, divided though it be, tragical though its history, and sinful many of its empirical members, is somehow a real unity, the body of Christ. Wherever the Word and sacraments are, there is the visible church, token of the presence of God, *extra quam nulla salus*. And so even the legal forms of the church, which in his earlier life he had tended to view as belonging to the "world," he came to regard as essential to the community; and he made it a matter of principle to submit to the formulated doctrinal requirements of the Lutheran church as he understood them.

The famous rejection of metaphysics is not based primarily on intellectual grounds, but on the feeling that metaphysical method can never lead us to know the God revealed to the Christian community. The Hegelian Absolute is not a Rock of Ages; and conversely, the fact that God is will, love, personality, is given to us in the Christian revelation and can never be proved from another source. Christian theism is our only hope for a coherent worldview; yet it is not true because it is coherent and scientific, but solely because it is Christian. In the third edition of *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung* he came to believe that Christianity would

be true on its own account, even if the Christian idea of God were not used to explain the world—that is, even if no relation were thought between God and the world. The first edition had stated that such a course would make theology impossible.¹ So stalwart is his loyalty to the community that he is thus willing, if need be, to face the consequences of deism and a complete metaphysical and logical dualism not unlike the doctrine of the twofold truth. At the same time he recognizes that the community-faith has always posited a God-world relation which leads to a conception of the immanence of God in the world.²

It is first in this context that one can understand Ritschl's attitude toward value-judging. Without question, he holds that all religion consists of value-judgments, which function to produce "blessedness" in us.³ But Ritschl does not hold that what seems to us most valuable, most practical, most blessed, is therefore true. He is nearer to the intellectualistic position that only the true can be truly satisfactory. Religion is blessedness but a blessedness that finds its basis and firm hold in the objective existence of a Christian community, bearer and transmitter of the revelation of God in Christ. Sometimes, indeed, he seems to take a universal and extra-Christian standpoint, when he makes the self-evaluation of the human spirit the fundamental fact.⁴ But he specifically asserts that the ethical proof of Christianity can only succeed when undertaken from the standpoint of the community of believers.⁵ All value-judgments of the Christian religion are a community affair, a means of mutual understanding among Christians.⁶ There is no way of convincing a Buddhist or a Mohammedan of the superiority of Christianity. In a word, Christianity is not true because it is valuable; but values are significant because they are Christian. This is meant, of course, not in the interests of obscurantist traditionalism, but in the interests of religious life.

¹ *RV*, III, 213 (3d ed.), compared with III, 191 f., (1st ed.).

² *RV*, III, 284, 353, 205, 116, 224, 201.

³ *RV*, III, 376.

⁵ *RV*, III, 8.

⁴ *RV*, III, 213, 201, 25.

⁶ *Theologie Metaphysik*, p. 39.

Whatever is believed by the Christian community, expressing the social aspect of Christianity and its character as a historic movement founded by Jesus Christ, is true and valuable for that community. Christian truth is not accessible to others. Such is Ritschl's outstanding attitude toward the problem of truth.

But we find many passages in which Ritschl is clearly not using the community-faith as his criterion of religious truth. We have already mentioned that one ground for rejecting the traditional *testimonium* was that it treated the self as passive. Here he assumes a criterion which is somehow immanent in the reason as such. Again, we find him rejecting mysticism because it lacks ethical sanity—it denies the will its birthright in religion; whereas the human self is agent, not patient, and in personal life reality pertains to spiritual causality alone.¹ Again, the Kingdom of God is not merely a community-belief; but, as the goal of God, the world, and the community, it is an ethical ideal of universal love in which all active selves gladly co-operate; and this ideal is true and valid precisely because of its ethical character. Another frequent teaching in the pages of Ritschl is that Christianity is the means to mastery of the world; in the first edition of *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung* he taught consistently that Christianity is true because it gives us this power to overcome worldly obstacles and temptations. In later editions such passages are withdrawn in favor of the absolute supremacy of the Christian revelation possessed by the community. Nevertheless all editions retain the argument that man's sense of his own spiritual dignity is the final answer to every system of mechanical naturalism. Laying great stress on John 7:17, he makes this consciousness of ethical power, mastery, activity, the final test of truth in many passages.² Yet this side of his thought nowhere comes to so systematic a development as did his evaluation of the community. It is this pragmatic-ethical criterion by which Ritschl is chiefly known, but it does not profoundly satisfy him. It is apparently too subjective, too relative; he yearns, as do all great spirits, for a truth that is eternal, objective, beyond himself. At bottom he seems to feel that there is nothing in the individual that can be relied on to lead him to

¹ RV, II, 6; *Theologie und Metaphysik*, 55, 74. ² RV, III, 8, 24 f., etc.

the truth. When he seems to approve this "ethical criterion of the truth of the Christian religion," suggested by Spener, he qualifies it at once by the assertion that it can only succeed when worked out from the standpoint of the community of believers.¹

There is still a large body of Ritschl's teachings that does not fit either of the criteria yet discussed. In spite of his well-known rejection of mysticism, there is a noticeable strain of the mystical in his thought. He attacks, it is true, Kaftan's teaching that "the life of the soul hid with Christ in God is the heart of the Christian religion"; but he himself holds that "the fellowship which a Christian may have with God is as close as that between the head and the members of a family."² In explicit contrast to community-life, he says that "in the personal sanctuary of this peculiar knowledge of God, of the world, and one's self, which consists more of states of feeling than of intellectual reflections, one is absolutely independent over against men; or if not, one has not yet attained the enjoyment of reconciliation." Here ultimate religious truth is what is given in an experience of absolute immediacy, and derives its value and its truth from that immediacy.³

To be related with the present criterion is that group of passages, especially in *Theologie und Metaphysik*, that expounds Ritschl's attitude toward philosophy. Here he tells us that metaphysics is not true because it is abstract. Only that which is concrete and particular is true. Phenomena as given in experience are the only reality; facts of consciousness as immediate data are the only soul. There is neither thing-in-itself nor soul-in-itself. But although using Kantian terminology, it is doubtful whether he followed the Kantian arguments. Such at least is Herrmann's opinion. Ritschl's position was here more akin to Comtian positivism than to Kantian criticism; yet, unlike both, it was a consequence of an inner demand for immediacy rather than of a process of reasoning. Such phenomenalism is at bottom mystical.

Later in life he comes more and more to emphasize the feeling element in the highest experience. He says that the feeling of

¹ RV, III, 8.

² RV, III, 94, 617.

³ See J. H. Leuba's hostile criticism of this type of theology in *A Psychological Study of Religion*.

blessedness—"the feeling of joy in eternal life"—is the highest value-concept, which determines everything else.¹ Much of his discussion of the "mastery of the world" moves in the realm of the mystical rather than the ethical. It seems clear that the general trend of his thinking as he grew older was away from the primacy of the will toward the primacy of the emotions, of what satisfies the heart. He did not seem to see that feeling as such is even more subjective than will; nor was he clearly conscious of the clash between the mystical and the social criteria in his own thinking, although he observed it plainly enough in pietists and in other theologians.

We have now found three different criteria of truth implicit in Ritschl's thinking: first, that is true which the community believes; secondly, that is true which satisfies our active ethical nature; and thirdly, that is true which is given in immediate experience. Nowhere does Ritschl fairly attempt to correlate these diverse points of view, although there are traces of an uncomfortable feeling that they are incompatible. For instance, the "Essay on the Conscience" is a frank rejection of the ethical criterion in favor of the community-criterion; and in most passages in which he holds to the latter he qualifies or denies the other two. But he made no attempt to relate the positivism of the immediately given with the metaphysics of the Christian God-in-Himself. However, his tendency in later years toward accepting the pre-existence and present exaltation of the Christ is an implicit recantation of the principle that only the given is real. Further, the criterion of immediacy is plainly inconsistent with the ethical criterion; for (as he himself points out) the latter demands that the *Kosmos* shall be subordinated to the *Ethos*, existence to validity; whereas the immediately given is the *Kosmos* made ultimate.

It is fairly clear that the three criteria do not coincide; that they contradict each other at points; and that Ritschl was in a measure aware of the incongruity. This last fact is one that may afford us to a degree an explanation of the situation. Clearness and accuracy meant much to Ritschl. But they were the clearness and accuracy of a man who demanded religious life and rated it

¹ RV, III, 25.

higher than theological form; who could look on the consistency of a theological system as something purely formal and external; who cared more about being a Christian than about being a conservative or a radical thinker. Now we may apply the term empiricist—in a broad sense—to any man who thus rates experience above theory, content above form. A religious empiricist might naturally be expected to construct a theology which is intended to be confined to the realm of history (although the Christian idea of a personal and transcendent God makes the undertaking impossible), which brings the Kingdom out of the eschatological future and down from the heavenly heights to the earthly present and to the actual ethical struggles of men, and which sees in the concrete given facts of external phenomena and inner feeling the immediate guaranty of the Christian truths. Such a view, expressed in widely varying, often contradictory, formulae, is what we should expect from a theological empiricist.

In a sense, this empiricism was Ritschl's strength and his glory. It gave him a certain freedom of motion, a disregard for the hair-splitting of formal logic, a freshness and reality (of conception, not of expression) in the handling of theological problems in their relation to actual life in the Christian community. It permitted him to be what he became—the teacher of a generation, who inspired thousands and compelled all to reconsider fundamentals, and yet a teacher who had not one submissive disciple.

But precisely the empiricism that was his strength was also his weakness. First of all, it prevented him from understanding the only philosophers to whom he was willing to lend a hearing—Kant and Lotze. Secondly, it closed his eyes to the essential fact of the unity of self-consciousness and of truth as an expression of the attitude of a total personal life over against the world. The Kantian teaching of the activity of the self he accepted; but the unity of the knowing subject he did not grasp. The three criteria, as we have discovered them, illustrate this fact. We know the faith of the community, we will the Kingdom of God, we feel the presence of given phenomena and emotions. But these three facts stand separate, almost unrelated, as could not be the case had Ritschl seen clearly the unity of the thinking, willing, and feeling subject.

For this same reason Ritschl could tolerate a double truth—theoretical and religious—and in his later writings deny any need for relation between the two.

Thirdly, the empiricism which hindered him from recognizing the unity of the self led him to see a unity which is, to say the least, much more hypothetical than the unity of the self; namely, the unity of the social group of the Christian community. Overlooking the fact that the only real beings in that community and its history were the individuals (unless one accepts and justifies the "social mind," as Ritschl did not), he was led to attribute an importance to the idea of the community that seriously hampers the ethical individualism of Christianity. To say that all that the individual receives from God he has through the medium of the community; that his justification and atonement mean simply that he is a member of the community—of that realistic unity which exists "without reference to the counting of its members"; that he cannot be said to be truly a believer in Christ unless he is identified with the church, the worshiping community—is to justify the charge that Ritschl approaches the Roman Catholic conception of the church as the institution through which alone salvation is mediated.

Fourthly, Ritschl's empiricism led him to a doctrine of deism, whereas his Christian training led him to a doctrine of immanence. On the whole, the former conception dominated his thought. Once in the history, and only once, has the transcendent God come into touch with man—namely, in Christ. The development of the Christian community and the realization of the kingdom must be thought, it is true, as caused by God, but the only actual point of contact between God and the history is in the Christ; all else is effect of this cause, inference from this premise. There is very little room for Ritschl to see God in the Old Testament according to his principles; and he flatly refuses to think about the fate of the nations that do not come under the influence of the historical community. Revelation is, then, a fact of the past, a matter of tradition and nothing else, although we gladly call attention to the fact that his empiricism also led him (inconsistently) to recognize the "personal sanctuary." In general, however, for Ritschl, God's

presence in the world is the exception and not the rule; God's existence can be known only by disregarding and overcoming the world, while one accepts the faith of the community. This constitutes a grave limitation of his ability to recognize divine truth in the actual experience of life.

Finally, Ritschl's empiricism led him to another serious limitation, namely, a decided retrenchment of the missionary and evangelistic character of Christianity. He conceived his task as confined within the bounds of the community. The Christian estimate of other religions was purely a matter of mutual understanding among Christians and is not to be thought of as having validity for others. Once in the community, the Ritschlian theology may have a significance for us; but if we stand outside, what then? There is no hope of bringing the Buddhist or Moham-medan to an understanding, much less to an acceptance, of the Christian standpoint. The nations outside the movement of occidental history fare ill in Ritschl's hands. His empiricism could not, or did not, rise to the international and universal point of view.

Ritschl does not give us a satisfactory criterion of religious truth. But he has taught us, as his chief message, the fruitful principle that religious truth is primarily social.

LUTHER AND THE REAL PRESENCE

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By 1523 Luther had thrown overboard the following items in the Roman doctrine of the Lord's Supper or mass: (1) trans-substantiation, (2) the absolute necessity of the priest, (3) the sacrifice of the mass, (4) private and soul masses, (5) the denial of the cup to the participants except the officiating priest. He taught positively, on the other hand, that active faith was necessary for a blessing in partaking, that the Word was greater than the sacrament and alone gave it validity, and that the Word could be received without actual partaking.

It is evident from this that Luther's views were open to misunderstanding and objection, and he must either go backward or forward to clear matters up. The Catholic could say: You deny trans-substantiation. Well, how is the body of Christ related to the sacrament? Is it only a spiritual presence, or a bodily one, and, if so, how and where and why? How do you understand "This is my body"? How can you secure the presence of the body? The Protestant could say: You deny the indispensableness of partaking, because faith is the chief thing subjectively and the Word is the chief thing objectively, and faith is not bound to the sacrament but is bound to the Word. Then, why not restore the sacrament to its original position as a memorial meal where faith is stimulated to a spiritual feeding in Christ? What *special* blessing is there in the partaking? what *special* gift in the Supper? what *special* function in the presence of the body and blood in the sacrament and nowhere else? What is your religious interest in the doctrine of the Real Presence? What is the connection between partaking of the body and blood and the forgiveness of sins?

It may be said, then, that partaking is necessary because we as sinners are subjected all the time to attacks which endanger

our assurance of salvation, and in the sacrament the grace of God is offered to us by an appeal to the senses. Well, why could not the mere exhibition of the signs of the Supper do this, as well as the partaking? The exhibition could do this, but if it could, how much more the reception by the mouth of the very body and blood with which Christ died on the cross for our sins, and which are now glorified in heaven. That reception is an assurance doubly sure. But how do you know it is the very body? May not the bread be a symbol or sign? That brings us to Luther's doctrine of the Real Presence.

In Luther's letter to Paulus Speratus,¹ who brought an inquiry to him about the Supper from the Bohemian Brethren, and in a letter to the Brethren themselves (1523),² he comes to this question when treating of the adoration of the sacrament. Everything depends on the words of institution; for believers they contain life and blessedness; they are much more important than the sacrament itself. The blessings which the Word promises have been won by Christ in his body, and thus it is this body of which we partake in the sacrament. "For faith adores thus that it puts before itself him alone, whose body and blood it does not doubt to be there." "Those are mistaken who desire to compel us to adore as though Christ were in the sacrament in a glorious way as he is in heaven." Though that is true, the content of the sacrament is "Christ with his flesh and blood and everything which he is and has" (p. 392). "Christ is there where his flesh and blood are; and he cannot be separated from them" (p. 409). But you cannot compel one to adore in the sacrament, because Christ is not there to be adored but to help. Luther does not bring us much beyond his former discussions in this, because what he wants in the sacrament might be subserved by the spiritual presence of the body. The matter really goes back to the Scripture, and because that teaches the literal presence it must be held. It is frivolous to doubt the natural sense of a word of Scripture unless you are compelled by another word of Scripture (p. 393). Such another cannot be

¹ De Wette, *Luthers Briefe*, II, 208 f.

² Erlangen edition of Luther's *Werke*, XXVIII, 388 ff. ("Brief an die Böhmen von Anbeten des Sakraments des heiligen Leichnams Christi").

brought forward. Therefore we must hold to the nearest sense. "For I do not teach Christianly when I carry a sense to the Scripture and draw the Scripture after that, rather than let the Scripture be clear, and infer my sense according to that." "We dare not stand and say, It *might* be understood thus. *Might* and *must* are not one" (p. 398). "Keep yourself from this [that is, from such a false interpretation of the words of institution], let reason and wit go, which bother themselves in vain how flesh and blood may be there, and because they cannot understand it will not believe it" (p. 393). Reason is uncertain, arbitrary, wavering. It cannot therefore take part in questions or facts on which our salvation hangs, such as the deity and humanity of Christ, his virgin birth, or the real presence of his body and blood in the sacrament (p. 394). For on these questions depends the peace of our conscience, and therefore everything rests on their objective reality. But that reality is placed in question as soon as you allow the criticism of human reason. In fact, "if you could show me [he says elsewhere] that there is nothing in the sacrament except bread and wine, you would have done me a great service, for I have suffered much, and would have gladly been convinced, because I saw well that with that opinion I would have given to the papacy the greatest slap [that is, I would have robbed her of a Scripture to which she appealed, and also the doctrine which was almost the life of her life]. I have had two who have written on the subject more skilfully than Carlstadt, and not tortured the words according to their own thoughts. But I am caught; I cannot get out: the text is too forcibly there, and will not allow itself to be twisted out of the sense with words."¹

Though Luther in this letter to the Bohemians repeats what he taught elsewhere, that the Word is much more important than the sacrament and that one can be saved without the latter though not without the former (pp. 391-92), yet he emphasizes the body and blood as not only the true signs (*Wahrzeichen*) of such Word, but for the first time makes them convey the content and blessing of that Word. "You must hold it [the Word in the sacrament] a living, eternal, almighty Word which can make you living, free

¹ *De Wette*, II, 577 (1524).

from all sin, preserve you eternally, and which brings all that it signifies, namely Christ with his flesh and blood and everything that he is and has" (p. 392). The signs are not only the pledges of the forgiving grace of God and the external proofs to help your faith in the Word, but they themselves contain the sacramental gifts. Still it is not said that these gifts come to us by physical partaking, but they are apparently given to us by faith in the Word.

This next step was taken in "Wider die himmlischen Propheten von den Bildern und Sakrament"¹ (1524-25), when the Real Presence comes to its rights with a vengeance. "If I will have my sins forgiven, I must not run to the cross, for it is not given there yet, but to the sacrament or Gospel, where I find the Word which gives to me the forgiveness won on the cross. Therefore Luther has taught rightly that whoever has a bad conscience from sin *he* should go to the sacrament and receive consolation, not on the bread and wine, not on the body and blood, but on the Word which offers and gives to me in the sacrament the body and blood of Christ as poured out for me" (p. 286). Does that insure forgiveness? Does the body of Christ convey that blessing received in the Supper? Yes. "He who receives the cup receives the blood of Christ which he poured out for us; he receives the New Testament, that is, the forgiveness of sins" (p. 289). That is, there is now a casual connection between the physical partaking and forgiveness. Carlstadt "has taken it upon him to deny that in the sacrament there is the forgiveness of sins. Such a position is rubbish [*Dreck*], where the Word remains [broken for us], which is nothing else than that the bread and the body are broken, and it is instituted for our good, to release us from sins. For Christ has laid the power and might of his sufferings in the sacrament that we should find according to the Word, that is my body which is given for you for the remission of sins" (p. 282). Partaking is a means for the forgiveness of sins. "For all who have sins to be forgiven the body and blood of Christ is necessary" (p. 288). This is an advance for Luther. Previously, forgiveness was appropriated in the Eucharist because there was faith in the Word whose believableness was guaranteed by the presence of flesh and blood; now, however, one

¹ Erlangen edition, XXIX, 134 ff.

receives forgiveness because he believingly receives flesh and blood as means. Formerly flesh and blood were a sign, now they are a vehicle; formerly they were significative, now they are instrumental. Carlstadt would have us receive the Spirit first in order to profitable partaking, Luther would have us receive the Spirit and all blessings in the use of the external means, which are indispensable. God "will give to no one either Spirit or faith without the external word and signs which he has instituted for this." Carlstadt's too mystical spiritualism, says Luther, ignores the words of institution and perverts the real order, according to which Christ is first reconciler and giver of grace, and only secondly, moral pattern. According to the former, Christ's real body and blood are not in the sacrament but in heaven, and of course they are not partaken, nor would they be useful if they were partaken. Whereas, Luther said, the Spirit is bound to the person and work of Christ, and to the granting of grace only through the Word, which grace the Word mediates to us in partaking of the body and blood. Besides, Carlstadt is hindered from the truth by his "reason," really his unfaith, by which he cannot acknowledge the miracle of the Supper.

We see, then, Luther's religious interest in the Real Presence. First, it alone preserves the integrity of Scripture, both in its content and in its interpretation. Secondly, it alone guarantees the sure reception of the forgiveness of sins. Thirdly, it preserves the supernatural conception of Christianity.

I do not understand that by the advance in the book of 1524-25 Luther intended to deny the possibility of salvation through the Word without the physical use of the sacrament. "Even were mere bread and wine there, yet if the Word is there, on account of the same Word there would be forgiveness of sins" (p. 286). With all emphasis on the body and blood as indispensable vehicle, it is impossible that one who took earnestly faith alone (*sola fides*) should confine salvation to physical partaking. I think Luther never retracted what he said in his famous treatise, *On the Freedom of a Christian Man* (1520): "These and all of God's words are holy, true, righteous, . . . and he who hangs on them with true faith his soul will be cleansed so thoroughly that all virtues of the

Word will become his. And by faith the soul will by God's Word become holy, righteous, true, peaceful, free, full of all goodness, and a true child of God, as I John says, To them he gave that they might become children of God, all who believe in his name."²

There is nothing specially new to remark in the next treatise, "Sermon von dem Sakrament des Leibes and Blutes Christi wider die Schwarmgeister" (1526).² The object of faith is here the body and blood, though the forgiveness of sins is yet the special sacramental gift. With the one is given the other to the faithful receiver. But the sign theory again comes out. "Forgiveness is the first chief piece of Christian doctrine, which is conveyed to us in the Word, and his body and blood are given to us as a sign and assurance of that, bodily to receive" (p. 350). The same general circle of thoughts that we have been accustomed to comes out in "Dass diese Worte Christi, das ist mein Leib, u. noch Fest Stehen, wider die Schwarmgeister" (1527), and in "Bekenntniss von Abendmahl Christi" (1528),³ with a massive emphasis on the Real bodily Presence. "In the Lord's Supper the Word is given to us, as Christ's body (for us crucified) is there comprehended, that he is there to be bodily eaten [*dass er da sein soll leiblich zu essen*], and such eating is useful for the remission of sin, as the Word runs" (p. 136). "Therefore we say, in the Supper is the forgiveness of sins, not on account of the eating or that Christ deserves or has won the same forgiveness of sins, but on account of the Word, by which he communicates to us such won forgiveness, and speaks, This is my body which is given for you. So you hear that we eat the body given for us, and hear and believe such in eating; therefore forgiveness of sins is there communicated which on the cross was obtained" (p. 184). Against Zwingli's objection that the flesh profiteth nothing, he grounds the usefulness of the partaking of the flesh and blood in this way, viz., that "there stands the public article of our faith that Christ's flesh is full of Divinity, full of eternal good, life, blessedness, and he who takes a bite of that, takes therewith eternal good, life, all blessedness, and everything that is in his flesh" (p. 130). "The new testament (the last

² *Luthers Werke in Auswahl*, ed. Otto Clemen, II, 14.

³ Erlangen edition, XXIX, 328 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, XXX, 14 ff., 151 ff.

will of Christ that he left us in the sacrament) is Gospel, Spirit, forgiveness of sins, in and through the blood of Christ, and more; for everything is comprehended in one thing and in one heap or being, everything in the blood, everything in the cup" (p. 335), against Zwingli's doctrine that the wine in the cup is only a sign of forgiveness through the blood. "Who drinks of this cup, he drinks truly of the real blood of Christ, and receives the forgiveness of sins or the Spirit of Christ in and with the cup" (p. 325). He says the Word is first, for without the Word the cup and the bread are nothing. Also, without the bread and cup the body and blood of Christ are not there, and without the latter the New Testament is not there. Without this last, forgiveness of sins is not there, and without this there is no life nor blessedness. Everything is necessary in its place. "See, all that reaches and gives to us the Word of the Supper, and we get hold of that (the Word) by faith (pp. 338 f.)." That is Luther's eucharistic chain.

The blessing of the Supper reacts also on our own body. With express reference to Irenaeus, he connects the nature of the resurrection body with the "eternal food" of the Supper. Graebke, who has given us such a thorough and sympathetic yet scientific investigation, calls attention to this as a weakness of Luther, since by his putting to one side the scholastic doctrine of grace and sacrament-magic, he had really broken with the error springing from Greek tradition. But Graebke thinks that as Luther was driven by his opponents to place emphasis on a specific effect of bodily partaking, it is wonderful that he did not more frequently bring forward the body and blood as the food of immortality. "This is all the more surprising as his time—with its very insufficient attempts at distinction between spiritual and sensuous—took no such offense at that as we do today; and even Calvin attributed to the body and blood the significance of predisposing our nature to immortality. But with Luther this is only incidental."¹

The last book which has any significance for Luther's doctrine of the Real Presence is the Large Catechism (1529), where the vehicle-view, thoroughly at home in these years, is expressed. "We

¹ Graebke, *Die Konstruktion der Abendmahlslehre Luthers in ihre Entwicklung dargestellt*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 66.

go to the sacrament for this reason that we there receive such a treasure, through and in which we get forgiveness of sins."¹ Our opponents who say that bread and wine cannot forgive sins must be told that "we do not attribute such forgiveness to bread and wine, as in itself bread is only bread, but of such bread and wine which is Christ's body and blood, and which has the Word with it" (p. 145). "What is now the sacrament of the altar? It is the true body and blood of the Lord Christ in and under the bread and wine, commanded to us Christians through Christ's Word to eat and drink" (p. 144). In connection with Augustine what the Word does is thus expressed: "The Word is that which makes and distinguishes this sacrament, so that it is not mere bread and wine but is and signifies Christ's body and blood. For it runs: 'The Word comes to the element and makes it a sacrament.' This saying of St. Augustine is so proper and so well spoken that he could not have said anything better. The Word must make the element a sacrament; otherwise, it remains a mere element" (p. 143).

We might state, then, Luther's view of the Supper (1523 ff. A.D.) thus: It is a divine institution in which in response to faith we receive forgiveness of sins in receiving the real body and blood of Christ in and with the bread and wine. The thing (*res*) of the sacrament is now body and blood, but made so only by the Word. What makes the body and blood the vehicle of forgiveness? Not because they are remembrance signs, not because they point to forgiving grace won by the death of Christ, but because they are made by the Word independent bearers of forgiveness, for which they are the historical means. They are the vessel in which forgiveness is placed. Steitz-Hauck call attention to the fact that in this Luther was influenced by scholastic ideas, as it was an idea at home in the Middle Ages that grace is immanent in the sacramental substances, even Hugo of St. Victor expressing the thought in a way quite near Luther's, that grace is included in the body and blood as in a vessel.² Of course it follows from this that the body is partaken of just as truly by the sinner as by the saint, though by the former to his condemnation, for only to faith is forgiveness, though reached

¹ Erlangen edition, XXI, 144.

² Art. "Sakramente" in *Realencyk. f. prot. Th. u. Kirche*, 2. Aufl., XIII, 289.

in the elements to all, really appropriated. It is striking that this last point, this survival of the spiritual in Luther's view did not suggest the question whether something more of the spiritual might not also have been retained, whether a view so realistic as his might not be suspected as harking back to Judaism and mediaevalism, and as inconsistent with the charter of Christianity in John 4:23-24.

But this leads us to the question, How realistic was Luther's view? I fear we cannot answer this question. Facts look in two directions here. An immediate dynamic force and effect are ascribed to the Word, as if it were almost of hypostatic character, a fourth Person of the Trinity, a working immediately divine. So the presence of the flesh and blood in the bread and wine looks to us crasser than it must have been in Luther's mind, and the bread as conveying the body—could it really have been so materialistic as it looks? Such a sentence as this: "Christ is entire with flesh and blood in believing hearts"¹ cannot be meant as it reads, but must refer to the fact that the Christ who is there is not only divine but human. With our receiving of flesh and blood we implicitly receive in that very act forgiveness, as the Word communicates the whole Christ with all his gifts, flesh and blood and forgiveness. But faith only can receive the forgiveness, even if the mouth does receive the flesh. There is then a spiritual strain here in Luther's thought, whatever else there is. So long as it is the function of the Word to present the body, which body our faith realizes was offered for our sins, and thus makes forgiveness possible, and really presents us with that forgiveness, which can be received however only by faith—we are saved from too massive, realistic or materialistic thought, and kept within Christian limits. The Word only *offers* us the forgiveness contained in the body; it is for us to take it or not, but we can take it only by faith. So we might say, perhaps, that the gospel offers us salvation contained in the eternal written word as in a body or vehicle; but we take only by faith. "The mouth eats the body of Christ bodily," says Luther, "for it cannot get hold of the Word nor eat it, nor does it know what it eats, and tastes the same to it as if it was something else than Christ's body. But the heart takes hold of the

¹ Erlangen edition, XXIX, 343.

Word in faith and eats that spiritually, just as the mouth eats bodily. For the heart sees well what the ignorant mouth eats bodily. Whence does it see it? Not from the bread, nor from the eating of the mouth, but from the Word, where it stands: Eat, this is my body. And there is only one body of Christ. For both, mouth and heart, eat each one in its own way and measure. The heart cannot eat bodily, and the mouth cannot eat spiritually. So God makes it equal: that the mouth for the heart eats bodily, and the heart for the mouth eats spiritually."¹ As already stated, there is now a changed relation: as before, the body was a sign that in the Word was the vehicle of forgiveness, now the Word is the sign that the body is the vehicle of forgiveness.

Of course we have to remember that in denying the *ex opere operato* theory of the Roman church (the automatic working of the sacrament where no positive obstacle bars) Luther had no intention of denying that automatic working where faith is present. When Hugo says: "Sacrament not only signifies but confers that of which it is the sign or signification," and when Occam says: "Sacrament is the significant and efficacious sign of grace," Luther would readily have consented. With Luther there is a communication of forgiveness through faith in the Word (sign theory) or through believing partaking of body and blood (vehicle theory). God is already gracious in himself and through the work of Christ, and the sacrament serves to assure us of that, but it also serves actually to give us the blessing. Graebke (conservative) thinks this realistic conception is the after-effect of the scholastic idea of the infusion of grace. We must remember, however, that Luther never got clear of the influence of his own struggles after peace—struggles which Denifle explained away as either imaginary or invented to get pretext for sin, but which were all too real; so that Luther always looked upon all forms of sacramental doctrine under the standpoint of a distressed and attacked conscience. That significance of the sacrament for assurance was never absent from his mind.

If we sum up in a word Graebke's chronological sequence in this second half of the history of Luther's mind for this doctrine we get: in 1523, body and blood are the object of the Word that gives

¹ Erlangen edition, XXX, 93, also p. 87 (1527).

assurance along with the forgiveness; in 1525, body and blood are the vehicle of forgiveness; in 1526, along with forgiveness, body and blood are the *res* or central thing; in 1529, body and blood exclusively the *res*, forgiveness coming in as effect of the same. This does not mean that anticipations of later views or echoes of former do not also occur before or after these dates (as, for instance, in the Large Catechism, where body and blood are also guaranty and sign as well as vehicle),¹ but that the foregoing sequence represents actual facts in Luther's history.

What were the causes of this sequence? What was behind this development? Undoubtedly it was the controversy with Carlstadt on the background of Luther's religious and psychological experience. With the former, forgiveness was not the chief thing, but the moral transformation of the will and life; not justification, but the making righteous; not consolation, but power; not so much freeing from the guilt of sin as from its might. The chief thing in the death of Christ was not satisfaction, but moral obedience. When we get a true knowledge of his death, our will is bent to his will and is transformed. Christ is principally pattern. There is no redemption in Christ until the religious principles verified in his death become ours in personal appropriation. Strictly, Christ's work includes nothing else than the fulfilment of those demands which Carlstadt placed on all believers. He had no doubts to fight against himself, no struggles after hard-won peace, as Christ's grace and peace were allowed for all who would take it. The only object of the Supper is the remembrance of the death of Christ, which remembrance perfects itself in the true knowledge of his death, which knowledge is enlivened and strengthened by the Supper and brings with it new power to kill the flesh. The content of the Supper is only the external witness of this memory, an act of confession for the edification and improvement of the other members of the society. The partaking has no religious significance—only the spiritual eating, viz., the living knowledge of the death of Christ has worth for the inner life. There are indeed divine gifts, but these are not mediated by the Supper, but are the immediate bestowments of the Spirit, who has direct

¹ *Ibid.*, XXI, 145.

dealings with our spirits. Among these gifts forgiveness is only the first, there are others far richer. To receive them, we must have the right internal disposition—a waiting on God in a self-denial of all creaturely dependence. A preparation for the Supper is not feeling the need of strengthening our feeble hold on God's gracious favor by bringing us a pledge of the forgiveness of sins in the signs and forgiveness itself by the use of the signs, but is (forgiveness being already ours) the right knowledge of the death of Christ for a worthy celebration of his memorial. If one has this right knowledge the sacrament is really not essential for him. The assurance of forgiveness, anyhow, no outside act or service can bring, but the Spirit of God only. He anoints us, he seals us, he—not the Supper—is the pledge of our redemption.

It goes without saying that this was altogether too spiritual a doctrine for Luther. The distressed soul needs an external prop, an objective pledge of grace, a forgiveness independent of the subjective condition of the seeker (of course faith being presupposed) something outside of us and independent of us which would work in spite of our doubts and fears. This is assured by the Word, which the signs attest. But some might say the Word itself is spiritual; we cannot handle that. The penitent wants something more external. So Luther went on to declare that the signs (bread and wine—body and blood) convey the grace, and so the doctrine of the Real Presence is psychologically and religiously explained in Luther's mind. Not that that Presence was ever doubted by him. It was always taken for granted. But now it is dovetailed into his system as a necessary part of his religious world. A more sensible means is needed for the sinner than the Word. The signs themselves bring forgiveness. This was Luther's answer to the spiritualization of Carlstadt, and it was quite in advance of his old view that it was heresy to seek anything stronger than the Word, because such a seeking would put in jeopardy the full validity of the Word. It was also in advance of his doctrine that the sacrament was nothing else than a special form of the Word, in which the permanent worth of the Word as the vehicle of salvation is assured. Now, over against this he emphasizes the view—as reaction against Carlstadt—that the body and blood bring to us

specific gifts of grace. Before, the sacrament was only another form of offering us the same blessing, a blessing conveyed in all cases by the Word, though now with stronger appeal to the senses.

Another reason for this change in Luther was his desire to preserve the sacrament as something—not that we offer to God, not that we use for edification, not (as Carlstadt taught) as simply to remember Christ's death and sink ourselves in that in order to strengthen and transform our will so that it will conform to God's will—but as something which God actually gives to us, which he does for us, that is, the forgiveness of our sins in receiving the body and the blood. "Don't wonder," says Luther, "that I sweat blood over Carlstadt's doctrine concerning the memory and knowledge of Christ, if everything were not lost. If Carlstadt is right the sacrament is an idle work and commandment, but no gift or Word of God that offers and gives me Christ's body and blood."² The reader can now—if he has carefully followed this brief sketch of Luther's history between 1523 and 1530—easily answer the questions asked at the beginning of this article.

But that is not all of Luther, even in these years. And this other part must not be shelved. "This is our doctrine that bread and wine cannot help, that even the body and blood in the bread and wine cannot help—there must be something else there. What then? The Word, the Word, the Word; you lying spirit, do you hear what the Word does? For if Christ should be given and crucified for us a thousand times, that would be all in vain if the Word did not come and communicate it to us, and say: That is for you; take it and have it for yourself"³ so that even the Real Presence does not fall too heavily in the balance, if you only secure the working of the Word (p. 286). "I preach the Gospel of Christ, and bring Christ to your hearts by the bodily voice, so that you can form him in yourselves. If you now rightly believe, and get hold of the Word in your hearts, so say to me, what have you in your heart? You must say to yourself that you have the very true and real Christ. For with one word can I make it that the one Christ comes through the voice into so many hearts, and everyone who hears and receives the preaching, takes hold of him alto-

² Erlangen edition, XXIX, 284 f.

³ *Ibid.* (1525).

gether in the heart. . . . Why then should that not also tally with the fact that he gives himself also in the bread" (p. 334) (1526). It was the same Christ given in the preaching as in the sacrament, one to the society as a whole, the other to each individual, and where Christ is there is every spiritual blessing. "There is a difference when I preach his death. That is a public proclamation in the society, in which I give to no one particularly, but each one gets it who can. But when I hand out the sacrament I give it to him who takes separately, present him with Jesus' body and blood, so that he has forgiveness of sins, won by his death and preached in the society. That is something more than the common preaching. For though in the preaching there is that which is in the sacrament, yet there is this advantage that here it has to do with a certain person" (p. 345. 1526). He praises the riches of God that he will fill the world, and give himself in many ways, with his words and works.¹ Christ is greater than sacrament, and the way to get him is faith. Finally, says Kattenbusch, the sacrament is always with Luther the awakening and meriting incitement to faith, and indeed—that is his entire personal impression—as a pledge of the disposition (*Gesinnung*) of God, that still then he permits faith to be trust when the "mere" word will not suffice.² But Kattenbusch holds that Luther would not need to have objected to the *opus operatum* if it had come before him in its "classical" original shape (compare above on controversy with Carlstadt).

I have no space nor heart for criticism of Luther's history or doctrine in regard to the Supper. "Great men need not that we praise them; the need is ours that we know them." That is the first sentence in McGiffert's admirable *Luther: The Man and His Work* (New York, 1912). The same might be said on this matter also. We must take Luther as he was. A statement without criticism (or with very little) can be found in the able work of Dieckhoff, unfortunately left incomplete,³ or in the classic book of

¹ I am indebted here to Kattenbusch, in *R.E.*, 3. Aufl., XVII, 372.

² *Ibid.*, p. 373.

³ *Die evangelische Abendmahlslehre in Reformationszeitalter*, Vol. I (Vol. II not published), Göttingen, 1854.

Köstlin.² Expositions equally reliable and friendly, though with criticisms, are Jäger² and Graebke,³ or the special book of Diestelmann.⁴ All these I have used. One might use also the histories of doctrine and the older and modern works on the history of the Supper. But Luther himself must not be ignored. All that he wrote has one unmistakable mark—it has feet and hands and blood and heart. It lives and moves.

² *Luthers Theologie*, 2. Aufl., 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1901. See Index under "Abendmahl."

³ *Luthers religiöses Interesse in seiner Lehre von der Realpräsenz*, Giessen 1900, 92 pages (see last part for criticism).

³ *Die Konstruktion der Abendmahlslehre Luthers in ihrer Entwicklung dargestellt*, Leipzig, 1908, 107 pages (for criticism, pp. 102-7).

⁴ *Die letzte Unterrednung Luthers mit Melanchthon über den Abendmahlstreit*, Göttingen, 1874 (for exposition of Luther's doctrine see pp. 91-331). I pass no judgment on the opinion of Diestelmann on the *Unterrednung* itself.

THE SURVIVAL VALUE OF MIRACLE

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The forces that have invalidated the traditional conception of miracle in the mind of the modern man are now a matter of history.¹ The earliest and perhaps the most influential of these has been the application of exact scientific method to the phenomena of nature and of human society. The geometrical figure and the abstract algebraical formula have transformed the vague guesses of the poet, the speculations of the philosopher, and the dogmas of the theologian into tangible and accurate forms of thought capable of practical use and exact verification.² The effect of the clear white light of scientific method upon man's conception of nature and of God is simply incalculable. When the game of cards was first introduced into Geneva, toward the close of the fourteenth century, it was viewed with suspicion because of its mysterious complications. The authorities forbade the playing of the game when there was a comet on the horizon in order not to vex still further an offended heaven.³ But when Newton and Halley, aided by the mathematical and astronomical work of their predecessors, were able to plot the orbit of the comet and reduce it to law, the superstitious fear of this celestial portent disappeared. No one passage of Holy Writ has caused the shedding of more innocent blood than the command of Exod. 22:18, "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." But when in 1563 John Wier of Cleves dared to rise in the midst of theologians and judges who were holding solemn inquisition over shrieking and blaspheming lunatics, and assert that that they were not bewitched but mentally diseased, he began the

¹ White, *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology*, I, chap. xiii; Lecky, *History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe*, I, chaps. i, ii; A. C. McGiffert, *The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas*, chaps. iii, v, vii.

² J. T. Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, I, 312 ff.

³ E. Doumergue, *Jean Calvin*, III, 433.

movement afterward carried out by Tuke, Pinel, and modern psychiatrists that finally brought sweet reasonableness into one of the darkest and most gruesome phases of Western Christianity.¹

Thanks to the benign spread of scientific method, we no longer, as formerly, fall back upon fairies and ghosts, witches and warlocks, devils and angels for the solution of our mysteries. Almost instinctively we view the world as ruled by law. Hence arises the distrust of the traditional conception of miracle. It is not that men have taken the trouble to disprove the miraculous, but that traditional miracle has simply become superfluous to the modern way of thinking. It belongs to the intellectual impedimenta. If believed in at all, it is accepted on other grounds than that of its rationality.

In the slow process of the application of the results of scientific method to miracle, the leader was a gentle-spirited, "thought-bewildered" spectacle-grinder of the seventeenth century. Spinoza challenged the traditional idea of miracle as unworthy of the infinite perfections of God.² Hume, ignoring the skeptical implications of his own philosophy, made use of the idea of the uniformity of nature to assert that miracle could be predicated only when the falsity of the testimony upon which it was based would be a greater miracle than any alleged miraculous event.³ A small library of controversial literature has gathered around the few pages Hume devoted to the problem. German theological rationalism, led by the Tübingen school, joined forces with the skeptical philosophers and the scientists in rejecting miracles in the sacred records also. The conclusions of the historical critic and the scientist received literary interpretation and popularization through Renan, Lecky, and Arnold. Finally, through the influence of the scientific materialism of the first half of the nineteenth century, miracle became taboo and was able to maintain itself only in the ranks of the devoutly orthodox. Darwin's epoch-making work, *Origin of Species* (1859), seemed to strengthen in the realm of biological science the general opposition to miracle and furthered

¹ White, *op. cit.*, II, 122.

² *Tract. Theol.-Pol.*, VI, 11.

³ *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, sec. 10.

a mechanistic and deterministic philosophy of evolution in which miracle was superfluous.

As a result of the tremendous pressure exerted by the triumphs of science, the general attitude of both orthodox and liberal theologians toward miracle has become distinctly apologetic. This appears even in the eagerness with which the staunchly orthodox seize upon any of the conclusions or concessions of science that seem to support miracle.¹ A prominent Boston divine some eight or nine years ago gave us an eloquent and deeply spiritual discussion of miracle, the conclusion of which was that "the fate of Jesus and his gospel is in no way bound up with the fate of the miracle."² The progressive pastor is advising that miracle be avoided in the pulpit as much as possible because it is a hindrance rather than a help.³ It is even asserted that miracle itself was not necessary, as is usually contended, for the authentication of Jesus' person and teachings to the men of his time.⁴ A critical New Testament scholar seeks to eliminate miracle entirely by the strict application of the scientific method. He asserts that alleged miracles fall into two classes. The first includes the healing of disease, the casting out of devils, and the like, which admit of explanation and are not therefore miracles. The second class includes the raising from the dead, the feeding of the multitude, and like occurrences which would be genuine miracles if they really had happened, but which could not have happened since they involve a "breach of natural law."⁵ Thus pastor and scholar of the liberal wing seem generally to have reached the conclusion that, all things considered, miracle should no longer be emphasized.

Yet the problem of miracle in the Christian faith is not solved by simply ignoring it. The modern world, schooled in scientific

¹ Johnson, "The Miracles and History," *Princeton Theological Review*, VIII, 529 ff.; J. A. MacCulloch, article on "Miracles," *Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

² George A. Gordon, *Religion and Miracle*, p. 130.

³ C. S. Patton, "Miracles and the Modern Preacher," *American Journal of Theology*, XX, 105 ff.

⁴ Frank Hugh Foster, "The New Testament Miracles: An Investigation of Their Function," *American Journal of Theology*, XII, 369 ff.

⁵ J. M. Thompson, *Miracles in the New Testament* (1911).

method and convinced of the uniformity of nature, will have none of the traditional conception of miracle as essentially an interruption of this uniformity. The candid student of the Gospels must see, however, that any attempt to read into these simple records later scientific or theological distinctions is unjust to the writers themselves. It makes them father ideas totally foreign to their conception of God and nature. If we are to accept the records at all, we must recognize that miracle is an integral part of the early Christian world-view. A non-miraculous Christ would have been at once discredited by both Jew and gentile. To the historian he would be a greater miracle than the Christ of history. For Jesus and his followers miracle was a natural and necessary manifestation of religious life and power. The problem therefore is one of doing justice to the early Christian point of view, and at the same time of evaluating miracle if possible in terms of modern life.

It is entirely to the credit of the orthodox critic that he insists upon the right of the sacred records to tell their own story. If Luke narrated in all good faith the story of the virgin birth, the descent of the Pentecostal flames, the blinding of Elymas, the tragic taking off of Ananias, he should at least be allowed the benefit of his honest convictions. A candid historical criticism demands as much. Renan is certainly mistaken in the assertion that "the miracle was a violence done to Jesus by his age, a concession demanded by the necessity of the hour. Hence the exorcist and the thaumaturgist are discredited while the religious reformer will live forever."¹ The orthodox scholar is nearer the truth when he insists that miracle is part and parcel of the thought of Jesus. To ignore it is to fail to enter into the secret of his spiritual enthusiasm or to understand his world-view.

Allusion has been made to scholarly attempt to show that even from the standpoint of the New Testament times, miracle was not necessary to the moral and spiritual influence of Jesus.² But it is not convincing. It is probably true, as the writer contends, that

¹ *Vie de Jésus*, p. 279.

² Frank Hugh Foster, "The New Testament Miracles: An Investigation of Their Function," *American Journal of Theology*, XII, 369-91.

the deciding factor was the commanding nature of the character of Jesus and his spiritual power. "He spoke as one having authority." But the natural and inevitable instrument of the age through which spiritual power found expression was miracle. Jesus addressed a people who had long been accustomed to associate miraculous endowment with spiritual enthusiasm and power. Moses and the elders manifested the presence of the power of Jahweh by mighty works. The chosen instruments of God—Samuel, Elijah, and Elisha—were necessarily miracle-workers. Tense spiritual enthusiasms, the so-called pneumatic endowments of the early Christians, were always attended with miracles.¹ Miracles were frequently associated with teachers and intellectual leaders of the age, such as Plotinus.² The fact that a later more critical age has discounted miracle is no reflection upon the moral integrity of Jesus. Much of the finest moral enthusiasm of early Christianity was inspired by eschatological ideas which we deem mistaken and later by monasticism. Yet the spiritual triumphs of Paul or of Jerome and St. Francis are none the less precious because certain of their ideas were in time discredited. To assume that Jesus was forced "either to renounce his mission or become a thaumaturgist"³ presupposes a lack of harmony with the ideas of his age which we have no grounds for assuming.⁴

Again the conservative scholar, especially if he has mystical affiliations, finds himself thoroughly at home in the anti-intellectualistic world-view of Jesus where miracle is but the "breaking through" of forces that encircle the saint and are making for the regeneration of the world. Perhaps the fundamental weakness of Christianity, a weakness that is strongly reflected in traditional theology, is that it is more interested in saving than in understanding the world. It becomes thereby constantly exposed to the mistake of trying to redeem a world which it does not thoroughly

¹ Case, *The Evolution of Early Christianity*, pp. 146 ff.

² Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, IV, Zweiter Theil, pp. 524 ff.

³ Renan, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

⁴ Renan, however, practically justifies Jesus' use of the miracle in this statement: "Telle est la faiblesse de l'esprit humain que les meilleures causes ne sont gagnées d'ordinaire que par de mauvaises raisons" (*op. cit.*, p. 268).

comprehend. Not even Augustine, probably the greatest intellect Christianity has produced, was courageous enough to insist with the Greeks that there can be no right action without clear insight. The world, especially in Jesus' day, was intellectually bankrupt; not knowledge for knowledge's sake was the goal, but any knowledge that would bring *ἀραπαξία*, or peace of soul. All problems of logic, ethics, God, nature, and society were subordinated to the supreme problem of soul-salvation. The scientific question whether miracle was a priori possible was never raised—in fact, could not be raised in the existing state of knowledge. The question of the reality of miracle was approached from the standpoint of its immediate moral and religious associations, and it is a familiar fact that religious enthusiasm has been the mistaken sponsor for every possible sort of logical as well as moral fallacy.¹

Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that for the oriental mind the spiritual world is full of superabundant creative activity. The Oriental moves in an atmosphere of transmigrations of souls, virgin births, divine revelations. The line between the natural and the supernatural is shadowy and uncertain. Religious truth as a passive, scientifically objective entity hardly exists; it is known only as felt in the plastic, dynamic, shifting religious consciousness. For this reason even the gospel of Jesus suffers from the "literal-minded savagery"² of the Occidental. Only the sympathetic spiritual imagination can fully enter the supernatural world in which Jesus lived. But here a word of warning is necessary. The very sympathy of the devout soul with the oriental supernaturalism of Jesus and his followers may prove a snare. The constant emphasis of the supernatural has undoubtedly driven men to an ultra-scientific explanation of religious phenomena. The so-called religion of science is largely a revolt against the uncritical superlatives of the religion of supernaturalism. It is dangerous to lay exaggerated emphasis upon the transcendental in religion or philosophy. The religious imagination needs the safe and salutary check of science. The literal-mindedness of science is nothing but an insistence upon a decent regard for the demands of

¹ Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 521 ff.

² Hocking, *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 149.

common-sense. Without it we may drift in an opalescent sea of emotionalism as charming as it is futile and evanescent. If ever supernaturalism is rejected entirely it will be from the imperative demand for a clearer formulation of moral and spiritual values than it makes possible. There is a profound truth in Nietzsche's dictum, that religion is constantly being shipwrecked upon morals.

The conservative is prepared by his acceptance of the gospel records at their face value to enter whole-heartedly into the religious atmosphere of Jesus, but difficulties immediately arise. How can he conscientiously reconcile such widely divergent world-views as that of the man of the first century and that of the man of the twentieth? For Jesus and his disciples, as we have seen, the natural and supernatural were not sharply distinguished. God was very close to his saints and manifested his presence and favor in miraculous fashion. It was entirely natural for the spirit-filled man to prophecy, heal the sick, cast out devils, and even to raise the dead. The distinction between the natural and supernatural was simply a matter of spiritual nearness to, and co-operation with, God. The problem of nature's "unbroken causal nexus" never entered the thought of the early Christian. The point of departure for the understanding of miracle for the early Christian as for the man of antiquity was not the idea of the uniformity of nature but rather the sense of free, creative activity of the personal will. Miracle was simply the manipulation of the ordinary course of events, without effort, by some superior power, gods, or spirits, just as man, within the limits of his own sphere, controls those things that are within his power.¹ The presuppositions of such an idea of miracle are, first, the ignorance of natural law, second, the feeling of the intimate relation of God to man. The miracles of the biblical records differ from those of contemporary accounts solely in the moral earnestness and spiritual idealism that accompanied them. This, rather than their historicity, has secured their acceptance by the religious mind. There is nothing so purifying, so elevating, so disarming to criticism as a lofty moral enthusiasm.

¹ Sabatier, *Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire*, p. 68.

The modern man, owing to the effect of scientific progress, has lost forever the naïve religious attitude of the early Christian. The apologist for miracle therefore finds himself in this rather unpleasant predicament: He must defend the New Testament account in its entirety, including the objective reality of miracle, before a world which has lost the mental background of the primitive Christian which alone made miracles real and spiritually significant. The conservative finds himself obliged to combine the ancient conception of miracle as an unusual and supernatural event with the modern idea of the uniformity of law. Miracle becomes thereby "an event in the external world" and yet an event "due to the immediate power of God." This reduces miracle to a curious *zwischen Ding*; it belongs to the world of human experience, and yet it is not of that world. It is "an inner-worldly act of an outer-worldly actor."¹ It does not violate secondary causes and yet "it is an insertion into the already evolving series of second causes of something entirely new, which, although joined to the series of natural causes, is not in any sense their product, and not within their power to produce even under the divine control."²

This gives us a vicious dualism with strong deistic implications. God is made to function in two different rôles, first as an extra-neous, transcendent wonder-worker who intervenes at stated times and interrupts, or at least supplements, the natural causal nexus of his original plan with an immediate exhibition of divine power, and secondly as the orderly, law-abiding God of providence, who directs all things by fixed causal relations. If emphasis is laid upon the immanent activity of God and miracle is subsumed under a more comprehensive divine plan, of which miracle itself and the causal nexus of nature are constituent elements, then miracle ceases to be miracle; it is only the manifestation of higher, more comprehensive law. What appears to the sense to be miraculous is in reality a part of an orderly sequence that is not properly understood. This saves the integrity of the divine plan, but sacrifices the reality of miracle. On the other hand, if we are asked

¹ Le Bosquet, "Classification of Miracles," *American Journal of Theology*, XV, 569.

² Hodge, "What Is a Miracle?" *The Princeton Theological Review*, XIV, 261, 262.

to accept the reality of miracle as an event that is unusual, abnormal, and supernatural, as it undoubtedly was to the early Christian, we are forced to say that the inspired writers were mistaken, or we must accept the unworthy conception of a deity who changes his own laws in an arbitrary fashion and descends to the level of the prestidigitator to accomplish his ends. This saves the historical veracity of the sacred writers and the reality of miracle, but at the sacrifice of the divine dignity. Orthodox supernaturalism, because of its fidelity to the world-view of the sacred writers, has been forced to affiliate itself with the latter position. But the modern man, dominated by the idea of nature's uniformity and self-sufficiency, feels small need of such an absentee deity and is inclined to elbow him out of the universe. Indeed, it is by constant insistence upon the objective reality of biblical miracles, and the consequent identification of the divine activity with the strange, the abnormal, the inscrutable, that we tend "to make God less and less necessary and even to return to atheism."¹

The traditional conception of miracle also presents serious epistemological difficulties. It is conceded that "the defender of miracles must be prepared to accept the responsibility of showing, not only that the occurrences are inexplicable, but that they are beyond the capacity of natural agency."² But it may very well be said that if an event is from the very nature of its occurrence "inexplicable," and laps over into another world of which we have no knowledge we are not even in the position to affirm that it is a miracle unless we wish to understand the miraculous as a synonym for the mysterious and unknowable. McCosh felt this difficulty and suggested a way out through intuitionism. What we are really asked to believe is that there is a higher law of nature which at times interferes with natural law as we know it, although we have no information whatever as to the operation of this higher law. We are asked not only to accept this unknown higher law as of equal validity with the known law of nature in explaining the miraculous event, but this unknown higher law must necessarily take prece-

¹ Borden P. Bowne, "Concerning Miracle," *Harvard Theological Review*, 1910, p. 146.

² McCosh, *The Supernatural in Relation to the Natural*, pp. 110, 111.

dence over the known laws of nature since it alone takes in the entire sweep of the infinite plan of God that includes the natural order.¹ The facts of science and of experience are thereby placed at the mercy of theological dogma or metaphysical speculations.

The logical tergiversations necessitated by the defense of miracle are aptly illustrated by a recent writer who alludes to a gospel miracle as an "inexplicable fact."² The miracle is "inexplicable" because it transcends the course of experience and the laws of thought. This inexplicable character is a *sine qua non* of its miraculousness. At the same time, it is a "fact" because it is an integral part of a higher causal relation of which we have no knowledge whatever. But just what is meant by an "inexplicable fact"? The spectator may say that the disappearance of the lady in the sleight-of-hand performance is an "inexplicable fact." But by "fact" he includes only the data given him by his senses before and after the trick. He does not include as part of the "fact" a theory of the miraculous suspension or violation of nature's laws. No possible experience of our own and no amount of testimony of the experience of others can ever bring miracle under the category of "fact," for the very simple reason that by hypothesis it belongs to the supersensuous. The senses can only tell us that a given experience is extraordinary or inexplicable; to say that it is due to supernatural causes is in every case an assumption based entirely upon religious prepossessions. To speak of a miracle, then, as a "fact" is to juggle with words. A miracle may be a postulate of religious belief or of philosophical speculation, never an objective datum of experience.

In the light of what has just been said it will be seen that there is a pathetic element in the eagerness with which apologists cite the discoveries of science as supporting miracle. Reference is made to the progress of science as not being unfriendly to the supernatural, to the triumphs of idealism over materialism in philosophy, to the progress of discovery and invention as height-

¹ C. S. Patton, "Miracles and the Modern Preacher," *American Journal of Theology*, XX, 105.

² MacCulloch, article on "Miracles," *Hasting's Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, p. 682b.

ening our sense of the boundlessness of reality and the mystery of the universe, to the monistic implications of expanding knowledge as strengthening the belief in "one God" and "one law" that includes miracle and science as parts of one divine unity. Particular emphasis is laid on the general admission of the historical veracity of the healing acts of Jesus as indicating the reliability of the gospel narratives and supporting the miraculous elements.¹ The logic of this is not convincing. Pausanias, the famous Greek traveler, made a tour of the cities of Greece from 160 to 174 A.D. His descriptions of the altars, temples, basilicas, statues, and innumerable art treasures have been verified within the last half-century by the archaeologist's spade, often to the smallest and most trifling details. Yet no scholar for that reason lends any greater credence to good Pausanias' pious accounts of the marvelous performances of gods and men given with the utmost faith in their verity. How long will it be until we shall have the same canons of historical criticism for Luke and Paul as for Herodotus and Pausanias?

The modern apologist's uncritical exploitation of science in favor of his cause reminds one of the tendency of the spiritualist to place X-rays and table-levitation, wireless telegraphy and telepathy upon the same footing. Certainly there is something grotesque, almost sacrilegious, in a recent attempt to utilize the modern theories of matter in support of the resurrection of Jesus. Ether, electrons, corpuscles, and the like are all marshaled in mechanical, materialistic array in support of the simple, devout narrative of the empty tomb. It is argued:

If these theories of matter be true, might not Christ's body be resolvable without corruption into the ultimate constituents of matter and then re-formed as a new ethereal body, since ether is submaterial, the indwelling spirit moulding it as if it were a material body, yet not subject to the limitations of such a body? At all events these new theories lessen the difficulties in the way of accepting the Resurrection.²

Such a pseudo-scientific rationalization of the beautiful gospel story destroys its spiritual charm entirely. We must go back to

¹ Johnson, "Miracles and History," *Princeton Theological Review*, VIII, 545.

² J. A. MacCulloch, article on "Miracles," *Hasting's Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, p. 683.

the pious explanations of animal nature gathered in the monkish compilation *Physiologus* of the early Middle Ages to find a parallel to such a scandalous violation of the spirit and intent both of science and of religion.

To assert, however, that the traditional idea of miracle is passing is not equivalent to saying that miracle itself has lost its interest. There are many reasons for thinking that miracle belief in some form or other will always be a factor in religious experience. The "will to believe" seems to be a universal human characteristic found among the most ardent devotees of exact science as well as among religionists.¹ It has been suggested that so far from losing our interest in miracle we are now ready for its fresh discussion and intelligent evaluation.²

Of fundamental importance for the re-evaluation of miracle was the revolution wrought in the thinking of men by the theory of evolution. The traditional idea of miracle had as its background the conception of a static carpenter-universe ruled by fixed laws and shot through with the eternal and unalterable design of its Creator. Miracle was but the breaking through of this ordered plan by its Deviser in the interest of higher spiritual values. When Darwin published his *Origin of Species*, in 1859, he seemed to give this traditional world-view its death blow. Nature became all at once self-sufficient. Miracle and even God seemed superfluous, almost antagonistic to nature, now suddenly become architect of her own destiny. Seldom are articles of faith killed in an argument. More often they perish through disuse; in fact, the belief for which we can find no use has already begun to die. Hence there are multitudes of moderns, imbued with the scientific world-view, who are ready to reply to any apologist for miracle in the traditional sense as LaPlace replied when criticized by Napoleon for not mentioning God in his *Mécanique celeste*, "Sire, je n'ai pas besoin de cette hypothèse."

¹ Joseph Jastrow, "The Will to Believe in the Supernatural," *Nineteenth Century*, March, 1911, pp. 471-86.

² W. A. Brown, "The Permanent Significance of Miracle for Religion," the Dudleian Lecture for 1915 at Harvard University, published in the *Harvard Theological Review*, VIII, 301.

The mechanical interpretation of the universe suggested by Darwin and elaborated into a philosophical system by Spencer aroused vigorous protests. To be sure, Darwin confessed that "with respect to the causes of variability we are very ignorant at all points." But by placing the chief emphasis on the selective effect of the forces of nature upon variations, he suggested a deterministic world-view inimical to any satisfactory interpretation of personality or of moral and spiritual values. This was still further emphasized in the agnostic philosophy of Spencer and was not escaped even in the later theistic and idealistic interpretations of evolution. As a trenchant critic of evolution has remarked:

Under a sheer evolutionary account of man, the world of real persons, the world of individual responsibility with its harmony of spontaneous dutifulness disappears. With it disappears the genuine personality of God. . . . This discovery that the leading conceptions of the evolutionary philosophy are opposed to the vital conceptions underlying the historical religion of our Western civilization, of course does not in the least settle the merits of the issue between these conceptions in the court of rational evidence. But the interests at stake touch everything that imparts to human life the highest worth, and all that our past culture has taught us most to value. These interests, it may well be contended, are so great as to justify us in challenging any theory that threatens them.²

Twenty years have passed since this challenge of Spencerian evolution was uttered in the interest of religion. Meanwhile an entire change has taken place in our scientific outlook. Science has lost much of its old, hard, law-bound, deterministic atmosphere. We find world-famed physicists, astronomers, and psychologists interested in visions, observing spectral arms and spirit voices, and feeling not one whit disgraced thereby. Even the scientists are not ashamed to confess "the will to believe in the supernatural." Furthermore, the spirit of old Heraclitus has invaded our science and philosophy. We live in a plastic universe, replete with creative energy. The "block universe" of the Hegelians has given place to the "open universe" of the pragmatist. The prophet of this new order is Bergson. He has given us a brilliant picture of an ever-changing, growing, striving world. This vision lifts from our hearts the stifling weight of determinism. For Bergson

² G. H. Howison, *The Limits of Evolution*, p. 7.

"there are no things, there are only actions." God himself "has nothing of the already made; he is unceasing life, action, freedom."¹ In place of the mechanical and deterministic evolution of Spencer, Bergson offers us a developmental process the essence of which is spontaneity, creativity. As opposed to the absolute creation of traditional theology he champions a creative evolution. He recognizes no absolute teleology. Not even God can tell the beginning from the end; for the deity himself existence is one vast adventure.² The very heart of Bergson's philosophy is freedom; life is the measure of reality. In such a world-view the traditional conception of miracle as an interruption of fixed laws or a manifestation of higher law, is meaningless. But miracle in the sense of the setting-free of energy, creative activity, becomes part of the eternal order of things. Instead of being the unusual, the abnormal, miracle is now the hallmark of reality, the token of life and growth.

The influence of the philosophical movement represented by Bergson upon the idea of miracle has been still further strengthened by recent tendencies in psychology. There is an inclination on the part of psychologists to take action as the point of departure in the science of the mind. In fact, psychology has been defined as "the science of behavior."³ Not that consciousness does not play its part; behavior must ultimately be interpreted through consciousness. But the material for the growth as well as for the interpretation of personality comes through action. The child in its efforts to reproduce "social copy" stumbles upon variations or inventions which mean, not only new accretions of experience, but also new increments to the self. The new self, or to be more exact, each modification and enrichment of the old self, is only attained through the conscious and creative reinterpretation of the old in terms of the new by the child. It is his own will, therefore, and not another's that is ever achieving, inventing, re-evaluating, and through this process he arrives at an understanding of his own per-

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 248.

² E. C. Wilm, "Bergson and the Philosophy of Religion," *Biblical World*, XLII, 281.

³ Pillsbury, *Essentials of Psychology*, p. 5.

sonality and likewise impresses his individuality upon his fellows.¹ It is then in these most intimate and vital experiences of the developing soul-life that we find the measure of personality both human and divine. Creativity, spontaneity, power of initiative, these are the ear-marks of the personal and intelligent will.

If, therefore, to be a person is to be a creator, a miracle-worker, if you please, it follows that to believe in a personal God is to believe in miracle; a theistic faith implies the acceptance of miracle as a necessary manifestation of divine creative personality. A god who is no miracle-worker is either dead or never existed. In a godless universe miracle would degenerate into a mere chance happening, the slipping of a cog in the machine. The notion of miracle as a corollary of personality is openly expressed or implied in almost every modern attempt to define miracle. "Belief in God," we are told, "stands simply for the position that if God is alive, he must reveal himself in definite acts. A God merely postulated or inferred by the human mind does no miracles."² All things partake of the miraculous in the sense that they "root in the ever-living, ever-working will of God. They are also miracles in the sense that they cannot be deduced in their successive phases from antecedent conditions, but continually proceed from the activity of the Divine."³ The "heart of the miracle-belief is divine activity. Miracle is the way in which man confesses his faith in a God who can do things and is doing them. . . . It expresses the creative aspect of religion."⁴

The tendency to see in miracle an outstanding characteristic of divine personality has far-reaching implications for our conception of God. In the traditional view miracle was a rather

¹ Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 114 ff.

² Wendland, *Miracles and Christianity*, p. 1.

³ Borden P. Bowne, "Concerning Miracles," *Harvard Theological Review*, III, 156, 157.

⁴ Professor William Adams Brown, "The Permanent Significance of Miracle for Religion," *Harvard Theological Review*, VIII, 311. A knowledge of this exceedingly suggestive essay, delivered originally as the Dudleian Lecture at Harvard for 1915, is almost indispensable for an understanding of the new conception of miracle. Incidentally it will show the valuable work of liberal scholarship in conserving fundamental religious concepts and reshaping them to meet the needs of modern life.

casual and unimportant phase of divine activity. Under natural and normal conditions God was thought to work through laws, and this law-abiding phase of his activity rather than the occasional and spectacular violations of an established order was supposed to give us the most trustworthy insight into his nature. This made it possible to ascribe to the deity a more or less self-centered existence in which he was able to exercise the eternal and unchangeable perfections of his divine nature untrammelled by the conditions in a fleeting and transient world. But what is the situation when miracle, or evidence of personal initiative, of divine creative energy, becomes the characteristic proof of God's existence? How is it possible for God to be constantly initiating new forces in the universe without himself partaking of those changes? Is not the price that such a miracle-working God must pay for his activity a necessary delimitation of his infinite perfections? The problem, of course, is as old as Aristotle. Aquinas, following the lead of the great Stagirite, suggested a solution in his distinction between "actuality" and "potentiality."¹ He has been imitated by many Protestant scholastics. The problem, however, was not so pressing when men still clung to the idea of a carpenter-universe with unalterable laws. But today, when men think in terms of evolution and even describe reality as an eternal flux, the situation is entirely different. All credit therefore must be given to Mr. F. H. Johnson, who in his book *God in Evolution* courageously accepts the logic of the situation and attempts to describe the rôle of an active miracle-working God in a plastic, changing, striving world. If his God is not quite as dignified and perhaps not as worshipful as the aristocratic deity of traditional theology, one must respect his courage, his moral integrity, and the thoroughly whole-hearted fashion in which he has linked his destiny to that of the universe he seeks to save.

Granting that miracle in the sense of evidence of divine initiative, or of creative energy in the universe, is of fundamental importance for our belief in God's existence and our interpretation of his character, we have still to decide what are the ear-marks of miracle.

¹ *Contra Gentiles*, I, chap. xvi, quoted by Thomas J. Gerrard, "Bergson and the Divine Fecundity," *Catholic World*, XCVII, 640.

The believing heart inclines to look upon events of surprising or wonderful character, that bring insight into truth, that reassure faith and exhibit the creative activity of infinite goodness in the universe, as miracles. It is evident, therefore, that no objective test of miracle can ever prove satisfactory. The failure to recognize this fact has brought about the shipwreck of the traditional idea of miracle. In the traditional sense miracle is usually opposed to fixed natural law. The test of miracle is thus found in objective conditions, in the fixed causal nexus of nature. Not faith and emotional attitudes, but the canons of science are made the court of last appeal. It will be seen at once that the old miracle-apologetic has thus set for itself an impossible task. It finds itself forced to assume that every alleged miracle cannot be explained in terms of natural law, either at present or at any future stage of scientific progress. Such a statement, science of course refuses to accept.¹ The modern protagonists of miracle recognize the difficulty and meet it for the most part with the frank acknowledgment that miracle can never be made a matter of final objective proof. In its last analysis it is a matter of belief, of subjective attitude. At most it is a phase of reality which faith alone enables us to grasp. For faith provides for miracle both its rationale and its religious value.

It would seem then that in addition to the plastic and dynamic conception of the universe made familiar to us by Bergson's reinterpretation of evolution and by the contribution of functional and voluntaristic psychology to our idea of personality, there is a third factor making for the re-evaluation of miracle in modern thought—namely, the tendency to find in subjective experiences the source of religious truth and the measure of religious values.

The movement in religious thought that paved the way for this subjective evaluation of miracle dates from Schleiermacher. The great German theologian sought to rescue religion from the destructive rationalism of the eighteenth century, on the one hand, and from the deadening effect of Kantian moralism, on the other, by making it purely subjective, a feeling of oneness with the

¹ W. A. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

absolute.¹ Under the pressure of the wave of scientific materialism that reached its height about the middle of the last century, Ritschl and his followers were forced to modify still further the position of Schleiermacher. In their hands religion became merely a matter of *Werthurtheile*, judgments of value. God was interpreted as a moral purpose, an attitude of the will, rather than a factual objective entity. Since we can form no trustworthy existential judgments in religion, we are limited to the evaluation of subjective experiences for our knowledge of spiritual realities. All religious problems become for the most part simply a matter of the psychological analysis of religious experiences. Miracle, therefore, can never involve questions of natural law, of scientific principle, or even of objective fact; it is a matter of the evaluation of subjective experience. For the early Christian believer, possessed of the *christliche Weltanschauung* of faith, the gospel account of the raising of Lazarus was a miracle; it was felt to be a manifestation of creative spiritual energy, of divine sympathy and compassion. For one not possessed of the Christian world-view it would be an impossible or at most an inexplicable event.² In the absence of faith no event can ever be a miracle.

The conclusions of Schleiermacher and the Ritschlian school have left their imprint upon almost every modern attempt to define miracle. "Without subjective personal faith," writes Wendland, "there is no such thing as religious knowledge or perception of the divine working." Faith thus gives insight into an aspect of reality "which no non-religious ideas can touch," which is "inexplicable by the immanent causal nexus, and due to directly creative divine action."³ The physical miracle Bowne thinks is "unconditionally to be rejected" because science can tell us nothing as to the nature and constitution of reality; it only tells us "how things hang together." Hence it is only as we are enabled by faith to admit the existence of God "that miracle in any intelligible sense is given or that it has any practical importance."⁴ Similarly, Pro-

¹ Reden über die Religion, Zweite Rede, "Das Wesen der Religion."

² Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, pp. 268 ff.

³ *Miracles and Christianity*, pp. 5, 14, 15. ⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 145, 155, 159.

fessor W. A. Brown defines the miracle as "an exceptional event, or quality in an event, in nature or human life, the significance of which religious faith finds in the self-revealing activity of Deity." The miracle itself only becomes real through a "mystical intuition of God." It follows from these psychological conditions of miracle-belief that "there can be no such thing as a final proof of miracle."¹ Miracle becomes merely a postulate of religious belief which is inseparably united with the idea of a personal God. It will be seen that this at once removes miracle from the field of science and of empirical fact. Miracles are impossible for one who does not have the religious attitude.

But to make miracles dependent upon faith or the subjective religious attitude does not solve all our problems. Shall we restrict it to the subjective attitude entirely, and say with Schleiermacher, "miracle is only the religious name for an event; and any event is a miracle, even the most entirely natural, whenever it is of such a kind that the religious view of it predominates"? Or shall we assert that, while faith is necessary to the comprehension of miracle, the significance of miracle is not exhausted with the psychological analysis of the emotional situation, but that we gain real insight through faith into divine creative activity not given in the causal nexus of science? If, as is only too evident, we cannot escape the cognitive implications of the religious experience, the problem of miracle is pushed back into the realm of metaphysics. It falls heir, therefore, to all the persistent problems of metaphysical speculation. Granting that faith enables us to recognize in unusual events the divine initiative, the old question still remains whether God is constantly introducing into the world new factors that cannot be derived from the existing world-order, or whether his activity is limited to the direction of forces operating from the beginning. If the latter alternative is accepted, then it would seem that miracle is due simply to man's inability to grasp the cosmic process in its entirety. Bowne, who has made so much of the terms "natural-supernatural" and "supernatural-natural," seems open to this criticism. All things, he tells us, looked at from the point of view of their origin and the creative energy they

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 302, 314, 316.

manifest are "supernatural"; viewed from the standpoint of the causal nexus of nature all things seem "natural."¹ It is hard to see from this point of view how miracle-faith is anything more than a pious deceit, the *Machwerk* of a beneficent "reign of divine illusion." Strange to say, a recent writer accepts the logical implications of this view. "Miracles were and are," he claims, "all parts of the great Illusion of the Divine Government, but none the less real and inspiring on that account." This suggests the benevolent hoax of Santa Claus perpetrated by indulgent parents upon their trusting offspring.

It is not surprising, then, that bolder thinkers are unwilling to surrender belief in miracle to the tender mercies of an immanentist theism, and insist upon an "open universe" in which God is constantly setting in operation new forces that cannot be explained in terms of the given world-fact. Only in some such universe as this can we postulate miracle in the true sense. To be sure, it is a world full of contingencies, both divine and human. In it life becomes a real adventure, shared in by both God and man. But the greatest asset of such a world is the free creative initiative of a miracle-working God who shapes it to his will. In such a world we may indeed be often puzzled by the drift of the cosmic weather, but, like Israel's prophets viewing the shipwreck of national hopes, we can still be confident that somewhere or in some way in an infinitely plastic universe the great Conserver of Values will bring us to our "desired haven."

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 148 ff.

² F. W. Orde-Ward, "Prolegomena to an Essay on Miracles," *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1916, p. 608.

OATHS AND VOWS IN THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS

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Oaths and vows are common among all peoples. There are the legal oaths imposed by the judges in their administration of justice. But there is also the prevalent custom of a person binding himself in a certain direction by means of a vow. In ordinary speech a man would emphasize his statements by expressions of asseveration invoking either the deity or the component parts of the universe, or purporting to stake his own life or the life of those dear to him as surety for his veracity. This was also much in use among the Jews and, owing to the peculiar binding force of the Jewish oaths, occupied a great deal of the attention of their spiritual leaders.¹ The Essenes are reported to have avoided swearing, and esteemed it worse than perjury, for "they say, that he who cannot be believed, without [swearing by] God, is already condemned" (Jos., *War*, ii, 8, 6, § 135; cf. Philo, ed. Mangey, ii, 458). On this account, it seems, they were relieved from taking the oath of allegiance to Herod (*Ant.*, xv, 10, 4, § 371). In the Slavonic Enoch (49:1) it is said, "I swear to you, my children, but I swear not by any oath, neither by heaven, nor by earth, nor by any other creature which God created. If there is no truth in men, let them swear by the words 'yea, yea,' or 'nay, nay.' " Jesus also was strongly opposed to oaths and vows. Matt. 5:33-37 is a close parallel to Enoch. "But I say unto you," Jesus teaches, "Swear not at all;² neither by the heaven, for it is the throne of God; nor by the earth, for it is the footstool of his feet; nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King"; it therefore makes no difference whether you mention God's name explicitly or

¹ About the Semitic oath in general, cf. now Pedersen, *Der Eid bei den Semiten*, Strassburg, 1914; the remarks on the rabbinic oath (pp. 196, n. 3, and 177-78) are a digest of Frankel, *Die Eidesleistung bei den Juden*, Dresden and Leipzig, 1840.

² *ὅρκος* is not translated in Syrsin; cf. Merx, *Matthaeus*, pp. 101-2.

anything belonging to him. "Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, for thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your speech be Yea, yea; Nay, nay."

Does this passage denote that Jesus was opposed altogether to every kind of oath even when imposed by Jewish courts in accordance with the Law? The different views of the gospel-commentators on this question are well summarized by Montefiore in *The Synoptic Gospels*, II, 511. He himself, following Loisy, is of the opinion that "the most probable interpretation of vs. 34 is that all oaths of every kind and on every occasion are forbidden for the disciples and the members of the coming Kingdom. This would be in accordance with the practice and ethics of the Essenes." But they themselves seem to have been inconsistent in the matter of oaths. How are we to reconcile their practice, as mentioned before, with the fact which Josephus reports (*War*, ii, 8, 7, §§ 137-42) that the Essenes imposed frightful oaths on those that were about to enter their sect? Nor is it likely that they would have opposed the oaths prescribed in the Mosaic law, seeing that "what they most of all honoured, after God himself, was the name of the law-giver, whom if anyone blasphemed, he was punished capitally" (Jos., *ibid.*, § 145).

It is more likely, with Wellhausen and Merx, that Jesus' attack was not directed against oaths rendered by a court of justice, but against unnecessary swearing in ordinary speech. Jesus demands of his followers not to emphasize their statements by any of these formulae of oaths, whether expressly mentioning or implying God, but to answer with a simple and manly yea or nay. It is in a similar way that we have to understand the practice of the Essenes. Only on solemn occasions, as when accepting a new member into their fraternity or when called upon in a lawsuit, would they take recourse to an oath.

In fact, several such expressions of asseveration in ordinary speech are found in the talmudic literature, which proves that they were quite common among the people and were even used by scholars. The following story will illustrate the popular trait. Simon b. Antipatris, a contemporary of Johanan b. Zaccai, once had visitors whom he pressed to have a meal with him. But they

refused the invitation and "vowed by the Thora not to eat or drink with him" (i.e., Simon). Soon, however, they disregarded their vow, and partook of the meal. On this account their host maltreated them (*Derekh Erez*, c. 6, beginning). Evidently these people never intended it to be a proper vow, but used it unnecessarily for emphasizing their refusal. R. Gamaliel (probably II) uses the expression *העבודה*, "by the (temple) service," when assuring in ordinary conversation with the two scholars, whom he sent to the famous Ḥanina b. Dosa to pray for his sick son, that the saint's prediction was exactly correct (*Berakot* 34^b missing in the parallel account in *Yer.*, v, end).¹ About Gamaliel's father, Simon (cf. *Jos.*, *Vita*, 38, 39), the Mishnah (*Keritot* 8a) relates that "once a pair of doves [required for sacrifices, *Lev.* 12:6] fetched in Jerusalem the exorbitant price of a gold denarius. Then R. Simon b. Gamaliel said, 'By this sanctuary *המזבח הזה*, I shall not go to sleep [tonight] till the price will drop to an ordinary denarius'" (for a similar oath, cf. *Acts* 23:12 f.). Likewise the priest Zachariah b. *הקצב*, who went through the revolution of 66-70, makes use of this expression for the sake of emphasizing his statement (*Ketubot* 2:10). R. Eliezer b. Hyrcanos, when hearing a new Halakha about which he had no previous tradition, exclaims, "By the covenant *הברית*, these are the very words that were said unto Moses on [Mount] *Horeb*" (*Tos. Halla* 1:6; *Pesahim* 38^b).²

To return to the formulae of oaths expressly mentioned by Jesus. With "by heaven" cf. *Sifra* to *Deut.*, § 304, *השמים*.³ Elijah the prophet is supposed during a conversation with R. Josê b. Ḥallafta to use the expression, "by thy life and the life of thy head" (*חייך וחיי ראשך*, *Berakot* 3a bottom). But "by thy head" in Matthew means, of course, that the person who uses this expression would say, "by my head" (*בחיי ראשי*; "by my head" is contracted from "by the life of my head"). People used also to vow

¹ R. Ḥiyya, the contemporary of Yehuda, the Patriarch and redactor of the Mishnah, also uses this expression, *Yebamot* 32^b.

² Cf. *Yer.* *Pea* 196, bottom, where for R. Eleazar b. Azarya read most probably R. Eliezer (b. Hyrcanos).

³ See also *Nedarim* 11:13: a woman says to her husband, *שמים ביני לבינך*. This is, however, explained by *Yer.* (42d, ll. 63-64) to mean, "Just as heaven is distant from earth so is this woman estranged from her husband."

by the life of their children. This is reflected in an Agadic parable by Eleazar b. Azarya, a contemporary of Gamaliel II, "[It is like] unto a king who longed for children. When he has a daughter born he vows by her life. But when afterwards a son is born, the king stops vowing by his daughter but begins to do so by the life of his boy" (Mekhilta Bo 16, ed. Friedmann, 19a top). Instructive is Sanhedrin 3:5. A defendant, having been sentenced to deny by oath the claims of the plaintiff, obtains a concession from the latter, who declares, "Vow thou by the life of thy head" (וְרִירָא לִי בְחַיֵּי רִאשָׁךְ). But now the plaintiff wants to withdraw the concession and insist on the original oath. This is granted by R. Meir, but not by his contemporaries (חכמים). This Halakha clearly shows that the legal oath was different from such expressions as "by thy head" which were used in ordinary speech for the sake of asseveration. The former was regarded as superior in binding force to the latter—at least so in popular opinion. But it also shows that the rabbis regarded such a vow, if intended as such, to be legally binding in monetary affairs, and that no trifling was allowed with such formulae of oaths. The Mishnah Shebuot 4:14 בשמים ובארץ, דריי אלו פטוריין, which is often quoted to show the contrary, is quite a different case. Schürer's (II⁴, 576, 109) translation, that if a man "swears by heaven and earth he is *not* guilty of perjury," is totally wrong. The case speaks of witnesses who refrain from giving evidence. Thereupon the plaintiff can publicly announce an oath binding anybody who knows any evidence not to withhold it (Lev. 5:1). In such an emergency, if the plaintiff used the formula "I adjure you by heaven and earth to give your evidence," the witnesses were not bound to respond.

Jesus demands of his followers that their (ordinary) "speech be yea, yea; nay, nay" (cf. James 5:12; II Cor. 1:18-20). A similar statement is found in Sifra to Lev. 19:36, B. Metzia 49a (cf. Yer. Shebiit, 39d bottom) in the name of Jose b. Jehuda, a scholar of the second half of the second century A.D., "Let thy Yea be true and thy Nay true" (שִׁידוֹא דִּין שִׁלְךָ צִדֵּק וְלֹא שִׁלְךָ צִדֵּק). The repetition of yea, yea, nay, nay is merely for emphasis and not for the purpose of making it an oath in the rabbinic sense, as several gospel-commentators assume. R. Eleazar, an Amora of

the second half of the third century A.D., states that *yea* and *nay* are oaths (Shebuot 36a). To this Rāba, a Babylonian Amora (d. 352), remarks that for such a purpose *yea* and *nay* must be repeated twice. But this is too late a talmudic statement in connection with the Gospels. The accepted opinion in the time of Jesus certainly knew of no such a distinction and hardly regarded *yea* and *nay* as a legally binding oath.¹ There is therefore no ground for assuming that the repetition in Matthew, as against James 5:12, is due to an interpolation in the rabbinic sense, as Johannes Weiss, *ad loc.*, maintains.

In this connection it is of interest to compare the statements of Philo about oaths and vows. They may sometimes appear in a form peculiar to Philo, the Greek eclectic philosopher and at the same time the Jewish moralist. But we also detect in them conceptions and conditions similar to those found among the Palestinian Jewry. Philo too is against unnecessary swearing. "That being which is the most beautiful, and the most beneficial to human life, and suitable to rational nature, swears not itself, because truth on every point is so innate within him that his bare word is accounted an oath" (*De decal.* xvii). "For the word of the virtuous man shall be his oath, firm, unchangeable," is Philo's explanation of the commandment not to take God's name in vain (*De spec. leg.* i). He knows some people who, "without any idea of acquiring gain, do from a bad habit incessantly and inconsiderately swear upon every occasion, even when there is nothing at all about which any doubt is raised, as if they were desirous to fill up the deficiency of their argument with oaths," while others will "in profane and impure places" go on "swearing and stringing together whole sentences full of oaths, using the name of God with all the variety of titles which belong to him, when they should not, out of sheer impiety" (*De decal.* xix). He advises those who find it necessary to swear, to do so by "the health or happy old age of his father or mother, if they are alive, or their memory, if they are dead" (*De spec. leg.* i). In support he mentions one of the patriarchs as "swearing by the

¹ Cf. also Tosafot to Shev. 36a: ולא ידבר שם ד' אמת. Quite different is the confirmation Amen after the recital of an oath; cf. Num. 5: 22 and Shev. *loc. cit.*; Matt. 26: 63-64.

face of his father" (evidently referring to Gen. 31:53). He praises those people "who, when they are compelled to swear are accustomed to say (in the oath) only thus much, 'By the' or 'No, by the' without any further addition, giving an emphasis to these words by the mutilation of the usual form, but without uttering the express oath. However, if a man must swear and is so inclined, let him add, if he pleases, not indeed the highest name of all, but the earth, the heaven, the universal world; for these things are all most worthy of being named and are more ancient than our own birth and, moreover, never grow old" (*ibid.*). It is difficult to ascertain whether Philo speaks here of the oaths imposed in the law courts. He would then be opposed to the Halakha as prevalent in Palestine. Still more strange is the view of Philo that in the utmost an oath should only be in the name of the Logos and not in that of the highest being (cf. Frankel, *Eidesleistung der Juden*, pp. 19 ff.). But it is also possible that Philo intersperses his own ethical speculations with the actual custom of the Alexandrian Jews as regards oaths and vows. Be it as it may, it is worth noticing the difference of opinion between Philo and Jesus as regards such formulae of oaths as "by heaven" or "by earth." Philo, the contemplative sage, advocates their use in preference to the mentioning of the divine name; he points out their real significance and expects the person who swears to be fully aware of it. But Jesus had in mind the masses of the people who usually do not give full account to themselves of every expression they use. He therefore condemns all such formulae of oaths, especially in ordinary speech, as being tantamount to proper oaths.

An attack on the pharisaic way of defining vows is contained in Matt. 23:16-22. It is a common error to assume that the instances mentioned in this passage refer to oaths one takes, for example, in monetary disputes. To refer in such oaths to the temple or to the gold of the temple would lack all connection and relevance. The Mishnah Shebuot 4:13, which Schürer quotes as an illustration to this passage of Matthew, has already been dealt with above. Matt. 23:22 could possibly have been directed against the rabbinic view expressed in this Mishnah. But the context in connection with vss. 16-17 is against this assumption.

What is apparently meant in these verses is the vow by means of which a Jew imposes upon himself or upon other people the penalty not to enjoy something by the declaration that it should be regarded as holy and as inviolable as a sacrifice, the temple, or any of its belongings. In short, it should be קרבן, Qorban, i.e., like Qorban (קרבן; cf. Ned. 1:4). In such cases it was necessary to formulate the vows in an exact and well-defined way, in order to make them clear and well defined (cf. Nedarim 11a). Now the Pharisees, according to Matthew, maintain that if "one swears by the temple it is nothing" (אֵינוֹ כְּלִימָה), but if "by the gold of the temple," he is bound (ὁφείλει, חייב); secondly, if by the "altar," the vow has no effect, but if by the "gift that is upon it," it becomes valid. In other words, if a Jew declares a certain thing as sacred to him as the temple, he is not bound by the vow (נדר). Only then does the vow become valid when the specified thing is to be like the gold of the temple; and likewise in the other instances. But the talmudic tradition (Ned. 1:3) is in complete contradiction to this statement of Matthew. The Mishnah states that a vow (נדר) with the declaration "like the temple," כְּדִכְּלִימָה, "like the altar," כְּמִזְבֵּחַ, is valid. The Talmud reports on this point no different opinion by any individual scholar to be taken as a remnant of the early Halakha. It is therefore difficult to account for Matthew's denunciation of the Pharisees in this particular instance of the formulae of vows (so also Frankel, *Eidesleistung*, p. 60, n. 103).

But the most serious attack on the rabbinic tradition as regards vows is contained in the retort of Jesus concerning the filial obligations toward parents (Mark 7:1-13; Matt. 15:1-11). According to Num. 30:1 ff., a Jew could impose by a vow a certain disadvantage upon *himself* (Num. 30:3, לְאִסֵּר אֶת-נַפְשׁוֹ). But it is nowhere mentioned in the Bible that a man can prohibit another person by means of a vow from deriving any benefit from anything that belongs to the former. Thus, to use the talmudic phraseology, קרבן שאני נהנה לך, "Qorban be anything that I would benefit from thee," is biblical, but קרבן שאתה נהנה לי, "Qorban be anything that thou wouldst benefit from me" (cf. Ned. 1:4 [Babli 116, 13a]; 3:5; 4:1 ff., 8, 5:4), is not mentioned

in the Bible as being a valid vow. Yet already in early times the tradition developed to the effect that a Jew could declare all his belongings to be Qorban in regard to one or many particular persons. Against this tradition Jesus protested, adducing the hypothetical case of a son and parents, as was the custom in those times in arguments (cf. the instance of seven brothers marrying in succession one and the same woman, Matt. 22:23 ff. and parallels). According to the principle of your tradition Jesus argues against the Pharisees, it is possible for a disobedient son to declare to his father or mother by a vow קרבן שאחזה נהנה לי and in this way transgress the fifth commandment. Such a case is actually reported in Ned. 5:7 to have happened in Bêth Horon (בית חורן):¹

This is the meaning of Jesus' attack on the Pharisees, which is so generally misunderstood by the gospel-commentators. Only Merx, *Matthaeus*, p. 244, recognized that Jesus attacked the tradition of קרבן שאחזה נהנה לי, without, however, elaborating the point. Hart, in his long article on Qorban (*JQR*, XIX [1907], 615-50), entirely failed to grasp the fundamental problem of vows and their annulling. He therefore made the unwarranted suggestion that Jesus himself was a Nazirite and as such could not benefit his parents from his work. Whereas Luke (1:15) clearly states that John the Baptist was a Nazirite, it is nowhere mentioned that Jesus was such a one. Nor is there any indication in the Talmud that the labor of a Nazirite was regarded as sacred and that none was allowed to derive from it any benefit.²

As regards the details, the expression "Qorban" in Mark 7:11 is quite exact. The gloss "Given to God" (δ ἐστι δῶρον, cf. Matt.

¹ On the other hand, we find an instance of a father vowing not to benefit in the least from the work of his son, in order that he should devote all his time to the study of the Law (Tos. Bekhorot 6:11; the case was brought before José b. Halafta, who lived at Sepphoris, middle of second century A.D.; see also Ned. 38b; Yer. Bikkurim III, end, 65d, ll. 72 ff.). More frequent are the cases of fathers in their anger disinheriting their children by means of vows. Jonathan b. Uzziel, a disciple of Hillel, was thus disinherited by his father (Yer. Ned. V, end, 39b, ll. 47 ff., different in B. Bathra 133b); El. b. Hyrcanos was all but disinherited by his father (Gen. R. c. 42, Aboth d. R. Nathan c. 6, and Pirke de R. El., beginning); Rachel, the wife of Akiba (Ned. 50a top; Ketubot 62b bottom); cf. further B. Kamma 9:14; Yer. Ned. 39b, l. 2.

² About the dissolution of vows (Hart, *ibid.*, pp. 643-44) see farther on.

15:5; Syriac versions and some Greek codexes read in Matthew, also Qorban; see Merx, *Matt.*, *ad loc.*) is only misleading, because in using the formula קרבן שאתה נהנה לי one does not make one's property an actual gift to God. The meaning is simply that all the belongings of the person who pronounces the vow should be to the person specified in the vow in the status of a Qorban (קרבן = נקרבן; cf. above, p. 266, and also Ned. 3:2), i.e., just as from anything dedicated to the temple [הקדש] none must derive any benefit. But no advantage accrued to the temple treasury, in most cases, as the result of such a vow.¹ This is the general talmudic conception of these vows. Philo (*De spec. leg.* iv) has evidently vows of this kind in mind when he writes that "there are some men who, out of the excess of their wicked hatred of their species, being naturally unsociable and inhuman, or else being constrained by anger as by a hard mistress, think to conform to the savageness of their natural disposition by an oath, swearing that they will not admit this man or that man to sit at the same table with them, or to come under the same roof; or, again, that they will not give any assistance to such a one, or that they will not receive any from him as long as he lives. And sometimes even after the death of their enemy they keep up their irreconcilable enmity, not allowing their friends to give the customary honours even to their dead bodies when in the grave." All vows of this kind are made by using the formulae קרבן שאתה נהנה לי or קרבן שאני נהנה לך.

The term "Qorban" is used by Josephus promiscuously to denote several kinds of vows. In *Ant.*, iv, 4, § 73, he speaks of "such also as dedicate themselves to God as a Corban, which denotes what the Greeks call a gift." By this "ministration" he means the vow to pay one's value to the priest (ערכך, Lev. 27:1 ff.). For the various kinds of this vow see *Erakhin*, chaps. 1-5; the talmudic expressions of them being נדרים and ערכין. An actual case of the temple times we read in *Erakhin* 5:1 (*Tos.* 3:1 has a fuller report which we quote here). "The mother of Rimatia vowed that 'if my daughter recover from her illness, I shall pay to the temple treasury her weight in gold.' When the daughter recovered, the

¹ This explanation of Qorban is also pointed out by Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels*, I, 164-66, without, however, citing the talmudic evidence.

mother went up to Jerusalem and weighed her in gold." As far as can be gathered from the talmudic sources, the whole obligation to the treasury was a monetary one; there is no indication that the labor of the person concerned in the vow was consecrated as long as the vow was not yet carried out (cf. Erakhin 21a; Tos. 1:2; 2:16; and 3:14). In *Contra Ap.* i, 22, § 167, Theophrastus is quoted as enumerating among others, "particularly that called Corban, which oath can only be found among the Jews, and declares what a man may call 'a thing devoted to God.'" Here really the vow of "Qorban be what thou (or I) benefit from me (or thee)" can be meant, of which the Gospels speak.¹ But in this vow the specified thing is actually not a gift "devoted to God," but is placed in the status of such as regards the person specified in the vow. In a third passage Josephus calls the temple treasury (the γαζοφυλάκιον, Mark 12:41-44; Luke 21:1-4) by the name of Qorban. Pilate "raised another disturbance, by expending that sacred treasury which is called Corban, upon aqueducts" (*War*, ii, 9, § 175). Evidently the treasury was so called because the money contained therein was the result of vows by means of which people actually consecrated a part of their fortune to the temple treasury. The usual expression in the Talmud for such gifts is דְּקִדֵּשׁ. A portion of this treasury seems to have served as a charity fund (cf. Shekalim 5:7 and Tos. 2:16). Such dedications are reported even after the destruction of the temple. They are called דְּקִדֵּשׁ לַשְּׁמַיִם, "consecration to heaven (God)," i.e., for divine purposes such as charity and similar objects. Tos. Nidda 5:16 relates that once a child "consecrated an axe to heaven" (שְׁדֻקְדִּישׁ קִרְדֹּם אֶחָד לַשְּׁמַיִם) and the case was brought before Akiba. More instructive is the story in Sabbath 127b (top). A Jew of upper Galilee, after working for a farmer in the Darom for three years, demands on the eve of the Day of Atonement his wages in order to return to his family. But the employer declares to be unable to pay, as he possesses nothing to claim as his own. After the festival, however, he visits his employee and pays him his due liberally. In the subsequent conversation the employee says that on hearing the employer's refusal to pay his wages, he

¹ Cf. also Halewy, *Doroth Harishonim*, I, 314-16.

assumed that it was because "he consecrated all his property to heaven" (שהקדיש כל נכסיו לשמים). Thereupon the landowner replies, "By the temple-service [העבודה, cf. above, p. 262], it was actually so; I vowed all my belongings [*sc.* to heaven] on account of my son Hyrcanos because he did not study the Thora. But when I visited my colleagues of the Darom, they annulled my vow." Here we have a case, taken from actual life, of a father, enraged with his son, whom he disinherits by vowing his property *actually* to belong to charity and thus disinherits himself at the same time. But generally the vow of Qorban, as mentioned in the Gospels, was not an actual gift, but giving to a thing the status of such in relation to a specified person, as explained above.

Of much interest it is to find Origen (*Commentary on Matthew*, Book 11, 9, translated in the Additional Volume of the "Ante-Nicene Christian Library," 1897, p. 438) actually explaining Qorban in the Gospels to mean such a vow as we have discussed here.

But the Pharisees and the scribes promulgated in opposition to the law a tradition which is found rather obscurely in the Gospel, and which we ourselves would not have thought of, unless one of the Hebrews had given to us the following facts relating to the passage. Sometimes, he says, when money-lenders fell in with stubborn debtors who were able but not willing to pay their debts, they consecrated what was due to the account of the poor, for whom money was cast into the treasury by each of those who wished to give a portion of their goods to the poor according to their ability. They, therefore, said sometimes to their debtors in their own tongue, "That which you owe to me is Corban" [that is, a gift], "for I have consecrated it to the poor, to the account of piety towards God." Then the debtor, as no longer in debt to men but to God and to piety towards God, was shut up, as it were, even though unwilling, to payment of the debt, no longer to the money-lender, but now to God for the account of the poor, in the name of the money-lender. What then the money-lender did to the debtor that sometimes some sons did to their parents and said to them, "That wherewith thou mightest have been profited by me, father or mother, know that thou wilt receive this from Corban," from the account of the poor who are consecrated to God. Then the parents, hearing that that which should have been given to them was Corban—consecrated to God—no longer wished to take it from their sons, even though they were *in extreme need of the necessities of life*.

The fallacy of this explanation is obvious. If the parents were "in extreme need of the necessities of life," they could obtain

support from this very Qorban, the charity fund, just as other poor did!

Let us now return to the attack of the Gospels against the tradition of the Pharisees and the scribes. Admitted that the pharisaic, or the traditional, conception of vows made the case mentioned in the attack of Jesus possible, let us consider whether the scribes or the Pharisees whom we find so anxious about the honor due to parents,¹ deserved the charge leveled against them of "making void the word of God," as expressed in the Fifth Commandment. According to the Bible a vow is indissoluble. Only a married woman or an unmarried daughter in her father's house could have her vows annulled by the husband or the father respectively (Num. 30:2-17). Now it is to the great credit of the scribes that they have devised a relief from the burden of vows which people in their excitement and rashness would impose upon themselves or upon other people. It is the device of annulling vows, the so-called פתח דרשן in the talmudic phrase, allowing the person who vowed to offer reasons of regret which showed that had he taken them into consideration before his vowing, he would never have made this particular vow, that helped to ease the burden of vows often involving hardships and even misfortune for whole families (see, e.g., the instance discussed by Bêth-Shammai and Bêth-Hillel in Ned. 3:5).

Very likely the Sadducees were opposed to such a radical device overriding the obligation of vows as laid down in the Bible. The pharisaic scribes were forced to find some indications in the Bible to justify their innovation. But these could hardly be found. An early Mishnah contains a frank admission that the annulling of vows is, so to say, "floating in the air and has no support" (היתר נדרים פורחין באויר ואין להם על מה שיסמוך), Hag. 1:8;

¹ Cf. the stories of R. Tarfon and R. Ishmael, Yer. Kidd. 61b, ll. 18 ff., Babli 31b. The honor due to parents is equal to the honor due to God, Sifra to Lev. 19:3; B. Mets. 32a; Kidd. 30b. Even a pauper who begs from house to house has to support his parents, R. Sim. b. Johai in Yer. Kidd. 61b, l. 63, Pesikhta Rabbati, ed. Friedmann, 122b. It is true most of these statements were made by scholars who lived after 70 A.D., but there is no reason for assuming that in this respect a scribe before 70 A.D. held less exalted views about the respect due to one's parents. R. Tarfon, it is known, did active service in the temple as a priest (cf. Bacher, Ag. d. Tann., I², 342).

Nazir 62a; cf. Tos. Hag. 1:9).¹ Yet seeing the great necessity of this device for the welfare of the people, the scribes of the Pharisees clung to the innovation and helped to make it the accepted opinion and practice. We find *הזיתר נדרים* made use of already by Simon b. Shetaḥ on the famous occasion when three hundred Nazirites came to Jerusalem to fulfil the rites due at the expiry of their term of Nazirite (cf. Num. 6:13 ff.). As these men could not afford the expense of the offerings, Simon b. Shetaḥ induced Alexander Janneus to pay for the half of these Nazirites, while he, himself, was to pay for the other half. In fact, however, the famous scribe annulled the vows of the Nazirites of the hundred and fifty people allotted to him, exempting them in this way from bringing any sacrifice (*מצא ליהן פתור*). This procedure of Simon b. Shetaḥ was one of the causes of Alexander Janneus falling foul of the Pharisees and taking the side of the Sadducees (cf. Yer. Ber. 7:2, 11b, l. 40 ff.; Nazir 5:3, 34b, l. 2 ff.; Gen. R. 91, 3 and see especially Leszynsky, *Die Sadduäer*, pp. 48-51 and 113).²

Returning to the case mentioned in the Gospels, we may safely assume that the scribes would have given every facility to such a son for annulling his vow. The Mishnah Nedarim 9:1, which is so often misconstrued, makes this quite clear. As it is well expounded by Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels*, I, Mark, *ad loc.*, it need not be fully cited here. It establishes the fact that if the vow of the

¹ This is an old Mishnah, since already R. Eliezer and R. Joshua comment on it that *הזיתר נדרים* has a basis in the Bible (*יש להם על מה שיטמור*). In their time the hermeneutics of the Halakhic Midrash was already fully developed, so that there was no longer any difficulty in finding some biblical indication for this innovation.

² About the annulling of vows cf. further Yer. Aboda Zara I, 40a, l. 62; Erubin 64b; Tos. Pes. 2:28. Gamaliel (II) is asked to annul a vow while on his way from Akzib to Tyre. See also Tos. Sanhedrin 6:2 and the legends in Lam. R. c. 2. Philo also seems to have known this custom. He insists that vows, if once made, should be scrupulously carried out, "especially if *neither implacable anger or frenzied love, or unrestrained appetites agitate the mind, so that it does not know what is said or done, but if the oath has been taken with sober reason and deliberate purpose*" (*De spec. leg.* iii). Now such reasons to invalidate the vow would usually be given by a man who asks the scribe to annul his vow. There are other details in Philo which show his agreement with the Palestinian Halakha about vows; but these cannot be discussed here. Suffice it to say that Ritter's (*Philo u. die Halakha*) remark (p. 45, n. 2) that "about vows in general Philo has an entirely different view from the Halakha," is subject to much modification.

son affects the parents in a way detrimental to their material well-being, as in the case mentioned in the Gospels, all scholars of the first century, whose opinions on this matter are quoted in the talmudic writings, agreed that the rabbi who dealt with the vow should simply prompt the son with reasons conducive to the annulling of the vow (ומודים בדבר שבינו ואביו ואמו שפוחדין לו) (בכבוד ואמו) (בכבוד ואמו).¹ Thus, in spite of the tradition attacked in the Gospels, every facility was given to a son, who in his anger deprived his parents by means of a vow from benefiting from him, to annul his vow and carry out his filial duties. As for a really bad son, vow or no vow would make no difference.² It was this consideration that left the genuinely pious scribes of the Pharisees quite unconcerned by the attack of the Gospels against their tradition.

Jesus must have had some peculiar conditions in Galilee in mind when pointing out that vows lead to disgraceful treatment of parents. A remarkable Baraita informs us that the Galileans were much addicted to forswearing mutual benefit from each other. R. Yehuda (b. Ilai) says, "The Galileans were quarrelsome and used to interdict by vows the enjoyment of benefits from one another. Their forefathers therefore bequeathed their portion (in the common civic property) to the prince (לנשיא)," in order that all the inhabitants should be able to benefit from it (Nedarim 48a; cf. Mishnah 5:5). R. Yehuda settled in Tiberias after 135 A.D., and as he speaks here of the forefathers of his countrymen, the Galileans, this may well reflect the conditions in the time of Jesus.³

¹ This is the proper meaning of the Mishnah, according to Rashi and all commentators. A proof for the meaning of *בכבוד אביו ואמו* is the first half of the Mishnah in Ned. 9:1 (*כבוד עצמו וכבוד בניו*): *ואומר לו [והחכם] אלו היית יודע: (כבוד עצמו וכבוד בניו) שלפניו יהיו אומרים עליך כך הוא ויסתרו של פלוני מנשו נשיו ועל בנוחידו יהיו אומרים בנות גרושה הן וכר ואמר [הנדרר] אלו הייתי יודע וכר*. We see then that the reasons for the annulling of a vow were simply made ready for use for the man concerned in cases affecting the welfare of a family. Edersheim's (*Life and Times of Jesus*, II, 21) way of translating and quoting the beginning of Ned. 9:1 is simply a falsification. Nor does Schürer (II, 577) convey the full meaning of the Mishnah.

² It is only in the first half of the third century that some scholars were of the opinion that a son be compelled by the ecclesiastical authorities to maintain his parents, Yer. Pea 15d, ll. 28-35, and Pesikta R., c. 23-24 (ed. Friedmann 122b).

³ Cf. Dr. Büchler, *Synhedrion*, p. 167, n. 141, who points out that by *נשיא* the Tetrarch of Galilee, Herod Antipas, 4 B.C.-31 A.D., could be meant.

With so much vowing out of spite and vindictiveness there must have arisen cases of hardship both for parents and for whole families. How far Galilee has been influenced by the pharisaic scribes of Jerusalem in the matter of annulling of vows, in face of the very probable opposition of the Sadducees (cf. above, pp. 17-18) is difficult to ascertain. Anyhow the attack of Jesus on this kind of vowing, as being conducive to disobedience of parents, *by itself* could be quite well understood. What is incomprehensible is the pointed tendency of this saying of Jesus as an onslaught on the scribes and the Pharisees, the very people who would give all possible inducement to a son to annul his scandalous vow. But this tendency may in reality be ascribed to the authors of the Gospels rather than to Jesus himself.

THE ORIGIN OF *MAŠŠOTH* AND THE *MAŠŠOTH*-FESTIVAL

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It is a generally accepted fact that the biblical festival of *Pesaḥ*, or Passover, is the result of the amalgamation of two ancient festivals, the original *Pesaḥ* and the *Ḥag Hammaššoth*.¹

Pesaḥ was in origin essentially a shepherd festival, observed by the Israelite tribes in common with practically all Semitic peoples in the nomad stage of civilization. Upon it, apparently, the firstlings were offered as a taboo-sacrifice to the deity, conceived of primarily as the creator and bestower of life. However, after these nomad tribes had taken up permanent residence in Canaan, and had passed over into the agricultural stage of civilization, with the necessary modification of original shepherd customs and religious rites, this sacrifice of firstlings upon this annual festival developed into the sacrifice of a yearling lamb or kid for each household, now the regular social unit. This was known as the Paschal lamb or Paschal sacrifice, and became the characteristic feature of the celebration of the original nomad festival in the new agricultural environment. From its beginning *Pesaḥ* seems to have been celebrated at night, and to have been of only one night's duration.

The *Maššoth*-festival, on the other hand, was an agricultural festival pure and simple, celebrated originally by the Canaanites and borrowed from them by Israel. It was celebrated just before the beginning of the harvest season, which in Palestine comes shortly after the vernal equinox,² and, along with most of the

¹ Cf. Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*⁶, pp. 82-88.

² According to Dionysius of Alexandria (Eusebius, *Church History*, VII, 20), it was not proper to celebrate the Passover until after the vernal equinox. Muḥaddast (*Description of Syria, Including Palestine*, translated by Le Strange [Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society], p. 76) too relates that Easter was celebrated by both the Christians and the Moslems of Syria at the vernal equinox.

agricultural festivals of the western Semites, was of seven days' duration. The characteristic feature of its celebration, at least in the undoubtedly modified biblical form, was the eating of *Maṣṣoth*, or unleavened bread.

The question of the origin of this peculiar and interesting rite is one which has always been recognized as important, but which has generally been dismissed with a superficial explanation, that, however, lay so ready at hand as to mislead even the most capable and careful scholars.¹ Because of the evident connection of the *Maṣṣoth*-festival with the beginning of the harvest, and the bringing of the 'Omer, or first sheaf, of barley as a taboo-sacrifice, and the permission following thereupon to eat of the new crop, it has been generally assumed that these *Maṣṣoth* were made of the new crop, were "the natural offering, from the newly-gathered barley, to the gods that had allowed the crops to ripen, and after that were the staple article of food of the harvesters,"² and were partaken of during the festival as a kind of sacrament.

It is, to say the least, surprising that this theory should have found such general acceptance. For, since the 'Omer was brought, at the very earliest, only on the second day of the festival, and the new crop was absolutely forbidden until this sacrifice had been brought, and yet the eating of *Maṣṣoth* was enjoined from the very first day of the festival, it follows that either the *Maṣṣoth* of the first day must have been made of the old crop, and have differed in this respect from those eaten after the 'Omer had been brought, a distinction of which no biblical record is found,³ or else the

¹ As for example, Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, pp. 83 f.

² Hirsch, in *Jewish Encyclopedia*, IX, 554.

³ This is touched upon in the older Midrashim, yet too briefly and confusedly for the evidence to be at all conclusive. To harmonize Deut. 16:8, "Six days shalt thou eat unleavened bread," with Exod. 13:6, "Seven days shalt thou eat unleavened bread," Rabbi Simon (*Sifre* to Deut., par. 134; ed. Friedmann, 101b) says, "For six days one should eat (*Maṣṣoth* made) of the new grain, and for one day (*Maṣṣoth* made) of the old grain." (However the Sulzbach edition, 69a, col. 2, reads, "For six days one should eat of the new grain, but on the seventh day of the old.") This last procedure, though strange indeed and probably incorrect, agrees in part with *Mehilla*, Bo, VIII (ed. Weiss, 11b). Cf., also *Jer. Pesahim*, V, 33a. These references I owe to the kindness of my colleague, Professor J. Z. Lauterbach.

Maššoth of the entire festival must have been made, wholly or in part, of the old crop.

Furthermore, if the *Maššoth* were made of the new crop at the very beginning of the harvest, they could have been made of barley alone. And if so, then this fact would certainly have been properly recorded. Not only does no such provision occur, but the Bible seems by its very silence and the general nature of its references to imply that *Maššoth* might be made from almost any kind of grain. And the Mishnah¹ distinctly provides that *Maššoth* may be made of wheat, barley, spelt, oats, or rye, while according to the Gemara² rice and a species of millet are alone prohibited. Clearly the *Maššoth* could not have been made of the new crop, but must have been made of the old crop, at least in part. Consequently, the customary explanation of their origin, cited above, is altogether groundless.³

Before we offer a solution of this problem we must first determine the exact time, in relation to the harvest, when this festival was originally celebrated. Whereas P (Exod. 12:3, 6, 15-20; Lev. 23:5-8; Num. 28:16-25) dates the festival from the 15th through the 21st of the first month, the older codes (Exod. 23:15; 34:18; Deut. 16:1-8) merely fix the festival for the month⁴ of Abib, the month of ripening grain. After the close of its Passover legislation, Deuteronomy proceeds to legislate for the next harvest festival, of first-fruits or weeks (Deut. 16:9-12). It provides that this festival, of only a single day's duration, shall come exactly seven weeks after the day when the sickle is first put to the standing grain. There is no direct statement that the *Maššoth*-festival was connected with this last act. Yet from the context as much might be inferred.

However, the provision in H (Lev. 23:9-16) that the 'Omer shall be offered upon the day after the Sabbath of the *Maššoth*-festival,

¹ *Pesahim*, II, 5.

² *B. Pesahim*, 35a. Cf. Eisenstein in *Jewish Encyclopedia*, VIII, 393.

³ Cf. also, Marti, *Geschichte der israelitischen Religion*⁴, pp. 124 f.

⁴ Or, possibly, the new-moon day (a communication from Dr. K. Kohler). I believe that this suggestion has also been made by Meinhold.

and that from this day they shall count fifty days until the Feast of Weeks makes it clear that this same connection between the two festivals is implied in Deut. chap. 16, and that the *Maṣṣoth*-festival, according to D as well as H, was celebrated at the very beginning of the harvest season.

But we must still determine the exact meaning of the much-discussed expression used by H, *ממחרת השבת*. Rabbinic tradition has interpreted this as the second day of the *Maṣṣoth*- or Passover-festival, the first day being regarded as the Sabbath because of the importance of the Paschal rites observed thereon, or, more correctly, upon the evening before.¹

However, while this did become the accepted rabbinical interpretation of this expression, it is significant that it was by no

¹ It is, however, significant that Num. 33:3 states explicitly that by *ממחרת* *הפסח* not the 16th but the 15th of the month was meant. The same is undoubtedly the implication of Josh. 5:11 f. (Granting that the words *ממחרת הפסח* and *ממחרת*, missing in LXX, are a late insertion [cf. Holzinger, *Joshua*, pp. 12 f.], then this is the implication of the glossator). Not unlikely the words *ממחרת הפסח* in Num. 33:3 are a gloss, and the original text merely cited the fact that the Exodus took place on the 15th of the first month. At any rate careful consideration shows that *ממחרת הפסח* of Num. 33:3 cannot be identical with *ממחרת השבת* of Lev. 23:11; for this would imply that the 14th of the first month, the day preceding the eve upon which the festival really began, consequently the day upon which all preparations for the festal celebration were to be made, was the Sabbath, on the face an utter impossibility. At the same time, it seems that the late author or glossator of Josh. 5:11 f. did mistakenly regard *ממחרת הפסח* of Num. 33:3 as identical with *ממחרת השבת* of Lev. 23:11, and therefore told that on the day after the Passover (i.e., the day after the Sabbath), in other words, on the day of bringing the *Omer*, the sacrifice of which removed the taboo upon the new crop, the people actually began to eat of the new crop (LXX, *μα*, for the biblical *קלרי*). Cf. also, Samaritan Chronicle, XVII [ed. Crane, 50]), and therefore the manna ceased upon this selfsame day.

Furthermore, the traditional application of the term *שבת* to the first day of the *Maṣṣoth*-festival, the 15th of the month, must have been unknown to, and therefore later than, the author of Num. 33:3. For a writer of the priestly school would hardly have ventured to imply that Israel began its journey upon the Sabbath.

My attention has very kindly been called by Professor J. M. P. Smith to Benzinger, *Archäologie*², pp. 389, 399, and to Jastrow, 'On *ממחרת השבת* ("The Day after the Sabbath")' *AJSL*, XXX, 94-110, which I had overlooked in the preparation of this paper. Jastrow, in particular, advances the hypothesis that by *שבת* the full-moon day, the 15th of the month, is meant. Accordingly *ממחרת השבת* would refer to the 16th of the month. However, I find myself altogether unconvinced by the arguments advanced, and therefore see no reason to alter, or even modify, my own arguments and conclusions.

means the universal interpretation. The Book of Jubilees (1:1; 6:17-22; 15:1; 44:3 f.), by fixing the Feast of Weeks upon the 15th of Sivan, clearly began to reckon the fifty days from the 22d of Nisan,¹ the day after the close of the *Maššoth*-festival. The Book of Jubilees probably reflects Hasidean practice.² It is noteworthy that the Samaritans,³ Boethusians, and Karaites⁴ likewise observed the same system of reckoning, and accordingly must also have interpreted *ממחרת השבת* as the day after the close of the entire *Maššoth*-festival. Furthermore, the practice of these sects shows that they interpreted the word *השבת* literally as the Saturday of the week of the *Maššoth*-festival. With them the festival always began on Sunday, and consequently always concluded on Saturday.⁵

¹ It is well known that the calendar system of the Book of Jubilees prescribes a year of 364 days, divided into 13 months of 28 days each. Accordingly the 50th day from the 22d of Nisan would fall upon the 15th of Sivan.

² Cf. Kohler, in *Jewish Encyclopedia*, VII, 301 ff.

³ Petermann, *Reisen im Orient*, I, 289.

⁴ Cf. Revel, in *Jewish Quarterly Review* (New Series), III (1913), 350 f.

⁵ This, too, is the interpretation of the expression adopted by a number of modern scholars. Cf. Holzinger, Exodus, p. 42; Bertholet, Leviticus, p. 80; Baentsch, Leviticus, pp. 414 f.; also Hitzig, "Ostern u. Pfingsten," *Schreiben an S. Ideler*; and A. Epstein, *Eldad Haddani*, pp. 157 ff.

Not improbably from the very oldest times the *Maššoth*-festival began on Sunday and closed on Saturday. This would make the cutting of the *Omer* and the beginning of the harvest fall on Sunday also. This is very probable for economic reasons. Exod. 34:21 (even granting with Bertholet [Deuteronomy, p. 80] that all references here to agricultural practices are late insertions) expressly enjoins the observance of the Sabbath as a day of rest and abstention from work, even during the important period of the harvest. Then the crops must be gathered quickly lest they perish for one cause or another. The loss of a single day is vital. Nevertheless the observance of the Sabbath is particularly enjoined for the harvest period. In view of this the religious calendar would not improbably be so constructed or modified as to enable the people to begin harvesting on a Sunday in order to lose as few days as possible during the critical harvest season, because of the need of Sabbath observance. Further corroboration of this hypothesis may be seen in the celebration of Palm Sunday and Easter Sunday in the ancient Christian church. However, the discussion of the peculiar and interesting celebration of these two days, particularly in the Eastern church, would lead too far afield for this paper, and must be deferred for presentation elsewhere.

Further corroboration of this conclusion may be seen in the fact that the Sabbath preceding the Passover is known in the synagogue as the "Great Sabbath," and special services are held upon it (*Shulhan 'Aruḥ*, *Ṭoraḥ Ḥayyim*, 430 and *Jewish Encyclopedia*, XI, 215b). The traditional grounds for the peculiar importance or sanctity of this

The Falashas too begin to count the 'Omer from the 22d of Nisan,¹ i.e., from the day after the close of the *Maṣṣoth*-festival, regardless of whether this be on Sunday or not, and accordingly celebrate the Feast of Weeks on the 12th of Sivan.² The Peshittā too renders מַמְדִּירַת הַשֶּׁבֶת by מַמְדִּירַת הַשֶּׁבֶת. It is clear, therefore, that the rabbinic interpretation of מַמְדִּירַת הַשֶּׁבֶת as the second day of the festival, with the accompanying result that the *Maṣṣoth* would be eaten during the continuation of the festival through the first six days of the harvest season, was by no means universal or necessarily correct.

Careful consideration of the biblical evidence confirms the conclusion that מַמְדִּירַת הַשֶּׁבֶת can mean only the day after the close of the Passover festival. In the first place it must be noted that vss. 4-8, in which the provisions for the celebration of the *Maṣṣoth*-festival occur, are from P and not from H. The prescriptions of H for the celebration of the *Maṣṣoth*-festival, and the relation thereto of the ceremony of bringing the 'Omer, can no longer be definitely determined. Yet so far as can be gathered from the Bible, there is not the slightest reason for believing that הַשֶּׁבֶת cannot designate the concluding day of the festival quite as well as the first day. In fact, since the festival lasted for seven days, it would most likely be thought to have but one Sabbath, and that the last day of the seven, since the feeling must have been strong that the Sabbath came but once, and as the last day of, every seven days. This hypothesis is strengthened by the unquestionable fact

particular Sabbath are confused, and probably prove no more than that from the very oldest times the day was regarded as peculiarly holy. And long after the origin of its peculiar sanctity was forgotten, these various traditions sprang up to account therefor. Not impossibly the peculiar sanctity of this day is a reminiscence of the earliest form of the celebration, when the festival actually began on Sunday, and the preceding day was, in a certain sense, likewise important and sacred as the day of preparation for the festival. A reminiscence of this seems to lie in the tradition (cf. *Tosefot to B. Shabbas*, 87b), that at the time of Exodus the 10th day of the 1st month fell upon Saturday; nevertheless, obeying God's command (Exod. 12:3), the Israelites selected the lambs for the first Paschal sacrifice on that Sabbath day.

¹ Cf. A. Epstein, "Essay on the Falashas," in his *Eldad Haddani*, pp. 153 ff.

² The Falashas, of course, employ the regular Jewish calendar.

that H uses the term שבת frequently in the sense of a group of seven, whether days or years.¹

Exod. 13:6, which gives the J prescriptions for the celebration of the *Maššoth*-festival,² without any direct reference to the Pass-over with its sacrifice of the Paschal lamb, expressly states that *Maššoth* shall be eaten during the seven days of the festival, and only upon the last day does the *hag*, the sacred dance, the culminating religious rite of the festival, occur. A more direct and explicit statement, that in the original *Maššoth*-festival the seventh rather than the first day was the most important day, could not be desired.

In view of this unmistakable evidence it is certain that both D and H, as their contexts imply, regarded, with J, the seventh and last day of the festival as the one of chief importance, the one upon which the ceremonial climax was reached. This therefore must be the day designated by H as the Sabbath, upon the day after which the *Omer* was to be sacrificed and the actual harvest and the enjoyment of the new crop were to begin.

It is certain that the ritual importance of the last day of the week, emphasized particularly in P, was the result of the combination of the two festivals, *Pesaḥ* and *Maššoth*. The peculiar nature of the Paschal sacrifice with its many attendant details, all culminating in certain very definite and picturesque ceremonies, performed in a single night, would tend to magnify the importance

¹ Lev. 23:16; 25:8; cf. also, Isa. 66:23 and Duhm on this passage. Note also the common Palestinian-Aramaic and Syriac designation for the week, שבת, מַסְבָּת, and also the New Testament σαββατον (Matt. 28:1; Mark 16:2, 7; Luke 18:12; I Cor. 16:2). This in itself would make it probable that the term השבת as used by H means the last day of the festival rather than the first day.

In this connection attention may be called to the interesting fact that whereas, so far as can be determined, in all other sources שבת is invariably masculine, in H it is regularly feminine. (Exod. 31:13-16; Lev. 23:3, 15, 16; 25:6, 8. In Lev. 16:31, חַטָּאת should probably be emended to חַטָּאת; cf. Exod. 35:2; Lev. 23:32; 25:4. Likewise in Jer. 17:24, the Massorites changed the *Ketib* בַּרְּהָ to בְּרָהָ. Probably they were correct in this, since otherwise in Jer. שבת seems to be invariably masculine.) Not impossibly this feminization of שבת may be due to the influence of the Babylonian *šabattu* (feminine), with which the H writers, probably living in Babylon, were, not improbably, acquainted.

² Though recast somewhat by later Deuteronomic writers.

of this rite over the rather long-drawn-out rites of the *Maṣṣoth*-festival, particularly colorless when divested of their original, non-Yahwistic elements. Accordingly the natural tendency would be to accentuate the importance of the ceremonial on the first night of the combined festival, and to minimize, unconsciously perhaps, the importance of the last day. This tendency would be heightened as the Passover came to be increasingly regarded as commemorating the Exodus from Egypt, fixed by tradition upon the first day of the festival. Nevertheless Lev. 23:7-8 still represents both first and last days as days of solemn assembly and abstention from work; both are equally holy.¹

From all this evidence we may posit with certainty that previous to its amalgamation with the Passover, and the consequent transference of the ritual culmination of the celebration from the seventh to the first day, the *Maṣṣoth*-festival was celebrated for seven days, and reached its ritual climax upon the last day. On this day the *hag*, or ritual dance, was celebrated, and on the next day the people went out to their fields, solemnly cut the first sheaf of barley and brought it with proper ceremonial to their local shrines as the taboo-sacrifice for the new crop. Thereafter they were free

¹ It is impossible to determine just when this amalgamation of these two originally independent festivals took place. In all likelihood it evolved gradually, owing chiefly to the fact that the two festivals were celebrated at about the same time of the year, and that the Passover, originally a shepherd festival, naturally lost its primary significance when celebrated by an agricultural people. This amalgamation would naturally be furthered by the attempt to attach a historical significance to the combined festival by associating it with the Exodus. Undoubtedly this historicization of this combined festival began some time before D, for already the JE account of the festival associates it with the Exodus (Exod. 13:3-16. But notice that this account shows decided evidence of Deuteronomistic reworking; cf. Holzinger and Baentsch to the passage.) But it may be safely inferred that the amalgamation was still by no means complete at the time of the composition of D, for the Passover legislation in Deut. 16:1-8 is by no means a unit, and exhibits unmistakable evidence of later reworking (cf. Steuernagel and Bertholet on the passage). Likewise H (or P, Lev. 23:5 f.) distinguishes carefully between the two festivals. This distinction is still maintained in the Samaritan Passover ritual (Petermann, *Reisen im Orient*, I, 288). It is quite certain that the final amalgamation of the two festivals, and the complete association of this new resultant festival with the Exodus, with its emphasis laid upon the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb and the attendant rites upon the first night of the festival, is the work of the post-Deuteronomic period, and finds its first complete and harmonious expression in P.

to partake at will of the new barley, without fear of violating the property rights of the deity and incurring his consequent displeasure and wrath.

This sacred dance upon the last day of the *Maṣṣoth*-festival may well remind us of the festival dance described in Exod. 32:5 ff., of the dances of the maidens of Shiloh in the vineyards as a part of the celebration of their annual *hag* (Judg. 21:19 ff.) and of the dances of the maidens of Jerusalem in the vineyards on the 15th of Ab and the 10th of Tishri.¹ It is quite significant that, according to Josephus,² these dances were celebrated thrice annually. The implication is that they constituted integral parts of the celebration of the three great, annual harvest festivals, consequently designated by the term *hag*. This entire matter I have treated in greater detail elsewhere.³ There I have shown that these dances were celebrated in the earliest Canaanite ritual in honor of the great Canaanite triad or trinity, the father-god Ba'al, the mother-goddess Asherah, or Astarte, and the divine child, Tammuz, or Adonis. The more important festivals were celebrated for seven days. They began with a period of fasting, mourning, and bodily affliction, as if for someone dead, naturally the dead god of vegetation, Tammuz. But day by day they became more and more joyous in the thought that the dead deity had been, or soon would be, restored to life in the crop of the new year. And this increasing joyousness culminated in the sacred dances upon the seventh day, participated in chiefly by the maidens, and attended by scenes of mad merry-making and wild, unbridled license, and sacred prostitution. Into a detailed consideration of these ceremonies we cannot enter here.⁴

¹ Mishnah, *Ta'amith*, IV, 8.

² *Ant.* V. ii. 12.

³ *JAOS*, XXXVI (1916), 321-33, and an article soon to appear in *JQR* (New Series).

⁴ It is interesting to note that Maundrell (ed. Wright, in Bohn's *Antiquarian Library* [1848], pp. 462-74), in describing the celebration of Easter at Jerusalem, as witnessed by him April 3-10, 1697, says that the entire celebration lasted seven days. It began with Easter Sunday, or rather with the ceremony of the descent of the Holy Fire in the Church of the Sepulcher on the late afternoon of the preceding day, and continued until the following Saturday. Of this last day Maundrell writes: "We

Now, if the *Maṣṣoth*-festival was originally an Astarte-Tammuz festival, as has been stated, and of this the proof is ample, it would be surprising did it too not begin, as did all other such festivals, with a period of fasting and mourning for the dead and soon-to-be-revived god. Of actual mourning rites only meager traces remain. But there is abundant evidence of the ceremony of fasting as preparatory, or introductory, to the celebration of the *Maṣṣoth*-festival. It is still customary among orthodox Jews for first-born sons, and some say even first-born daughters, to fast in preparation for the festival;² and in more ancient times it seems to have been the regular practice that all people fast on the day before the beginning of the festival, in order that they might better enjoy the

went to take our leaves of the holy sepulcher, this being the last time it was to be opened this festival.

"Upon this finishing day, and the night following, the Turks allow free admittance for all people, without demanding any fee for entrance as at other times, calling it a day of charity. By this promiscuous licence they let in, not only the poor, but, as I was told, the lewd and vicious also, who come thither to get convenient opportunity for prostitution, profaning the holy places in such manner (as it is said) that they were not worse defiled even when the heathens here celebrated their aphrodisia." We cannot help correlating the promiscuous license upon this concluding day with the merry-making and license of the last day of the ancient Canaanite agricultural festivals, and particularly the *Maṣṣoth*-festival, out of which, as is generally admitted, Easter developed.

In this connection too it should be noted that rabbinical tradition has dated the crossing of the Red Sea upon the 7th and last day of the Passover, and in this way accounted for the, to the rabbis, otherwise seemingly inexplicable sanctity of this day. This tradition implies that the song and dances of Miriam and her maidens (Exod. chap. 15) were celebrated on this concluding day of the festival. It is probably a reminiscence of the old Canaanite and early Israelite practice of the dances and songs of the maidens upon the concluding day of the great harvest festivals. Possibly too, the language of the Midrash may even be interpreted as somewhat reminiscent of the fact that this last day of the festival was the Sabbath (*Shemot Rabba*, Par. XIX, near end). Commenting upon Exod. 13:7, the Midrash says, "No leaven shall be seen with thee for seven days; corresponding to the original seven days intervening between the redemption and the dividing of the Red Sea are the seven days of creation; and just as the Sabbath is fixed once in every seven days, so are these seven days (of the Passover) fixed for each year."

² *Shulḥan 'Aruḥ*, *Ṿorah Ḥayyim*, 470. The importance of this practice of the first-born fasting may be inferred from the custom cited by Moses Isserles (*ibid.*, notes), that while the first-born child is still a minor, and therefore not obligated to fast, the father shall fast for him; but if the father himself be a first-born, and therefore bound to fast for himself, the mother shall fast for the child.

opening feast and thereby perform the duty of eating the *Maṣṣoth* with greater gusto and zeal.¹ The Falashas too observe a general fast on the part of all the people from the evening of the 13th to the evening of the 14th of Nisan.²

The traditional reason for this fasting is that it commemorates the deliverance of the Israelite first-born from the fate that overtook the Egyptian first-born. But the Falasha practice and also the former practice of pious Jews, that not only first-born, but all people, fast on the day preceding the Passover, implies that at one time this practice of a general fast may well have been the rule and not the exception. Just this is what we would expect as part of the celebration of an ancient Astarte-Tammuz festival.

Furthermore, the custom, still observed by orthodox Jews, of carefully searching out and destroying all leaven, or so providing for its disposal that there might be no possibility of its enjoyment during the festival, is of prime importance.³ According to R. Jehudah this leaven could be destroyed only by burning.⁴ Its destruction was imperative. The Bible insists that there shall be absolutely no leaven, neither *ḥameṣ* nor *S'or* within the entire country during the seven days of the festival (Exod. 12:15; 13:7; Deut. 16:4).

We can interpret this custom, and that of fasting as preparatory to the main celebration of the festival, only in the light of similar customs, observed under practically parallel conditions, by primitive agricultural peoples. The entire *Maṣṣoth*-festival, we have shown, originally preceded the commencement of the harvest. The new crop could not be eaten until after its regular taboo-sacrifice of the 'Omer, or first sheaf, had been properly offered on the day after the close of the *Maṣṣoth*-festival. The eating of the new crop is among many primitive agricultural peoples a ceremony of deep religious significance, for which careful preparation must

¹ Cf. the discussion of the reason for R. Shesheth fasting on this day (*B. Pesahim*, 108a; also, *Jer. Pesahim*, X, 37b, and the statement of *Massket Soferim*, XXI, 3, "The pious fast for the sake of the *Maṣṣoth*"). These references also, I owe to the kindness of Professor Lauterbach.

² Epstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 153.

³ *Shulḥan 'Aruḥ*, 'Orah Ḥayyim, 431-39.

⁴ *Mishnah, Pesahim*, II, 1.

be made, since the entire life of the people is bound up with the new crop. Before the first mouthful of the new crop may be taken, the old crop must be entirely destroyed, put out of the way completely. Under no condition may it be mixed with the new crop, even in the bodies of the eaters. They must fast for a definite period, and very often use strong purgatives and emetics in order that absolutely not one grain of the old crop may remain in their bodies at the time when the new crop is first eaten. Otherwise the two crops would be commingled, and the new crop, the food supply for the coming year, would be contaminated and rendered unfit for use.

The annual green-corn festival, observed by the Creek Indians, and in almost identical form by the neighboring and kindred Yuchi, Seminole, and Natchez Indians, is typical. Frazer describes this festival as follows:¹

Amongst the Creek Indians of North America, the *busk*, or festival of first-fruits, was the chief ceremony of the year. It was held in July or August, when the corn was ripe, and marked the end of the old year and the beginning of the new one. Before it took place, none of the Indians would eat or even handle any part of the new harvest. Sometimes each town had its own busk; sometimes several towns united to hold one in common. Before celebrating the busk, the people provided themselves with new clothes and new household utensils and furniture; they collected their old clothes and rubbish, together with all the remaining grain and other old provisions, cast them together in one common heap, and consumed them with fire. As a preparation for the ceremony, all the fires in the village were extinguished, and the ashes swept clean away. In particular, the hearth or altar of the temple was dug up and the ashes carried out. Then the chief priest put some roots of the button-snake plant, with some green tobacco leaves and a little of the new fruits, at the bottom of the fireplace, which he afterwards commanded to be covered up with white clay, and wetted over with clean water. A thick arbour of green branches of young trees was then made over the altar. Meanwhile the women at home were cleaning out their houses, renewing the old hearths, and scouring all the cooking vessels that they might be ready to receive the new fire and the new fruits. The public or sacred square was carefully swept of even the smallest crumbs of previous feasts, "for fear of polluting the first-fruit offerings." Also every vessel that had contained, or had been used about, any food during the expiring year was removed from the temple before sunset. Then all the men who were not known to have violated the law of the first-fruit offering and that

¹ Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, "Spirits of the Corn and the Wild," II, 72-75.

of marriage during the year were summoned by a crier to enter the holy square and observe a solemn fast. But the women (except six old ones), the children, and all who had not attained the rank of warriors were forbidden to enter the square. Sentinels were also posted at the corners of the square to keep out all persons deemed impure, and all animals. A strict fast was then observed for two nights and a day, the devotees drinking a bitter decoction of button-snake root "in order to vomit and purge their sinful bodies." That the people outside the square might also be purified, one of the old men laid down a quantity of green tobacco at a corner of the square; this was carried off by an old woman and distributed to the people without, who chewed and swallowed it "in order to afflict their souls." During this general fast, the women, the children, and men of weak constitution were allowed to eat after midday, but not before that time. On the morning when the fast ended, the women brought a quantity of the old year's food to the outside of the sacred square. These provisions were then fetched in and set before the famished multitude, but all traces of them had to be removed before noon. When the sun was declining from the meridian, all the people were commanded by the voice of a crier to stay within doors, to do no bad act, and to be sure to extinguish and throw away every spark of the old fire. Universal silence now reigned. Then the high priest made the new fire by the friction of two pieces of wood, and placed it on the altar under the green arbour. This new fire was believed to atone for all past crimes except murder. Next a basket of new fruits was brought; the high priest took out a little of each sort of fruit, rubbed it with bear's oil, and offered it, together with some flesh, "to the bountiful holy spirit of fire, as a first-fruit offering, and an annual oblation for sin." He also consecrated the sacred emetics (the button-snake root and the cassina, or black-drink) by pouring a little of them into the fire. The persons who had remained outside now approached, without entering, the sacred square; and the chief priest thereupon made a speech, exhorting the people to observe their old rites and customs, announcing that the new divine fire had purged away the sins of the past year, and earnestly warning the women that, if any of them had not extinguished the old fire, or had contracted any impurity, they must forthwith depart, "lest the divine fire should spoil both them and the people." Some of the new fire was then set down outside the holy square; the women carried it home joyfully, and laid it on their unpolluted hearths. When several towns had united to celebrate the festival, the new fire might thus be carried for several miles. The new fruits were then dressed on the new fires and eaten with bear's oil, which was deemed indispensable. At one point of the festival the men rubbed the new corn between their hands, then on their faces and breasts. During the festival which followed, the warriors, dressed in their wild martial array, their heads covered with white down, and carrying white feathers in their hands, danced around the sacred arbour, under which burned the new fire. The ceremonies lasted eight days, during which the strictest continence was practiced. Towards the conclusion of the festival

the warriors fought a mock battle; then the men and women, together, in three circles, danced round the sacred fire. Lastly, all the people smeared themselves with white clay and bathed in running water. They came out of the water believing that no evil could now befall them for what they had done amiss in the past. So they departed in joy and peace.

Similar festivals, with parallel ceremonies, all practiced for the same purpose of preventing the mixing of various kinds of food, are celebrated among the most widely scattered peoples.¹

Among practically all primitive agricultural peoples just enough grain is cultivated for food for one year. Occasionally a small amount of the old crop may remain when the new crop is ready to be harvested, but this is the exception and not the rule among peoples that live altogether upon the agricultural plane of civilization and do not carry on commerce with the produce of their fields. Famine, due to a crop for one reason or another insufficient for the needs of the year, is not uncommon among such strictly agricultural peoples. These must have been the normal conditions in ancient Israel and among the still earlier Canaanites. Certainly Lev. 25:20-22² and 26:10 imply that it was an unusual thing for the annual crop to prove sufficient for more than one year.

It is therefore very probable that among the ancient Canaanites and the early agricultural Israelites, the custom existed of destroying the usually meager remains of the old crop before the new crop could be used or even harvested. And if this hypothesis be correct, we must see in the ceremonies of the destruction of all leaven, of the fasting before the *Maṣṣoth*-festival, and of the eating of the *Maṣṣoth* themselves, the religious, sacramental rites by which the last remains of the old crop were destroyed as the necessary preparation for the cutting and eating of the new crop. All of the old crop was thus burned except just enough to prepare the *Maṣṣoth* for the festival. These were actually the very last of the old crop, and with their final consumption the old crop would be entirely destroyed and the new crop could be harvested and eaten with impunity, after the offering of its regular taboo-sacrifice, the first

¹ Frazer, *op. cit.*, 83 ff.

² This is clearly a late insertion into the text and refers rather to the Sabbatical than to the Jubilee year; cf. Bertholet and Baentsch on the passage.

sheaf. These facts, that the entire *Maššoth*-festival, as we have shown, must have preceded the beginning of the harvest, and that the *Maššoth* must have been made entirely of the old crop, admit no other logical and consistent explanation.¹

That this is no forced nor improbable hypothesis is proved by the fact that two rites of strikingly similar nature are still observed in connection with, or as preparatory to, the celebration of Easter in the present-day Christian church of Palestine. Bliss tells that "on this same Thursday (Maundy Thursday) the Maronite patriarch at his seat, with two or three bishops, consecrates the oil of baptism, oil for extreme unction, and the holy chrism (the *meirān*), all three kinds of oil to be distributed by the bishops among the Maronite churches for use during the coming year. Oil remaining from the year before is burned."² And it is a well-known and oft-described practice that preparatory to the descent of the sacred fire in the Church of the Sepulcher at Jerusalem on the Saturday afternoon preceding Easter Sunday, all fires are extinguished in the Christian homes, monasteries, and churches of Palestine. Runners bearing the sacred brands or tapers kindled from the new holy fire hasten from the Church of the Sepulcher, carrying the precious burden to all parts of the country, and with these the new fires are once more kindled.³ This rite too reminds us strongly of the ritual of the Creek green-corn festival.

But this is by no means all. For agricultural festivals, even among the most primitive peoples, are seldom, if ever, celebrated

¹ Further proof of this may perhaps be seen in the practice recorded in the *Shulḥan 'Aruḥ* (*Orat Ḥayyim*, 435), based upon a decision of Rab (*B. Pesahim*, 6b), that if a man neglected to search for and burn the leaven in his house either before or during the Passover, he must still do so after the festival had passed, for the enjoyment of such food was absolutely forbidden. The celebration of the Passover had made all such food strictly taboo. This too may be a survival of the oldest practice that all grain remaining from the old crop had to be burned, and therefore became completely invalidated, at the beginning of the *Maššoth*-festival and preparatory to eating the new crop.

² *The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine*, p. 162.

³ Cf. Wilson, *Peasant Life in the Holy Land*, pp. 45 f.; Stanley, *Sinai and Palestine*, pp. 460-64; Maundrell (ed. Wright), *A Journey from Aleppo to Jerusalem*, pp. 462-64; Ridgeway, *The Lord's Land*, p. 262; Field, *Among the Holy Hills*, p. 50; and other writers.

merely as important and memorable occasions in the life of the people. They have always a religious significance, are always celebrated in some relation to the supernatural powers that preside over the blessings of agriculture. As stated above, these primitive Canaanite agricultural festivals were celebrated in honor of the great triad or trinity, the father-, mother-, and son-gods, Ba'al, Astarte, and Tammuz. These gods were the result of the deification of the great agricultural forces and phenomena, the heaven or the sun, with its fructifying rain or sunlight, the earth, conceived as the great mother, and the annual crop, the offspring of the union and fertilization of mother-earth by father-heaven. And in the annual cycle of sowing, sprouting, growth, ripening, and harvesting of the grain we have the key to the right understanding of the nature of Tammuz, his myths, and religious rites. His festivals were naturally celebrated at different times of the year, either at the time of his death and burial in the earth, or at the time of his resurrection or rebirth, and were always associated with rites commemorative of the rôle played by the parent deities in the great, annual, divine mystery. In fact, there seem to have been no Tammuz festivals pure and simple. They were rather all festivals in honor of the inseparable trinity of gods, and their rites were not only designed to commemorate the various activities of each of the three gods, but were also of a homeopathic magical nature, intended to compel the great deities to function in the proper manner, and so bring forth the annual and indispensable crop.

But if Tammuz was the annual crop, and this is absolutely certain, then each successive annual crop meant the rebirth of Tammuz, or in another aspect certainly clearly perceived by the people, a new, and each year an ever-new, Tammuz, as the successor of the old Tammuz, the first-born and only-begotten son of mother-earth herself, therefore, the eternally virgin goddess, whose virginity is renewed annually after the birth of her son. And since Tammuz was the crop, and therefore identical with the grain and everything made therefrom, the burning of the remains of the old crop and the eating of the *Maššoth*, as a religious rite, as a sacrament, clearly were nothing but the expression and prac-

tical realization of the principle that the old Tammuz must be completely put out of the way before the new Tammuz, the new crop, can be actually born or reborn. And the eating of the *Maššoth* as a sacrament would be nothing more than the eating of the old Tammuz. That this conception of the eating of the god is neither strange nor forced may be inferred from the story of the celebration of the Passover in the three Synoptic Gospels (Matt. 26:26 f.; Mark 14:22 f.; Luke 22:19 f.), where Jesus gives to his disciples the *Maššoth* with the words, "This is my body," and in the resultant ceremony of the eucharist in the Catholic church.¹ Similar practices of the sacramental eating of the god, parallel to this of the eating of Tammuz in the form of the *Maššoth*, are found among the most widely scattered, primitive, agricultural peoples.²

It is noteworthy in this connection that among the heathen Harranians at the annual festival of the weeping women, celebrated in the month of Tammuz, when the women bewailed the death of Ta-uz, because, as they believed, Ta-uz had been cruelly killed by his master, his bones ground in a mill and then scattered to the four winds, they would eat nothing that had been ground in a mill.³ Likewise among the people of Asia Minor, during the annual festival of mourning for the dead Attis, a deity parallel in

¹ It is significant that the eucharist is partaken of only after fasting. In this connection I may state that Dr. Paul Carus, of Chicago, has suggested to me that the term "mass" for the important rite of the Catholic church that primarily commemorates and is modeled after the Last Supper, may, in view of the significant rôle of the *maššoth* in the traditional accounts of the Last Supper, be derived from the Hebrew *maššah*. According to Fortescue (*Catholic Encyclopedia*, IX, 791) this ceremony was originally designated as *εὐχαριστία*. The term "mass" (*missa*) is not authenticated until St. Ambrose (d. 397). He, however, uses it in such manner as to indicate that it was then an established and commonly accepted term. A doubtful reference occurs in a letter of Pope Pius I (ca. 142-ca. 157). The late mediaeval form *missio* designates the mass as the ceremony of dismissal of the people. But this explanation of the origin of the term is generally regarded as doubtful and unsatisfactory. In view of all this the suggestion of Dr. Carus seems to me quite probable.

² Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, "Spirits of the Corn and the Wild," II, 48-108.

³ Chwolson, *Die Ssabier*, quoting Fihrist, IX, No. 5, p. 4. *Ta-uz* is of course merely a dialectic variation of Tammuz, and approximates very closely the original Babylonian or Sumerian *Du-u-si*.

every way to Tammuz, the worshipers abstained from bread.¹ Similarly too, as Jaussen records, among the fellahin of Moab still today, before the beginning of the harvest every owner of a field makes a repast for Ḥallil, clearly a Tammuz-survival, at which all the reapers are present. Then he says, "The sickle is opened."² Thereafter the harvest begins. This is undoubtedly a survival of the old custom of sacramental meals preparatory to the commencement of the harvest.

The fasting preparatory, or introductory, to the *Maṣṣoth*-festival would accordingly not only be a ceremony of mourning for the dead Tammuz, but also be designed to prevent the commingling of profane and holy food in the body of the eater, and the consequent contact of the new with the old Tammuz. Robertson-Smith shows conclusively³ that fasting is very often the ritual preparation for a sacramental meal, and evidences his claim by a mass of proof. Just this, as we have seen, was the purpose of the fasting incidental to, and preparatory for, the Creek green-corn festival.

And the *Maṣṣoth* themselves would be the survival of the simplest, most primitive, and speediest form of preparing grain for food, the form in which the nomad, particularly when on a journey, still eats his bread.⁴ This primitive mode of preparing the remains of the old crop for sacramental eating during the seven days of the festival would be peculiarly suited to the nature and exigencies of the occasion. It was merely another instance of the continuation of ancient and outgrown practices in religious cere-

¹ Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, "Adonis, Attis and Osiris", 226, quoting Arnobius *Adversus nationes* v. 16; Sallustius Philosophus *De diis et mundo* iv; *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*, ed. F. G. A. Muhlbach, III, 33.

² *Les coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, p. 252. Cf. Deut. 16:9, בקמה, מזהחל חרמש, and the corresponding designation of the 15th of Ab, חמנל הירם תבר, (B. *Ta'anith*, 31a), the day that marked the close of the harvest season.

³ *Religion of the Semites*, p. 434.

⁴ Cf. Chwolsohn, *op. cit.*, II, 218 (note 238) and the designation there of *Maṣṣoth* as "bread after the manner of shepherds." Note also the statement of Musil (*Arabia Petraea*, IV, 148), that camel beduins regard bread as a dainty and eat it only about once a month. Some tribes eat leavened bread only during the rainy season and unleavened bread (*ḥafīr*) during the dry season.

monial, long after more modern and practical customs had superseded them in everyday life.¹

Such, we believe, was the origin of the *Maṣṣoth* and of the *Maṣṣoth*-festival.

¹ Cf. Chwolson, *op. cit.*, II, 734 (note 126); Toy, *Introduction to the History of Religions*, p. 113, note 1. Similar to this would be the persistent use of flint and stone knives at circumcision (Exod. 4: 25; Josh. 5: 2), the prohibition of using stones hewn with iron tools in building an altar (Exod. 20: 25), the peculiar garb worn during the Passover (Exod. 12: 11), and the *ihram*, or sacred garment, worn during the sojourn within the *haram* during the Meccan pilgrimage. These last are undoubtedly survivals of the most ancient and simple Semitic dress. Cf. Burton, *Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah*, (Memorial ed.) II, 138 f., 205, 284.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

A NEW FRENCH BIBLE¹

The Bible Society of Paris has just issued the first instalment of a new translation of the Bible which is intended to commemorate the centenary of the Society. The purpose of the edition is to present to the public in general a thoroughly scientific translation in good idiomatic French. The elements that mark the scientific character of this translation may be enumerated.

First of all the attempt is made to secure a sound textual basis. The translators are not content with a simple rendering of the Masoretic text. Rather they compare that text with the various versions critically, and endeavor to correct its manifest errors. Where the versions fail in furnishing guidance, they do not hesitate to resort to critical conjecture. Of the former kind of emendation Gen. 4:8 furnishes a good example. As the Hebrew text reads, the verse runs, "Cain said to Abel his brother; and when they were in the field," etc. The versions supply after the word "brother" a phrase, "Let us go to the field," which brings these two apparently unrelated statements together. Examples of emendation by conjecture will be found in Gen. 10:14, where "whence came the Philistines" is transposed to follow "Caphtorim" and in Exod. 2:18 where the name "Reuel" is omitted as not having been in the original text. Passages where the text is so badly corrupted as to be unintelligible and where neither versions nor critical conjecture avail to remedy it, are left untranslated, the lacuna being marked by a line of dots in the text, and a literal rendering of the words of the Masoretic text being added in a footnote. One set of footnotes is devoted to giving the more important textual data such as the important variations of the versions. Literary criticism is also taken into account in that the letters *J, E, P, D*, etc., are printed alongside of the text in the margin, indicating the source to which each particular passage belongs. In pursuance of the same policy, glosses in the text are indicated by being printed in small type. The divine name is used in the form *Yahvé*. Where the exact

¹ *La Sainte Bible—Traduction nouvelle d'après les meilleurs textes avec introduction et notes*. Edited by Adolphe Lods. Paris: Société Biblique de Paris, 1916. 80 pages. Fr. 50 (the entire work). By subscription only.

connotation of any given word is not known, the word is simply transliterated, as, for example, is done with *kinnor*, in Gen 4:21. Words demanded by the sense though not actually presented in the Hebrew are placed within square brackets.

The translation is accompanied by brief interpretative notes printed in small type at the foot of the page. These notes are concise and clear. They interpret the obscurities of the text in a thoroughly scientific spirit, and they discuss briefly such questions as the unity and origin of disputed passages. In addition to the notes there is printed on the last two pages of the cover of this fasciculus a provisional introduction to Genesis. This is of the briefest possible character and concerns itself with such questions as the Mosaic origin, the composite character, and the sources of Genesis, tracing briefly the history of the growth of the Pentateuch.

The format of the Bible is on an elaborate scale. The type page measures $10\frac{1}{2}$ by 7 inches. The margins are wide, yielding a page $14\frac{1}{2}$ by 10 inches over all. The text itself is printed in two columns in beautifully clear, large type. The material is arranged in paragraphs, not by verses, just as in the revised version, and the large divisions of the text are indicated by titles, while smaller paragraph headings are set into the text at the side. Fragments of poetry are printed line by line, clearly indicating their poetic character. The edition is to be limited to one thousand copies.

The French Society is to be congratulated heartily upon this piece of work. The Germans have two Bibles of this general sort. There is none such available in English. As to the character of the French, a foreigner cannot well pass judgment, but the ideals of the enterprise are lofty and have been achieved with a high degree of success.

This first *livraison* includes Genesis and Exodus, chaps. 1 to 9:16. Its translators were MM. Louis Aubert, of Neuchâtel, who did the work on Genesis, and Henri Trabaud of Geneva, who has begun on Exodus. The general editor is Adolphe Lods of the Sorbonne. All these gentlemen are deserving of the highest praise. It is to be hoped that the strain of the great war will not interfere with the successful completion of this splendid enterprise.

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ASSYRIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY¹

The best monograph on any single Assyrian reign is still Olmstead's *Western Asia in the Days of Sargon of Assyria. A Study in Oriental History* (New York, 1908) and its author, having already deserved well of his colleagues, is the more entitled to a hearing when he comes to offer a most incisive and instructive study of our sources for the history of Assyria in so far as they belong to the reigns of Tiglath-pileser I, Ashurnazirpal III, Shalmaneser III, Shamshi-Adad V and the Synchronistic History, Sargon, Sennacherib, Esarhaddon, Ashurbanipal and the Babylonian Chronicle. The object is naturally enough to sift the more reliable from the less reliable of inscriptions in any one reign, and the principle on which Olmstead relies for the greater part is simply the relative age of the documents. As it was customary in Assyria in every reign to prepare a more or less boastful inscription immediately upon the occurrence of the king's first victory, and then after another victory to follow with another inscription incorporating in abbreviated form the contents of the first, Professor Olmstead accepts, in general, as the more reliable the text which is nearest in time to the events which it describes. The principle is doubtless sound enough in many cases, but I much doubt whether we shall find our way safely through these mazes if we erect it into a canon of criticism, not subject to the application of such other tests as may in some cases be available. It would seem from some remarks, in which there lies concealed perhaps a touch of playfulness, that Olmstead rebukes his predecessors, who have sought to write the history of the Assyrians, for making no use of the principle at all. We are indeed a sorry company, and as Johnson said of the lexicographers, it is our fate "to be rather driven by the fear of evil, than attracted by the prospect of good; to be exposed to censure, without hope of praise; to be disgraced by miscarriage, or punished for neglect, where success would have been without applause, and diligence without reward." But while we confess our shortcomings, we might in further defense, allege that our mentor is himself not impeccable, as witness this sentence: "So when Sennacherib tells us that he took from little Judah no less than 200,150 prisoners, and that in spite of the fact that Jerusalem itself was not captured, we may deduct the 200,000 as a product of the exuberant fancy of the Assyrian scribe and accept the 150 as somewhere near the actual number captured and carried off" (p. 8). In reply to this it is

¹ *Assyrian Historiography: A Source Study*. By Albert Ten Eyck Olmstead. [The University of Missouri Studies, Social Science Series, Vol. III, No. 1.] Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri, 1916. vii+66 pages. \$1.00.

open to us to say that in the text of Sennacherib the verb used seems to imply only that the inhabitants were "marched out," i.e., to give allegiance to Assyria, and were not taken into captivity for, which a quite different expression is used (see Rogers, *Hist. Bab. and Assy.* [6th ed.], II 370, n. 1), and if he then allege that 200,150 is too large a number for the inhabitants of forty-six cities we shall gladly admit it, but insist that the population surely exceeded 150 souls! Has not Professor Olmstead spoken rashly of Sennacherib's historiographer as he has of modern historians who have "regularly" taken the "latest and worst edition" of the Assyrian inscriptions? But, laying aside the frivolous it seems to me that Olmstead's *Assyrian Historiography* is of the highest importance. He has made it clear that we do need to pay more earnest heed, not merely to use the sources, which most of us have done from Tiele to King, but to subject them to a more rigid sifting than any of us have consistently accomplished. And if this boon were not secured the little book would have great value for its bibliographical references, in which Olmstead displays a none too common mastery of the literature coupled with meticulous accuracy. I have indeed found amazingly few inaccuracies of any sort, and the proofreading has been skilfully done; we have only such slight slips as "statute" for "statue" (p. 20, n.) and Andrä for the name of Walter Andræ (p. 21, n. 1; p. 25, n. 4; p. 25, n. 3; and p. 29, n. 2).

ROBERT W. ROGERS

DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

HASTINGS' DICTIONARY OF THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH¹

This work was undertaken in response to a widespread request for an encyclopedic dictionary which should do for the rest of the New Testament what the *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* had already done for the Gospels. Hence, as the editor tells us in his brief preface, the *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*, taken in connection with the above-mentioned work, "forms a complete and independent Dictionary of the New Testament." It might also be described as comprehensive; for, like the other works edited by Dr. Hastings, it contains articles dealing with the language, history, criticism, theology, geography, and antiquities of the New Testament. Some subjects which were discussed in the *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* are also treated in the present volume;

¹ *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*. Edited by James Hastings. New York: Scribner, 1916. Vol. I. xiv+729 pages. \$6.00.

but inasmuch as the reader could not be assumed to have both works, such duplication was in many cases necessary.

Of the 99 contributors to the first volume of the *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*, 83 are British and 9 American. Germany is represented by Thumb, von Dobschütz, and von Schlatter, and France by Batiffol. With the exception of the latter, who is a Catholic priest, the writers are all Protestants. It is hardly necessary to say that, in spite of important differences of various sorts, all of them accept the critical point of view and use the scientific methods of modern scholarship.

It is customary to regard the Apostolic Age as closing with the death of the apostle John, which is commonly believed to have occurred about 100 A.D. The present dictionary, however, despite its title, contains matter pertaining to the second century as well as to the first. For example, we have a valuable article on Ignatius by Batiffol, a good discussion of the Apocryphal Acts by Lake and de Zwaan, and a very thorough article on the Uncanonical Gospels by Moffatt. To have confined the work strictly to the limits of the Apostolic Age would have been a fatuous sacrifice to that foolish consistency which Emerson calls "the hobgoblin of little minds."

In a thoroughly satisfactory article on the Acts of the Apostles Professor Lake says concerning the authorship of the work: "The traditional view that Luke, the companion of St. Paul, was the editor of the whole book is the most reasonable one" (p. 20a). Acts has, to be sure, certain primitive characteristics; but Lake is certainly right in saying that "the weakening of the eschatological element, and the interest in the Church, as an institution in a world which is not immediately to disappear, point away from the very early date advocated by Harnack and others" (p. 21a). He thinks that on the whole the most probable date is the decade 90-100. As sources used in the compilation of the book he recognizes, besides the "we-sections," certain traditions derived from Antioch, Jerusalem, and Caesarea. "The theology of Acts is, on the whole, simple and early, showing no traces of Johannine, and surprisingly few of Pauline, influence" (p. 27b).

W. C. Allen accepts Harnack's view that Acts was written at the end of Paul's imprisonment in Rome, and makes this date the *terminus ante quem* for the composition of the Synoptic Gospels. Thus Mark falls between the years 30-50; Matthew was written about 50; and Luke is assigned to the period 47-60 (pp. 474 f.). Harnack's dating of Acts seems to the reviewer an insecure foundation to build upon, and he feels sure that most scholars will not agree with Allen's early dates for the Synoptic Gospels.

The command of the risen Christ to baptize the nations into the threefold name (Matt. 28:19) is undoubtedly a true part of the First Gospel. But the collocation of Christ, God, and the Holy Spirit in II Cor. 13:13 by no means proves that Jesus "made some such utterance" as that contained in the above-mentioned verse of Matthew, of which the latter is "a much abbreviated record" (p. 130*a*). All that can be said with confidence is that the words in question reflect the usage of the church, or of a section of it, in the last quarter of the first century. The Matthaean formula of baptism is probably only a liturgical expansion of the primitive formula preserved in Acts.

On p. 204*b* Plummer says: "We do not know who so happily adopted the word [*ἐκκλησία*] for Christian use. It is not impossible that Christ Himself may have used it, for He sometimes spoke Greek. He used it or its equivalent in a Christian sense (Matt. 16:18); but Matt. 18:17, though capable of being transferred to Christians, must at the time when it was spoken have meant a Jewish assembly." Can we assume that Matt. 16:17-19 is a genuine utterance of Jesus? Apart from difficulties of a different sort, these verses are not found in the parallel sections of Mark and Luke. So, too, in view of the adverse judgment of most critical scholars, we desire proof that Matt. 18:17, which is contained only in the First Gospel, is rightly ascribed to the Master. We are also told that beyond reasonable doubt the Christian community owes its origin to Jesus (p. 205*a*). Does this mean that he actually founded the church, or does it mean that the impetus which resulted in the establishment of the church originated with him? That the latter of these alternatives is true cannot be doubted.

In an article on dates Professor Zenos, feeling it necessary to find a place in Paul's life for the composition of the Pastoral Epistles, accepts as historical the release and second imprisonment of the apostle. On the basis of an inscription discovered at Delphi he concludes that Gallio entered upon the proconsulship of Achaia in the spring of 52 A.D. (pp. 275*b* f.). Deissmann, however, seems to the present writer to have shown that in all probability Gallio became proconsul in the summer of the year 51 (cf. *Paulus*, 1911, pp. 159-74). The determination of this matter is of great importance for the student of the Apostolic Age, because upon it depends the date of Paul's arrival in Corinth and the writing of the letters to the Thessalonians. Zenos places the accession of Festus as procurator of Judaea in the year 60 (p. 276), and thus ranges himself with those who agree with the testimony of Tacitus. In view of the conflicting data given by Josephus, Tacitus, and Eusebius this question is as difficult as it is important. Perhaps, on the whole, an earlier date,

October 55–October 56 (Harnack) or September 56–September 57 (Lake), is preferable.

The editor could have found no one better fitted to write on Hellenistic and biblical Greek than the late Professor Thumb, of Strassburg, and his contribution is an excellent résumé of the subject.

There are a number of articles dealing with various subjects in the field of biblical theology. Among these the reviewer would call attention to Platt's discussion of the atonement and to an article by C. A. Scott entitled "Christ, Christology." After examining the material contained in the New Testament, Platt concludes, against some recent writers, that a theory of the atonement "is potentially present and virtually expressed in the common experience and preaching of apostolic times where it is not formally defined" (p. 122a).

Much careful and conscientious work has gone into the making of Hastings' *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*, and students, teachers, and ministers will find it a valuable book of reference for the field which it covers. The second volume is awaited with keen interest.

WILLIAM H. P. HATCH

THE GENERAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
NEW YORK

THE EPISTLE OF ST. JAMES

The data are so indefinite that apparently we shall never reach a "consensus of opinion" on certain of the New Testament books. And one of these is the Epistle of James. Professor Ropes's commentary¹ seems as fertile in new suggestions and points of view as any that have been written. The author maintains that the little book is—

a religious and moral tract having the form, but only the form, of a letter. . . . It is probably the pseudonymous production of a Christian of Jewish origin, living in Palestine in the last quarter of the first century or the first quarter of the second. . . . The epistle reflects the conditions of Jewish life in Palestine, and almost all the ideas have their roots in Jewish thought, but in much of the language, style, and mode of expression generally, and in some of the ideas, Hellenistic influences are unmistakable and strong. The interweaving of the two strains contributes much to the freshness and effectiveness of the epistle as a hortatory essay.²

¹ *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle of St. James*. By James Hardy Ropes. (The International Critical Commentary.) New York: Scribner. 1916. xiii+319 pages. \$3.00.

² P. 1.

In certain particulars this represents a decided advance over Professor Ropes's predecessors, especially as regards "Literary Type" and "Literary Relationships," both of which are admirably treated. In the first of these sections, after a concise discussion of the epistolary type along the well-known lines laid down by Deissmann, he proceeds to show in an entirely convincing fashion that the style of the tract is that of the Hellenistic diatribe rather than of Jewish Wisdom Literature. This distinction, noted, but not sufficiently emphasized by Heinrici, Wendland, and others, constitutes a real contribution to the understanding of the book, and excellent use is made of the fact in the interpretation of such troublesome passages as 2:17-20.

As to "Literary Relationships" Professor Ropes takes the sanely skeptical view, which fortunately is becoming more common on both sides of the Atlantic, that even close resemblances between writings are not conclusive evidence of literary dependence. With regard to Jewish Wisdom Literature (except Ecclesiasticus), the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, the New Testament books, and the Apostolic Fathers, the conclusion is the same:

In no case (unless it be Romans and Galatians) is direct knowledge or influence on either side to be admitted. . . . Just as the typical style of the Greek diatribe persisted in recognisable form for centuries and was used by preachers and writers of diverse literary level, so likewise the phrases and vocabulary of Jewish Hellenistic religious writing and public speech at the time of the origin of the Christian church made up a common stock used independently by many writers in widely distant places for a long period.¹

The sections of the introduction which deal with language, text, the history of the epistle in the church, and commentaries, ancient and modern, are also eminently satisfactory, being full and scholarly without prolixity.

On the other hand, for his conclusion that the place of origin was some such city as Caesarea Stratonis, and that "the writer and the readers . . . were Greek-speaking Jewish Christians in Palestine" (pp. 48, 49), the author presents a strong, but less convincing, argument—strongest perhaps in the commentary on 2:6-7 (p. 197). His own summary (pp. 48 f.) is a telling exposition of the difficulties which beset the theory proposed. If the address is original, such a destination is hardly possible. In any case could not similar conditions probably have been found in Asia Minor before Pliny's letter to Trajan? The author might have been a Greek-speaking Jewish Christian any-

¹ Pp. 21, 23.

where in the empire, and the audience sought "oecumenical Christendom."

The commentary, like the introduction, is all that one could ask. The avoidance of oversubtle or strained interpretations, e.g., 1:3, 10, 11 (p. 149); 3:6; 4:5; 5:1; the excellent choice of illustrative quotations, and above all the wise arrangement of confusing data and intricate discussions make the reading a joy. One would gladly discuss certain moot points, such as the reading ἡ τροπῆς ἀποσκιάσεως, 1:17, the interpretation of ἐμφυτον in 1:21, τῷ κόσμῳ in 2:5, the oppressors of 2:6, and ἐνεργουμένη in 5:16, but lack of space forbids.

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PELAGIUS' COMMENTARY ON THE PAULINE EPISTLES¹

An interesting and valuable pamphlet contains a lecture which Professor Souter delivered before the British Academy in March, 1916. The writer is a recognized authority on the text and canon of the New Testament, and he has made a thorough study of Pelagius' commentary on the Pauline epistles.

In 1906 he maintained, in a lecture before the above-mentioned body, that the commentary of Pelagius is based on the Vulgate, and this opinion is repeated on p. 51 of his *Text and Canon of the New Testament* (1913). Dr. Souter also suggested that Codex Augiensis, a ninth-century manuscript of the commentary at Karlsruhe, might be "the best surviving authority" for the Vulgate text of Paul's letters. A few years later an important manuscript of the commentary bearing the name of Jerome was discovered at Balliol College. This codex, which dates from the middle of the fifteenth century, contains an Old Latin biblical text closely related to that which is found in the *Book of Armagh*. Thus the question concerning the type of New Testament text used by Pelagius was reopened. Since the Balliol MS was clearly copied from an exemplar written in insular (probably Irish) script, Dr. Souter believes that an Old Latin text was substituted for the Vulgate by Irish scribes, who, in spite of the growing popularity of the latter, long preferred the earlier type of text. In view of the Irish affinities of the Balliol MS and the slowness of the Vulgate in winning its way in many places, this hypothesis is on the whole more plausible than the opposite

¹ *The Character and History of Pelagius' Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul*. By Alexander Souter. Oxford: University Press, 1916. 36 pages. 2s. 6d.

one, viz., that an Old Latin biblical text was at some time supplanted by the Vulgate in the tradition represented by Codex Augiensis.

Professor Souter also examines at some length Dom de Bruyne's novel view, first published in 1914, that Pelagius was himself the author of the Vulgate text of the Pauline epistles. There is much force in de Bruyne's arguments against the Hieronymian authorship of this portion of the Vulgate; but nevertheless Dr. Souter does not accept the Benedictine scholar's theory of the origin and history of the Vulgate *Corpus Paulinum* (pp. 6 ff.).

In this second lecture Professor Souter uses several new arguments to prove that Codex Augiensis and the Balliol MS represent the original form of Pelagius' commentary, which was published anonymously in 409 A.D. Except in Ireland, where it was known under the author's name, it was most commonly attributed to Jerome. The rest of Dr. Souter's pamphlet is occupied with a learned discussion of the textual tradition of the commentary, of which he purposes to publish a critical edition in the Cambridge *Texts and Studies*.

WILLIAM H. P. HATCH

THE GENERAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
NEW YORK

RELIGION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS¹

Professor Wright has given in the latest volume of the Bross Lectures a stimulating discussion of religion from the point of view of one interested in functional psychology. While guarding himself in his introduction against the charge of subjectivism commonly associated with the word "pragmatism," he nevertheless makes it perfectly clear that the "world" in which a man lives is a construct built out of the objects of his will. The inquiry which he sets himself is to ascertain the function of religion in this world. There are, he believes, certain typical stages of development in the history of religion. By tracing this development we may more intelligently ascertain what kind of religion will function harmoniously in the "world" in which the modern man must live.

The first stage of life he calls "primitive." Here the will is directed to the attaining of the satisfactions of our native and immediate instincts and desires. A world of space-relations is constructed in which bodily movements to pursue and seize desired objects are possible. Religion

¹ *Faith Justified by Progress*. By Henry Wilkes Wright (The Bross Lectures for 1916). New York: Scribner, 1916. xiv+287 pages. \$1.25.

in the primitive life is regarded as a process of securing the good-will of spirits in control of things, in order that man may more surely secure the things which he wishes. The function of religion is thus to make more certain the attainment of the objects of will in the space-world.

The second stage is the "natural life." Here the conception of nature as an orderly system is dominant. Objects are subject to natural laws, and may be best attained by taking advantage of the sequences which are invariably found expressed in these laws. Scientific agriculture supersedes magic and religious cult. The logical form of religion here is the conception of a wise and benevolent providence in control of nature. Moreover, since trust in the sequences of nature makes possible long looks ahead, civilization arises with its ambitious plans for larger ends. A broader and more inclusive faith thus arises.

But in this world of law and order evil is an ugly and apparently inescapable fact. The sequences of nature cannot be deflected from their course. There is no religious way of securing special favors. The third stage of religious faith represents the will of man reaching out for a "supernatural" world in which the activity of God may be seen to be perfectly good. Recognizing that nature as it exists cannot satisfy human aspirations, man conceives the possibility of becoming a citizen of an eternal spiritual world, where he may rise above the vicissitudes of the temporal and find eternal peace and joy. This is the mediaeval conception which is familiar in the theology of traditional Christianity. But in this mediaeval form the contrast between the natural and the supernatural is so sharp that there is no way of bridging it save by some form of divine intervention. This fundamental emphasis on miracle is in some ways like the primitive appeal to the special aid of spirits. The practical result of this emphasis has been a patient endurance of evils in the natural world, since man's highest good is to be secured in another world. The church has inculcated pious submission rather than social revolution in the presence of social injustice.

The fourth stage, which Professor Wright expounds as the kind of religion needed today, involves a return to the world of present experience as the field for religious faith. This, however, does not mean—as advocates of supernaturalism think it does—a reversion to naturalism in the older sense. The only message of the older naturalism was that of submission to the inevitable sequences of nature. The modern ideal aggressively wills the transformation of the world by putting the sequences of nature under the direction of social idealism so as to create for humanity the broadest possible opportunity for physical and spiritual

welfare. "The human will in the broad light of modern day still seeks a spiritual kingdom, not a 'Heavenly City' perhaps, but a spiritual community whose life shall furnish to every man the opportunity for personal development and satisfaction" (p. 199). The primary postulate of the faith belonging to this idea is "that the actual world contains potencies of adaptation and growth, of which human intelligence may avail itself in the establishment of a universal spiritual life" (p. 203).

What, now, is the function of religion in this kind of a world? As contrasted with supernaturalism, which pictured an ideal spiritual world already established in the unseen, modern religion pictures this ideal world as something which must be created by ethical co-operation of men with one another and with the forces which may be utilized in the present world. Thus, whereas man formerly waited passively for the blessings to be bestowed from above, he must now actively aspire and labor for the creation of blessings. "The modern ideal is . . . *dynamic*, is that of an expanding spiritual system, a developing society of free persons. It exists, not realized, but *to be realized*" (p. 218).

This religion of co-operative activity is precisely what democracy needs. The highest good of man cannot be achieved by one individual for another, or by one group for another. Every man in a democracy must have his active share in the creation of the blessings which all are to enjoy in common. The religion of democracy therefore will place foremost such things as universal education, conservation of the health and strength of workers, a fair distribution of the burdens and the rewards of industrial life, and the organization of government so as efficiently to care for the welfare of all citizens. In short, this kind of religion helps men to achieve their desires by calling to their aid the forces of the world which we know, exactly as other stages of religion called to man's aid the forces which were believed to be potent in the world as then understood.

Fundamental in this religion of democratic progress is the conception of God as striving at an unfinished task. There is a real place for human co-operation with God in this task. It makes a real difference whether man assumes a passive or an active attitude toward God's work. The heart of religion will be co-operation with a divine yoke-fellow, rather than the abnegating trust of supernaturalism. This conception of a co-operating and striving God Professor Wright declares to be the Christian conception. It makes possible here and now the realization of spiritual unity with God. This world becomes the primary field for religious satisfaction instead of being the sorry waiting-place for entrance

into another world. We may think of God as "the guiding spirit of social progress, the leader in the work of human betterment, who strives and suffers with us in the cause of universal evolution" (p. 281). Another fundamental belief is the affirmation of the eternal worth of the human person, involving, of course, immortality, but also involving the conviction that the religion of human progress is a worthy end. Thus the belief in immortality is not a doctrine of reward in another life for deeds done here, but is rather the conception of an unlimited opportunity of personal development transcending the obstacles and disappointments of earthly life.

The book is a welcome addition to the growing literature which sets forth the religious aspects of our modern life, with its mastery of nature and its growing belief that the world as we know it need not be accepted just as it stands, but may be transformed through the co-operation of spiritually minded men. It is one of the merits of Professor Wright's discussion that while he recognizes in this aspiration of our age a kind of religion very different from the supernaturalism which found expression in the mediaeval creeds and liturgies, he at the same time interprets it as a phase of the evolution of religion. Doubtless there is already a widespread attitude of welcome for precisely this type of religion. But there is as yet a deplorably meager provision for the social cultivation of a strong sense of the vitality of this kind of faith. It is to be hoped that Professor Wright's book will be widely read; for it is well calculated to arouse interest and sympathy for a religious movement of great promise.

GERALD BIRNEY SMITH

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DISCUSSIONS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS¹

The Christian Life in the Modern World is the subject of the McNair lectures given by Professor F. G. Peabody at the University of North Carolina. The author recognizes that the burning questions for the Christian thinker of the present are not those of criticism nor of Christian theology, but those of Christian ethics. It is charged by many that "all that can be substituted for an incredible theology is an impossible ethics." The reply made to this is that Christianity asks "the acceptance, not of a teaching, but of a teacher," and that it must be "recognized as a progressive historic movement, still in the making." In a discussion of the family the socialistic idea that the family is to be

¹ *The Christian Life in the Modern World*. By Francis G. Peabody. New York: Macmillan, 1914. 234 pages. \$1.25.

merged into the larger unity of the state is repudiated, the importance of eugenics is acknowledged, the method of the rich in sending children to boarding-school is characterized as "a principle of deportation," and the true philosophy of the family is found in Jesus' teaching of the indissolubleness of the marriage tie.

Taking up the subject of business and industry the author assumes "that humanity is to remain for the present as it is," and urges that "the only practical problem, therefore, is to apply the principle of competition to beneficent ends." This is in contrast to unethicized capitalism on the one hand, and socialism on the other. "The wage system in its bare economic form must be supplemented, if it is not to be supplanted"; but this leads to profit-sharing, industrial partnership, and the like, through the infusing of "fraternalism" into our competitive system. A lecture is devoted to the ethics of spending and of giving. The conception of the state as an instrument of conquest is contrasted with the conception of it as a moral organism, an agent of idealism. The plan for a "World Conference on Faith and Order" is characterized, in the light of the conditions of unity proposed, as being based upon a dogmatic, confessional, intellectualized view of discipleship. What is needed is "a simplified, socialized, and spiritualized church," which is "but another name for the Christian life organized to serve the modern world."

The lectures take account of the most recent literature on the subjects dealt with, they are written with the author's well-known felicity of expression and mastery of antithesis, and they bring out his point of view skilfully under broad, simple, and suggestive conceptions. They can hardly be said, however, to make a contribution additional to that already made in Professor Peabody's widely read and brilliant books on Christian ethics; and there are several questions, which lie close to the themes taken up, that receive but slight treatment, or none at all—such, for example, as the bearing of industrialism and feminism on the family; the reciprocal relation between the individual Christian life and a progressive reconstruction of social institutions; internationalism; and church federation.

A convenient manual, "intended primarily for the use of study-circles, young people's classes and inquirers generally," is *The Christian Life*,¹ by Rev. R. H. Coats. It is divided into sections which adapt it for daily reading and weekly discussions for an eight weeks' course.

¹ *The Christian Life*. By R. H. Coats. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 164 pages. 6d.

Such studies, prepared by competent men and published in inexpensive form, as is true in this instance, are greatly needed, and the teaching of this little volume is judicious and admirable, but the material, the vocabulary, and the arrangement are hardly popular enough for the purpose in view.

Christian Freedom is the title of the Baird lecture for 1913,¹ delivered by William M. MacGregor, pastor of Saint Andrew's United Free Church, Edinburgh. The lectures were addressed to popular audiences in Glasgow and Edinburgh. Their topic is "the priesthood of all believers." The author has developed his thought by means of a free exposition of the Epistle to the Galatians; at the same time he has drawn liberally on all the Pauline epistles and on the life of Paul. Pertinent though the Epistle to the Galatians is to the author's subject, the reader is likely to feel that the blending of exposition and systematic discussion has interfered with the value of the result. But the book is enriched by many allusions to recent critical and theological writings, as well as to general literature, and many stimulating passages as to the meaning of Christian freedom are given.

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THE THEORY OF ABSTRACT ETHICS

In a small but thoughtful book² the author has condensed the results of many years of philosophical and ethical reflection and, at the same time, given his own new solution of a problem by which, until recently, he had been somewhat baffled. This result he reached in consequence of his perusal of a review of Juvalta's *Old and New Problem of Morality* written by Mr. Benn in *Mind*, January, 1915. Not a little of the thought, too, seems to have been evoked by the present European conflict. At any rate, the author's conclusions afford a basis for the British contention that individual states should be allowed to develop in accordance with their own inherent tendencies rather than that they should be directed by some more or less benevolent despot.

In the opening chapter, Mr. Whittaker presents his own metaphysical position, especially his epistemology, which is idealistic, modified in the direction of philosophical rationalism. He indicates his approval of

¹ *Christian Freedom*. By William M. MacGregor. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914. xii+427 pages. \$1.50.

² *The Theory of Abstract Ethics*. By Thomas Whittaker. Cambridge: University Press, 1916. viii+126 pages. 4s.6d.

some of the views of Mr. Bertrand Russell, although he does not agree with that philosopher in every respect. This survey of the field, however, is only to make his own position clear, for he hastens to assert in the following chapter that ethics should be independent of metaphysics. He then calls attention to the bipolar character of ethics when viewed historically, since in the ancient world the emphasis was on the end, while in the modern world law has been especially stressed. The antagonism between these two concepts Mr. Whittaker makes clear, and then indicates that under the influence of Juvalta's work he has hit upon what he regards as a workable combination. He presents the two terms "Justice" and "Liberty" as equivalent to law and end, respectively, and makes the former central in "abstract ethics" and the latter in "concrete ethics." These two divisions are suggestive of theoretical or pure science on the one hand and of applied science on the other, but while Mr. Whittaker regards ethics as a science, he does not range it alongside of the other current sciences, but demands that it should develop from its own fundamental principle, as, he maintains, the other sciences do. Abstract ethics, then, is concerned with the principle of justice, while concrete ethics deals with ends which are decidedly varied. If I demand freedom to seek some end which I desire, I must accord the same freedom to my neighbor who may be seeking an entirely different end, but this very recognition of a plurality of ends involves the acknowledgment of the principle of justice.

But whence comes justice? It is here that Mr. Whittaker contends for an *a priori* element in ethics. He maintains that the traditional empiricism of British thinkers has been undergoing a modification in the direction of the general Continental emphasis upon the priority of thought as such, and with that movement he is heartily in sympathy, although he thinks his own way along instead of following any particular individual or group. This recognition of an *a priori* element in ethics began, he thinks, with Hobbes, and he therefore deals somewhat at length with that writer's fundamental positions; then, with but brief mention of other English authors, he passes to the ethical principles of Kant. Next, he sketches the main points in the teaching of Juvalta, indicates how, as he thinks, this recent writer has "advanced on Kant's ethical doctrine" in that he has "reached a higher degree of abstraction" and has "more expressly recognized the necessarily empirical character of all ends," and then indicates how upon the basis of this material he has been led to outline an abstract as well as a concrete ethics, with justice as the fundamental *a priori* principle in the former and ends central in the latter.

The effort to get away from metaphysics, however, does not result in complete success, for in the last chapter Mr. Whittaker contends that "not only Reason but Justice in some sense is a pre-existent reality ordering the constitution of the whole that is partly known to us in the world and in man." He does not, however, "identify Reason and Justice with the Whole of Reality, or the Absolute. The position indicated," he continues, "is the Platonic position, in some generalized sense, that 'Mind is King.' From this," he adds, "we must not infer the personality of that which directs the process of the world; but, personalized or not, it is this, rather than the Absolute, when we come to consider it closely and not vaguely, that corresponds to the theological idea of God."

In such a brief review as this necessarily is, one cannot bring out the many excellent and suggestive points of view presented by the author, nor is there opportunity for raising many questions. Two, however, may be asked: Might not justice be regarded as the *sine qua non* of a complex, thriving society? Where there is no justice, the human units, some or many of them, perish. Such a view does not necessitate justice as a metaphysically pre-existing reality. Gill-slits were well enough for fishes, but for the descendants of such creatures to live in the atmosphere they had to develop lungs. The presupposition of justice, then, is the condition which makes possible the maximum of longevity and of human welfare in a complex social group. It is hardly *a priori* in Mr. Whittaker's metaphysical sense, but rather in the Kantian transcendental sense.

The second question is as to the legitimacy of tracing back the fundamental principle of a science to a particular pre-existing reality. Justice Mr. Whittaker ranges as a co-ordinate, pre-existing reality beside Reason. But might we not take harmony as a central principle in aesthetics and make that also a similar pre-existing reality, and so on with the rest of the sciences? Mr. Whittaker contends that each science should develop from its own particular field. In a sense, this is true, but to follow the method indicated in connection with abstract ethics we should have to assume a galaxy of such pre-existing realities, in a sense, perhaps, identical with Plato's Ideas. Such procedure, however, would land us in something decidedly different from modern science.

I may also add, however, in spite of the criticism, that a second reading of the book is much more valuable than the first.

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SOCIAL ADAPTATION

"The purpose of this book¹ is to show how the doctrine of adaptation is coming more and more to be considered as the key to social philosophy and its manifold problems and how this doctrine has evolved until at present it is being applied to the process by which man and social groups, by taking thought, transform their material and spiritual environment, and to the process by which they become conformed into more or less agreement with their ideals and with the *World All or God*" (Introduction, p. 11).

By adaptation is meant such a state of adjustment between an organism or a social group and its environment as is favorable to existence and growth, or the process by which such unity comes into, and continues in, this favorable relation. The environment is both physical, or material, and social, or spiritual. Adaptation may be passive or active. Passive physical adaptation comprises biological evolution and its somatic changes. Passive spiritual adaptation includes psychic development under the pressure of social institutions such as language, law, and education. By active material adaptation is meant the purposeful modification of the organism or group to suit its environment, or the transformation of the environment to make it favorable for life, as by industrial development in society. Active spiritual adaptation comprises the purposeful adjustment of the individual to his spiritual environment as exemplified by the work of teachers and social reformers (Introduction, pp. 8-9).

The method employed in this work is to review the social theories of writers from Comte to the present time, not only showing their contribution to the idea of adaptation, but also indicating the general background of their philosophy. Brief criticisms and appreciations in the light of further investigation are presented by the author. This epitome of the history of social theory is valuable to the student of methodology and furnishes in English a fair substitute for Barth's *Philosophie der Geschichte*. Although such condensed treatment is difficult to summarize, the following outline may suggest its development.

After sketching the positivism of Comte and the cosmic evolution of Spencer, the author briefly presents three types of sociological method—the statistical approach as exemplified by Quetelet, the biological analogy of Lilienfeld, and the classifying method of De Greef. He then reviews

¹ *Social Adaptation: A Study in the Development of the Doctrine of Adaptation as a Theory of Social Progress*. By L. M. Bristol. Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. XIV. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915. xii+356 pages. \$2.00 net.

the development of the theory of biological evolution as shown by the contributions of Lamarck, Darwin, De Vries, and Mendel. This digest of modern hypotheses as to the transformation of life-forces should prove most helpful to the general student. The author also questions the direct application of biological theories to social groups and indicates how difficult it is to determine what is original nature and what is the effect of culture in members of present society. He therefore warns against the assumption of finality in the statements of the neo-Darwinists and supplements their ill-defined notions of differentiation and selection by views of the environmental school.

Dr. Bristol is, however, more interested in mental development. Hence the next section of his book is a sympathetic treatment of the contributions of the social psychologists—Le Bon, Durkheim, Ratzenhofer, Tarde, Giddings, and others. Baldwin's "dialectic of personal growth" by selective initiation and application of social example fits very neatly into our author's theory. He lets it here be known that his philosophy regards free will as essential to social progress. The reader may be surprised to find no appraisal of the work of Cooley, Fouillée, Wundt, and other psychologists in these chapters on spiritual adaptation, although the bibliography shows they are known to the author. Perhaps here is an instance of where logical order does not permit the introduction of much supplementary material.

Under the heading of "Active Material Adaptation," the work treats of methods of transforming the physical environment. Here are discussed the contributions of Ward, Patten, and Carver. The last writer has greatly influenced our author, although differences in point of view appear. The treatment of Ward seems rather meager considering his important contributions to dynamic sociology. In fact, this part of Dr. Bristol's work seems the least satisfactory. Students of economics will look in vain for some appreciation of the German historical school of political economy. It would seem that discussions of national policy like those of Schmoller and others should not be ignored in a discussion of social adaptation.

The last section, "Active Spiritual Adaptation," introduces the subject of creative mental effort. Novicow, Carlyle, James, and Ross are briefly reviewed. Then comes a chapter on idealization and religion of special interest to theologians. The theory is that individuals not only enter into the spiritual life of their group and of humanity at large, but that they project into the cosmos the enlarged image of a powerful and perfect person. With this ideal socius, or God, they also seek

adjustment through worship and noble deeds. There is a suggestion that men in this way may create divinity, but the author hastens to state that he believes in the reality of spiritual being back of this human effort.

The author's own point of view as summarized in his concluding chapter is that the social person is the supreme result of organic and institutional development. Such a person imitates and adapts the best examples in the social group about him, enlarging and perfecting his point of view, projecting as ideals results still to be attained, and exemplifying new virtues in his person. He thus shares the interests of wider circles and rises to a sense of comradeship with all mankind and with the Cosmic Person, or God. To produce such individuals is the great task of society.

There is also a suggestion that social groups, like nations or churches, may develop a personality or will of their own and strive collectively to control and lead humanity. But here the author's attachment to the point of view of individual psychology and religion prevents his giving any clear conception of the nature and goal of such super-organic personalities.

The social worker will find few practical suggestions in Dr. Bristol's book. The author believes that sound philosophy should precede programs and be their touchstone. Although he deprecates the use of analogy and advocates inductive investigation, his own work shows but slight analysis of actual social conditions. His research develops a general term borrowed from biology, but is without much social content or suggestion of concrete means to accomplish adjustment. Nevertheless he does subjoin a list of desiderata for groups in which adaptation and the development of social personality shall progress. These points include: (1) production of material goods as the basis for life and growth in culture; (2) the elimination of waste; (3) efficient consumption for social welfare; (4) education for industrial and social efficiency; and (5) enlarged social control to secure effective citizenship, to prevent wasteful competition, and to encourage co-operative effort. How these ends are to be attained is not indicated, save by the suggestion of general education and the example of great men.

The book contains a valuable bibliography, has good notes, an index, and a well-arranged table of contents. It shows wide acquaintance with the field of social theory and should prove helpful as a guide for study in that line.

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BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT

FLEISCHMANN, PAUL. *Alttestamentliche Lyrik* [Praktische Bibelerklärung: VI. Reihe der "Religionsgeschichtlichen Volksbücher"]. Tübingen: Mohr, 1916. 60 pages. Pf. 50.

Semitic peoples in general knew only one kind of artistic literary form, the lyric. Fleischmann introduces his reader to the proper poetical lyrics of the Psalter and Song of Solomon by a few quotations from the historical books of songs and sayings in old Israel. The Psalter is the main quarry for his material, and out of it he selects a few of the choicest psalms as (a) hymns to the honor of God, as 19:1-7; 104; 8; 103; (b) songs of worship, as 24; (c) songs of Zion, as 84; 122; 137; (d) songs of trust, as 23; 91; 2; 46; (e) prayers, as 42 and 43; 51; 130; 73; 139; 90. The Song of Solomon is given a section by itself because of the wonderfully dramatic presentation of the life of the Oriental. This is a well-adapted brief for popular use, whose treatment reveals scholarship that commands our attention. We cannot have too many such sensible *Volksbücher*.
Pr.

DAVIDSON, A. B. *The Book of the Prophet Ezekiel. In the Revised Version, with Notes and Introduction*. Revised by the late A. W. STREANE (The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges). New York: Putnam, 1916. lxii+403 pages. 3s.6d.

The first edition of this commentary was issued in 1892, and during all the succeeding years has held its place as the best English exposition of Ezekiel. The present edition makes use of the Revised Version as the basis of the interpretation and so falls into line with the more recent issues of this well-known series of commentaries. Practically all of Davidson's work is retained. Dr. Streane has limited himself to occasional brief notes marked off by square brackets. The main purpose of these is to record facts and views that have come forward since 1892. These notes are found chiefly in the exposition. The introduction is almost entirely free from them. It would have been well if the editor had supplemented the introduction with a presentation of the more recent view that finds Ezekiel to be a composite work, like practically all the other Old Testament writings, rather than a straightforward, continuous presentation of the prophet's thought. It would have been a valuable addition to the usefulness of the commentary if a new chapter had been included in the introduction dealing with the life and thought of Babylonia in Ezekiel's day. There is no doubt that Ezekiel's forms of presentation were largely influenced by his environment, and it is hardly less certain that the content of his message was to a considerable degree affected by the same influences. But what has been given us here is done well. Dr. Streane, who also completed Chapman's *Leviticus* in this series, lived long enough to prepare the manuscript of this version, but left the proofreading to the general editor, Dean Kirkpatrick.
J. M. P. S.

NEW TESTAMENT

ABBOTT, EDWIN A. *The Fourfold Gospel: Section IV. The Law of the New Kingdom*. New York: Putnam, 1916. xxiii+575 pages. \$3.75.

Dr. Abbott's elaborate exposition of Mark's Gospel and its parallels now fills 1,756 printed pages and has just reached the end of the tenth chapter of Mark. The

interpretative method of the earlier volumes is continued without change, a devotional reflection that draws its materials largely from patristic and rabbinical sources. It is to be feared that few students will have the courage to attack a work of such formidable dimensions, particularly as its value lies in its wayside musings on things in general rather than in any special formal conclusions.

B. S. E.

THORBURN, THOMAS JAMES. *The Mythical Interpretation of the Gospels*. New York: Scribner, 1916. xxi+356 pages. \$1.50.

This book, although not prepared specifically for competition, was presented by the author in connection with the Bross Foundation in 1915, and proved successful in carrying off the prize of six thousand dollars. It is the object of Dr. Thorburn to combat the theory, represented notably by P. Jensen and Arthur Drews, of Germany, J. M. Robertson, of England, and W. B. Smith, of Tulane University, New Orleans, that "our present canonical Gospels are in no sense whatever what we nowadays mean by the term 'historical documents,'" and that the Jesus portrayed in them is no more than a creature of human imaginative fashioning. In 1912 Dr. Thorburn essayed a similar task in his book called *Jesus the Christ, Historical or Mythical*, and, according to Maurice Jones, of Oxford, presented "a fairly adequate reply to Drews." In the same year appeared *The Historicity of Jesus* by Shirley Jackson Case, of Chicago, presenting the problem in a very readable and informing style, and arriving at conclusions which, while allowing due significance to undoubted environmental phenomena in the Hellenistic world, still conserve Jesus as a historical figure, and as the one whose personal religion created the first impulses which moved out into the expression of early Christianity. The difference in Dr. Thorburn's treatment is that he appears to confine himself to a marvelously detailed examination of the evidence and arguments set forth by the mythical school, demolishing each in its turn, without entering into any constructive discussion as to the character of early Christian literature and the life-experiences of those faithful souls which produced such records.

The general attitude of the book may be inferred by the following conclusion regarding the records of experiences in connection with the appearance of Jesus in chap. ii: "The Gospel story of the conception and birth—whether it be historical or otherwise—presupposes a peculiar case of true parthenogenesis, the idea of which has not been borrowed from either Jewish or Gentile sources." Such problems as the priority of Mark, the development of synoptic sources, or the Hellenistic mold of the Fourth Gospel do not seem to exist for the writer. The Gospels are accepted by him as occupying an identical plane of evidence, not only as to the historical character of the events to which they bear witness, but also respecting all the features in connection therewith. Such a discussion with its wealth of detail will do service in informing readers interested in knowing and opposing the patently wild speculations of such writers as Arthur Drews. Yet it leaves much to be desired by those who seek light on the origins of Christianity and their relation to the New Testament.

T. W.

DEAN, JOSEPH. *The Gospel According to St. Mark*. (Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures.) New York: Longmans, 1916. xviii+84 pages. \$0.50.

This is a part of Vol. I of a general commentary on the New Testament which is being prepared by Roman Catholic scholars of Great Britain and the United States.

In most respects the point of view is not unlike that of conservative Protestant scholarship, and free use has been made of the writings of Edersheim, Swete, and other Protestants. The Catholic interest appears in the comment on Mark 6:13, where the anointing of the sick with oil is said to foreshadow the sacrament of extreme unction, and again in 10:21, where the counsel to the rich young man to sell his goods is interpreted as a commendation of voluntary poverty and as implying a call to celibacy. The power of the church to grant absolution is guarded in the comment on 3:29. The textual problem of the concluding verses of the Gospel is frankly stated, but the writer accepts the deliverance of the Biblical Commission of the Church to the effect that the non-Markan authorship of the passage is not proved. The outline harmony in the Appendix by C. Lattey is based on the chronology of the Fourth Gospel.

J. P. D.

GIGOT, FRANCIS. *The Apocalypse of St. John*. (Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures.) New York: Longmans, 1915. xxiv+54 pages. \$0.50.

This is the third part of the fourth volume of the above-mentioned series. The commentator attributes the Apocalypse to the apostle John, asserts that the apostle and the presbyter are the same man, and maintains that the language of the Apocalypse resembles that of the Fourth Gospel. Thus he settles a part of the Johannine problem by denying the terms in which it is stated. He also stands for the literary integrity of the Apocalypse. He claims that all the material to be found in the book is strictly relevant to the thought and purpose of the writer, although we are not always able to interpret the symbolism in its details. There is an attempt to remove the book from the apocalyptic class and to give to it a place in a higher order of prophecy. The notes consist largely of references to the Old Testament passages, which were evidently in the mind of the revelator, and the abundance of these references tends to bring in question the primary character of the writing which is so stoutly defended. The series as a whole is significant in that it shows the intention of the Catholic church to provide suitable aids for laymen who wish to study the Bible.

J. P. D.

BOWEN, CLAYTON R. *The Gospel of Jesus*. Boston: Beacon Press. 235 pages. \$1.00.

The author here aims at a brief presentation of the New Testament material concerning the life and teaching of Jesus. Nearly half of the book is given to the historical record as it may be reconstructed from the text of the Synoptic Gospels. In an appendix is the legendary material, namely, the stories of the infancy, of Jesus walking on the sea, of the feeding of the four thousand (a doublet), of the transfiguration, and of the resurrection. The place of the last named is supplied in the text mainly from I Cor. 15:5-8. Concise but comprehensive notes discuss the text, section by section, interpreting narrative and teaching, and giving reasons for the rejection of variant forms of the tradition or of obviously secondary material. A detailed index of passages used or omitted enables one to turn at once to the place where any particular verse is considered in the notes. The writer gives in condensed form the conclusions and many of the arguments of modern "liberal" scholars on obscure or disputed points. A man who works through the first three Gospels, or, better still, the text of Huck's *Synopsis*, with a parallel study of the brief notes by Mr.

Bowen, will train himself in the discriminating use of the gospel tradition, and will be able thereafter to read his New Testament with a clearer understanding and a more reasonable interpretation of its contents.

J. P. D.

KIRK, HARRIS E. *The Religion of Power. A Study of Christianity in Relation to the Quest for Salvation in the Graeco-Roman World, and its Significance for the Present Age.* The Sprunt Lectures, delivered at Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Virginia, 1916. New York: Doran, 1916. x+317 pages. \$1.50.

The plan followed by the author is, first, to review the "Quest for Safe Conduct," as made by the mystery religions, by Greek and Roman ethical philosophy, and by Jewish legalism; and, secondly, to discuss Christianity as a religion of God-given power. The inadequacy of the non-Christian movements lay in the fact that they depended upon the power of man alone in seeking salvation. The study of these "Quests," however, is lacking in sympathetic understanding and in careful analysis, while the discussion of Christianity is somewhat vitiated by a strong apologetic interest. This is shown in the paragraphs devoted to the resurrection of Jesus (pp. 190-95); to vicarious substitution (pp. 218-24); and to election (pp. 263-66).

On p. 298 the author speaks of the functional significance of Christian power; but in his discussions of the various religious forces he has been inclined to neglect function and to emphasize "revelations of objective truth" instead. In spite of this defect, the author has become aware of one of the most important phases of religious study, in that he interprets religion as a "quest."

C. J. R.

CHURCH HISTORY

HODGES, GEORGE. *The Early Church from Ignatius to Augustine.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915. xiv+312 pages. \$1.75.

Lectures on church history to an intelligent general audience require the form of an interesting story told with cursory rapidity and skillful brief portrayal of personalities and significant scenes. Dean Hodges' lectures have the excellence of this rapid explanatory treatment and this appeal to the historical imagination, while at the same time they convey a large substance of information. The stimulation of concrete historical perception is illustrated by certain pages—valuable for advanced students as well—where a fourth-century church and its order of worship are described. The book may serve as a model for popular lectures of high quality and as a convenient brief outline for theological students in preparation for more intensive study.

F. A. C.

ROCKWELL, WILLIAM WALKER (editor). *Papers of the American Society of Church History.* Second Series, Volume IV. New York: Putnam, 1914.

The papers read at the sessions of the Church History Society in 1912 and 1913 begin with one prepared by Dr. Samuel Macauley Jackson, whose fruitful life came to an end before the meeting in 1912. It was meant to serve as an introduction to a translation of the letters of Servatus Lupus of the ninth century, for the publication of which the funds of the society have been found inadequate.

Dr. Joseph Cullen Ayer's presidential address for 1913 on *The Mediaeval National Church*—admirable for learning and argumentation—deals with the question of ecclesiastical nationalism in the later Middle Ages. Dr. Ayer negatives the notion of a national church in England, or elsewhere in Western Europe, independent of the Roman See in law and jurisdiction.

An abstract of a paper by Charles H. Lyttle presents the view that Celano's account of the *Stigmata of St. Francis* was influenced by conceptions borrowed from Joachim of Fiore.

David Schley Schaff epitomizes *John Huss's Treatise on the Church* and, as in his recent biography of Huss, holds against Lutzow to the older view of Huss as a borrower from Wycliffe.

Edward Waite Miller's paper on *The Relation of Wessel Ganssefort to the Reformation* serves to measure more precisely Wessel's influence on the Calvinist current, and announces the preparation by Miller of a translation of Wessel's *Farrago and Letters*.

Henry Bradford Washburn, dealing with *The College of Cardinals and the Veto*, reviews four episodes in four centuries to show how political state interests have affected elections to the Papacy.

The only topic of American history is Richard Clark Reed's *Sketch of the Religious History of the Negroes in the South*. In this illuminating and painful story, ably told, Mr. Reed expresses the opinion that the negro is "incapable of self-development. He does not embody in himself any law of evolution." But surely the most popular accounts of the white man's evolution explain it by the selective influence of the environment. Mr. Reed's paper gives ground for thinking that the negro's white environment bears some of the blame.

F. A. C.

WILKINS, H. J. *Was John Wycliffe a Negligent Pluralist? also John De Trevisa, His Life and Work*. New York: Longmans, 1915. xii+113 pages. \$1.75.

In accumulating material for a history of the church of Westbury on Trym, the author, with competent assistants, has been able to establish beyond question that John Wycliffe was a pluralist. On the basis of the *Willesey Register*, the *Patent Rolls*, and the *Sede Vacante Register* it becomes clear that Wycliffe held the following positions: 1361, incumbent of Fillingham; 1365, warden of Canterbury Hall, Oxford; 1368, incumbent of Ludgershall; 1374, rector of Lutterworth, until his death in 1384. Meanwhile he held the prebendary of Aust from 1362 undoubtedly until 1375, and most probably until his death in 1384. So far as negligence in providing a chaplain for the prebendary at Aust is concerned, as complained of in the *Willesey Register*, the author finds an apology therefor in the peculiar conditions caused by the Black Death. He exonerates Wycliffe from the general charge laid against the canons of having neglected "the chancels of the churches appropriated to them, and the buildings belonging to the churches, the repair of which notoriously is and ought to be incumbent upon them (but they leave them) on the contrary to fall into ruins." The author's argument seems irrefutable. The documents upon which he bases his conclusions are inserted in full, so that the investigation as a whole is highly satisfactory.

Respecting Trevisa, several documents are inserted bearing upon his expulsion from Oxford in 1379. By the process of exclusion, the vexed question of the church

in which Trevisa held a canonry is settled in favor of Westbury on Trym. The date of his appointment thereto is fixed between 1388-90. His death is placed in 1402, which makes untenable his reputed authorship of the translation of Vegetius' *De re militari*. The translation into Norman-French of portions of the Revelation, engraved upon the roof and walls of the chapel at Berkley, representing one of the earliest attempts to translate the Scriptures into the language of Englishmen, cannot, according to this investigator, be certainly assigned to Trevisa. As to Trevisa's translation of the Bible, mentioned by Caxton, Bale, and Pits, Mr. Wilkins is unable to furnish conclusive data. He favors the tradition of Trevisa's translation, accounting for Wycliffe's and Hereford's failure to mention this translation on the ground of Trevisa's break from the support of Wycliffe. If Caxton did not publish this translation along with the *Polychronicon*, it may have been due to his desire to escape the odium attached to Wycliffe and his followers.

P. G. M.

SMITH, PRESERVED, and GALLINGER, HERBERT PERCIVAL. *Conversations with Luther*. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1915. xxvii+260 pages. \$1.00.

Of the Luther *Table-talk* there have been two English translations, an earlier (1653) by Captain Bell, and a later (1848) by William Hazlitt. The former, though delightfully quaint, is not scholarly; the latter, embodying many of the errors of the contemporary French translation of Brunet, is far from satisfactory, though, for lack of a better, it has retained a widespread popularity. In part it has been the purpose of Professors Smith and Gallinger, through contact with original records published only in recent years—Lauterbach's *Diary* (1872), Cordatus' notes (1885), the records of Rabe, Mathesius, and Heydenreich (published by Lösche in 1892 and by Kroker in 1903), and the manuscripts of Dietrich and Medler (1912)—to remove the errors of the Bell and Hazlitt translations; in part it has been to incorporate in their translation selected portions of this material lately acquired. The translation work has been well done, showing a marked improvement over the older translations that suffered, not only from the lack of a really good text, obtained only within the last few years through the services of the aforementioned critics, but also from Aurifaber's arbitrary and careless handling of the text then at hand. The selection of material is happy, calculated to present the human rather than theological interests of Luther, and frankly to expose the many frailties of the reformer. While in no sense superseding the portraiture of Hazlitt, these "conversations with Luther" at many points throw light upon the real Luther as we know him today. In this particular, the following sections will be found especially illuminating: "Contemporary Politics," "War and Turbulence," "The Peasants," "Schools," "Astronomy and Astrology," "The Humanists," "Human Reason and the Philosophy of the Pagans," and "Heresies." Taken as a whole, this work ought to fill a useful place among "required readings" of college and seminary students.

P. G. M.

SCHAFF, DAVID S. (transl.). *The Church, by John Huss*. With Notes and Introduction. New York: Scribner, 1915. xxiii+299 pages. \$2.50.

In the translation of the *De ecclesia*, Dr. Schaff puts the English-speaking world into touch with a work that by all scholars has been conceded to be one of the most significant of the many Huss productions, and notably important in its bearing upon

his questioned dependence upon Wycliffe and the grounds upon which he was arraigned as a heretic at Constance. Although only incidental to his task of writing a valuable biography of Huss, it is quite possible that scholars will thank Dr. Schaff quite as much for this timely service as a translator, as for that of a biographer. The work of translation may be characterized as faithful, and yet not servile. Although the content of the original is argumentative, theological, and heavily burdened with scripture quotations, the translator has succeeded in injecting into his translation not a little of Huss's vigor and pungency. An Introduction discusses the author, the circumstances under which *De ecclesia* was written, its contents and importance, and Huss's debt to Wycliffe. A brief index and a few notes are added. Twenty-two chapter headings brighten up the tedious structure of the author's argument.

P. G. M.

DOCTRINAL

BRIDGES, HORACE J. *Some Outlines of the Religion of Experience*. New York: Macmillan, 1916. xv+275 pages. \$1.50.

This is an interesting and stimulating book. The author is the leader of the Chicago Ethical Society. Thus from a position somewhat apart he studies the church and its task. He holds that the church is "the only possible channel for the communication of ethical ideals and an ethical dynamic to the masses of Europe and of our own country." But the church, divided as it is into many branches, fails to see clearly its task and so dissipates its energies. He claims that theologies are fundamentally interpretations of experiences. Traditional beliefs were formulated in an unscientific age when there was no clear distinction felt between experience and its interpretation. What is needed is that the church should center its attention upon those elements of religion which are verifiable in experience. Some of the chapters are: "The Reinterpretation of God," "The Rediscovery of Jesus Christ," "Inspiration," "Immortality," "Religion and Nationality."

The spirit in which the book is written is excellent. If it be read in the same spirit it will be found helpful whether one agrees with its conclusions or not.

F. A. S.

SMYTH, JULIAN K. *Christian Certainties of Belief*. New York: New Church Press, 1916. xi+123 pages.

The author deprecates the fact that many who admit the deep importance of the truths of religion consider them to be unproved and unprovable. He undertakes to show that the fundamental truths of the Christian religion—the Christ, the Bible, salvation, immortality—are the most incontrovertible facts of life. As we read the book we discover that these "facts" are sadly confused with the deliverances of Swedenborgian theology.

F. A. S.

JOHNSON, WILLIAM HALLOCK. *The Christian Faith under Modern Searchlights*. New York: Revell, 1916. 252 pages. \$1.25.

This book consists of six lectures delivered at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1914. The author's purpose is to show that Christianity, conceived as resting upon a supernatural revelation and centering about the person, passion, and resurrection of

Christ, has nothing to fear from the criticism of modern science and philosophy, but rather that Christ and his cross must furnish the solution to the deepest intellectual as well as moral problems of the age.

F. A. S.

MERRINGTON, EARNEST NORTHCROFT. *The Problem of Personality*. New York: Macmillan, 1916. viii+229 pages. \$1.30.

The author seeks to show that the self is ontologically real, and is the true basis for any theory of reality. Not experience, but the self as subject of experience forms the criterion of reality. To deny the reality of the self is to abandon ourselves to agnosticism and skepticism. Taking the self, or personality, which is the social and ethical aspect of the self, as the key to the interpretation of the universe, the author arrives at the conclusion "that there is an Absolute Personality" who exists, and whose nature is the perfect fulfilment of all meanings, values, and ideals.

F. A. S.

SHELDON, HENRY C. *Theosophy and New Thought*. New York and Cincinnati: Abingdon Press, 1916. 185 pages. \$0.50.

To his previously published booklets dealing with various aspects of modern religious belief, Professor Sheldon has added a discussion of two prevalent modern cults. A brief characterization of the essential tenets of each movement is given in the form of a running exposition based on citations from recognized authoritative works. A critical estimate closes the discussion. Professor Sheldon's treatment of these religious movements is marked by an intention to give objective information; but the brevity of his exposition, coupled with his evident disapproval of the doctrines, makes the account too intellectually formal to give any clew to the emotional and mystic fascination of occultism. However, to have reliable information in so convenient a form is well worth while.

G. B. S.

BRIDGES, J. H. *Illustrations of Positivism*. (A Selection of Articles from the *Positivist Review* in Science, Philosophy, Religion, and Politics.) Edited by H. GORDON JONES. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1915. xiii+480 pages. \$1.50.

This collection of addresses and articles by one of the ablest exponents of Positivism will be welcomed as a valuable addition to existing means of understanding the spirit and the meaning of the movement. The editor has grouped the essays under various pertinent topics, thus facilitating the use of the volume. The clearness of Dr. Bridges' thinking and writing, and his practical regard for the dictates of honest common-sense give to his utterances cogency and charm. The essays cover a wide range, dealing with current scientific and political questions as well as with Comte's philosophy. The high moral idealism and intelligent interest in science characteristic of Positivism find worthy expression in this admirable volume.

G. B. S.

MILLER, LUCIUS HOPKINS. *Bergson and Religion*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1916. ix+286 pages. \$1.50.

This book is a clear and comprehensive estimate of the value of Bergsonism as a philosophical reinforcement of a vital Christian creed. The standpoint from which

it is written is that of the usual apologetic interest: if Bergson and the Christian belief are compatible, so much the better for the Christian belief; if they are not, so much the worse for Bergson. In this case, philosophy and religion are in harmony. The "vital impulse" may be construed as a moral deity; "intuition" is the same as religious faith; Bergson's modified "finalism" is consistent with the more vital part of Christian theism; the Bergsonian plea for "freedom" lays a foundation for the religious belief in the kinship of God and man, communion and co-operation of man with God, the necessity of "conversion," and the doctrine of salvation. Even in the matter of immortality, Bergson's thoughts are "sobering," to be sure, "but not disappointing." "Now our conclusion with regard to Bergson is that he leaves us free to believe; nay, more, he furnishes us with a basis which *encourages* us to believe. The general tendency of his thinking is spiritual and progressive and would seem to be more compatible with a Christian conception of life—whether here or beyond—than with any other."

Perhaps the most significant suggestion which the book makes is this: Since Bergson's philosophy is so great an encouragement to Christian faith, we cannot afford to neglect those inalienable aspects of his system which are incompatible with the static and absolutistic elements of the traditional creed. This suggestion, however, is made rather too unobtrusively.

A. C. W.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

SAUNDERS, KENNETH J. *The Heart of Buddhism*. London: Oxford University Press, 1915. 96 pages. 1s. 6d.

This little book belongs to "The Heritage of India" series. The editors of this series are Dr. Farquhar and the Bishop of Dornakal. The editors state that every book accepted for publication must pass two tests: "Everything must be scholarly, and everything must be sympathetic."

The title is indeed an ambitious one for a book of only a hundred pages. It contains about fifty poems, called "typical," and about a dozen "specimen" stories. The poems, some of which contain but a few lines, are taken for the most part from the two works: *Psalms of the Brethren*, and *Psalms of the Sisters*.

Much that bulks large in the Buddhism of the Dialogues, and of the other sacred literature of Buddhism finds no mention in this, "an anthology of Buddhist verse," or in its stories. This is accounted for, as the writer indicates, by the fact that he is presenting the heart, not of Buddhism of the sacred literature, but rather that of the present-day Buddhist, who, the author assures us, has little interest in Buddha's doctrines of Nirvana, personality, and the soul. Moreover, the writer holds that the heart of a religion is to be found in its hymns rather than in its dogmatic literature. Consequently, this little volume is largely of the nature of a Buddhist hymnal. On the whole, it is a piece of work well worthy a careful perusal.

W. C. MACD.

MISCELLANEOUS

ECKMAN, GEORGE P. *The Literary Primacy of the Bible*. New York and Cincinnati: Methodist Book Concern, 1915. 209 pages. \$1.00.

This book is the result of a series of lectures delivered by the author in connection with the Mendenhall Foundation at DePauw University, Indiana. In a Foreword,

President Grose, the head of this institution, explains that the foundation provides for annual lectures which shall exhibit the proofs, "from all sources, of the divine origin, inspiration, and authority of the Holy Scriptures." The first chapter gives the book its name. Throughout the other five chapters the author treats of the Bible in various aspects; its poetry and oratory, its fiction and humor, the Bible as the most persistent force in literature, as ethical and spiritual literature, as inspired literature. By the terms of the lectureship the author is held within strictly defined limits in dealing with his subject. This may account for the curious mixture of traditionalism and present-day biblical scholarship which frequently shows itself in the different lectures. As a collation of the opinions of the world's great thinkers with respect to the Bible the book is interesting and helpful. The regret on reading each chapter is that these quotations, excellent indeed in themselves, should be allowed to pre-empt ground which lies open for a fresh plowing by the author himself.

T. W.

Towards an Enduring Peace. A Symposium of Peace Proposals and Programs, 1914-1916. Compiled by RANDOLPH S. BOURNE. With an Introduction by FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS. New York: American Association for International Conciliation, 1916. xv+336 pages.

This collection of various utterances both from individuals and from responsible organizations furnishes an imposing testimony to the strength and the extent of movements consecrated to the task of so reorganizing social, economic, and political standards as to make impossible a repetition of the present war. Twenty-eight somewhat extended excerpts from significant articles and addresses, and thirty-eight definite peace platforms and proposals are given. An excellent index facilitates the use of this valuable collection.

G. B. S.

D'ALÈS, ADHÉMAR. *Lumen Vitæ; L'Espérance du salut au début de l'ère Chrétienne.* Paris: Beauchesne, 1916. 282 pages. Fr. 3.50.

The dedication of this book to the soldiers of France and the author's hope that it may carry into the trenches a reassuring faith are sufficient indication of its practical purpose. The author makes no attempt to set forth ecclesiastical propaganda, but is intent upon serving those among whom he cannot minister in person. The inability of the *Pax Romana*, of the mysteries, and of Judaism, to satisfy human need is stated in rather conventional form; but more attention is paid to early Christianity in the hope that the experiences of the saints will give assurance to a soldier's uncertainty of life. The value of the book can only be determined by those for whom it was intended.

C. J. R.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

- Fowler, Henry Thatcher. *The Origin and Growth of the Hebrew Religion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916. xv+190 pages. \$1.00.
- Oesterley, W. O. E. *The Wisdom of Ben-Sira (Ecclesiasticus)*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. 148 pages. 2s. 6d.
- Schaeffer, Henry. *The Social Legislation of the Primitive Semites*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915. xv+245 pages. \$2.35.

NEW TESTAMENT

- Burnside, W. F. *The Acts of the Apostles in Greek*. Cambridge: University Press, 1916. xlvii+275 pages. 4s.
- Nägelsbach, Friedrich. *Der Schlüssel zum Verständnis der Bergpredigt*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1916. 55 pages. M. 1.20.
- Torrey, Charles Cutler. *The Composition and Date of Acts*. (Harvard Theological Studies.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916. 72 pages.
- Williams, A. Lukyn. *The Hebrew-Christian Messiah*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. xxii+425 pages. 10s. 6d.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Horsch, John. *Infant Baptism*. Scottsdale, Pa.: Horsch, 1917. 157 pages. \$0.40.
- Sertillanges, A.D. *L'Eglise*. 2 vols. Paris: Gabalda, 1917. viii+318 pages. Fr. 8.

DOCTRINAL

- Darling, Charles D. *Doubters and Their Doubts*. Boston: Sherman, French, 1916. 117 pages. \$1.10.
- Mathews, Shailer. *The Spiritual Interpretation of History*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916. x+227 pages. \$1.50.

- Sanday, W., and Williams, N. P. *Form and Content in the Christian Tradition*. New York: Longmans, 1916. xv+167 pages. \$2.00.

- Tonquedec, Joseph de. *Introduction à l'étude du merveilleux et du miracle*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1916. xvi+461 pages. Fr. 5.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

- Mozley, John Rickards. *The Divine Aspect of History*. 2 vols. Cambridge: University Press, 1916. xx+407 and x+509. 36s.

PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

- Coe, George Albert. *The Psychology of Religion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916. xvii+365 pages. \$1.50.
- Leuba, James H. *The Belief in God and Immortality*. Boston: Sherman, French, 1916. xix+340 pages. \$2.00.
- Saunders, K. J. *Adventures of the Christian Soul*. Cambridge: University Press, 1916. xiii+145 pages. 3s. 6d.
- Snowden, James H. *The Psychology of Religion*. New York: Revell, 1916. 390 pages. \$1.50.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Beach, Harlan P. *Renaissant Latin America*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1916. vi+258 pages. \$1.00.
- Brown, William Adams. *Modern Missions in the Far East. A Report Prepared for the Board of Directors of the Union Theological Seminary*. New York: Union Theological Seminary, 1917. 76 pages.
- Jones, Jenkin Lloyd. *Love for the Battle-Torn Peoples*. Chicago: Unity Publishing Co., 1916. 166 pages.
- Nelson, Ralph W. *How Christ Would Organize the World (The University of Kansas News-Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 10, January 15, 1917)*. Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas, 1917. 32 pages.

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A N N O U N C E M E N T S

Vol. XVI

No. 1

THE SUMMER QUARTER

1917



THE Summer Quarter at the University of Chicago is the most largely attended of the year, more than five thousand students having registered in the summer of 1916. The University year is divided into quarters: the Autumn, Winter, Spring, and Summer. In 1917 the Summer Quarter will begin June 18 and close August 31. The First Term will begin June 18; the Second Term, July 26. Students may register for either Term or for both. Students entering at the beginning of the Second Term may register for courses for which they have had the prerequisites. The courses during the Summer Quarter are the same in character, method, and credit value as in other quarters of the year.

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The Divinity School is open to students of all denominations, and the instruction is intended for ministers, missionaries, theological students, Christian teachers, and others intending to take up some kind of religious work. The English Theological Seminary, which is intended for those without college degrees, is in session only during the Summer Quarter. The Graduate Divinity School is designed for college graduates. Pastors, theological teachers, students in other seminaries, candidates for the ministry, and other Christian workers, with requisite training, are admitted in the Summer Quarter.

The Chicago Theological Seminary will also be in session during the Summer Quarter, and its courses are open on the same conditions as those that obtain in the Divinity School.

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of medicine, who may matriculate as unclassified or as graduate students. Practitioners taking this work may attend the clinics at Rush Medical College without charge.

Education

In the Professional Schools the Graduate Department of Education in the School of Education gives advanced courses in Principles and Theory of Education, Educational Psychology, the Psychology of Retarded and Subnormal Children, History of Education, and Social and Administrative Aspects of Education. The College of Education is a regular college of the University, with all University privileges, and in addition provides the professional training of elementary- and secondary-school teachers and supervisors. It offers undergraduate courses in professional subjects and in the methods of arranging and presenting the various subject-matters which are taken up in the elementary and secondary schools. The University High School, with the fully equipped shops of the Manual Training Department, is in session during the Summer Quarter, and opportunity is offered to take beginning courses in Latin and to review courses in Mathematics and History. The regular shop work, supplemented by discussions of methods, is open to teachers pursuing these courses.

Commerce and Administration

The School of Commerce and Administration is an undergraduate-graduate professional school, offering courses arranged to meet the needs of those preparing for various business pursuits, for commercial teaching, for secretarial work, and for philanthropic service. The work for the summer of 1917 will be organized, in co-operation with the School of Education, with especial reference to the needs of commercial teachers. In all the curricula emphasis is placed upon (1) broad foundations of work in history, political economy, sociology, psychology, biology, government and law; (2) an individualized curriculum; (3) contact with practical affairs; and (4) a professional spirit.

The University of Chicago is peculiarly fortunate in its environment in summer. The city of Chicago is relatively cool. High temperatures are not frequent or long continued, and the normal temperature, in comparison with that of other large cities, is low. Reports of the United

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States Weather Bureau show that the average summer temperature of Chicago is lower than that of most cities of its class. In addition to this advantage in weather conditions, the University has an especially favorable situation in the city. To the south stretches the Midway Plaisance, an avenue of lawn a block wide and a mile long; and about equidistant are Washington Park, a large recreation ground on the west, and Jackson Park, equally spacious, on the shore of Lake Michigan, to the east.

Opportunities for diversion are numerous. In Jackson Park there are golf links, and in both Jackson and Washington parks, lagoons for rowing. There are many tennis courts in both parks, along the Midway, and on the campus. Through the Frank Dickinson Bartlett Gymnasium full facilities for physical culture are given to men. The Reynolds Club offers social privileges to men. Similar opportunities for women are offered in the gymnasium, swimming pool, and clubrooms of the new Ida Noyes Hall. Many social clubs are organized among students. The Dames Club of the University of Chicago, composed of wives and mothers of students, meets every second and fourth Saturday of the month. The place of meeting will be announced in the *Weekly Calendar*.

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
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
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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

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THE DANGER OF REACTION, THEOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL

ALFRED E. GARVIE
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The practical man who thinks that "common sense" is the Ariadne clue to the labyrinth of life often looks down on the thinker and rates very low the influence of theory on practice. In reality his own life is influenced by thought, crude and narrow, traditional and conventional, and he would be a better man were his knowledge wider and his understanding keener. Over against his opinion may be set the truth, of which history affords abundant and varied illustrations, that ideas or ideals rule the world. At the present moment there is being written in fire, blood, and tears the record of the destruction and devastation which can be wrought in the world, not by passions let loose, but by calculated policy directed by a false ideal of national duty and destiny. The German nation has often been mocked and scorned as doctrinaire; but it has shown how great is its efficiency and how direct and potent is the influence of theory on practice. If it seems much less probable that the English nation, with its deep-rooted and widespread prejudice against education and science, will or even can be much

¹ As the United States of America is now an ally of Great Britain and will soon experience the conditions of a country at war, it is hoped that this statement of some aspects of the position in Great Britain may be of interest and value to American readers.

affected by its thinkers, yet sufficient influence may be conceded to theory over practice to make it worth while to consider some of the changes in thought, of which there are indications at the present moment.

It cannot be doubted that as man's experience and character are affected by his circumstances the war is reacting on the morality and the religion of the nation. It would be an interesting study to try to discover what moral virtues or religious graces have been thrown into the foreground or allowed to fall into the background owing to the changed conditions and obligations. That there have been both losses and gains in morality and religion cannot be doubted. But, since man acts as he believes and wishes, still more interesting is the inquiry regarding the effect of the war on religious ideas and moral ideals. Ethics and theology as the interpretation depend on the reality of morality and religion, but the interpretation reacts on the reality, and a man lives in relation to God and man as he thinks. It will be generally admitted that war is so much a contradiction of Christian ideas and a challenge of Christian ideals that there is likely to be more danger of reaction than assurance of progress for theology and ethics in the changes of thought that it brings with it. That there has been some progress and that there is possibility of still greater progress cannot be denied, and some of the more promising signs of the times will in the subsequent discussion be mentioned; but the progress can be secured only as the reaction is arrested. To enter a *caveat* against some of the tendencies—theological and ethical—of the moment is the purpose of this article, although the writer does not believe that the reaction is either widespread or deep-rooted in the nation, the Christian heart of which is thoroughly sound.

I

There is reason—and good reason—for surprise, disappointment, indignation, and condemnation in regard both to the intentions avowed and to the methods adopted by Germany; and those who owe most in their knowledge and their thought to German scholarship and speculation must feel most keenly the shame and grief that her fall must awaken in every conscience concerned about

righteousness and in every heart moved by compassion. This feeling, however, does not justify the rejection as false and wicked of all that Germany has contributed to the criticism, literary and historical, of the Holy Scriptures. Soon after the war broke out some of the religious weeklies found room for a letter in which German wickedness was given as a reason why the higher criticism should be contemptuously rejected. W. R. Smith and S. R. Driver, to mention only two of the great scholars and good Christians who have accepted and advocated the critical positions, may be summoned as witnesses against any such hasty conclusion under the stress of strong passion. It is becoming common for persons who have no competence for pronouncing an opinion on these matters to sneer at the professors who in their investigations and conclusions have been indebted to Germany. If there has been any subserviency, by all means let it cease; but dependence on thorough knowledge and serious thought, even if German, is not anything of which to be ashamed or to repent.

In so far as in ethics or theology the moral or religious insight has been affected by national peculiarity of standpoint and outlook, entire independence is certainly to be commended. To give only one illustration, the man who believes in a free church in a free state must feel offended by the extreme Erastianism, the complete subordination of church to state, which marks so much German writing. A believer in conversion and revival must feel no less indignant at the contempt often expressed for *Methodismus*. The separation of theological thought in the universities from the religious life in the churches has injuriously affected German theology. Much as the writer owes to German scholarship, he has offered these criticisms and cautions regarding German thought when Britain and Germany were at peace and when many efforts were made to insure their lasting friendship. He feels that he has a right now to protest against the exploitation of the feelings of a time of war in order to hinder the mutual co-operation of the two nations at other times in common tasks of knowledge and thought. It would certainly be a proof of reaction in theology and ethics if the interchange of scholarship and speculation were to cease. To insure progress Great Britain must not, under a misguided patriotism,

be rushed into a *protectionist* system in the things of the mind and soul.

II

The expansion of knowledge and the advancement of thought in all spheres of intellectual interest during the last century cannot be adequately described. The principle of evolution has proved of inestimable value in setting in order the enormous mass of facts gathered in many fields of inquiry. For some thinkers the conception became an obsession; and they were prepared to mutilate reality in order to force it into this Procrustes bed. The *religious-historical* method, as applied to the origin and development of the Christian religion, has not been free of these excesses. It was often assumed that evolution necessarily involved progress, that movement must always be upward; and the history of the past was rearranged contrary to the available evidence in order to sustain this appearance. But evolution is a neutral conception; it may involve retreat as well as advance; e.g., the savage may be, not an improvement on, but a degradation of, the primitive man. Who can doubt that, on the whole, in the long run there is progress? But this is no necessary, inevitable accompaniment of evolution. This belief in progress based on this idea of evolution inspired an optimistic spirit, which ignored or defied the reality that challenged it.

With this war there came for many people, as for the uninformed and unintelligent, a relapse into pessimism. Where is your boasted progress now? was the question on not a few of the lips that had indulged in the boast. This war shows the collapse of modern civilization and culture, was the cry of good and godly people who thought they were rendering Christianity some service by libeling man and so dishonoring God. At such a time as this men need cool heads as well as warm hearts. Granted that for the time being progress has been arrested, that, unless all the peoples involved are watchful and careful, there may even be reaction in many fields of man's thought and life, that does not prove that the advance of last century was illusive and not real, and that the path of progress in the future may not be cleared of some of its ancient obstructions. It is true that the civilization and culture of Germany, which it is only prejudice to discredit, although it may be

only justice to pronounce it inadequate, have been used to assist a false national ideal and not to advance the true interests of mankind, and that its Christianity has been so perverted by its patriotism as not to restrain the tendencies, which its recent development has encouraged, to an aggressive self-assertion; and the writer would be the last to plead any justification for its crime against humanity in provoking, and in its methods of conducting, the war. We may be disappointed that neutral opinion has not been more effective collectively from the very beginning; and yet we must recognize that the almost world-wide condemnation of Germany's action proves an advance in humanitarian sentiment and international conscience. The attitude of the spectator as well as the conduct of the actor must be taken into account in coming to a judgment on the moral situation generally. Even if the actions of the Allies were to belie their professions, and a charge of hypocrisy were in any measure justified, the aims which they have declared so as to secure the approval of the neutral nations show that there has been progress in what may be called the international conscience. Even the excuses Germany offered at home—and now abroad—are the tribute of hypocrisy, which vice offers to virtue. That the world generally is so sensitive to the cruelties, horrors, and miseries of war shows that a stage of development has been reached in which it has become a confessed anachronism.

The total moral and religious reaction against war at the present time is not only evidence of past progress, it is promise of future progress. If the use of a Hegelian formula may be ventured on, the antithesis of the war to the thesis of the growing internationalism of the last century may result in the synthesis of the League to Enforce Peace, of an international organization strong enough to hold in check all national aggressiveness. "Out of the eater may come forth meat, and out of the strong sweetness." "The wrath of man may yet praise the Lord." There is one thing that can arrest progress, and that is the disbelief in the possibility of progress and the consequent indifference and inaction regarding the surest and speediest means of securing it. The optimistic temper, controlled by sound judgment, is auspicious, the pessimistic, due to rash opinion, ominous for the future.

For morality no less than for religion the belief in progress is important. On the one hand, the estimate of man, and, on the other, the assurance of God are affected. Doubt of progress lowers consideration of man and lessens confidence in God; and both of these involve an arrest of the progress of ethics and theology in the interpretation of God and man. If we doubt progress generally, we are likely to favor reaction in ethics and theology. If it looks as if mankind had of late gone quite astray, the old paths will seem better than the new ways. And that conclusion is being drawn; reactionaries are vocal, and it would seem as if progressives had been put to confusion. The writer himself believes that there is safety and profit in the van and not in the rear, in pressing on to new visions and not in falling back on old positions. Correction of fresh errors of thought there may be, emphasis on old truths there must be, but in ethics and theology the words of command must be: Still forward. This general statement must be justified by particular illustrations.

III

It has been assumed that the war has reinstated the old doctrines of original sin and total depravity and has discredited the modifications of these by recent theological thought. As the methods of the Allies in the war are assumed by the advocates of this view to be as legitimate as their objects are meritorious, it must be Germany that is offering the convincing evidence of original sin and total depravity. It is now being increasingly recognized that racial and national distinctions, real as they are, are not to be explained by radical differences of nature, but by climatic, cultural, educational, social, moral, and religious influences. German babies are not born worse in moral disposition than English. In the one, as in the other, there are possibilities of good or evil, which are developed or repressed by environment and education. The German child grows up in a nation that has cultivated, owing to its historical conditions, imperialist ambitions and that has developed a militarist system to give effect to these; and so he is ready to do and dare anything, regardless of moral considerations recognized by other peoples, at the call of patriotism. That natural

appetites and passions have broken loose must be admitted, not because they are necessarily stronger in the German than in the Englishman, but because a false ideal has not only failed to restrain them, but has even given them freer rein. It is the calculated policy of ruthlessness which is the problem to be explained, and not the human nature which it has perverted and exploited. To suppose that Germany is by natural necessity worse than other peoples is to excuse rather than to emphasize her guilt. To recognize, as ample evidence proves, that since 1870 Germany has been treading a path of moral error which has inevitably resulted in moral defect is in no way to lessen her responsibility for the crimes she has committed, but to trace the evil to a real and not a supposititious cause. It is patriotism which has corrupted and absorbed religion, perverted and suppressed morality, distrusted and defied the internationalism toward which religion and morality at their best in other nations were leading, which is the devil in this drama of evil.

Let us from this instance learn that nurture is more potent for good or evil than nature, environment than inheritance, the *social* than the *physical* heredity. There is a confirmation and not a contradiction of the more modern view of the development of good or evil in the individual, which has superseded the old doctrines of total depravity and original sin. Let us also learn—and the lesson is not unnecessary—that patriotism may be no less a demon of darkness than an angel of light, and that it must be subordinated to, and controlled by, a religion and a morality which recognize that internationalism, not by the suppression of nationality, but by the mutual harmonizing of the interests of the nations, is the goal toward which human progress tends. Let us learn lastly that, since the moral offense of Germany which has excited, and justly, so keen a moral indignation is not a “vice in its blood,” it may find a place of repentance, and may by the disappointment of its imperialism and by the defeat of its militarism be brought to a better mind, so that it may take its place among the other nations in a reconciled world to co-operate with them in the higher interests of the race. If the vision seems remote from reality, the history of the past should teach us that nations, even as individuals, can reform and can be converted. Lest this hope should

sound too Pharisaic, let it be added that even this nation and its allies need the warning not to repeat her error and defect, and so fall under her condemnation.

IV

The war is being interpreted by many persons as a "judgment" of God on the sin of man; and some persons even are not content with the general statement which has at least the appearance of rationality, but commit themselves to particular applications in which the absurdity is patent. Anybody who has any knowledge or understanding of historical causation must regard as proofs of the sheer stupidity of which many pious persons are habitually capable the suggestions that God in this world-wide calamity has been signifying his displeasure against Welsh disestablishment or Irish home rule, against our drinking habits or our Sunday desecration. We may use the word "judgment" in this connection only after careful definition. The war is the consequence of primarily the political and commercial ambitions of Germany, and of the relation to other nations which these involved, but secondarily, also, of the attitude of the nations toward one another, which afforded an international environment in which Germany's nationalism developed as it did. If God be the ultimate cause and the final purpose of the world, even if he be in all, and through all, and over all, we cannot deny that, as he permitted the sin, so he purposed its consequence. In this sense the war can be spoken of as God's judgment; but it is a judgment in which he remembers mercy. If the nations are led by the war to learn and to turn from the error of their ways in their mutual relations, and if a step toward internationalism is taken as the result of it, we must no less recognize his will; he means the judgment to be, not retributive alone, but reformative also. His action is at every stage conditioned by man's, whether defiant or submissive.

God's action in human history is not arbitrary, vindictive, or even merely judicial and governmental; and we must beware lest in emphasizing his judgment at this time we fall back from the Christian revelation and the fuller interpretation of it which has been reached by modern theology. A return to the harsh views

of God from which with much pain and toil the last generation had to make its escape would be a loss. God is righteous, that is, he does and will do only what is in accord with his own perfection and all that is necessary for the fulfilment of his holy love for all men. In so far as the war leads to due emphasis on the holiness of the love of God and on the judgment which is blended with mercy in the cross of Jesus Christ, it will be a gain theologically. If, however, it should lead, as it seems to have led some, to relapse from the conception of the Holy Father to that of the Righteous Ruler, there will be a regrettable reaction. The sentimentalism of some representations of God's fatherhood assuredly needs correction; the conception needs to be thoroughly moralized in making clear that the good which God's love seeks to impart to man is participation in the divine nature, likeness to his holiness, and that God's righteousness in his dealing with men is his constancy and his insistence on the fulfilment of this purpose. But we must beware of exalting righteousness above love, or sovereignty above fatherhood. From the extreme of sentimentalism we must not swing to the other extreme of rigorism. It will be exceedingly great gain if the doctrine of the atonement, in which judgment is taken up into mercy and love shows its holiness in the way in which it imparts its forgiveness, regains the focal position in Christian thought and life from which it has in recent theological developments been moved; but that prize can be gained without paying the price of shifting the emphasis from where the New Testament places it on the holy fatherhood of God, and the righteousness of God, which is not punitive, but redemptive, reckoning as righteous all who believe in Christ, who in his cross is set forth as propitiatory. A world stricken as it is today needs not so much the terror of the Lord as his tenderness; and the love which suffers in saving from sin to holiness will create the broken and contrite heart as never will judgment alone, even if conscience admit that it is righteous.

V

The failure to recognize adequately that, as the holy love of God has for man moral ends, so it must use with man moral means, is responsible for another theological relapse. Unable to answer the

question, "Why did God allow the war?" or, "Why does God not stop the war?" because not giving due weight to the moral considerations involved, some amateur theologians have prepared to cut the Gordian Knot by denying God's omnipotence, by depriving the Father of his almightiness. What must be insisted on is that God's omnipotence is not relevant to the problem of the war at all. Even the physical pain and loss are the results of free moral acts; and with these God can deal only by retributive justice to bring penitence and redemptive grace for the penitent. This omnipotence could have prevented the war or could stop it now only by the extinction of the free agents responsible for its commencement or continuance. To raise even the question of the relation of God's omnipotence to the war is to go, not forward, but backward, in Christian thinking; it is theological reaction. The problem of sin and evil is not a new problem; and this is not the first age that has been called to solve it, or at least to make the attempt to render the mystery less intolerable. The Christian church has already been confronted with this solution of it, and has decisively, and it is to be hoped finally, rejected it.

VI

Turning now from the danger of reaction in religious ideas to the same peril as regards moral ideals, we may observe the close connection there has been, and is, between individualism and universalism, as both are corrections of nationalism. Until Jeremiah and Ezekiel taught, the prophets of Israel addressed themselves to the nation as a whole and treated it as regards both duty and destiny as a unity, even though the change is heralded in Isaiah's doctrine of the remnant; but these two prophets of the Exile emphasized individual liberty and responsibility with even, one may be pardoned for adding, some exaggeration. Religion detached from the nation and attached to the individual was now ready to be universalized, and this movement we find in the great unnamed prophet of the Return, while the missionary obligation which universalism imposed is presented in the Book of Jonah. We may also regard the beautiful idyll, the Book of Ruth, as a protest against Jewish exclusiveness. In our present situation the tendency

is toward the reverse process. The nation has realized its solidarity in the perils, sufferings, labors, and sacrifices of war as it had not for several generations. Patriotism has been a more fervent feeling and a more potent motive than in the times of security and prosperity, which seem now so remote from us. The writer would not for a moment desire that it should be less, but wishes with all his heart that it may remain in the days of peace to discharge the many hard tasks that the future of the nation holds. It must be recognized, however, that these other moral interests have suffered, and that patriotism loses some of its moral value in so far as it represses these factors of national progress.

Avoiding all purely political considerations and confining ourselves only to the moral issue, we cannot but view with regret, and even apprehension, the attitude too commonly assumed by the conscientious objector. The law provides for total exemption, but nearly all tribunals have treated that as a dead letter; the law does not intend any form of persecution of the man about whose sincerity and genuineness there is no doubt, but many of the tribunals, by imposing combatant service where a good case for exemption was presented, or by insisting on non-combatant service when even that was conscientiously objected to, have revived persecution and have forced the army, which has other better work to do, to become the agent of persecution. The War Office honestly intended to give effect to the intentions of the law, but, nevertheless, instances of brutal ill-treatment there have been and possibly still are. The writer does not share the convictions of the conscientious objectors; the refusal of all non-combatant service seems to him even irrational and proof of a certain perversity of moral judgment; there has been sometimes an offensive self-assertion and an unwarranted defiance of all authority. But when all these concessions have been made, there still remains the fear that the nation as a whole has lost some of the respect for the individual conscience which in the highest moral interests it is imperative to retain.

Moral progress in the past has depended so much on the exercise of the individual moral judgment, often in opposition to the current moral standards, that the repression of it is much to be

regretted. The sincerity of the reformer has been proved by his willingness to be the martyr; but the society which has inflicted that penalty upon him has lost and not gained moral credit by so doing. It cannot be pretended that the national safety depended on suppressing conscientious objectors, of the genuineness of which there was as certain evidence as any law court would feel entitled to base its judgment upon in ordinary cases; and, therefore, it must be urged that there has not been adequate justification in the nation's claims on all its citizens for the too common disregard of conscience that we have been witnessing. Liberty of conscience in times past has been won at so great a cost that it is earnestly to be desired and hoped that what we have good cause so much to regret will prove a temporary, and not a permanent, reaction.

It is probable that in the more complex organization which modern society demands there will necessarily be a greater subordination of individual liberty to social obligation than there ever has been; and this can be saved from becoming an immoral tyranny only in the measure in which society, on the one hand, recognizes the realm of individual conscience, in which it is an unlawful usurper and not a legitimate sovereign, and the individual, on the other, recognizes the limits within which his claim for liberty can alone be made reasonably and righteously. The adjustment between these two factors in moral obligation is so delicate and so difficult that it would be a disaster if a rough-and-ready solution of the problem, hastily reached under the disturbing influence of war, came to be regarded as adequate or final. It may be said, in opposition to this temperate plea for respect for the individual conscience, that the murderer might plead that he had a conscientious objection to the continuance of his enemy in life, or the thief, that he had convinced himself that it would be only equitable that the superfluity of the rich man should be transferred to relieve his penury. But it is surely possible to make a distinction between motives and actions which are below the moral level already attained and ideals and aspirations which may still seem impracticable, but which would raise that level. Peace and not war among the nations is surely to be desired and commended, as murder and theft are not; and the man who feels bound in his own action to

anticipate the moral progress of the race, even though he seems altogether "too previous," can claim a toleration which cannot be shown to the man who wishes to revert to a lower stage of moral development. The conscientious objector to combatant or even to non-combatant service may be mistaken in his judgment that a nation is not justified in maintaining its existence and protecting the human good of which its history has made it the custodian against aggression by force of arms; and he may even be imperiling the possible progress of mankind by his lack of understanding of the signs of the times; and yet he does aim at a higher and not a lower standard of human relationship. This instance should suffice to make clear the principle of differentiation between acts that may, and acts that should not, receive tolerance.

VII

Before the war there was a movement toward a Christian universalism, a political internationalism. Some persons have rashly concluded that the movement was a mistake and that after the war it must be shunned and not sought. That patriotism is morally lawful and even praiseworthy, even as is family affection, we are now more convinced than we ever were before, since nationality seems to be, not only a divinely tolerated, but even a divinely appointed, mode of human unity, and a nation is the bearer of a distinctive type of human good as a contribution to the wealth of the whole race. But nationality is concentrative and not exclusive of humanity, and universalism or internationalism is not the opponent but the complement of patriotism. It is the offense of Germany that it has developed, and is now trying to realize, a nationalism to which it is ready to subordinate and even to sacrifice all the interests of the other members of the race. Signs are not wanting that some persons would invoke Satan to exorcise Satan by setting up in Great Britain a nationalism, in the British Empire an imperialism, which individually, industrially, and socially would be exclusive, a permanent antagonism to the nations with which we are at war. That it may take a long time to heal the wounds of national estrangement, who can doubt? That the maintenance of hostile relations should be avowed as a policy is a moral scandal. That

way madness lies, the suicide of all the common interests of humanity, of which all the nations are bound to be the preservers. Not less but more than ever must universalism or internationalism be the aspiration and ideal of good men in all lands. The entrance of the United States into the war and the political change in Russia are a great relief to the fears, and a great encouragement to the hopes, of all who desire the growing unity of all nations. Against the moral reaction of a patriotism that would oppress the individual conscience, on the one hand, or repress the universal or international ideal, on the other, the British nation needs to be on its guard; Christians in it shall be protected against the moral reaction as they are rescued from the religious reaction by respect for human nature, reverence for the holy love of God, and recognition that, not by his almightiness, but by man's obedience, does he fulfil his purpose of progress for all mankind. Should similar dangers show themselves in America, this article may, the writer hopes, serve to sound the timely note of warning.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY

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The entrance of the United States into the world-war has been accompanied by an interpretation of the meaning of our participation which suggests an idealism with great spiritual possibilities. Every Christian contemplates with loathing the idea of war for purposes of selfish aggrandizement. Human life is too sacred to be ruthlessly sacrificed to sordid schemes of national rivalry. The United States ought to lend the influence of its forces toward the ending of conditions which make inevitable such tragedies as the present. President Wilson has nobly expressed this purpose in his statement that the world must be made safe for democracy. This means ultimately that human interests must be made supreme as contrasted with the interests of any one class or group or nation at the expense of another. If our country can contribute toward this end, our participation in the war will be one of the most glorious deeds of history.

There is a peculiar responsibility resting on the Christian church in this situation. If the world is to be made safe for democracy, there must be a religious interpretation of democracy. No mere force of arms can establish a new kind of brotherhood. Only as men's sense of duty shall be such as to reinforce the fundamental principles of democracy will the new ideals be permanent possessions of humanity. It is the purpose of this paper to inquire concerning the ability of Christianity to furnish the religious and moral attitude indispensable to democracy.

It would be easy to point out that the fundamentals of the gospel of Jesus—the conception of the value of every human soul, the importance of the attitude of good-will, the practice of the Golden Rule—are all indispensable to a society which is to live on the basis of righteousness and mutual trust. Nothing is more needed than

that the gospel of good-will shall come to rule in international as well as in personal dealings, if the tragedy of this war is not to be repeated. The part which the preaching of the Christian message has had in leading the world toward a conception of life which makes democracy possible is greater than we often realize; and this preaching, with its leavening power, will always constitute a bulwark of righteousness, steadying the movements of political development.

But Christianity is not simply a gospel of good-will. Christianity is organized with doctrines and practices which demand the loyalty of Christian men. Now it is a historical fact that these doctrines and practices originated in an age when democracy was unknown. The Christian church has developed in relation to the politics of imperialism. Never has it consciously faced its task in terms of a democratic civilization. The early Christians felt the gospel to be so incompatible with the political aims of this present evil age that they declared that their citizenship was in heaven. The righteous social order for which they hoped was not to come by any democratic evolution, but by the cosmic catastrophe in which the imperial power of God would be superior to that of earthly sovereigns. It was to be a *Kingdom* of God, imposed on the world by kingly power, not evolved by human effort. Mediaeval Christianity developed in a world in which the Holy Roman Empire represented the fundamental conception of political organization; and the church was the spiritual counterpart of this earthly empire. The Reformation came when national states were emerging; but every state had its king. The Anabaptists could at that time make only a negative protest, significant as we now see that protest to have been. In the United States a policy of mutual non-interference by defining spheres of sovereignty so as to avoid conflict has prevailed, rather than an organization of the church to interpret democracy.

The structure of Christianity, as we know it, has been determined by imperialistic ideals. We are now for the first time face to face with a world which, we believe, is to be democratic. Are the doctrines and the practices of the Christian church adapted to this coming age? Can the world be convulsed by the struggle

between autocracy and democracy and the church escape a spiritual crisis? Does not membership in the church involve loyalty to certain ideals drawn from imperialism? Indeed, have we not been more or less conscious for some time that those who hope most from democracy are distressed by the traditional defense of vested rights so common in the church? As we look back on the past century of Christian history can we not see that there has been a significant spiritual struggle, in which the ideals of democracy have been incessantly making inroads on the autocracy of church polity and ecclesiastical doctrines? If the present enthusiasm for liberal political ideals is to find sympathetic interpretation in Christianity, must not some changes in emphasis and in organization be seriously contemplated?

There are four important questions to be considered as we face this issue: *First*, what conception of authority is consonant with democracy? *Secondly*, must not the norms for the religion of a coming age be drawn primarily from the demands of that age? *Thirdly*, must not experiment and change receive a welcome which the church has hitherto refused to give? *Fourthly*, must not the conception of *assurance* which Protestantism has exalted as the essence of religious experience be modified so as to give to an experimental faith its positive value?

1. *The problem of authority.*—The fundamental issue between autocracy and democracy is the question of ultimate control of decisions which affect the welfare of men. Autocracy claims the right to prescribe for men what they ought to do; democracy insists that men shall have the right to determine their duty for themselves. Autocracy imposed on the colonies in this country arbitrary taxes; democracy raised the protest, "No taxation without representation." Autocracy in the Prussian theory of politics gives to the ruler the right to declare war and to mobilize the army; democracy in the United States requires that the will of the people shall be expressed through Congress on a question so vitally affecting all the people of the nation. The various reforms of our methods of voting, the establishment of primary elections, the movement for the referendum, and similar significant tendencies in modern life are all expressions of the conviction that wholesome conditions

can be secured only as the control of politics shall be in the hands of the people.

It is obvious that any interpretation of moral and spiritual life which places restraints upon men from an alien source is out of harmony with the democratic ideal. The protest against the doctrine of the divine right of kings will find an echo in any realm in which appeal is made to an occult source of authority protected from criticism or reform by the assertion of a metaphysical rather than a moral right to exist. In view of this fact, it is worth while to ask ourselves whether we may not be preserving in the structure of our inherited doctrines and polity a conception of authority which was entirely in harmony with the political philosophy of the Middle Ages, but which must inevitably come into conflict with the idealism of democracy. If the democratic movement is to receive a religious interpretation, we must make sure that our Christianity can give this interpretation with genuineness. An autocratic religion in a democratic world would be an anomaly. If President Wilson's demand that the world is to be made safe for democracy is to be realized, democracy must be safe in the Christian church.

The history of modern Christianity is really a struggle between the autocratic theology of the mediaeval church and the desire of Christian people to gain control of their religious life. Mediaeval Catholicism was the religious embodiment of the ideal of government from above by divine sanctions. Christianity was defined as a religious system coming to men by divine revelation and administered by ecclesiastical officials who derived their authority from the apostolic succession instituted by Christ. The content of a man's religious belief was determined *for* him by a superior power. The individual had no right to criticize or to modify the doctrine thus prescribed. His duty was to obey and to accept.

The doctrine of infallibility is the practical expression of absolute autocracy. It means that whatever the infallible church says, is immune from adverse criticism just because the church says it is. All encroachments on the metaphysical rights of the divinely established church are to be systematically resisted. Modern Catholicism is seeking to maintain in the world a religiously

controlled civilization, the control being in the hands of officials whose responsibility is not to living people, but to a superhuman commission affirmed to be of divine authority. To save the absoluteness of its authority, Catholicism consistently seeks to eliminate from the forces of civilization all influences which might in any way weaken the hold of ecclesiastical authority. The ideas of men must be shaped by a rigid censorship of education and by a carefully guarded indoctrination. The validity of an ecclesiastical administration of human activities is asserted to be superior to that of any other kind of organization. Church schools are to be preferred to secular schools. The ecclesiastically approved philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is to displace Kant. A Catholic scholar must have the *imprimatur* of a church official in publishing a book dealing with doctrines or movements which concern the church. A list of dangerous and forbidden writings is prepared by officials of the church to guard public opinion from possible contamination. The control of beliefs and practices is kept in the hands of those who have a divine commission. The religion of Catholicism is a consistent expression of absolutism. It can never interpret democracy, for it distrusts democracy.

The Protestant reformation is often declared to have been a great democratization of Christianity. It is true that the right of the individual to defy the authority of the church was stoutly maintained. It is true that the principle of lay participation in the organization of church activities has been to a greater or less extent recognized. Especially should it be emphasized that the efforts of the Independents in the struggle for religious liberty in England made powerfully for political freedom, since church and state were so closely interwoven. And above all the recognition of equal rights for all religious bodies in this country has made possible a significant freedom of discussion and a virtual emancipation of the individual from the necessary control of any church. For when no one religious body has the right to coerce, when citizenship does not depend on conformity, the possibility of absolute ecclesiastical control is limited to those who voluntarily submit to such control. Absolutism thus exists only on sufferance. However it may insist on the theory of underived authority,

it can enforce that authority only in so far as people elect to recognize it.

Protestantism has thus made democracy possible. But has Protestantism realized the full meaning of democracy in the realm of religion?

The presupposition of thinking during the Middle Ages was that fundamental truths and laws must be derived from divine mandates. Protestantism denied the competency of the church to interpret infallibly the will of God; but original Protestantism made no revision of this fundamental principle of mediaeval thinking. The discovery of truth was assumed to be identical with the ascertaining of what God had prescribed. That biblical teachings should be final in their dominion over men was asserted as stoutly by Protestantism as by Catholicism. No *man* has authority to impose his private interpretation of the Word of God on his fellows; but every man must accept the mandates of God as these are revealed in the teachings of the Bible. Luther was quite as vehement as were Catholic theologians in denouncing the discoveries of Copernicus, the reason in both cases being that the Copernican theory was not in accord with the pronouncements of Scripture. In spite of the many struggles of advancing thought and in spite of the many modifications of the literalistic theory of biblical authority, Protestant religious thinking still proceeds usually on the hypothesis that conformity to authoritatively prescribed teachings is imperative. Independent inquiry is dangerous, and dissent from scriptural doctrines is disloyalty to God.

It is here that we find the significance of biblical criticism. Popularly, criticism is still widely regarded as an unwarranted refusal to submit to rightful authority. The "higher critic" is depicted as a religious anarchist, doing what is right in his own eyes, as the Israelites did before there was any king in Israel. Exactly as it is treason to refuse absolute allegiance to an unlimited monarch, so it is held to be religious treason to withhold complete assent to the dictates of the Bible. Now, criticism in the realm of biblical study means that the utterances of Scripture are subjected to the judgments of men, exactly as democracy in government means that the deeds of the ruler are to be judged by the citizens of the

country. It would be interesting to compare the attitude and the arguments of those who in the days of growing democracy shuddered at the sacrilege of a denial of the divine rights of kings with the attitude of those who in Christendom are dismayed at any curtailment of the absolute authority of Scripture. But if freedom of criticism is essential to political democracy, is it any less essential to a religion which serves a democratic age?

The rights of criticism have today established themselves in certain realms in which the teachings of the Bible are pertinent. It is generally recognized that a geologist has the right to dissent from the doctrine of the earth's origin and history as given in the first chapter of Genesis, and that historians have the right to correct the biblical accounts of the wars and the reigns of Israelitish kings in the light of evidence from Assyrian and Babylonian monuments. Yet even here there is a persistent attempt to maintain the conception of conformity to biblical teachings "properly interpreted." Thus, even in the modification of actual beliefs, there is frequently preserved the attitude of unquestioning obedience to an authoritative pronouncement. It is assumed that legitimate doctrines must be sanctioned by a revelation from above. Thus, even when a harmonization of science with Scripture takes place, it is accomplished in such a way that the religious significance of honest examination of the facts is depreciated in comparison with the attitude of conformity to external authority.

Now, the democratic conception of authority is vital rather than formal. The real leader in a democracy is the man who lives so completely in sympathy with the needs and the aspirations of his fellow-citizens that he voices their actual interests. The sovereign crowned by superhuman sanction represents the autocratic conception of authority. Democracy finds the embodiment of its ideal in Lincoln, whose greatness grew out of a sympathetic sharing of the life of the people. The entire machinery of democracy is devised to secure the vital identification of the lawmaker with the people for whom he is to legislate. This ideal is often crudely worked out, as when rigid insistence on local residence is a condition of election; but the intent is plain. Real authority must come from sharing the life of men, not from an alien commission.

The historical method of studying the Bible is of great significance from this point of view. As a result of this method the authors of the biblical books cease to be the somewhat mechanical mouthpieces of a superhuman oracle. They take their places in the life of humanity, gaining their greatness from the completeness with which they could interpret the struggles and aspirations which were taking place in society in their day. An Old Testament scholar has recently expressed this fact in the following suggestive words:

The Hebrews were given no extraordinary or abnormal aids or advantages not within the reach of other men, then as now. God did not show favor toward them in any such way as to render them exempt from the temptations, weaknesses, failures, and sins that beset us all. Nor were they endowed with power or grace that was not accessible to other men. Having the same opportunities and being possessed of the same faculties as other men, no more and no less, the Hebrew prophets and saints threw themselves heart and soul into the task of interpreting the world about them in terms of God. The Old Testament is the record of their success.¹

The historical spirit of interpretation is imperative if the Bible is to be used for the building up of a democratic civilization. We cannot maintain one kind of authority in our political life and a totally different kind of authority in religious life unless we wish religion and democracy to be mutually distrustful. To insist on blind submission in religion is a spiritual preparation for blind submission to autocratic power in the state; it is fundamentally opposed to the ideals of democracy. If the church is to guide and inspire the new age, it must teach men to see God's leading in the actual events of life rather than in mere formal proclamations of doctrine.

That this involves a readjustment of religious sentiment is evident. It throws on the living generation a far larger responsibility for the discovery of ideals and aims than has previously been supposed. But everyone who has come to feel that intimate touch with the great figures of the Bible which comes from historical appreciation knows also the uplifting inspiration derived from companionship with the rich religious life of these men. When once the

¹ J. M. Powis Smith, *A Guide to the Study of the Christian Religion*, p. 155.

utterances of the Bible are read as interpretations of the struggle for faith and of the response of God in the aspirations of men, they may serve to inspire our struggles and to give us faith in a way directly significant for the religious guidance of democracy. The authority of the Bible thus is the authority of men who have shared completely with humanity the perplexities and the struggles which all must experience, and who are fitted to counsel and to help precisely because of their oneness with us rather than because of a unique possession of superhuman knowledge which sets them metaphysically apart from us. One of the supreme tasks of the church in a democratic age is to make universally accessible the historical interpretation of the Bible. That this means a revision of ideals of religious education is evident. But if democracy is to be religiously inspired, men must learn to seek the guidance of God in the events of their own life. If religious inquiry is always directed toward formal oracles, conceived as having a unique metaphysical origin, there is no adequate training of religious feeling for the presence of God in the very structure and progress of human living.

2. *The deriving of norms from future needs.*—The democratic age in which we are to live needs prophetic and creative leadership. Few of us realize how completely this war will change our problems. Under the stress of military necessity England has abandoned traditions which seemed too sacred ever to be modified and has reconstructed the life of her people in radical ways. Keen-sighted observers had for years been calling attention to relics of feudalism in the industrial and social order; but not until the entire resources of the nation had to be co-ordinated for the common good did the future take precedence of the past. Democracy is often felt to be lacking in reverence for established ways. But such irreverence is only the negative expression of a great positive desire that the future shall be better than the past. Democracy is inevitably more interested in the possibilities of the future than in the sanctities of the past.

This war has burned in upon our consciousness the fact that traditional conceptions of international relations are bankrupt. The utterances of President Wilson have made it clear that the

great issue before us is not any re-establishment of *status quo ante*, not any mere national aggrandizement, not any of the aims for which wars in the past have been waged, but a better kind of a world, in which nations may dwell together in peace. Never was there greater need for prophetic and creative idealism. If the world is to be made safe for democracy, men must acquire the habit of looking for the norms of action and of aspiration in the better future rather than in the disastrous past.

Is the Christian church prepared to cultivate this kind of spiritual idealism?

Our inherited conceptions of duty are all in the opposite direction. Catholicism denounces Modernism as the quintessence of all heresies, because the Modernist derives his standards from the possibilities of the future rather than from the mandates of the past. Catholicism and Protestantism alike have defined Christianity as something which was divinely prescribed in obligatory form at the beginning. If this definition be accepted, the supreme duty is to reproduce this authoritative model. Church polity must be precisely what is ordained in the New Testament. Baptism must be administered in its exact original form. Beliefs must be a repetition of what men in the first century believed. Industrial and social questions are to be met by studying religious precepts uttered in relation to a social and industrial order centuries old.

It is true that the exigencies of modern life are making serious inroads into this conventional way of determining religious duty. Some twenty-five years ago in a certain city the advisability of introducing the Society of Christian Endeavor was discussed by the pastors. A paper was read which by painful collating of texts and much conjectural exegesis contended that such societies might be established because of scriptural sanction. Almost no one now would feel that such sanction is essential. The question must be decided by asking whether such a society will make for a better state of Christian living in the future. The Young Men's Christian Association is making us more and more familiar with the method of seeking guidance from the exigencies of present and future conditions rather than by consulting the Scriptures after the manner of the scribes.

Yet, when all is said, it must be confessed that the presupposition of most Christian thinking is such as to support a conservative rather than a constructively progressive conception of the task of Christianity. Instinctively men seek guidance by asking what has been prescribed in the Bible, or approved by councils, or written in creeds, rather than by analyzing the problems of the present in the light of the task to be accomplished. To laud the "good old-time religion" is popularly considered a mark of greater insight than to suggest improvements. To declare that the faith of our fathers is good enough for us seems more devout than to ask whether the present generation has no more strenuous task than simply to conserve a spiritual inheritance. Ought we not rather to ask whether a vital faith can continue if each living generation shall assume no greater responsibility than that of holding to a faith once delivered? The impotence of a religion which simply reproduces the past is tragically revealed when, as often occurs, a father who knows nothing but inherited ideas is helplessly bewildered by the religious estrangement of his son, not knowing that the bigger world of the son demands a bigger faith than that which the father can supply.

The extent to which the dead hand of the past is strangling the religious life of today should be more generally recognized. Conformity is the pathway to favor in the church. The candidate for the ministry who can repeat shibboleths in his examination for ordination is surer of a hearty approval than is the man who professes a "new theology." Many of the most enterprising and devoted men in our colleges deliberately turn away from the Christian ministry because they are convinced, rightly or wrongly, that there is no place in the church for the kind of free and independent thinking which they have learned to love and to employ constructively. The religious education of children still consists too largely in mastering precepts from a literature two thousand or more years old rather than in acquiring the capacity to face and to interpret the world of today. The mediaeval habit of thinking still persists in church circles, even when the honest attempt is made to face present problems. To be supremely concerned over a valid succession from the apostles reveals the type of mind which

is supremely concerned over dynasties. But in an age which is marked by the eager aspiration of men to create a better future in the state, in industry, in culture, in religion, the church which is primarily concerned with the maintenance of ancient orders and century-old formulas is missing the real spiritual issues.

Indeed, a more sympathetic reading of the New Testament should furnish food for sober thought. If the apostle Paul, for the sake of a more vital religious life among the Gentiles, refused to make obligatory on them the rite of circumcision, although it was repeatedly commanded in his Bible and had all the sanction of centuries of usage, what would he say of a church which is more concerned with conformity to ancient customs than with the new demands of a new age? If Jesus considered the need of a living man more sacred than the scriptural law of the Sabbath, how would he judge a church which systematically subjects the thinking of living men to the compulsion of agreement with prescribed doctrines? That there is here a sharp challenge to the church is evident to anyone who reads the signs of the times.

3. *The value of experiment.*—The third question to which attention should be directed is closely related to the preceding. If the future is to condition our aims and standards, we must adopt the method of discovering the truth which makes possible advance in knowledge. This method is that of scientific experiment.

The fundamental difference between the mediaeval world and the modern world is to be found here. If a mediaeval man wished to know about nature, he consulted Aristotle or reasoned from general philosophical hypotheses. The modern man learns by scientific observation and experiment. But experiment means the right to question and to test the adequacy of received explanations. An infallible system of doctrine could have no place for vital experimentation.

Democracy, by its very nature, is a gigantic experiment. Instead of a dynasty with fixed succession of rulers, democracy puts its elected officers to the test of experience and reserves the right to choose a different governor if the present one proves incapable. Into our legislation is coming more and more of the spirit of experimentation. It is increasingly recognized that there are no rights

and privileges so sacrosanct that they may not be modified or set aside in order to construct a future better than the past has been. Democracy can exist only as there is freedom to conduct the great experiment of government in such a way as to make the best use of increasing human wisdom. Government must always be responsive to the vision of a possible better future, and must shape experimental laws so as to secure that better future.

Now, freedom to experiment carries with it freedom to make mistakes and to learn from mistakes as well as from successes. It involves the right of dissent, the right of free speech, the right to say foolish things as well as wise things. There can be no a priori infallible authority to prevent error. Men must constantly learn by free discussion and by mutual criticism how to distinguish the bad from the good. It is true that democracy has not yet learned to realize that exact scientific research must be cultivated if experiments are to be consistently guided toward improvement, instead of constituting a chaos of individual efforts. Still, even with the mistakes which freedom of inquiry inevitably brings, the right to experiment is to be preferred to the compulsion of a supposedly infallible alien authority.

Does the Christian church welcome experiments in belief and practice? Or does the church feel somewhat uncomfortable at the idea of nonconformity? The new world into which we are entering is certain to be a world in which experiment will have a large place. Can Christianity so interpret the significance of experimentation that this characteristic activity of modern life shall find itself reverently working in co-operation with religious impulses instead of compelled to endure ecclesiastical condemnation? Who knows what is to be the exact nature of the new world in which democracy is to be made safe? Who knows just what kind of religious faith and what forms of worship and of activity will best give spiritual vitality to this world? To assume that the doctrines which gave inspiration to mediaeval life will without change be suited to a world in which scientific experiment and democratic mobility are dominant is to beg the entire question. We simply cannot find out what the task and the function of Christianity in the new age is to be without experiment.

What, for example, shall be the content of faith for China as that ancient civilization grows into a sympathetic organ of modern democracy? Shall the beliefs of the Chinese Christians be prescribed autocratically by Western ecclesiastical bodies? Or shall oriental Christians be encouraged to work out their own ways of expressing their faith? There are signs that the missionary enterprise—the most stupendous experiment which the Christian church has undertaken—may introduce into our ways of thinking and acting a new spirit. If we shall come to see that it is essential to the vitality of religion in Japan or in China that freedom to think honestly and to construct doctrines congenial to the oriental mind be granted, it will be self-evident that the same freedom should be granted to Christians in our land. The broader spirit of sympathetic toleration may be the means of encouraging a type of Christianity flexible enough to meet the needs of the growing democratic world.

Or, again, what should be the attitude of the church toward the science which is the means of discovering truth in the modern world? Catholicism attempts to keep scientific inquiry under the domination of the church in order that no dangerous innovations may be made. Protestantism, too, has dreaded and distrusted the inroads of a completely free science. But intelligent men have come to see that an *a priori* control of science by the church is sure to prevent the discovery of the truth. If only one of several hypotheses may be seriously considered, there is no way of determining whether the others are actually inferior. One may be missing a better doctrine simply by holding to one which is conventionally approved.

Is the church willing to recognize the desirability of scientific questioning in the realm of religion? Is it willing to put its doctrines, its organization, its ritual, to the test of actual experiment and to make changes, if such shall be necessary? May a college student modify the doctrines which he has been taught so as to include the teachings of modern science? May a church determine by actual experiment whether baptism is essential to a Christian life, or whether it is desirable as a test of church membership? May a rural community avoid the criminal rivalry of our existing denomi-

national dogmatisms by the experiment of a community church, conforming to no conventional ecclesiastical model? To be sure, such experiments are constantly being made, but it is too often at the cost of forfeiting the fellowship of ecclesiastically regular churches. Shall it be said that those experiments in religion which are of the very essence of a growing democracy shall be frowned on and penalized by the church? Shall Christianity continue the unhappy habits of the past century, when she permitted scientific discoveries to be made only under determined protest, and thus discredited herself in the eyes of scientific men? Or shall the coming of the new era be a challenge to the church to honor the prophets while they are alive instead of building their tombs when they are dead?

4. *The need of a new emphasis in religious faith.*—Finally, the attitude which has been suggested in the foregoing discussion requires a new type of religious faith. Protestantism received from Luther the conception that absolute assurance is the mark of the highest type of religious life. To be absolutely sure in spite of all the seductions of men and all the devils of hell was fundamental for Luther. Uncertainty there must not be. Experiment was out of the question. Waiting for the outcome of a process was not to be thought of. One must be certain from the first, and this certainty must rest on the acceptance of God's word which abideth forever.

We can see how this emphasis constituted at the time a necessary weapon against the power of the Catholic church. Absolute certainty based on God's word was a fitting rejoinder to the claims of the church to exercise jurisdiction over men. But it was easy to transfer this attitude from the assertion of freedom from ecclesiastical tyranny to the affirmation of the entire system of faith and practice in Protestantism. It has been generally assumed that dogmatic certainty is synonymous with vital religious experience. To admit questioning or doubt into religious life has been regarded as a demoralizing practice. Nothing seems so terrible to many a conscientious Christian as to be "unsettled" in one's belief. Thus honest questioning often incurs the burden of suspicion and distrust.

In an age which is to proceed with the great experiment which is before us, assurance of the Lutheran kind is impossible. We must have a faith which looks to the future for its justification, which can proceed tentatively, which can rejoice in partial glimpses of truth, seeing in these the promise of greater insight as men go on in the quest. To insist prematurely on dogmatic finalities would be to defeat the best outcome of human progress. Now this means that assurance is no longer the most important thing in religion. Indeed, the best thing which could happen to some self-complacent persons would be to be plunged into anxiety lest they may not be losing their souls while preserving their sense of assurance. It may be fairly asked whether a religion which exalts the feeling of absolute certainty that God is looking with approval may not be failing to appreciate the fundamental attitude of Christianity. Repentance is the pathway to genuine discipleship. The Pharisees brought down upon themselves the fiery denunciations of Jesus because they were incapable of repentance. They were so sure of their acceptance with God that they were neglecting the duty of self-criticism.

Is our religious faith such as to be willing to trust a cause to the outcome of moral criticism? Are we ready to exchange the absolutes of dogmatic certainty for the experiments conditioned by constant criticism? Is a religion which wants no risks to be preferred to a religion which is committed to ventures of faith in which the outcome is not absolutely certain? This is a fundamental question which must be faced in our day.

That there are marked modifications of the older dogmatic position is evident to all who observe the signs of the times. The word "infallible," which designates absolute certainty, is fast disappearing from our religious vocabulary. Increasingly men are learning to trust to the processes of inquiry and experiment. More and more are we finding that uncertainty may be the surest pathway to the truth. Formerly men felt that, unless they could be absolutely certain that the world came into existence precisely as it is said to have been created in Genesis, religious faith would be shattered. But in the past two generations we have come to be conscious of new ways of conceiving origins. No one knows now

exactly how the world came into being. But we are content to trust to the processes of criticism and to the natural growth of knowledge to bring us satisfactory explanations. There are better theories to be formulated in the future, and our present ignorance is thus a positive way of seeking for the best.

What is true of the doctrine of creation is coming to be true in other realms of thought and practice. Uncertainty is felt to be, not a calamity, but rather an invitation to enter a better and a larger realm of knowledge. It makes revision possible. It delivers us from the necessity of living always subject to the restrictions of present conditions. It was uncertainty as to the finality of the pope's authority which made possible the Protestant reformation. It was a desire for a better future which inspired the Methodist revival. It was doubt as to the correctness of the stern Calvinistic doctrine of unconditional election which led to the more Christlike conception of God, which today inspires us.

It is here that the doctrine of evolution may play a positive part in the religion of democracy. This doctrine was dreaded because it destroyed the conception of a universe of finalities. There are no finished things. Everything is always in the process of growth or change. Accustomed as theology was to looking to divine origins for sanctions, it was bewildered by a way of viewing things which rendered origins obscure, if not contemptible. How could man have any dignity if he is descended from animals? How can the Bible be of any significance if it is the outgrowth of men's thinking as they passed through striking changes of experience and belief? So reasoned men who were thinking in terms of divine rights and who based moral values on supernatural origins.

But as time passed, and as we had an opportunity to become more familiar with the real significance of the doctrine of evolution, we discovered that, instead of constituting a fatal obstacle to religious faith, it actually made possible a new kind of faith. Not the origin of a thing, but the result of its development is most significant. Not the chaotic movements of star dust, but the marvel of the universe, which is still in the process of development; not the beastlike habits of primitive man, but the glory of a Plato,

an Isaiah, a Shakespeare, or a Lincoln; not the rude sounds of tom-tom and the raucous shouts of savages, but the creative art of the modern symphony; not the superstitious animism of the cave man, but the majesty of the worship of the God of the whole earth; these later developments rather than the crude beginnings furnish the ground of our faith. They are inspired by what things may develop into rather than by their origins.

The faith of democracy must inevitably be a forward-looking faith. We are keenly conscious of defects in popular experiments; but we believe that defects can be corrected. The future is to be better than the present. Our children shall have a better country in which to live than the one in which we spend our life. Good and glorious as the past may be, that past can find its full meaning only in a greater future.

If Christianity is to be an inspiring power in such a civilization, it too must develop a forward-looking faith. Instead of trying to reinstate primitive Christianity, it must learn to think of Christianity as a religious movement always developing, always learning from the progress of history how better to interpret the providential guidance of God. Uplifting as was the early Christian belief that the Kingdom of God would come suddenly and quickly by a miracle, is there not something far more inspiring in the belief that God gives to his children large responsibility for bringing in the Kingdom? Is not the story of the mediaeval attempt to evangelize all the world and to organize it under the dominion of the Christian church a fascinating tale of a growing faith with ever-expanding vision? When that faith became complacent, when the church was more concerned to conserve her own power and privilege than to advance with prophetic vision into the coming age, out of the mutterings of discontent and the various efforts to realize a free and vital faith came Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation, shattering the dream of ecclesiastical control of civilization and releasing new power as laymen were summoned to find in their vocations the opportunity for Christian living. When, again, Protestantism became self-satisfied and was more concerned with orthodoxy of doctrine than with zeal for human welfare, Pietism and the Methodist revival awakened humble souls to a realization

of their dignity, and thus prepared the way for a religiously inspired democracy. And in our own day we have been witnessing movements which point to a new opportunity for Christianity if it can bring to expression faith in the religious meaning of progress. Many are the signs of a future full of hope. More and more are churches asking what is demanded by the future; less and less do mere precedent and slavish conformity dominate the efforts of Christian people and of Christian organizations. To secure a better religious life for the coming generation is increasingly felt to be more important than to conserve unchanged the religion of our fathers. Inquiring minds are invited freely to work out beliefs which will inspire life rather than to accept prescribed creeds. Divinity schools are reorganizing their courses by asking how best the needs of the coming generation may be met rather than by asking how students may be indoctrinated in the tenets of an unchangeable system. Sunday schools are revising religious education by asking what is demanded by the interests of living children rather than what is officially approved in the ancient creeds. Some of the best preaching of our day is vibrant with the prophetic note. The pathetic feature of the situation is that men who have been alienated from the church by its dogmatism in the past are generally unaware that a new spirit is growing in the church, and that honest inquirers may now find a welcome and a place for service where formerly they would have been distrusted.

The present war is bringing the old order to an end in the political world. The church is better prepared inwardly than it knows to renounce its alliance with defeated autocracy. If the present crisis shall stimulate Christian leaders to think in terms of the coming age, the church will be enabled to furnish that without which the future would be indeed dark—a religious interpretation of the democratic movement which shall make dominant the forces of spiritual life, and thus deliver the world from the tragedy of depending on brute power.

THE PAULINE THEOLOGY AND HELLENISM

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The purpose of the present paper is a general survey of the extent of the influence of Hellenism on St. Paul. The material was originally delivered as a lecture, and the lecture form has been retained.

The most important division of Paulinism that appears to be quite inexplicable from Jewish premises may for the lack of a better title be called the "redemption doctrine." Briefly stated, it is this: The world and all men in it, Jews and Gentiles alike, are in their natural state under the domination of imperfect heavenly beings, from whose power, however, Christians are delivered by Christ.

As the discovery of this system in the epistles is of comparatively recent date, an investigation of it in some detail may be found profitable. Its key is in the word *στοιχεῖα*, which St. Paul uses four times, in Gal. 4:3, 9, and Col. 2:8, 20, the other occurrences of the term in the New Testament being Heb. 5:12, where it can mean only "first principles," and in II Pet. 3:10, 12, where it may be translated "elementary substances," although the exact force in this last passage is dubious. For the Pauline passages nearly all older commentaries and not a few of the more recent adopt the meaning in Hebrews, and, at first sight, this sense appears to give a very satisfactory translation. So, for instance, in Gal. 4:3, "we Jews, when we were children, were held in bondage under elementary instruction fit for children, which belongs to this world," a rendition that seems quite appropriate, especially in view of the figure of the Law as our "disciplinary guardian" (*παιδαγωγός*) in 3:24. But when we attempt to read this force of *στοιχεῖα* into the next paragraph of Galatians (4:8-11) our difficulties begin.

In 4:8-11 the readers are addressed as Gentiles who in time past have not known God. Quite recently they had begun to "observe days and months and seasons and years," to the great vexation of St. Paul, who asks them, "How do you turn back again to the weak and beggarly στοιχεῖα, to which you are willing to be in bondage all over again?" The verb ἐπιστρέφετε and the repeated πάλιν, emphasized at its second occurrence with ἀνωθεν, leave no doubt that St. Paul construes this "observance" of theirs as a relapse into their former heathenism, so that the service of the στοιχεῖα was to him a part of that heathenism. Consequently στοιχεῖα cannot mean "first principles," for the former worship in which the readers had "not known God" was positive irreligion, not an elementary form of true religion.

The real meaning of the noun in vs. 9 is given from the obvious parallel with vs. 8; "the poor and beggarly στοιχεῖα which you wish to serve again" is a direct resumption of "you used to serve those who by nature are not gods" (τοῖς φύσει μὴ οὖσιν θεοῖς). That is, the Stoicheia are the former deities of the Galatians.

The name, to be sure, is rare for Hellenistic deities, and this is probably the reason why the meaning of the passage was so long undiscovered; but direct evidence of the use of the word in such an application exists. We find, for example, an exact parallel to St. Paul in Philo:

Can we compare (with the monotheists) those who reverence the στοιχεῖα earth, water, air, and fire? to which different nations have given different names, calling fire Hephaestus [Ἡφαιστος], I presume because of its kindling, [ἕξαιψις], and the air Hera [Ἥρα], because of its being raised up [αἵρεσθαι]. . . . But these names are the invention of sophists; but the elements [στοιχεῖα] are inanimate matter. . . . But what shall we say of those men who worship the perfect things made of them, the sun, the moon, and the other stars, whether planetary or fixed, or the whole heaven or the universal world?¹

The στοιχεῖα here are, properly speaking, the four "elements," earth, air, fire, and water, but these are not in themselves direct objects of worship; they are associated with various deities (including members of the old Olympic pantheon) who are supposed to be connected with them in some way, perhaps to hold them in control.

¹ *De vit. contempl.* i; cf. *De dec.* xii. 53.

And closely related to this worship of the *στοιχεῖα*, though in a more refined form, is worship of the heavenly bodies. Philo's passage puts us on familiar ground; he is describing the Hellenistic religious phenomena that we sum up under the general title "astral worship." To quote from Cumont:

Beneath the lowest sphere, that of the moon, the zones of the elements are placed in tiers: the zones of fire, air, water, and earth. To these four principles, as well as to the constellations, the Greeks gave the name of *στοιχεῖα*, and the Chaldeans already worshipped the one as well as the other. The influence of Oriental religions, like that of Stoic cosmology, spread through the West the worship of these four bodies, believed to be elements, whose infinite variety of combinations gave rise to all perceptible phenomena. . . . By the end of the pagan period the divinity of these practical agents was a religious principle, accepted by all heathendom.¹

To be sure, worship of the *στοιχεῖα* was not astral worship in the strict sense:

There is, however, an essential difference between the powers of this sublunary world—elements and demons—and the stars. The former are subject to the activity of the latter, their various manifestations are caused by the combined influence of the heavenly bodies; to the latter alone belong constancy and regularity; they alone serve for the purposes of scientific divination.²

This distinction corresponds to that made by Philo, but it naturally would not have been made with any too great rigorism in the popular mind, particularly as in Greek *στοιχεῖα* meant "constellations" as well as "elements," and no justification need be offered for the inclusion of *στοιχεῖα* worship in astral worship.

Now the astral worship of the Hellenistic period is a subject on which our information is satisfactorily complete. It is best presented in English in the work of Cumont just cited, but every treatise on Hellenistic religion discusses the topic more or less fully. Like the other beliefs of the period, the astral cults are disorderly syncretisms, but they all possess certain common features. Fundamental in all is the conception that the heavenly bodies are deities which have a direct and controlling influence over human affairs,

¹ *Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans*, 1912, p. 121.

² *Ibid.*

a statement that is only a roundabout way of saying that they all presume a belief in astrology. The extent of this belief during the period under discussion needs no description, and its results on the practical outlook on life were far-reaching. By the stars all human events were irresistibly fixed in advance, so that the fate of every human being was determined down to its smallest details by an unchangeable destiny (*ἀνάγκη, μοῖρα, εἰμαρμένη*). Men's attitude toward this destiny varied. The philosopher usually accepted it and sought a stoic refuge in a retreat into the impregnable fortress of his own personality. Other men held that the deities were not totally beyond human sympathy or power and that they could be propitiated or even controlled; this tenet found its expression largely in magical performances which, as remedies for stellar fatalism, proved morally worse than the disease. Still other men undertook to appeal from the stars to the deities above them—deities not commonly known and difficult of access, but of a might great enough to snatch their devotee from the malign power of the planets. So Apuleius tells us¹ that, after initiation into the Isis mystery, the mystes is delivered from the power of "blind Fortune" into the "guardianship of a Fortune who can see and who even illuminates the other deities with the splendor of her light." "Calamity has no power over those whose lives the majesty of our goddess has claimed for her own service."

Gal. 4:8-10 now offers no difficulty. "But in time past, when you did not know God, you were in slavery to beings who were not truly gods. But now that you have come to know God—or, to speak more correctly, now that God has come to notice *you*—how does it happen that you are turning back again to those poor and beggarly astral deities? You behave as if you wish to be enslaved to them all over again; what other meaning can be ascribed to your observance of days and weeks and months and years? These divisions of time are precisely what the astral beings determine!" This is perfectly clear and would have been entirely obvious to the Galatians.

The only detail in this sentence calling for further explanation is the play on the word "know." "You have come to know God"

¹ *Metamorph.* xi. 15.

is the conventional Hellenistic phrase to describe initiation into an esoteric religious system, but St. Paul, after using it, substitutes "rather you have been known by God," where the verb is employed in the strict Old Testament sense of "regard with favor," "choose out" (Ps. 1:6; 144:3; Amos 3:2, etc.).

Now it is in no way remarkable that St. Paul should believe that the stars were deities which the Gentiles worshiped, because, if for no other reason, this belief is set forth categorically in the Old Testament: "Lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, when thou seest the sun and the moon and the stars, even all the host of heaven, thou be drawn away and worship them, and serve them, which Yahweh thy God hath allotted unto all the peoples under the whole heaven" (Deut. 4:19; cf. 17:3; 29:26; Jer. 8:2, etc.; Acts 7:42 f.). And it was quite in the order of things that St. Paul should remind his readers of their release from slavery to their former deities; any Jew of the period might have used exactly the same words. The remarkable feature of St. Paul's teaching appears when we apply the results of our study of Gal. 4:8-10 to Gal. 4:2-5, as we are bound to do (for we certainly have no right to translate the two occurrences of *στοιχεῖα* in vss. 2 and 9 by different words). As *στοιχεῖα* means "elemental spirits," "astral deities," in vs. 9, it must have the same meaning in vs. 2, and the necessity of such a translation in vs. 2 appears from another consideration. Notwithstanding the opinion of the great commentators of the past, the Law to St. Paul did not represent "elementary principles," but "temporary principles," if not "wrong principles." A contrast with the use in Heb. 6:1 will make this clear. Under *στοιχεῖα* the writer of Hebrews classifies repentance, belief in God, baptism, etc.—matters that really and necessarily belong to the earliest stages of the instruction in Christianity, matters which may be reviewed and restudied from time to time by those of greater maturity. But in St. Paul's system the Law plays no such part. St. Paul no doubt used the Old Testament prophecies as part of his apologetic to Gentiles as well as to Jews (Rom. 1:2), but he certainly did not give his converts instruction in the Law as the first step in their Christian instruction. The Law to him had had some not very precisely defined function in the religious history

of the world, but this function, whatever it had been, was now completed; the new salvation, far from being an elaboration of the Law, was something entirely different.

Returning now to Gal. 4:1-3, we have the following as its translation: "But I say, as long as the heir is a minor, he differs in no way from a slave, even though he is owner of the whole estate, but he is under the control of guardians and administrators, until the day of his majority. Just so we, when we were minors, were kept under the control of the astral deities of this world." Again, the sense is perfectly clear when we once realize the extraordinary equation that St. Paul has set up. He has identified in some sense Jewish legalism with Gentile heathendom; both to him are a worship of the same astral deities.

We can trace some of the steps by which he must have reached this conclusion. The Jews believed that God governed the world through his angels and associated or identified all the heavenly bodies with some of these angels. The Old Testament (*u.s.*) taught that these heavenly bodies, "the host of heaven," were the objects of gentile worship. The Old Testament also, though in a different series of passages (I Kings 22:19; Neh. 9:6, etc.), used the same title, "the host of heaven," for the angels. And finally the Jewish Haggadah, which St. Paul unquestioningly believed, taught that the Law was given by angels, by the "host of heaven." Here were all the elements needed for St. Paul's conclusion, and all he had to do was to combine them. The heat of polemic doubtless supplied the motive for this combination, which could never have occurred to any orthodox Jew; the angels in Jewish thought were little more than animated automata, passive executors of God's will, incapable of disobeying him. But in St. Paul's teaching they acquired vivid personalities of their own and became beings acting independently of God's control—a concept for which there are a few, but only a very few, precedents in the Jewish sources (Enoch 89:59-65; Jubilees 6:23). Possibly such a belief may have been more prominent in the Judaism known to St. Paul, but the full conclusion drawn from it could never have existed in Judaism of any sort.

For the result of St. Paul's combination is the doctrine that the Law was not given by God at all, but was the work of the astral deities; this is the meaning of the sentence "the Law was given by angels" in Gal. 3:19. St. Paul goes on to prove that this is so; "it was ordained through angels by the hand of a mediator. Now a mediator is not of one, but God is one" (vs. 20). The passage was a famous *crux* of the older exegesis, which generally paraphrased it in some such fashion as this: "The Law was a *contract* between two parties, God and man, and for a contract a mediator was required. But when God gives a *promise*, as in the New Covenant, he speaks for himself alone and so needs no mediator." That this paraphrase is satisfactory no one will maintain, especially as the necessity for a mediator in every contract is far from obvious, but it seemed to be the best sense that could be made of the passage. The difficulty lay in the fact that the older exegesis was on the wrong track in taking *διαταγὴς διὰ ἀγγέλων* as a mere passing allusion, while it is really the chief element in the sentence. The meaning is: "The Law was ordained by angels, and they, being many, were obliged to use a mediator, for they could not all speak at once. One person does not need a mediator, as he can transact his affairs directly. And God is One. Therefore the use of a mediator proves that the Law did not come from God." This is entirely plain. The rest of the context of the passage confirms this interpretation. God had made a covenant with Abraham and nothing can change God's decree; God himself will not alter it (vss. 15-18). "What then of the Law?" It was not God's work, but He allowed the deities of this world to inflict it on the Jews for disciplinary purposes, much as God in Enoch 89:59-65 commits his rule for a season to certain shepherds, who prove unworthy of their trust (90:25).

This doctrine of the Law is evidently an "overlay" on St. Paul's earlier theology, as appears from the difficulty he has in reconciling this origin of the Pentateuch with its inherently good character. "Is the Law against the promises of God? God forbid, for if a law could have been given that would make alive, this would have been that law!" Its framers, then, must be supposed to have been beings of exceedingly keen moral insight,

erring only in supposing that flesh and blood are capable of sustaining so heavy a burden. This would be comprehensible enough, but we are then brought into the difficulty of understanding how such beings could be classed by St. Paul as the deities of the Gentiles in 4:8-10. And when we leave Galatians and turn to Romans the difficulty becomes still more acute, for in the latter epistle St. Paul speaks of the Law in the full Jewish terminology as the "Law of God" (7:22, 25). In fact, there seems to be no way of reconciling these discrepancies any more than there seems to be any way of reconciling many discrepancies in other Jewish works of the period; they are due to approaching the same subject from distinct and irreconcilable starting-points. It used to be thought the duty of the exegete to force such divergencies into some kind of agreement, but if we so construe our task we shall never understand St. Paul.

We now have the preparation needful for the explanation of St. Paul's treatment of Christ's death in connection with this Stoicheia theology. "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the Law by becoming a curse for us" (Gal. 3:13). We need not recall the part that this verse has played in certain theologies, which taught that it was inherently necessary that God should curse someone before he could forgive anyone. The fundamental fallacy in such an interpretation is that St. Paul is not talking about a curse from God at all; he is talking about a curse from the Stoicheia. These beings attached a curse to crucifixion, and when Christ was crucified they hurled it at his head. The cross was a test between his power and theirs, and from it he emerged victorious, so breaking their power completely. Or, as St. Paul states the doctrine more fully in Colossians (2:14 f.), when on the cross Christ held up the Law to men's derision as repealed and impotent, at the same time by his cross he stripped the principalities and powers, leading them in the triumphal procession of a conqueror, making a public show of them.

Colossians, chap. 2, in fact, simply repeats the teaching of Galatians. The readers are warned against following teaching "according to the Stoicheia of this world" (vs. 8), such as the observances of "a feast day or a new moon or a sabbath day"

(vs. 16; "meat and drink" are added here as the elements in such a "following"), with a specific mention of "the worship of the angels" (vs. 17). With an allusion to his doctrine of the mystical union, he tells his readers that "they have died with Christ and so have become free from the control of the *Stoicheia*" (vs. 20), and so need not be subject to ordinances as though still "living in the world." An important further contribution to this doctrine is given in I Corinthians. In that epistle we read (2:7 f.): "We speak a wisdom of God which is the revelation of a mystery, God's hidden wisdom . . . which none of the rulers of this world knew; for if they had known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory." In these "rulers of this world" the older commentaries saw, not unnaturally, the authorities who were directly concerned in the crucifixion, but this interpretation appears to be quite out of the question. The passage forms part of a rather elaborate argument (I Cor. 1:17—4:21), in which St. Paul decries the enthusiasm for "knowledge" that was so in vogue among the Corinthian Christians. In opposition to this he sets up the "word of the cross," which was the wisdom and power of God, but which all the wisdom of this world, even that of the rulers of this world, had failed to discover. These "rulers" consequently represent the highest embodiment of non-divine wisdom, something that no one would have dreamed of looking for among the Jewish high priests and Roman procurators; if St. Paul had wished a supreme human antithesis for his exaltation of heavenly σοφία, he might have found it in the philosophers of Athens or the scribes of Jerusalem (cf. 1:20), but he certainly would not have thought of finding it in Caiaphas or Pontius Pilate. Moreover, the description of these rulers as "being done away" (καταργούμενοι) in vs. 6 is inapplicable to earthly authorities; the "rulers" that St. Paul is discussing are the celestial beings who control the events of this present world, the astral deities, the *Stoicheia*. Their initiative in the crucifixion, which is stated explicitly in the present passage, is obviously presupposed in Col. 2:14 f. and Gal. 3:13.

Before proceeding in our study of St. Paul's references to them, it will be profitable at this point to ask the following question: How would a Greek have understood the passages that have just

been discussed? There can, I think, be no doubt as to the answer. To a Greek these passages would contain a unified system of doctrine. The world was under the control of astral deities who had completely enslaved all men. From heaven there descended a Redeemer whom the deities attacked and slew. But in slaying him they worked their own overthrow, for he was immediately restored to a new and heavenly life. And he stripped them of their power, so that men who now adopt his worship are freed completely from the control of their destiny. Here is the complete conventional program of a Hellenistic mystery-religion.

A study of Colossians proves, in fact, that certain converts had construed Christianity in precisely these terms. And they had even gone a step farther and attempted to combine it with other mystery-religions, as was the custom of the times. The deities of the Hellenistic world were by no means jealous gods, and it was a common practice for their worshipers to have themselves initiated into many mystery-religions, so as to have their salvation guaranteed as thoroughly as possible. And it was natural to regard Christianity as only one more of the oriental cults that were pursuing a propaganda in the Roman Empire, and to think of "Christus" as the latest addition to the oriental mystery-pantheon, alongside Osiris, Attis, Adonis, and so on. For the full results of this reasoning we have to look to the second-century gnostic systems. But the logic on which these systems rested had existed, probably, from the very beginning of gentile Christianity. It is doubtless not too much to say that, when Christianity had made its first three gentile converts, the first Christian "Gnostic" was among them.

Now, in writing to Colossae, St. Paul does not tell his readers that their whole idea of religion is mistaken, that they are wrong in thinking that the astral deities exist and have an influence on them. On the contrary, he admits that there is very much that is true in their belief. And he limits his corrections to a single thesis: Christ is immeasurable and incomparably superior to these deities. He created them, he has subjected them to himself, and, in consequence, the Christian can and should ignore them and their cults altogether. In other words, St. Paul is quite satisfied to have Christianity treated as a mystery-religion, provided it be treated

as the only true mystery-religion, as a mystery-religion so perfectly divine that it cannot enter into a syncretism with any other cult.

Indeed, when St. Paul wrote Colossians, he evidently was at some pains to use mystery-terminology. In 1:13 the readers are told that God "has delivered us from the power of darkness and has transferred us into the kingdom of his beloved Son." In order to conform to the mystery concepts the eschatological "Kingdom" has here been made a strictly present quantity, the only unambiguous instance of such a use in St. Paul (Rom. 14:17 and I Cor. 4:20 are different). In vs. 19 we meet the technical gnostic term *πλήρωμα*, whose meaning St. Paul evidently supposes known; it is an inversion of correct method to argue that the gnostic use of this word is due to a perversion of St. Paul's sense. The astral deities together made up the "Pleroma," to which the Colossians had looked for salvation; St. Paul replies that God is the true Pleroma and it has been his good pleasure to dwell "bodily in Christ" (cf. 2:9 f.). In vs. 19 we read that God through Christ "had been well pleased to reconcile all things to Christ, making peace through the blood of his cross, to reconcile all things through Christ, whether earthly things or heavenly." The verse is obscure in its reference to "heavenly things," but the sense seems to be that the astral deities had been brought into an unwilling obedience. The epistle then passes into more Jewish terminology (but cf. 1:26; 2:24) until 2:8—3:3 is reached, a thoroughly Hellenistic passage that has already claimed our attention. But we may note the emphasis laid on baptism as an initiation-rite and the definite allusion to Hellenistic religious ceremonies in the words *ἀ ἐώρακεν ἐμβατεῖων* (vs. 18), "entering into a cult by means of a spectacle." This last phrase is deprecatory of the established religions, but the others cited are obviously designed to describe Christianity by means of their terms.

St. Paul could not have written with such ease on so technical a subject if the matter had not long been perfectly familiar to him, and we are surely justified in asserting that he must have been thoroughly accustomed to presenting Christianity in just such terms. Nothing else was to be expected from the custom of the times. Judaism had done its best to make itself acceptable to

Gentiles by speaking to them in their own terms. The Alexandrian propaganda of Wisdom and Philo was carried on naturally in Christianity by Apollos and the author of Hebrews. And nothing else was to be expected from St. Paul's own personality. He had never learned to think of a religion as a closed system of philosophical dogma; the Pharisees agreed in practice, but never thought unity of doctrine needful. As a Christian St. Paul was perfectly indifferent to differences of religious outlook if only the very central matters were not touched. When certain of the Corinthians introduced baptism for the dead (I Cor. 15:29), he not only let the practice go on undisturbed, but even used it as part of his argument for the resurrection. It is most unlikely that St. Peter, the Galilean fisherman, and Apollos, the Alexandrian scholar, had any too many ideas in common, but St. Paul simply exhorts their respective followers to live peaceably together and refuses to take sides in their controversies (1:10-12). As long as Apollos' Alexandrianism is not exalted as the only intelligent form of Christianity, he is delighted that it is taught (1:4-7), and he is on excellent personal terms with Apollos (3:6; 4:6; 16:12). Yet in the same epistle he advises the Christian Jews to continue their Jewish customs (7:18). Examples of rabbinical dialectic occur almost everywhere in his epistles, but on occasion he is equally capable of using Alexandrian allegory (Gal. 4:21-31). When he says, "I am become all things to all men," more is implied than that he had learned to live like a Gentile in order to gain the Gentiles; whether he was conscious of it or not, he had learned to think, argue, and preach in gentile terms, even when these terms related to basic problems in religion.

And I do not think that we have any right to doubt that St. Paul believed in his Hellenistic terms as sincerely as did Philo in his. Professional rhetoricians could have been found who would take pleasure in producing elaborate arguments from insincere premises, but St. Paul was not the type of man to attempt such a rhetorical *tour de force*. Just as Philo thought that there was no difficulty in finding all sorts of points of contact between Moses and Plato, so St. Paul would have been unconscious that the Greek doctrine of *Stoicheia* and the Jewish doctrine of angels were really

different. Indeed, identifying these two doctrines was particularly easy, for practically every separate element in the former had its parallel in the latter; it was only the combinations of these elements that made the difference.

Unfortunately, we have no data to determine how and when St. Paul began this Hellenistic interpretation of Christianity. Probably his development had reached this stage well before the beginning of his "epistolary" period; if many contemporary scholars are right in holding that Galatians is the earliest of the extant epistles, this supposition is made a certainty. His pre-conversion days, however, are excluded, for, as has been said, the combinations that made him a Hellenist are just the combinations that would have been impossible for a Jew (this naturally does not preclude for that time a knowledge of what Gentiles believed). And in his Christian career it cannot be supposed that he set out deliberately to copy, let us say, the Isis cult, and I cannot even agree with Reitzenstein when that distinguished scholar asserts¹ that St. Paul's Hellenistic knowledge came through literary channels; the picture of the apostle sitting down to study any of the sources of the *Corpus hermeticum* is one that my imagination cannot compass. Such suppositions are quite needless; the conceptions were everywhere, and from the moment that St. Paul began serious gentile work he must have been in contact with them at every turn. Many of the initiates into the cults were men in intense moral earnest, and many of the converts to Christianity were undoubtedly men who previously had sought moral peace in other oriental religions. Such men could not fail to interpret their experiences in the new religion in terms of their former categories; what, for instance, had been the former religion of Titus, and how did he interpret his conversion when he narrated it to St. Paul? And most converts became more or less professional missionaries in their turn; in what terms did they preach Christianity to their former coreligionists? With such men and their preaching St. Paul was very familiar, and no further explanation need be sought for the manner of his own initiation into the meaning and apologetic value of the language they used.

¹ *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, 1910, pp. 59, 210.

Certain scholars have gone much farther than this, maintaining that St. Paul's theology is fundamentally Hellenistic, but this thesis is not tenable. The comparative absence of Hellenistic argument from Romans should alone be sufficient proof to the contrary. Moreover, despite St. Paul's frequent correct use of Hellenistic terms, they show a constant tendency in his hands to revert to Jewish type—so much so that until fairly recent days commentators thought that all his references could be explained from Jewish antecedents. The *Stoicheia*, for instance, frequently become little more than the demons of conventional Judaism. In Col. 1:13 St. Paul describes their realm as "the power of darkness," and in I Corinthians, in the language of pure apocalyptic, he tells how they are being "done away" (2:6), how Christ at the end shall "bring to nought" every "rule and principality and power" (15:24), how the Christians themselves at the Parousia shall "judge angels" (6:3). "On account of the angels" the women at divine service are warned to have an *ἐξουσία* on their heads; the verse is obscure, but Dibelius¹ seems to have approximated the sense by translating *ἐξουσία* by "protection." That is, when in prayer or prophecy the members of the congregation are in some sort penetrating the higher world, the women must take special precautions. The obvious reference is to the angels of old who were seduced by the fairness of the daughters of men (Gen. 6:2; one of the most popular of Jewish legends, Enoch, chapters 6 ff., etc.). Most of the sources find the origin of demons in this fall of the angels; cf., especially, Test. Reub. 5:5 f.: "Command your wives and your daughters that they adorn not their heads and faces. . . . For thus they allured the watchers who were before the flood. . . . And the women . . . gave birth to giants." Again, in Colossians (cf. Eph. 6:21) the "*Stoicheia* of the world" in 2:20 seem paralleled by the list of vices ("fornication, uncleanness, passion," etc.) "of the world" in 3:5—so closely so, in fact, that the only step needed to convert the *Stoicheia* theology into a genuine demonology is to consider Satan, "the god of this world" (II Cor. 4:4), as the chief of the astral deities. But St. Paul never makes this last combination; in his epistles the *Stoicheia* and

¹ *Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus*, 1909, pp. 13-23.

Satan never appear at the same time, so that the fusing of the Hellenistic and Jewish systems is incomplete.

And it is incomplete also as regards the beings of the opposite moral extreme, that of righteousness. As has already been said, St. Paul thinks of the Stoicheia as having produced nothing less perfect than the Law of Moses. And he forgets himself frequently and speaks of "angels" who are only the righteous agents of God (I Cor. 13:1; 11:14; Gal. 1:8, etc.). In consequence St. Paul's heavenly inhabitants have not the clear form of the Hellenistic astral deities; they are in a state of unstable equilibrium as a sort of *tertium quid* between the angels and the demons of Judaism, approaching one class or the other according to the context. Evidently they have been superimposed upon a system already formulated. Hence to make the Stoicheia basic for St. Paul is simply perverse.

On the other hand, it is our duty to determine the extent of St. Paul's further accommodation of Christianity to such ideas and the amount of their reaction on his "normal" theology. And the topic most directly connected with the contents of the preceding paragraphs is the place occupied by baptism in the "mystery" presentation of Christianity. Fortunately our information regarding the initiation-rites of the mysteries is fairly full, the most elaborate account being that of Apuleius in Book xi of the *Metamorphoses*.

The essence of the ceremony is explained to be "the symbol of a voluntary death" (*ad instar voluntariae mortis*), its ministers being aged men who by the providence of Isis "had been in a manner born again" (*quodam modo renati*) and placed once more on the course of a new life (chap. 21). In accord with this explanation Lucius tells: "I penetrated to the boundaries of death, I trod the thresholds of Proserpine, and after being borne through all the elements I returned to earth. . . . I came into the presence of the gods above and the gods below, and did them reverence close at hand." And on the next day, arrayed as a statue of the gods (*duodecim sacratus stolis*), he was exposed to the admiration of the multitude, standing motionless, on a pedestal placed directly in front of the statue of Isis. The significance of the ceremony is

quite clear. The Isis cult centered around the belief that in the remote past Osiris had been slain and had lived again in an immortal state. And so the initiate, by repeating the experiences of the god, had in some way become identified with him. "As truly as Osiris lives, the initiate shall live; as truly as Osiris is not dead, shall he not die; as truly as Osiris is not annihilated, shall he not be annihilated" (*CIL*, III, 1090). The parallels with St. Paul's teaching are obvious, and we are bound to ask whether they do not give us the key to certain of St. Paul's characteristic phrases. It is always possible to explain them directly from St. Paul's personal religious experience, but influence of the mystery-religions certainly opens an easier way. His doctrine of baptism, for instance, draws its concept of cleansing from Judaism and its doctrine of mystical union directly from Christian experience. But from what source does St. Paul draw the conception of baptism as a burial connected with the death of Christ? The most natural answer is that this element was contributed by the mystery-religions, and this answer seems all the more indicated because "baptism into the death of Christ" is not a necessary part of St. Paul's argument in Rom. 6:3-7; it would have been enough if he had said "baptized into the exalted Christ and so removed from the glamour of this world." Again, we meet with an "overlay" on a system formulated apart from it. There is some evidence that the conception of proselyte baptism as burial had a foothold in Judaism before St. Paul's day;¹ if so, his adoption of the concept is still more fully explained. But, even in this case, the dependence on Hellenism is merely pushed back one stage farther, for such a doctrine has no true antecedents in the Old Testament. And, in any case, the form in which St. Paul presents it is not Jewish. The belief that an initiation-rite repeats in the believer the experiences of the Redeemer (whether or not Christ is called a "Savior God" is irrelevant) has no standing at all in Judaism, but is a commonplace in the Hellenistic systems.

Similarly, certain of St. Paul's more general statements about union with Christ's death may be explained from the influence of Hellenistic terminology. And this fact naturally suggests the

¹ J. Weiss, *Das Urchristentum*, 1914, p. 125.

question: Did any of the Hellenistic teaching regarding the death of a deity influence St. Paul's *doctrine* of the atonement? This question is probably to be answered with a categorical negative. Of course, to be sure, in the wild confusion of cults and philosophies that made up Hellenistic syncretism it is never very safe to say that any given tenet did *not* exist somewhere. But, as far as I am aware, the mystery-religions never placed positive value on the death of their deities. Adonis, Attis, Osiris, and the rest had died, but their devotees regarded these deaths as misfortunes simply, misfortunes that formed no part of a divine plan of salvation, misfortunes that were bewailed elaborately in the ritual. And nothing else could be expected when we remember that these deities were incorporations of the autumn decay of vegetation and its springtime renewal;² they brought salvation, not because they died, but because they were able to overcome death. On the other hand, however much the sacrificial element in Christ's death is reduced in St. Paul's theology, Christ's death had to him an unmistakable saving value that can be separated from the effects of the resurrection that followed; Hellenistic parallels are to be sought, not in the deaths of the savior deities, but in the general sacrificial concepts, such as the slaying of the sacred bull in Mythraism. It is undoubtedly true that phrases from the Hellenistic descriptions of the death of deities have worked their way into St. Paul's descriptions of the death of Christ, but these phrases cannot be given true doctrinal evaluation; their significance is dramatic, not theological. The death of Christ in his conflict with the Stoicheia has saved men by helping to procure forgiveness of sins, but this forgiveness has really nothing to do with the Stoicheia doctrine. When St. Paul writes (Col. 2:13-15; cf. 1:13 f.), "And you, when you were dead, . . . God has made you alive with Christ, forgiving you all your offenses; . . . and has stripped the principalities and powers," he has simply set side by side concepts of disparate nature and origin. The most that can be said in reconciliation is that God's forgiveness took away from the Stoicheia their power to harm.

² Cf., e.g., Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, 1914, 3d ed.

In fact, the concept of forgiveness is not a Hellenistic concept at all. Reitzenstein says:

What seems to me to be novel in the Pauline doctrine is the fact that the redemption is primarily a forgiveness of sins, not a mere expulsion of evil passions or vices or a liberation from death and an assurance of eternal life with God. The fearful earnestness of the preaching of guilt and atonement is lacking to Hellenism as far as I can see. Such doctrines as judgment at death from which *γῆρας* frees, or the pains of Hades, against which initiation rites protect, or even ascetic striving after purity—such doctrines cannot be compared seriously with the Christian revival of the concepts of sin and atonement. . . . The earliest church brought the death of Jesus in connection with this deep feeling of guilt and so gained faith in the forgiveness of even the worst sins. And then, but only then, the Christian *σωτήρ*-doctrine gained its true strength, which was destined to conquer the world. And all its Hellenistic rivals could do was to prepare its way through a world that had learned again to feel a sense of sin.¹

Just so Celsus contrasts indignantly the high character of those who were invited to participate in the mysteries with the type of men to whom Christian missionaries made appeals: "They say, 'Whosoever is a sinner, whosoever lacks understanding, whosoever is a babe . . . him will the Kingdom of God receive.' Why what other kind of men would a robber invite, if he were collecting a band?"² Here between the Hellenistic cults and Christianity there is a great gulf fixed, and the immensity of this gulf must never be forgotten.

Nor does the absence of the teaching of repentance alone measure the greatness of this gulf; in none of the cults did any marked ethical emphasis appear during New Testament times. No doubt, as has been said, many individual initiates were in very real moral earnest, thanks chiefly to Stoicism. And in the second Christian century the Isis cult took on an ethical character,³ but even as late as the time of Apuleius this aspect of the cult was undeveloped; the ethical outlook of the author of the *Golden Ass* speaks for itself. And the mystery-religions of Asia Minor and Syria seem never to have had any moral value, the latter, in par-

¹ *Poimandres*, 1904, p. 180.

² Origen *Adv. Cels.* iii. 59.

³ Cumont, *The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism*, 1911, p. 92, and the quotation from Celsus, above.

ticular, generally being found disgusting by the men of the period; when Heliogabalus endeavored to make the cult official, he shocked even the none too squeamish third-century Roman conscience.

As far as we can tell, the "salvation" procured by initiation into such rites was automatic and independent of the subsequent conduct of the initiates, who at the most seem to have been bound only to observe certain ritual taboos. Apuleius (xi. 6) makes Isis promise her votary blessedness after death without condition, although she adds, "If you shall be found to deserve the protection of my divinity by unflinching obedience, religious devotion, and inviolable chastity, you will learn that it is possible for me, and me alone, to extend your life beyond the limits that would have been appointed to it by your destiny." That is, every initiate receives immortality; the faithful initiate receives long life in addition. The saying of Diogenes (the cynic) sums up the situation: "Pataikon the thief has a better destiny after death than Epaminondas, because he has been initiated."¹

This concept of salvation automatically and irrevocably effected by baptism was evidently carried into Christianity by converts in Pauline circles. The practice of baptism for the dead must have had its foundation in some such idea, yet, as this rite could not possibly harm anyone, St. Paul saw no reason for interfering. But in I Cor. 10:1-22 we find a vigorous argument against the belief in irrevocable salvation as applied to the living. St. Paul argues from the past. Israel at the exodus had sacraments also that were scarcely inferior to those of Christianity, and yet the Israelites were nearly all rejected; God does not so relieve men of responsibility. "Wherefore my beloved flee from idolatry. . . . Or is it our purpose to make the Lord jealous? Are we stronger than he?" And St. Paul is very careful in his own teaching about baptism to avoid making its effects independent of conduct. So, in Rom. 6:4, a Hellenist after writing, "We were buried with him through baptism into death, that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father," would have concluded, "so we with him shall be raised from the dead." But St. Paul goes out of his way to avoid this obvious deduction and writes, instead, "in order that

¹ Plutarch *Quom. adulesc. Poet.* iv.

we also might walk in newness of life." All this is not to say that St. Paul did not teach that sacraments have an *ex opere operato* effect; it is a defect of Kennedy's *St. Paul and the Mystery Religions* (1913) that Dr. Kennedy often misuses this phrase. But St. Paul did consciously and explicitly deny that the assumed automatic effects of the initiation into the mysteries had any parallel in Christianity.

Our study of the effect of the mystery-rites on Paulinism may be completed with a mention of the relation of these rites to the Eucharist. Not very much can be said, however, for we really know very little about the sacred meals of the various cults. They existed, certainly, and were sometimes prepared with great elaborateness, at least in later times.¹ And, a priori, it seems altogether probable that the participants thought of entering somehow into communion with the deity through them. But we cannot prove this by quotations; Clemen's critique² of the passages cited in this sense appears just, and he is certainly right in maintaining that there is no evidence of the idea of *eating* the deity. Moreover, St. Paul writes as if his readers had never heard of communion with a Hellenistic deity which was gained through a sacral meal. When he warns against the danger of accidentally "participating in demons" (I Cor. 10:20), he proves its possibility first from Christian (vs. 16) and then from Jewish (vs. 18) premises—a method that would have been most roundabout if the Corinthians had been already familiar with the concept in question. To hazard a guess, it would seem that the original meaning of such meals had been lost to the Hellenistic world in general. They may have been thought by many worshipers to convey some ill-defined blessing, but for the most part they had degenerated into mere revelings. The disorders of the Christian Eucharist point in this direction (I Cor. 11:22–23, 33 f.). Of course we must always allow for the possible existence of concepts that have left little literary trace, but there is thus far no evidence that St. Paul's eucharistic theology was much affected by influences outside of Judaism and Christianity.

¹ Tertullian *Apol.* 39.

² *Primitive Christianity and Its Non-Jewish Sources*, 1912, pp. 257–66.

On the other hand, there exists a very close parallel between the mysticism of Christianity and that of Hellenism. Even the genuine Greek cults had long been familiar with orgiastic mysticism; in connection with the worship of Dionysius we can trace these phenomena back as far as we can trace Greek religion, and they have a continuous history down to the latest time in which we can speak of religion as specifically "Greek." The appropriation and elaboration of this particular concept (*ἑθουσιασμός*) by the philosophy is familiar and needs no discussion here. And of course similar phenomena are found in all the mystery-religions. In their crudest forms they were displayed by the votaries of Attis, who during religious frenzy mutilated themselves without feeling pain. St. Paul's converts would have needed no explanation of such ecstatic states as prophecy or glossolalia; most of them before their conversion to Christianity had doubtless seen such manifestations many times and had perhaps even experienced them. And a very close parallel with Christian terminology existed in the use of the word *πνεῦμα* for the cause of these phenomena.¹ St. Paul was very familiar with this side of Hellenistic religion, for at times these foreign *πνεύματα* took possession of Christian enthusiasts and led to distressing results, such as the utterance of shocking blasphemies in Christian worship (I Cor. 12:3; II Cor. 11:4; II Thess. 2:2; cf. I Tim. 4:1; I John 4:1-6). This Hellenistic "enthusiasm" certainly reinforced and accentuated the Jewish-Christian practice of the display of spiritual gifts and may have added special forms of ecstasy that were previously unknown, but we are unable to trace the extent of this. In any event, St. Paul's deprecation of even mildly orgiastic exhibitions shows that the novel manifestations had no direct effect on his theology.

Alongside of this orgiastic mysticism there existed another form which we may designate as the doctrine of "identification," according to which the worshiper actually *becomes* the god. It appears in the Isis cult, as we have seen; in Apuleius' account Lucius was arrayed in the vestments of Osiris. And it is found to a greater or less degree in the other religions, as when, for instance, in the Asia Minor cults the initiate was addressed by the

¹ Cf. especially the evidence in Reitzenstein, *Hellen. Myst.,* pp. 136-59.

name of the god Sabazius. But we must note that this doctrine was not pressed very rigorously, for Apuleius betrays no interest whatever in Osiris, and even Isis is to him primarily only a divine patron, while initiates in general certainly did not regard themselves as gods in the intervals between the experiences of frenzy. So the identification must have been thought of as either something very transitory or else (most probably) as a mere form. Now St. Paul at times comes very close to this identification doctrine, as when he writes, "It is no longer I that live" (Gal. 2:20), and it may have influenced his terminology to some degree. But he did not and could not really hold it, for, while he believed that he had repeated and was repeating Christ's experiences, he never for a moment thought of ever "becoming Christ." When he speaks of the change into the image of Christ (II Cor. 3:18), an entirely different cycle of ideas is operative and the concept belongs eventually to Jewish apocalyptic (Luke 20:36). Traces of the identification belief really do appear here and there in later Christian thought, but there is little point in comparing with Paulinism such a phrase from the Hermetic literature as "thou art I and I am thou, thy name is my name and mine is thine."¹

There was known, however, to Hellenistic thought still another mysticism that belonged to neither the orgiastic nor the "identification" types and that presented at times close parallels to St. Paul's "union" doctrine. But its history and its extent are obscure; a history of ancient mysticism in which the various types of experience are distinguished and classified has yet to be written. This "quietistic" conception on Greek soil appears to go back to the Orphic reforms of the Dionysiac rites, but, whatever was its acceptance in later days, it was undoubtedly given a new impetus by the Stoic doctrine of the soul as a detached element of the divine fires. It found its chief embodiment in the true astral worship and its chief expounder in Posidonius of Apamea.² The non-Greek elements in this mysticism are not yet properly analyzed, but Reitzenstein has certainly overemphasized the influence of the old Egyptian religion; this religion taught identification with Osiris

¹ Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, p. 21.

² Cumont, *Astrology*, etc., pp. 83-89, 139-49.

after death, but knew nothing of union with Osiris during life. We need not discuss the quotations that describe the soul as a natural part of the divinity, for this conception is the opposite of St. Paul's, who holds that only the Christian has the *πνεῦμα*, which he acquires by a direct and special act of God. But, perhaps through a combination of such a conception with the orgiastic, we find passages that have a surprisingly Pauline sound. So the disciple prays to Hermas, "Enter into me, Lord Hermas, like the babes in the wombs of women";¹ compare "my little children, of whom I am again in travail, until Christ be formed in you" (Gal. 4:19). And again we find a (third-century?) dialogue between Hermes and his disciple which displays an ethical mysticism which falls into almost Pauline terms:² "Cleanse thyself from the foolish sins (*τιμωριῶν*) of matter." "Truly, oh father, I do have sins within me." "Not a few, my son, but fearful ones and many." "I am ignorant, O father." "This very ignorance, my son, is one sin, grief is another, incontinence a third, lust a fourth, injustice a fifth. . . . But be of good cheer, my son, thou art being cleansed by the powers that come from God that thou mayest be united to the Word. Knowledge of God has come to us, and by its coming ignorance has been dispelled; knowledge of joy has come to us, and by its coming grief shall be put to flight," etc. How far such conceptions existed in St. Paul's surroundings I am unable to say; if they were familiar they would have been of great assistance to him in his work. But of one thing I feel very certain, to leave the Old Testament, the apocalyptic and other later Jewish literature, and the primitive Christian experience in order to seek for the origin of St. Paul's basic mysticism in astral worship or the Hermetic writings is to parody historical method.

Among the other Hellenistic parallels to St. Paul's statements there is only one that need be enumerated—the reference to the ignorance of the "rulers" in I Cor. 2:7. St. Ignatius, apparently referring to the same general concept, if not to this particular passage, says (*Eph.* 19) that "from the prince of this world were hidden the virginity of Mary, her offspring, and the death of the Lord as well, three mysteries of renown [*κρᾶνγῆς*], which God

¹ *Poimandres*, p. 20.

² *Poimandres*, p. 342.

worked in silence." That is, St. Ignatius states that the rulers did not know Christ when he came—a conception that appears in many forms in the gnostic systems and which has definite non-Christian and non-Jewish antecedents.¹ Doubtless the doctrine was familiar in some Hellenistic circles in St. Paul's day; its fundamental idea is the descent to earth of a Redeemer whom man's enemies did not recognize, so that they were taken unawares and defeated. But in St. Paul's statements the concept of the "incognito Redeemer" does not appear, for it was "God's plan," not "Christ," which was unknown to the rulers. The Stoicheia did not expect Christ, but St. Paul gives no intimation that they did not know him when he came. And in St. Paul the only "battle" between the rulers and Christ is his passive submission to their will. So the evidence is not sufficient to prove that St. Paul had ever heard of the legend in question.

Finally, we may mention a few Hellenistic parallels that were or could have been of influence on Pauline thinking—the religious use of *κύριος* and its correlative, *δοῦλος*, the part played in salvation by knowledge, the sacral or magical use of the name of a deity, and the Hellenistic associations for worship and their official meals. All of these require attention in a thorough study of the Hellenistic development of Christianity, and they all, doubtless, had more or less effect on St. Paul himself. But none of them is sufficiently central to warrant a detailed treatment here.

There remains the subject of Hellenistic philosophy in the narrower sense of the word—a theme that has been discussed exhaustively without adding very much to our knowledge of St. Paul. A reference to Platonism has been detected in I Cor. 15:45 f.: "The first man became a living *ψυχή*, the last man a life-giving *πνεῦμα*; but not the pneumatic was first, but the psychic, and afterwards the pneumatic." But, as a matter of fact, the statement is an attack on a Platonic doctrine adopted by Philo. The latter explained the double account of the creation of man in Gen. 1:26 and 2:7 by making the former passage relate the creation of the "ideal" man and the second that of the "empirical."² It is a very slight

¹ Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, 1907, pp. 238-76.

² *Leg. all.* xii. 31; *Opif. mund.* xlvi. 134.

assumption to hold that this doctrine had reached Corinth through Apollos, and no assumption at all to say that St. Paul was quite unable to understand it. The only "ideal man" of whom he had any knowledge was the "Son of Man" of Jewish apocalyptic, and he took the Corinthians to task for inverting the natural order of things. Whatever St. Paul does in this passage, he does not "Platonize."

The other Greek philosophical system that can come under consideration is Stoicism, with which he offers some genuine parallels in ethical matters. The subject is familiar, and I have no desire to add to the "Paul-Seneca-Epictetus-Marcus Aurelius" literature. The possible influence of Stoicism (through Alexandrianism) on the Pauline Christology has been already investigated and the existence of the influence affirmed. But a very interesting conjecture of Böhlig's¹ deserves mention. The Stoic origin of Phil. 4:8 ("whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honorable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue and if there be any praise, think on these things") has long been recognized, while St. Paul's treatment of the "conscience" in Rom. 13:5 (cf. 2:9) is admittedly un-Jewish. Now Böhlig argues very ably for Athenodorus of Tarsus (74 B.C.-7 A.D.) as the concrete source of this influence. It would be too much to say that he has proved his case, but it is not in the least degree unpalatable.

¹ *Geisteskultur von Tarsos*, 1913, pp. 119-27.

FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

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It is not easy to write history in the making. Time usually revises our judgments and qualifies our evaluations. Yet it seems safe to say that the past fifteen years have been years of striking and definite historical development in the field of religion under the influence of the ideals of education. I am asked to give specifically the story of the work of the Religious Education Association in these fifteen years, and, with that assignment, one need not apologize for any emphasis upon the activities of an organization.

When the Religious Education Association was organized in February, 1903, there came to public attention a movement which had been in existence for some time. Many leaders in the churches whose experience and sympathies were in the field of education had felt the woeful inadequacy and the pitiable inefficiency of the specifically educational activities of the churches. Some were alarmed at the tendency toward the complete secularization of higher education, and probably all recognized the deficiencies as to the elements of religious knowledge in the current general curriculum for the child. The first steps toward the creation of a special organization to meet these needs were taken by the Council of Seventy then engaged in directing the American Institute of Sacred Literature. Dr. Harper was the leading Spirit, and under his direction educators and religious leaders throughout the country were enlisted and the Religious Education Association was organized. At the end of these fifteen years of work it is pertinent to inquire: What has this Association accomplished?

First, it *has brought into currency a new significant phrase*. The expression "religious education" was scarcely known at that time; today it is a commonplace of our speech. The Association has placed it there. It has made men and women think of religion as a

normal subject in education, of religion and the religious life as involving processes integral to the entire process of education. It has changed the emphasis from the instruction in disintegrated parts of religious knowledge to the whole range of religion, and from one particular form of instruction to the whole inclusive process of education.

Secondly, the Association *has greatly enlarged the significance of the phrase "religious education."* Whatever it may have meant to a few farsighted leaders fifteen years ago, to the greater number of persons it means vastly more today than it did then. Speaking generally, religious education fifteen years ago might mean either of two things: instruction in the Bible and theology or general education in institutions under religious auspices. The interpretation evidently current in the early meetings of the Association was the former one; emphasis was principally upon the organization of courses in religious knowledge, especially in Sunday schools. Religious education, therefore, signified at that time a program of instruction in religious literature and history. Today the range of vision has greatly widened, moving out from instruction to the full meaning of education, and from the use of the word "religious" as defining a department of knowledge to its use as a descriptive adjective qualifying the character of education. Today religious education is concerned with the whole program of education so far as it deals with persons as religious persons and so far as it looks to a religious order of society. Its primary emphasis is educational and its mission is allied with advancing educational propaganda. This wider significance has broadened the work of the Association out from the church, the Sunday school, and the church college to every kind of educational agency, so that it includes in its fields the family, the community in its various aspects of recreation and social organization, the public schools, universities and colleges, the various social agencies, as well as the church in its different departments. Under these heads departments are organized and various enterprises are conducted.

The Association *has stimulated a conscience for character both individually and corporately.* By its program of agitation, education, and promotion it has helped to remind our world that the

ultimate product of education must be in the field of personality, must be essentially a spiritual product, that its highest ideals are in the realm of religious character. It has steadily endeavored to develop this responsibility in individuals, in families, and in institutions. Whatever the cause may be, no one can question the fact that in universities and colleges there has been an awakening of conscience as to this form of personal responsibility. Fifteen years ago the customary attitude was that of a sphinxlike indifference to the moral and spiritual welfare of students. The academic vogue required that the instructor should be guilty of interest in nothing but his special department of knowledge and of enthusiasm in nothing at all. The institution explicitly denied any responsibility beyond the organization of instruction and the collection of fees. Today in higher education there is a general and fairly definite consciousness of dealing with persons under social conditions. The responsible heads of institutions are alert to the spiritual needs of young people; they seek light and aid in meeting the religious needs of students; they welcome co-operative forms of religious development; they give to religion its normal place in the curriculum and they appropriate institutional funds to support activities ministering to the higher life. The university pastor movement would have been impossible but for the official attitude of the universities. The entire reorganization of the voluntary curriculum arranged and promoted by the Christian Associations is an attempt to meet the recognized religious needs of students; the formation of the new courses received unstinted co-operation from recognized academic leaders. What has been true in the university and college has been true, in some degree, in other units of social life. Child-welfare campaigns, playground movements, social centers in schools and churches, community ministries, are all manifestations of a clarifying realization that the business of life is the growth of persons. Through these fifteen years our aim has been held steadily in mind, to lay upon the public conscience the sense of the need of moral and religious training, to quicken some apprehension of the primary importance of character development and to enlighten the public mind on the processes involved. Perhaps this popular propaganda has so expended

energies as to prevent much-needed intensive work. But none will question the grave need for popular agitation. Moreover, the popular programs of service have helped to clarify the specialist's vision. In seeking to develop practical programs the leaders have found their laboratories.

The Religious Education Association *has brought to group-consciousness the large number of persons interested in the problems in its field.* Its membership constitutes a world-group united in a common social life and forming a common fellowship of aim and service. This aim lifted men and women above the controversies which had hitherto divided them, so that in the Association representatives of the great religious faiths find themselves standing on a common platform. The members represent almost every known great religious division and dwell in almost every great political division of the world. They are one in the common faith that life's ultimate product is spiritual and is to be realized by those known and orderly processes of development which we call educational. Few things have been more significant and more pleasing than the spectacle of Catholic, Jew, and Protestant, liberal and evangelical, men and women of many faiths and many fields, the social worker, the ecclesiastic, and the educator, publicly standing on the platform of the Association and speaking at its conventions.

The Association *has focused the developed group-consciousness into professional leadership.* Gradually there has emerged a clear picture of a definite need and a specific field of usefulness. Men and women have been led to give their lives to the work of religious education and to devote themselves to thoroughgoing professional preparation. Instruction in religion has become a matter of professional specialization. The teachers of the Bible, for instance, in colleges are no longer persons whose ability is predicated on their failure in all other fields, but are trained precisely as instructors are trained for other departments. The organization and direction of religious education in churches employs a large number of persons commonly known as directors of religious education, who have had two or three years of specialized professional training for that work. It is becoming customary to require that field secretaries in denominational Sunday-school work shall be similarly professionally

trained. In a word, a new professional group has been created. It is growing rapidly. The graduate schools, through departments of religious education, are preparing large numbers for these fields.

The Association *has organized the forces of leadership*. About its ideal it has gathered men and women of light and leading; highly trained representatives of the different fields of knowledge and service, specialists in education, in psychology, in religious knowledge, have been organized to direct their energies toward specific problems in this field. Investigations have been undertaken, experiments conducted, plans and methods studied and criticized. The processes and activities of religious training have come to share in the common life and experience of all scientific development in other fields.

These have been the general aims toward which the Association has worked. *The machinery* has been that of a membership organized in groups under the different types of institutions in which the members were interested, supporting a central office with an executive staff. The central office has organized conferences and conventions, directed investigations and studies, published the results of the members' work,¹ conducted a propaganda of agitation and improvement, maintained exhibits and a reference library and a bureau of information and consultation. It acts as a clearing-house for the whole field, gathering up the results of individuals and separate efforts and making them available to all.

What specific results have been achieved? First, *the reconstruction of the process of religious education*. In the Sunday school there have been effected the reorganization of the school on an educational basis, its reinterpretation as a part of the entire school of religion in the church, the provision of a fairly complete curriculum of religious knowledge, training, activity, and experience, the provision of teachers especially trained for their work, and the provision of a proper, special physical equipment. In the community the recognition of the deficiencies in our present schedule of studies

¹ In five volumes: *The Improvement of Religious Education*; *The Bible in Practical Life*; *The Aims of Religious Education*; *The Materials of Religious Education*; *Education and National Character*; and in the magazine *Religious Education* now in its twelfth annual volume. A large number of pamphlets on special subjects have been published.

has led, not only to programs of community activity and recreation under religious auspices, but also to the provision for week-day instruction in religion, as in the different plans of accredited high-school study in religion, week-day church schools, and the daily vacation Bible schools.¹ In institutions of higher education the subject of religion is being placed on a parity with others, both as to equipment and as to personnel. Voluntary religious activities come under more exact academic scrutiny, and larger support is given to all educational plans for religious development.

Provision is being made for the training of leaders and professional workers in this field. The general courses in voluntary agencies such as Sunday schools and Christian Associations look forward to the service which the laity may render. In about fifty standard colleges courses are offered in religious education preparing young people for usefulness in their communities in this field. These courses include the study of the Bible, the materials of religious education, psychology applied to religious problems and life, and educational method also applied to religious work. All the larger professional schools for the ministry have courses training men and women for specialization in this field. Without exception all these courses have developed within the last fifteen years. The effect of the work in the graduate schools is to give us general leaders, as ministers of churches, etc., who have sympathy with the educational vision, and special leaders who are thoroughly trained for the direction of educational work in religious institutions or to teach religious education in educational institutions.

The work of the Association *has produced a remarkable literature in its field.* Not to emphasize alone the fact that the Religious Education Association has published some ten thousand pages of material in its field, attention must be called to the long list of books produced during the lifetime of the Association. Publishing recently a bibliography on the principles of religious education—that is, its fundamental theory and its general scientific basis—the Association prepared a list of over two hundred and fifty titles of books, at least one hundred and fifty of which would be counted as indispensable in this field, and these all have been produced in

¹ The Association publishes free pamphlets giving details of these plans.

the last fifteen years. They include such work as Coe's *Psychology of Religion* and *Education in Religion and Morals*; King's *Personal and Ideal Elements in Education*; Welton's *What do We Mean by Education?* Then we must consider the very much larger product in the literature of methods and of materials. Under the former belong those books which treat the Sunday school from the educational point of view, those which consider religious education in the family and in the community and its relation to public education—a lengthy and rather weighty list: Rugh, Athearn, Hartshorne, Evans, Pease, and Weigle all have made their contributions.

In the work of Irving King, Bagley, Wilm, and Horne in general education the ideals and methods of religious education are most evident. In the field of materials and curriculum these years have witnessed the institution and establishment of entire series of studies. There are the independent series such as the "Scribner Graded"¹ and the "Constructive Series."² There are also the "International Graded,"³ with its eighteen years' work; "The Departmental Graded," published also by some of the church communions; the "Christian Nurture Series" of the Protestant Episcopal church; "The Young Churchman Series"; "The Beacon Series";⁴ "The London Diocesan Lessons";⁵ the "National Society Series," and the "Teachers and Taught Series,"⁶ these last three of Great Britain; "Union Graded Series"⁷ of the American Hebrew Congregations; textbooks of the "Religious School Teachers," also Hebrew; and the "Catholic Education Series" and "Text Books of Religion" for Roman Catholic Schools.

Some general concept of the development of this literature on religious education may be gained from the fact that the Religious Education Association began the collection of its library in the

¹ Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

² The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

³ Published by the different church communions.

⁴ The American Unitarian Association, Boston.

⁵ Longmans, Green, & Co., London.

⁶ Headley Brothers, London.

⁷ Department of Synagog and School Extension, Cincinnati, Ohio.

year 1905, and at the time of writing it has nearly 5,500 books and some thousands of pamphlets and collected material in this field. The books are about equally divided between textbooks for use in colleges, churches, schools, and families, and works on the principles, ideals, and methods of religious education.

The ideals of the Religious Education Association have found concrete expression in many institutions and other organizations. Mention has been made of the establishment of courses of "religious education" in colleges, universities, and graduate schools. The great denominations have quite generally organized special boards of religious education responsible to the whole communion for the various activities of education in the local churches and in the whole field. These boards appoint directors and secretaries of religious education for oversight, field work, and editorial positions. Such voluntary agencies as the Christian Associations include training in religious education in their professional schools and maintain locally courses and training work which come under this head. In their local activities they are keenly awake to the the possibilities and to present developments in the communities.

Last, and most important, the Association *has enlisted and retained the devoted service of leaders in religious and educational life.* Fifteen years ago the movement was new; it was regarded with suspicion and treated with lively hostility. For many it was a costly thing to be identified with the movement, for it meant breaking with traditional concepts and methods; it involved discarding long-established ecclesiastical mechanisms; it meant loyalty to the scientific ideal and method and the substitution of vital for mechanical processes in religion. But men cheerfully paid the price. Service in the Association has been a costly thing, the work has been new, experimentation has taken time; conferences and consultation have all been expensive, and the members have paid the bills. To give one instance, fourteen general conventions have been held and many hundreds of local and district conventions; the total number of speakers would run close to, possibly over, two thousand, but in all this time no speaker has received financial compensation or even so much as traveling expenses for his work.

It all means that through these fifteen years men and women have seen with increasing clarity the vision of vital processes in religion, of persons and society growing normally into the religious whole. And for the realization of their vision they have cheerfully given the best of their means and the richest fruitage of their minds. The total results cannot be stated statistically, but they cannot but be felt as tremendous movements of the tides of life by all whose minds are keen to the facts and tendencies of today.

THE PROGRESS OF FEDERATION AMONG THE CHURCHES

CHARLES S. MACFARLAND

General Secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America

While Christian unity as a sentiment is everywhere in the air, it is taking perhaps three concrete forms.

The first is that which is expressed by the hierarchy at Rome. It is not our purpose here to discuss this form.

The second is that which finds expression in such movements as the Christian Unity Foundation and the proposed Conference on Faith and Order. For that we pause to offer a sympathetic prayer and to express our hope. Co-operation in service must precede it, or at least go hand in hand with it. Fellowship and unity of action must not wait too long upon it. We must come together for it with enough mutual faith and trust to believe that our aim and work are common.

There is therefore another form of Christian unity which is possible without waiting for any conference on faith and order, and which is absolutely necessary before we can reach the common ground for any such conference. It might be called Christian unity at work. It is a unity not to be created so much as discovered and interpreted. We already have it. All we need to do is to exercise it.

God has put into our human order the mingling together of unity and diversity. While it is a unity, on the one hand, which is not uniformity, it must also be diversity, on the other hand, which is not divisiveness. I believe that the movement of which the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America is the most concrete expression is an illustration of this principle of progress.

Federal unity is stronger and more vital than the first form of unity, represented by the Vatican, because it is unity with freedom, and because unity is stronger without uniformity than with it.

The social difference between the unity of the Federal Council and the unity of Rome is also this: With federal unity the church may give herself for the sake of the world regardless of what becomes of herself; she may give herself for the sake of humanity and not for the sake of herself, while under the unity of Rome she is obliged first of all to take care of her own life. We must be willing to save our life by losing it.

Federal unity, however, recognizes the two principles of progress—differentiation and coherence. It recognizes that the Kingdom of God does not mean solitariness, on the one hand, or uniform consolidation, on the other. It is simply genuine co-operation without regard to the ultimate result to ourselves. It is not trying to get men to think alike or to think together. It is willing that the army should be composed of various regiments with differing uniforms, with differing banners, and even, if necessary, with different bands of music at appropriate intervals, provided they move together, face the same way, uphold each other, and fight the common foe of the sin of the world with a common love for the Master of their souls, for each other, and for mankind. It is unity without uniformity; diversity without divisiveness; comprehensiveness, not competition or compulsion.

I have discovered, I think, this interesting fact: that it is possible, almost always, to get the churches into Christian unity provided you can prevent them from discussing Christian unity. I am no longer asking men to come together from the various churches to hold a conference on the question of Christian unity. I am willing to talk with them upon almost any other subject than that. The important thing is to get them together to show them the common social task—a task which absolutely cannot be done unless they do it together—and leave them to draw their own inference as to their duty and as to the will of God and the Spirit of Christ.

I have discovered another interesting fact. If you want to have a conference which will be absolutely harmonious, without bitterness or invidious utterance, get men to come together from just as many denominations as you can, as in the Quadrennial Council, where they met together to face a common task. It is only when men and women of one denomination assemble in conference

that there is any serious divisive utterance. And the differentiation and distance between the two remotest constituent bodies of the Federal Council are less than the variance between the two wings of any one of them.

This unity we already have. It simply awaits its discovery and use.

Federal unity is denominationalism in co-operation. It is the effort to adjust autonomy and corporate action, individuality and social solidarity, liberty and social adaptation. According to the classic definition of Herbert Spencer, evolution is the process of passing from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation. Thus the rise and existence of denominations, following the Protestant Reformation, was an indication of progress and not of deterioration.

A study of history, however, reveals another element in evolution, namely, that it is cyclical. Progress is not definitely in one direction, it comes through both forward and backward movements. We go a long distance in one direction, we then pause, and to a certain point make a return. We then gather up our renewed forces and move on again.

In theology we know of thesis and antithesis. First we move in the line of one proposition; then comes a proposition the antithesis of this, and out of the ultimate blending of the two we find harmony and progress.

These various theories of evolution seem applicable to our denominationalism. We have gone pretty far in carrying out the proposition which has resulted in the diversity of denominationalism. Those who hold to Rome have gone equally far, in their antithesis, in the direction of unity. Perhaps we are getting, among our Protestant denominations, to recognize in equal proportion the two principles of evolution and progress which we find everywhere in the natural order—diversity and unity.

Our various denominations and sects arose largely from the demand for freedom, and through much suffering we found our freedom. We are now recognizing as denominations, however, that the highest freedom we possess may be the freedom to give

up some of our freedom for the sake of the common good. This was the kind of freedom to which Paul referred in his discussion of those denominational differences which had already begun in the apostolic church. We are ready to acknowledge, without forgetting perhaps, that in our intellectual expression of truth we have been of Apollos or Cephas, that we are all of Christ, and that in allegiance to him we must maintain or regain unity even in the midst of our diversity. We are following still farther our denominational search for freedom and are seeking this highest freedom in our modern movements toward Christian unity.

For the past century or two we have been largely building up denominationalism, and now we have discovered the severe truth of the word of Jesus: "He that saveth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life for my sake and the gospel's shall find it." That is the one text and suggests the one sermon for these thirty constituent denominations of the Federal Council and for all other Christian bodies.

Meanwhile one of the most startling of modern discoveries is that we have been so sadly and so thoughtlessly wasteful. We have wasted our mineral wealth, squandered our forests, and allowed the mighty forces of our streams to run out into an unneeding sea.

Worse still, in the development of industry, and by social neglect, we have wretchedly wasted our human power and, as our new legislation witnesses, we have been criminally prodigal with human life itself. We have poisoned, neglected, maimed, and mangled by our inefficient speeding up, by our twelve-hour days and seven-day weeks. While we have wasted the forests that make the mines, we have also wasted by thousands our human brothers in the mines, have slaughtered and despoiled our women, and have consumed our babes beyond the count of Herod in our suffocated cities, while we had half a continent of fresh air. In our commercial development we have sacrificed innocent human life upon the altar of, and have given over our little children to, an industrial Moloch saying, with outstretched iron arms, "Let little children come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the Kingdom of Mammon." And, if we followers of Christ are content to disavow

the blame, let us remember that in the same breath in which the Master said that to neglect these little ones was to forget himself, he also condemned men, in his most severe and solemn utterance, for the things they did not do.

But these are not an intimation of the worst of our dissipations, and indeed these wastes have been largely because of a deeper and more serious prodigality. We have let the very light within us become darkness, and the saddest of all has been the waste of our moral powers, our finer emotions, and our religious enthusiasms through sectarian divisions, denominational rivalries, and unrestrained caprice often deluding itself as a religious loyalty. If our effort for redemption had been given more fully to prevention, we should not now stand trembling, shamefaced, and bewildered before the results of our own social havoc. Our most serious profligacy has been the neglect to cultivate our ultimate power, the power of our religious enthusiasm, and our spiritual impulse, because these were neither socially concentrated nor socially interpreted and applied.

The first approach toward federation was the organization of Christian men and women in various voluntary organizations, upon particular interests which were obviously common to all the churches. Thus there have arisen, during the past half-century, a large number of interdenominational movements, the Young Men's Christian Association, the Young Women's Christian Association, the United Society of Christian Endeavor and various other young people's movements, the Brotherhood of Andrew and Philip and other similar bodies, the Laymen's Missionary Movement, the Student Volunteer Movement, the International Sunday-School Association, and other co-operative organizations.

Another type of such movement is represented by the American Bible Society, the American Tract Society, and similar societies whose chief distinctive common characteristic is that they are comprised within the realm of what are known as the evangelical churches.

Of a still different type are the various temperance and other reform organizations, as well as a multitude of societies for social and philanthropic work which, while having a less intimate connection

with the churches, are almost entirely made up of officials and members of the churches, many of which either tacitly or explicitly regard these organizations as expressing the will of the church.

These movements and organizations, while each concerned with its own special interest, have, at points, found their work to be in common, and have, in their turn, entered into voluntary co-operation.

Later this general movement assumed a more official character through the home mission boards, resulting ultimately in the Home Missions Council in 1908, the Missionary Education Movement for the common publication of missionary literature, and the Foreign Missions Conference of North America representing the foreign mission interests of the churches. The women's boards of missions have organized the Council of Women for Home Missions and the Federation of Women's Boards of Foreign Missions. The Sunday-School Council of Evangelical Denominations also belongs in this category.

The organizations which have been named do not complete the entire list, but are mentioned simply as indicating these forms of co-operative denominationalism. They are mainly voluntary movements, and those made up of official organizations are officially representative of those boards and not of the denominations themselves.

Meanwhile other Christian leaders, among whom should be mentioned William Earl Dodge and Dr. Philip Schaff, whose vision and interest comprehended the whole realm of Christian enterprise, organized the Evangelical Alliance, which, while it was not an official organization, did, as a matter of fact, within a limited sphere, speak and act for the American churches.

The federative movement, speaking in the stricter sense of the word, began in the local communities, the first federation of churches having been the New York (City) Federation of Churches in 1895, followed by the Massachusetts Federation of Churches in 1902.

At this point mention should be made of the simultaneous movement toward co-operation and federation in the foreign field. Attention should be called to the fact that federation in the home field is largely in the nature of a reflex action from foreign

missions. From time to time since 1872, when the first conference was held in Yokohama and the translation of the Bible was arranged for, various gatherings of missionaries have been held in Japan, looking toward increasing co-operation, the most notable of these being the Osaka Conference in 1881 and the Tokyo Conference in 1900. The transition was so gradual and normal that it would be difficult to determine the date of what might be called the first federation of the churches in the foreign field.

The following historical statements are made on the basis of previous reports in which conflicting dates are given:

The year in which the first local federation of churches was formed, 1895, at the annual meeting of the Open and Institutional Church League, one of the many interdenominational movements of that time, the secretary of that organization, Rev. E. B. Sanford, in an address calling upon the churches for larger social service, gave prophetic utterance to the call for Christian unity as a sovereign interest in the work of the League.

At about this time several measures were proposed and some organizations approached, all looking toward the same end. We may take as an example of these the proposal of the Brotherhood of Andrew and Philip, in 1891, which resulted in the formulation of a constitution which provided for a "Federal Council" whose members were to be appointed officially by the highest judicatories of their representatives on the executive councils of denominational brotherhoods, the first federal convention of this organization being held in the Marble Collegiate Church in New York in 1893. The founder of the brotherhood, Rev. Rufus W. Miller, later became a member of the Executive Committee appointed at Carnegie Hall. Other similar examples might be mentioned.

The first meeting looking directly toward federation was held in New York in 1899. The presiding officer was William E. Dodge, of the Evangelical Alliance, and its administrative work was performed by Dr. Sanford, who ultimately became the corresponding secretary and is now the honorary secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. It authorized action that brought about, in Philadelphia in the next year, the National Federation of Churches, whose membership was composed of

representatives of local churches and federations. The Executive Committee of the meeting in 1899 sent forth an utterance propounding the question: "May we not also look forward to a National Federation of all our Protestant Christian denominations, through their official heads, which shall utter a declaration of Christian unity and accomplish in good part the fulfilment of the prayer of our Lord, 'that they all may be one, that the world may know that Thou hast sent Me.'"

At the annual meeting of the National Federation in Washington, in 1902, a committee of correspondence was authorized to request the highest ecclesiastical or advisory bodies of the evangelical denominations to appoint representative delegates to a conference to be held in 1905. This conference, at Carnegie Hall, New York, adopted the constitution of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, which, after ratification by the constituent bodies in its fellowship, brought about the final and complete organization of the Federal Council at Philadelphia in 1908.

The 1905 conference elected Rev. William H. Roberts as permanent chairman, and the new federation was really more or less in existence during the period from 1905 to the final organization in 1908, through a permanent executive committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Roberts. Annual reports were published in 1906 and 1907, regarding, not only the progress of organization, but also the development of the federative movement in local communities and in the foreign field.

Finally, "the meeting of the first Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America was opened in the Academy of Music in Philadelphia at 7:45, on Wednesday evening, December 2, the Rev. William Henry Roberts, permanent chairman of the Interchurch Conference of 1905 and the chairman of the Executive Committee having charge of the Philadelphia meeting, being the presiding officer."

The distinctiveness of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America lay in the fact that it was not, like the other movements, a voluntary interdenominational fellowship, but an officially and ecclesiastically organized body. This was the ideal

clearly in view when the Interchurch Conference was called to convene at Carnegie Hall, New York, in November, 1905. The following is the preamble and the substance of the Plan of Federation adopted by that Conference:

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL

PLAN OF FEDERATION RECOMMENDED BY THE INTERCHURCH CONFERENCE OF 1905, ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES OF CONSTITUENT BODIES, 1906-1908, RATIFIED BY THE COUNCIL AT ITS MEETING IN PHILADELPHIA, DECEMBER 2-8, 1908

PREAMBLE

WHEREAS, In the providence of God, the time has come when it seems fitting more fully to manifest the essential oneness of the Christian Churches of America in Jesus Christ as their Divine Lord and Saviour, and to promote the spirit of fellowship, service, and co-operation among them, the delegates to the Interchurch Conference on Federation, assembled in New York City, do hereby recommend the following Plan of Federation to the Christian bodies represented in this Conference for their approval:

PLAN OF FEDERATION

For the prosecution of work that can be better done in union than in separation a Council is hereby established whose name shall be the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.

The object of this Federal Council shall be:

- I. To express the fellowship and catholic unity of the Christian church.
- II. To bring the Christian bodies of America into united service for Christ and the world.
- III. To encourage devotional fellowship and mutual counsel concerning the spiritual life and religious activities of the churches.
- IV. To secure a larger combined influence for the churches of Christ in all matters affecting the moral and social condition of the people, so as to promote the application of the law of Christ in every relation of human life.
- V. To assist in the organization of local branches of the Federal Council to promote its aims in their communities.

This Federal Council shall have no authority over the constituent bodies adhering to it; but its province shall be limited to the expression of its counsel and the recommending of a course of action in matters of common interest to the churches, local councils, and individual Christians.

It has no authority to draw up a common creed or form of government or of worship, or in any way to limit the full autonomy of the Christian bodies adhering to it.

The following restatement of principles underlying and guiding the work of the Federal Council was adopted by the Executive Committee at its annual meeting in Baltimore, December, 1913:

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

ITS DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER IN RELATION TO THE DENOMINATIONS

The difference between the Federal Council and organizations of similar general purpose which preceded it, is that it is not an individual or voluntary agency or simply an interdenominational fellowship, but it is a body officially constituted by the churches.

Its differentiation from other movements looking towards unity is that it brings together the various denominations for union in service rather than in polity or doctrinal statement.

The original delegates to the Interchurch Conference on Federation, which organized the Federal Council, felt that these limitations were necessary in order that such an organization might have adequate strength and momentum.

Its representative character.—The Federal Council is, therefore, the sum of all its parts. It is not an unrelated organization. Its function has been to express the will of its constituent bodies and not legislate for them. Were this, however, to be construed as precluding the utterance of the voice of the churches upon matters in regard to which the consciousness and the conscience of Christianity are practically unanimous, the Federal Council would be shorn of the power given it by the constituent bodies when they adopted as one of its objects: "To secure a larger combined influence for the churches of Christ in all matters affecting the moral and social condition of the people, so as to promote the application of the law of Christ in every relation of human life."

Denominational autonomy.—In the original Plan of Federation the autonomy of the constituent bodies is, however, wisely safeguarded. No action by the Federal Council, even though taken, as all its important actions have been taken, by the unanimous vote of the officially constituted delegates of the constituent bodies, can, by the terms of its constitution, be legally imposed upon those constituent bodies. Such action, by the terms of the constitution, goes back to the constituent bodies in the form of a recommendation for their action or ratification, which may either be assumed or definitely expressed.

It is, however, clearly the duty and the function of the Council to determine upon objects for such common action and to find appropriate expression of the consciousness and the conscience of the churches upon them.

Functions of the Council.—While the duties of the Council are thus, with these safeguards and limitations, to represent the churches upon important matters of common concern, and, in the sentences above indicated, to exercise a genuine leadership which recognizes the whole body of its constituency, the

Council may not consider itself primarily as an independent entity, but rather as a common ground upon which the constituent bodies through their official delegates come together for co-operation.

Under this conception the Federal Council does not create new agencies to do the work of the churches, nor does it do the work of the denominations or the churches for them. Its policy is that of using the existing agencies, and this policy should be followed out with relation to the interdenominational movements which are recognized by the churches. In the main, however, these existing agencies are the constituent bodies themselves and their official boards and departments.

It is, therefore, the function of the Council, not so much to do things as to get the denominational bodies and the interdenominational movements to do the work of the churches in co-operation. Here its function is not that of overseer and director, but that of an agency for the correlation and the co-ordination of existing forces and organizations, and, so far as it may be permitted, it is to recommend, give guidance, and point out the way.

Relation to local federative agencies.—With relation to State and Local Federations the Plan of Federation distinctly, it is held by many, intended that the Federal Council should be the initiator, creator, inspirer, and, so far as possible, the directing agency of such federations.

There is, however, no organic relation between the Federal Council and State and Local Federations, and it can assume no responsibility for the constituency of such federations or the form which they may take, or indeed any responsibility, except so far as they may carry out the principles and the policy of the Council.

Commissions.—These same principles of policy apply to the various commissions appointed by the Council. They act always as agents of the Council and distinctly represent themselves as such. They also hold themselves as subject to the Executive Committee of the Council in accordance with the by-laws of the Council.

Like the Council itself, these Commissions, in relation to the denominational agencies, regard themselves as the sum of all their parts.

The Council thus seeks to find the will of the constituent bodies and their departments and to interpret and express it in common terms. The Council then aims to secure the doing of the will and conscience of the constituent bodies by common and united action.

The co-operation implied in the fellowship of the Federal Council does not require any one of the constituent bodies to participate in such co-operative movements as may not be approved by it, or for which its methods of organization and work may not be adapted.

The Federal Council meets quadrennially and consists of about four hundred qualified delegates officially elected by the various denominational assemblies or other constituted authorities. Its

Executive Committee consists of about ninety of these delegates and acts for the Council during the quadrennium between its sessions, holding regular meetings. The Executive Committee has an Administrative Committee, holding regular monthly meetings, which acts for the Executive Committee between its sessions. The national office and its executives, under the Administrative Committee, carry on the continuous work of the Council. The Council appropriately maintains an office in Washington, D.C., and has become an incorporated body under the laws of the District of Columbia.

The period from 1905 to the final organization of the Council in 1908 was occupied in consultation with the thirty denominations invited to constitute the Council and in securing the official election or appointment of representative members. The quadrennium from 1908 to 1912 was a period largely of experimentation. The Executive Committee necessarily moved slowly and cautiously in the effort to make the adjustment between federation and denominational autonomy.

Much effort was given to the development of state and local federations, the nation being divided into districts in charge of district secretaries. This method, however, did not avail. The cities and towns were not prepared for federation. Many, therefore, of the federations organized were short-lived. It became apparent that the Council would need first to develop the spirit of federation before it could proceed to successful local organization.

At the quadrennial meeting in December, 1912, in Chicago, the work began anew. At that time the central organization consisted of two modest offices with one secretary, a stenographer, and one or two clerical assistants.

The Federal Council is developing its functions somewhat as follows: first of all, it is a clearing-house for denominational and interdenominational activities; secondly, it speaks and acts in a representative capacity for the evangelical churches of America which constitute the Council; thirdly, it acts for the churches in several departments of work through commissions and committees made up largely from the various boards and departments of its constituent bodies; and fourthly, it develops local federations in cities and towns.

1. THE FEDERAL COUNCIL AS A CLEARING-HOUSE

During the past four years the central organization has developed until now it occupies over thirty office rooms and maintains a printing and publication department of considerable magnitude, with fairly adequate machinery for reaching all the churches upon very short notice. Nine executive and field secretaries give their entire time to this united work of the churches, all of them being regarded as experts in their particular spheres. Several of the denominational secretaries give part time to the service of the Council. The central office maintains a staff of about forty assistants. The work of the secretaries consists of the visitation of denominational gatherings and local federations and the co-ordination of the work of the various commissions for the purpose of inspiring and stimulating co-operation among the churches. Contact is maintained with all the churches, and the central office is rapidly becoming a general bureau of information, issuing yearbooks and similar publications.

The Council has the beginnings of a religious publicity bureau. Important causes are taken up and furthered, common movements are generated, and the central administration is becoming a general power-house for the churches.

The office at Washington gives constant consideration to the interests of the churches which naturally center at the national capital, such as the appointment of chaplains, the care of the army and navy, the religious census, and similar concerns.

It should be noted that, while the pastors are receiving constant communications from the office of the Federal Council, they are appeals very diversified in nature and simply represent the multitude of legitimate interests which center in the Council. They represent economy in ecclesiastical administration because all these lines of work are carried on at one administrative expense instead of separately at greatly increased cost.

2. THE REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL

The functions of the Federal Council in its representative capacity have not been determined. Its administration attempts to represent the churches upon matters where substantial una-

nimity is obvious. It exercises this representative capacity by utterances in behalf of the churches; by messages upon matters of common concern; by the appointment of appropriate national days of prayer, and by the issuing of common subjects for the week of prayer, both at the beginning of the year and at Easter time. It undertakes certain activities in the name of the churches, such as the religious work in connection with the Panama Pacific Exposition, the celebration of the American Peace Centenary, the celebration of the Protestant Reformation, the co-operative movement for war relief, and such work as is done in co-operation with the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the churches.

The recent special meeting of the Council at Washington was a significant illustration of the exercise of its representative capacity. This meeting issued a message for the hour, prepared a common program for works of mercy, for the moral and religious welfare of the army and navy, for the development of the work of the chaplains, and for the conservation of the social, moral, and spiritual forces of the nation.

This function of the Council is illustrated by its comprehensive campaign for the conservation of human life, which includes both the spiritual and the social factors necessary to such a movement. From time to time new movements are projected such as the occasion may demand.

3. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKINGS

The various fields of service are covered by commissions. These are constituted, first, by the appointment of members representing the constituent denominations, to which are added men and women who are regarded as experts in their respective fields.

The Commission on Evangelism endeavors to stimulate the evangelistic spirit, to secure the organization of denominational commissions on evangelism, to co-ordinate the work of these commissions, and thus to bring about a nation-wide spirit and movement of evangelism.

The Commission on the Church and Social Service has formulated a statement of social objectives which has become almost a

classic in the world of social endeavor. Denominational commissions have been organized and have been brought into co-operative action. This commission has formed a connecting link between the churches and the various social movements, thus increasing the social spirit among the churches and infusing the social movements with the Christian spirit.

The Commission on Temperance has brought its work into co-operation with the historic National Temperance Society, and the two bodies now think and act as one. The immediate program now in operation includes the agitation for prohibition during the war, a movement for the abolition of the use of liquor at college and university commencements, a workingman's fellowship among labor organizations, an advertising campaign in the labor papers, a movement among society women for the discontinuance of the use of liquor at social functions, and other similar movements. The commission published five monthly temperance periodicals, including one for workingmen and two for young people.

The Commission on International Justice and Good Will was instrumental in securing the endowment by Mr. Carnegie of the Church Peace Union and the organization of the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. It has published handbooks, lesson courses, and similar material for educating and organizing the sentiment of the churches.

The Commission on Christian Education faces a complex task because of the multitude of interdenominational bodies working in this department, and it is endeavoring at the present moment to bring them into effective co-operation. Among the special matters with which the commission is now dealing is that of the relation between religious instruction and the public-school system. The commission has published two series of lessons on international peace with a handbook for the use of pastors and teachers.

In the realm of home missions the Home Missions Council is a body co-operating with the Federal Council. The Home Missions Council is made up of representatives of the denominational home mission boards in the interests of effective distribution and the adequate care of home mission interests.

The Commission on the Church and Country Life has up to the present time occupied itself mainly with surveys of rural church conditions, the last one, in the state of Ohio, bringing to light facts which are so startling that some improvement will surely issue as the result of the survey.

The Committee on Foreign Missions co-operates with the Conference of Foreign Mission Boards of North America. Its recent report to the quadrennial meeting of 1916 records a remarkable progress during the last decade in foreign fields which the churches at home might well take as an example. If we were to go out into this realm, however, with the story of the Edinburgh Conference and the Panama Congress, we should have a book instead of an article.

The Federal Council, from time to time, according to the call of the occasion, appoints special commissions, such as the Commission on Relations with Japan, whose work has been so noteworthy. This commission has been enlarged to a Commission on Relations with the Orient.

Other committees operating with perhaps less effectiveness up to the present time are those on Ministerial Relief and Sustentation, on Family Life and Religious Rest Day, and a recent committee appointed by the Executive Committee to care especially for the interests of the negro churches and people.

From time to time organizations are perfected to meet the needs of the hour, such as the Committee on the Celebration of the Protestant Reformation, the committees on various interests related to the war, the Committee on Christian Work in the Canal Zone, various committees for the relief of Protestant churches and missions in Europe, and the Committee on War Relief and the Work of the Red Cross.

The most signal example of the procedure of the Council in carrying out that principle in its constitution stating that its purpose is "to secure a larger combined influence for the churches of Christ in all matters affecting the moral and social condition of the people, so as to promote the application of the law of Christ in every relation of human life," is the recent development of a War Work Commission to meet the unusual tasks brought about by our entrance

into the war, including the importance of general leadership on the part of the church; the work of war relief in connection with the Red Cross and other bodies; the selection and training of chaplains; the distribution of religious literature; the services of outside preachers in connection with the camps; the moral and religious conditions in communities surrounding the camps; the provision of voluntary chaplains for the reserve officers' training camps, and other religious work in connection with such camps; temperance movements; the relations between the home churches and the men at the front; the care of the families of the enlisted men upon the part of the churches; the maintenance of the work of charitable organizations; the preservation of industrial standards; the preparation of war manuals and similar literature for pastors and church workers; the consideration of interned aliens; preparation for the work of reconstruction after the war; the appointment of missionaries to go abroad with the troops; and other similar work.

It is probably obvious that these are tasks which can better be performed by thirty Christian bodies acting together than by thirty Christian bodies acting apart.

4. LOCAL FEDERATION

The work of the present Commission on Interchurch Federations grew largely out of the Men and Religion Movement and has as its chairman and executive secretary the men who occupied the same positions in that movement.

The so-called district system did not meet with adequate success because the various communities differ widely in their readiness for federation. The commission is now approaching communities where the circumstances give promise of effective procedure. The ground is prepared in advance by adequate investigation and consultation. Federations in cities and towns of substantial size are not advised, unless the churches are ready to take the matter seriously, to establish an office for the federation, to raise a budget, and to employ a secretary. At the present time there are about twenty-five or thirty really effective federations. In the smaller towns, where it is not possible to have administrative machinery, the commission recommends that the pastors and

laymen shall give the federation the earnest and serious attention and service which it demands. Local correspondents are now being secured for every city and town in the country. In October a representative congress will be held at Pittsburgh for which long and careful preparation has been made in the effort at least to approach the standardization of the work and functions of local federations.

In justice to the principle of ecclesiastical economy, it should be noted that all these operations are carried on under one administration and at an expense which would be multiplied many times were this work being done by thirty bodies instead of by one.

At the special meeting of the Council at Washington, President Henry Churchill King expressed the belief that the Council had been born for just such a national hour as this. Previous to this time the chaplains in the army and navy have been appointed rather indiscriminately, often through political channels, and without very much concern on the part of the churches. Now the Secretaries of War and the Navy have at their hand in Washington a body representing all the churches with which they can deal. When the missionaries in Japan have occasion to plead their cause before the American churches, they have a body to whom they can come. When the Red Cross needs the service of Christian people, the organization turns instinctively to the Federal Council. The Protestant churches of war-stricken Europe find an open door to American Christianity. The persecuted Jews can here seek consideration for their wrongs. The religious census department finds it necessary to keep in constant communication with the Washington office of the Council. The social workers, the officers of the organizations for war relief, and similar toilers in the world's work are our daily visitors.

Progress, to be sure, is not necessarily indicated by statistics, and yet, perhaps, they indicate something. Four years ago the quadrennial reports constituted one moderate volume; the reports of the quadrennium just closed constitute six rather voluminous books.

Especially since the beginning of the war the relationships between the churches of America and Europe have deepened, and it is interesting to note that invitations have come to the Federal

Council from Holland and France to send messengers and counselors to help the Protestant churches of these countries toward more intimate co-operative organization and action.

Probably most of the leaders of the Christian denominations would agree with the affirmation of the Committee of Fifteen which was appointed to present a survey of the work of the Council, that, whatever decrease there may be of the sectarian spirit, the work of the Federal Council has not impaired the strength of the denominations and has not interfered with their legitimate autonomy. The federative movement probably has not stimulated denominationalism as such, but it has surely brought strength to denominational activities and has enlarged their boundaries.

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THE ARAMAIC PAPYRI OF ELEPHANTINE IN ENGLISH

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Although the whole body of Aramaic material from Elephantine at present known had been discovered and published by 1911, no complete English translation of it has yet appeared. This is not altogether discreditable to the scholarship whose medium of expression is the English tongue. The material is for the most part very fragmentary, and even those documents which are not too sadly disfigured offer many and great difficulties to the translator. The time for a definitive rendering has not yet arrived.

Nevertheless the translator and those authorities of the University of Chicago and of this *Journal* who encouraged him believe that it is time for such a rendering as can at present be made to appear in English. Not only theological teachers and students, both in and out of classrooms, but also men interested in history, religion in general, archaeology, ethnology, and sociology, many of whom know no Aramaic, have now for years looked with longing eyes toward these important documents, in which a Jewish outpost on the frontiers of a world-empire of the fifth century B.C. rose from its grave and presented itself to our astonished eyes. For such men as these, in order that they may get as near as possible to the sources, and for any layman who may be interested, these translations have primarily been prepared.

The translations were in large part made some years ago. They have naturally been revised before going to press. The translator dare not say "revised up to date"; for a complete survey of all articles, notes, etc., which have appeared on these papyri is more than almost any one man, certainly more than the translator, can at present accomplish. He has, however, attempted to make judicious use of all the more important material that he has been

able to secure. Nevertheless all his readings and renderings are based, not merely upon the texts published by Sayce and Cowley, Sachau, Ungnad, and Staerk, but also upon the photographic reproductions of the documents themselves in the magnificent volumes of Sayce and Cowley and of Eduard Sachau.

Further introductory remarks are at present less necessary than the presentation of the documents themselves. The most important introductory material will be easily found by the student in the well-known works of Eduard Meyer, Hedwig Anneler, Van Hoonacker, and in the essay by Stanley A. Cook, in this *Journal*,¹ also in the texts published by Staerk, both in Aramaic and in German. He who seeks more detailed information will be led in the right directions for his search by these books and articles.

In the meantime, not indulgence, but assistance is sought for these translations, to make them as widely and as generally useful as possible. If they be found acceptable at all, it is hoped that they may be issued later in book form. Before they are put into final form to this end, it will be possible to make many changes; even radical alterations may be embodied in the form of appended notes. Any request, advice, or criticism looking in this direction will be heartily welcomed and given such consideration as may be possible.

The copious and sometimes extensive footnotes will not, it is hoped, prove disturbing. Such comments have the disadvantage of scattering information and material which, in an introductory statement, might be gathered up to facilitate a rapid survey. On the other hand, too much rapid surveying is perilous, and the footnote commentary has this advantage, that it enables the reader to check up the commentator from the text itself.

A word is needed on the order in which the documents are presented and on the identifying numerals and abbreviations which are printed at their head. In a first division have been gathered up such documents as present information concerning the Jewish community at Elephantine in general, its beginnings, its history, its fate, so far as we know it, its position in the Persian Empire and in the Jewish community at large, etc. This material has been subdivided on the basis of a rather external criterion: (1) documents

¹ Vol. XIX, No. 3 (July, 1915), 346-82.

containing a solid body of text and (2) lists of names (accounts, etc.). Each subsection is arranged chronologically so far as possible. The reader need scarcely be warned that under the first head he may expect to find a rather heterogeneous collection of material, not official documents only. In fact, not a few of these documents would belong, from another point of view, under later heads. Yet, take it all in all, thorough acquaintance with this strange community seemed the first desideratum; hence the character of the first group, which may perhaps be called:

I. Documents of Public Character or Interest.

A. Varia.

B. Name lists.

The following sections will present in order:

II. Legal Documents.

A. The beautifully preserved set of family archives published by Sayce and Cowley under the title *Aramaic Papyri Discovered at Assuan* (hence the abbreviation *APA*).

B. Related material, chiefly from the Sachau publication (entitled *Aramäische Papyrus und Ostraka aus Elephantine*, hence *APE*).

III. Private Letters, etc.

IV. Literary Material.

Of this latter, which is very fragmentary, an account interspersed with translations will be offered; a full translation is impossible. By way of an appendix the more important inscriptional material in the Aramaic tongue will be added.

APA are inscribed and quoted, following the original editors, by Roman letters and the number of the line. *APE* are given the papyrus number (not the number of the plate) assigned to them by the original editor. To facilitate identification the Berlin Museum inventory numbers are added in parentheses. Quotations are made by papyrus number, column, where necessary, and line. For the Strassburg Papyrus see No. 10, Introduction. Names of common occurrence in the Old Testament or elsewhere are rendered in the forms in which they are best known. The transcription of Aramaic characters, where used, follows Brockelmann's system slightly

modified: as the transliteration is intended to represent the written characters of the original only, the possible fricative character of *b*, *d*, *g*, *k*, *p*, and *t* has been disregarded; to distinguish two different writings of *s*, one is always transliterated *s*, the other *š*, though it may sometimes have the value of simple *s*.

I. DOCUMENTS OF PUBLIC CHARACTER OR INTEREST

A. VARIA

NO. 1. CONTRACT FOR THE DELIVERY OF GRAIN FOR RATIONS

Two men with Jewish names contract with a man bearing what seems to be an Egyptian name, though his father's name is Jewish, for the delivery of grain. The grain seems destined for Jewish members of the military colony of Syene (?) (see No. 2, *APE* 27) only; cf. note 1, l. 6. Though a legal document of a business character, it is after all of semiofficial nature and throws interesting light on the position of the Jewish contingent in the Persian garri-sons of Upper Egypt. It is unusual to find one of the contracting parties as the scribe of such a document taking the dictation of his partner. Compare the following number.

APE Pap. 25 (P. 13493):

On the 28th of the month Phaophi, year II+(?) of Xerxes, <the 2 king>¹ <Hosea,> | son of *Hudwih*,² and Ḥḥḥ-ab, son of 3 Gemariah,³ to 'Es<p>⁴ | <son of> Hanani,⁵ the carpenter, as follows: Thou hast delivered upon our hand⁶ bar<ley> 4 | 78, and lentils, artabae 11 (?), for , artabae | 5/6 all the barley and lentils mixed (?), artabae 54+(?) |

¹ The year is uncertain. To the writer's mind, judging from the photograph, 3 is the most likely number; but 2, and even 12, are also possible. The date would be, accordingly, February 17, 484 or 483, or February 15, 474 B.C. Xerxes is written Ḥšḥš; cf. Esther 1:1, etc.; Dan. 9:1; Ezra 4:6.

² Cf. No. 13=*APE* 15:3: *Hudw*, a hypocoristic form.

³ Cf. No. 13=*APE* 15:5.

⁴ An Egyptian name? cf. *APA* B:11; D:7; *APE* 41:4.

⁵ Cf. No. 4=*APE* 6:2, note 1.

⁶ This seems to be the technical term for delivery of goods to a person, who is not their owner, but a delegated middleman for their transmission to their final destination; cf. l. 13; No. 2=*APE* 26:4, 14; No. 7=8:21.

7 century² of *Bḫlqm*³ 11+? | 2 men; for each man barley,
 8 artabae 2, g.³ 2 | . . century of *Nbysly*,⁴ 2 men, to(?)
 9 barley, artabae | and satisfied are we therewith.⁵ We will
 10 bring the grain | these <tr>oops⁶ of the century of *Bḫlqm*
 11 and of *N(?)* | (are) written in this document. We will give
 12 | house of the king⁷ and before the scribes of the storehouse⁸
 13 | upon-our-hand to bring to these men who are written
 14 | to (or for) thee by number⁹ in(to?) the house of the king and
 15 before the scribes of the s<torehouse> | we owe thee the sum of
 16 100 krš, silver, which(?) | (the?) god; and thou hast
 17 authority over¹⁰ our wages, which the house of the king | of

² Evidently a more or less permanent unit or subdivision, comprising 100, more or less, of a larger body of men. It seems not to be a military unit, for in the great temple-tax or collection list, *APE* 18, it appears to include women. In any case it is nowhere clearly related to the organization of the Persian army, as is the *dgl*, "colors," "company"; cf. note 4 on No. 14 = *APE* 35:2. The word occurs in this sense only in this papyrus, in its duplicate, 26:11, and in 18:1:19 f. Possibly it pertains to the inner organization of the Jewish community and was brought with them from Palestine, where it was well known, both as a factor in military organization, I Sam. 29:2; II Sam. 18:1, 4, and elsewhere in the historical books, and in the later, religious-political organism, Exod. 18:21; cf. Isa. 3:3. It is rather remarkable, in view of *APE* 19, that these Jews should apparently be providing their own rations; yet *APE* 19 seems to contain no Jewish names, or at most one. And the Jewish food laws and Dan. 1:8 come to mind.

³ The first element of this compound name is clearly Bethel, "the house of God." The second element is not clear as to its meaning. But a name like Bethelnathan, *APE* 34:4, 5, and probably also 40, Verso:1, makes perfectly clear that these are theophorous names, like Jonathan, Elnathan, meaning "God has given," "Jahweh has given," and "Bethel has given." In short, the house of God has been deified. Of a piece with these names is the oath by the temple and the altar, Matt. 23:16-22; *APE* 32:3. The name in this papyrus and *Bḫl-qb* in 17:9 are of precisely the same form. These names are not, as is sometimes stated, of Babylonian origin. Where found in Babylonian literature they are distinctly of West-Semitic origin. Cf. Zech. 7:2.

⁴ Manifestly a subdivision of the artaba; capacity unknown.

⁵ Clearly a Babylonian name, as are the other two names of centuries, *APE* 18:1:19 f. This does not necessarily mean that the institution was of Babylonian origin, nor that the original bearers of the names were Babylonians; cf. l. 7, n. 8.

⁶ Perhaps: "we agreed thereto"; lit. "good or happy is our heart therein."

⁷ Lit. "this force," the word elsewhere rendered "army"; "the army of Syene, of the Jews," etc.

⁸ A government office or bureau, probably; cf. No. 8 = *APE* 1/2:3.

⁹ A fixed body of government officials; cf. No. 3 = *APE* 4 and No. 7 = 8 and No. 10 = Strassb.

¹⁰ Or "in minas."

¹¹ = "claim to" or "upon"; cf. *APA*, *passim*.

ours¹ thou hast authority to seize, until thou shalt be paid in full (*lit.* filled) for
 18 the grain | Hosea has written (it) at the dictation (*lit.* accord-
 19 ing to the mouth) of 'AḥPab. | Witnesses: Kī², son of 'skīšy; Nīk'drī,³
 20 son of N(?) | R(or D)ukl, son of 'Abīhū,³ Šurī, son of Kdū(?),
 21 'fdrī,⁴ son of | 'mydt, son of Jonathan (*ihntn*), Šbtī⁵ son of
 22 Nbr(or d)⁶. | Hosea wrote (it) and 'A <ḥPa> b for 'Esp.⁶

NO. 2. CONTRACT FOR THE DELIVERY OF GRAIN FOR RATIONS

Though very fragmentary, it is clear that this papyrus is very similar in content to the previous document; in fact, all but an exact duplicate. It is written by the same man on the same date; the contracting parties and the materials contracted for are the same. Perhaps the two are, indeed, duplicates, though not as exact as manifolded or printed copies—one copy having been made for Ḥḏūḥ, the other for 'AḥPab. Or does one refer to Syene, the other to Elephantine? This fragment is presented in translation because it furnishes valuable supplementary information to No. 1 (*APE* 25).

APE Pap. 26 (P. 13475):

On the 28th of <Hosea>
 son of <Hū>dūḥ ahd 'Aḥ <Pab> . . .
 to 'Esp. . . .
 upon our hand barley . . .
 5 lentils, artabae 20+?
 all of <the barle>y and lentil <s> . . .
 to men ?5
 lentils, artaba 1
 this gra <in> Syene⁷
 10 in this document
 the century, and the leaders⁸ of
 the grain which thou hast given
 by number (*or* by minas) in(to?) the house of the ki <ng>
 which thou hast delivered upon <our> hand
 15 which not
 storehou <se>
 (the?) god, silver (*or* money, *or* the sum of)
 and a house of bricks
 of mine th <ou hast autho> rity to s <eize>

¹ I.e., moneys, goods, houses; cf. other business documents, especially in *APA*, for the terminology.

² An Aramaic name. Lines 19 ff. are written on the back of the sheet.

³ Cf. Exod. 6:23; but also I Sam. 8:2, and II Chron. 13:20.

⁴ See line 19, note 9.

⁵ Ezra 10:15; Neh. 8:7; 11:16.

⁷ Not mentioned in *APE* 25 (No. 1).

⁶ Line 22 is the docket.

⁸ Perhaps captains.

20 which he wrote above

Hosea wrote (it) in the palms of¹ ʾA <ḥḇab.>

Witnesses: Š^urī, son of

Nš^kd <r>ī, son of Nb

Bgd(or r) . . . , <so>n of ʾsmšd(or r)

NO. 3. FRAGMENT OF AN OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION

Though too fragmentary to determine the exact nature of its content, it is clear enough that several bodies of officials are writing (probably a report) to their superior (probably the satrap, whether the name be Arša or another). The document is important because it illustrates this type of official communication and the methods and organization of Persian provincial government. The report is always made by a body of men through their chief: X and his associates; cf. Ezra 4:7, 9, 17, 23; 5:3, 6; 6:6, 13 ("companions").

APE Pap. 4 (P. 13480):

<To our lord ʾArša>m²(?) thy servants ʾḥmnš³ and his associates, B(?) . . . and his associates, and the scribes of the district (or circuit).⁴ The welfare of our lord may the gods . . .⁵ | always. To proceed.⁶ To us thou hast made recompense(?) for every portion(?), to wit, what we(?) have given in the district in (the?) place of (or

¹ The unusual expression is literally translated; the usual form of expression is "according to the mouth," i.e., at the dictation; cf. No. 1 (*APE* 25), l. 18, and the end of many other documents. Or is this, after all, a different formula, to indicate a duplicate copy?

² Cf. No. 4 = *APE* 6:3, note 4.

³ Probably Achaemenes. A Persian noble? Named after the royal family?

⁴ *Mednš* is an administrative district, or a judicial (and administrative) circuit—in this case probably a subdivision of a province (Egypt). Two subdivisions of this kind, adjacent to each other, are named in these papyri: *Tšḥrs*, "The South Canal," No. 10 = Strassb. B, 4; *APE* 19 III:7, 11; perhaps the one here meant, also; Nō², Thebes, *APE* 19 III:4; perhaps also in the pitiable and untranslatable fragment, Sachau, p. 89e, Ungnad, p. 38; 10 (= No. 11):6 (?); cf. 15 (= No. 13):4; Jer. 46:25; Ezek. 30:14 ff.; Nah. 3:8. Each is named after a prominent landmark near its southern boundary. A similar subdivision of the province "Beyond the River" (Ezra 4:10 f., etc.), the Roman Syria, was "the province of Judah" (Ezra 5:8; cf. 2:1; Neh. 1:3; 11:3, etc.), the Roman Judaea; it was, however, less closely united with the greater province of which it was a part, and had a "governor" of its own. A whole province or satrapy may also be so designated, Esther 1:1 and *passim*. Later the word comes to mean city; cf. "a city of Judah," Luke 1:39; see Torrey, *Studies in the History of Religions Presented to . . . Toy*, pp. 290 ff.

⁵ Supply "provide for," etc., a common formula of salutation; cf. these papyri, *passim*.

⁶ A common formula of introduction; cf. these papyri, *passim*.

- 3 which) | . . defined species by species, month by month, they used to send to me.³ Also a letter⁴ was written (and) given to us.
 4 No <w?> | (line 4 is too fragmentary to make sense; what followed, if anything, is torn away. Lines 5-8 are on the back of the sheet and contain merely the elaborate address of an official communication to a superior and the date): | <To> our lord Aršam(?) <thyserva> nts ḥmnš and his associates, the ṣdkr,⁵ B |
 6 Ḥrṣ(?)⁶ and his associates, the scribes of the distr<ict>
 7 | . . retainer⁶ of Šin(?) . . , the ṣdkr, their associate, on the 19th of Marcheshwan, year 37 of Artaxerxe<s the king>.⁶
 8 and completed (? This word only is written in this line, at its end, under "Artaxerxes" of line 7. What followed, if anything, is broken away.)

NO. 4. A RESCRIPT CONCERNING THE FEAST OF UNLEAVENED BREAD (AND PASSOVER?)

This important document is unfortunately very fragmentary. It is addressed on the face of it by a certain Hananiah, possibly the brother of Nehemiah, who has come to Egypt (for this express purpose?), to the Jewish community at Elephantine. It is a matter of dispute whether Hananiah came as a messenger from the king to Aršam, satrap of Egypt, in another matter and then (on his own initiative?) brought the law of the feast or feasts in question with him from Jerusalem, or whether Hananiah imposes this law of the feast on the Elephantine Jews under the authority of, perhaps in

³ Torrey: Thou hast sent word to us concerning all(?) the tribute which thou hast imposed in the province, wherever [thou hast appointed(?)], saying: A detailed, classified report ye shall send to me month by month.

⁴ Some specific kind of letter? A Persian word, not the common word for an ordinary letter in these papyri; the same word is used, rendered "letter," Ezra 4:7; 18:23; 5:5; 7:11.

⁵ = "verifiers" (?); perhaps auditors of public accounts. Others: publishers or announcers of official edicts, rescripts, and other communications; but see *APE* No. 7=8:4, note 8.

⁶ Cf. II Kings 21:19.

⁷ The same word in No. 5=*APE* 11:4:8; see l. 8, note 2. Supply before it: "Wrote this document X" (son of X?).

⁸ November 428 B.C. The king's name is written ṣḥšš; cf. Ezra and Nehemiah, *passim*.

the name of, the king. The translator inclines to the latter view. Jerusalem and Palestine are nowhere mentioned in the papyrus. The instructions have a ring of authority, which the only document we have from Palestine, *APE* 3 = No. 9, does not exhibit. *APE* 8 = No. 7 cannot be used to illustrate "what such an official rescript would have looked like"; it is indeed an official order, but on a wholly different matter and of a wholly different type. It must be clear at the outset that, though the king had authorized the use of his name and power for this document, yet neither the king in person nor his central governmental bureau need have issued specific edicts on religious details. This edict is issued by Hananiah in person; that is clear beyond a doubt. But if Hananiah was the authorized representative and plenipotentiary (in this matter) of the king, as was Nehemiah, Neh. 2:1-8, not to mention the rather doubtful case of Ezra, Ezra 7:11-26, then the weight of the king's authority would be behind such edicts. The part of Arsān, satrap of Egypt, in the affair would be parallel to that of "the governors beyond the River" (the governors of the province "Beyond the River") and of "Asaph the keeper of the king's forest" in Neh. 2:7-9. He would recognize Hananiah's authority by safe conduct and non-interference, and, perhaps, by special orders releasing the Jewish soldiers from duty on specific occasions, and the like. But he would, of course, not issue an order prescribing the time and manner of celebrating a Jewish feast. Torrey considers this a festal letter: cf. II Macc., chap. 1. If Passover was mentioned in this document, it must have been in a portion now lost. The Passover itself is mentioned in *APE* 77, 2, obv., 5; *not* in the ostrakon published *PSBA*, XXXIII, 183 f.; cf. *JBL*, XXXI (1912), 13, note 9.

APE Pap. 6 (P. 13464):

1/2 <To my brethr>en(?), | <Id>*nih* and his associates (and?) the
<J>ewish <army> your brother Hanan<iah>.¹ The welfare of

¹ The name occurs first in the Old Testament in Jer., chap. 28, *passim*; also in Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Daniel. See especially Neh. 1:2; 7:2 (Nehemiah's brother; Hanani is a hypocoristic form; the same form occurs I Kings 16:1, 7 in a late legend in duplicate; cf. II Chron. 16:7; 19:2; 20:34). See also No. 5 = *APE* 11:7, 8.

3 my brethren may God¹ | To proceed: This year, the year 5 of
 Darius² the king, (a rescript was) sent³ from the king to ʾArša <m⁴>
 4 . . . | ⁵ Now do you count thus: Fou <rteen> |
 5 <ma>ke (or <d>o)(?), and from the 15th day to the
 6 21st day of <Nisan> . . . | be clean(?)⁶ and take heed!
 7 N<o> work <shall ye do> . . . | ⁷ <n>ot shall ye
 drink, and everything whatsoever that h<as> leaven <in it> . . . |
 8 (ll. 8-11 on the back of the sheet) . . . the setting of the sun
 9 until the 21st day of Nis<an> . . . | <t>ake into
 10 your chambers and seal (or lock up) between the days (of?) . . . |

¹ The plural, as in No. 3 = *APE* 4:1 and elsewhere in these papyri; but here certainly the majestic plural, as in the Old Testament, indicating no plurality of gods, whatever its origin may have been.

² Written *Drjshy*; cf. Ezra, Haggai, and Zechariah, *passim*; Neh. 12:22; also Dan. 6:1; 9:1; 11:1.

³ This is the usual meaning of the word "send" in these documents: to send a letter, a notice, an official communication, i.e., a rescript. One may also read: "having been sent . . . , <I announce to you>" or the like (*JBL*, XXXI, 1912, 1-33); but this reading is not as certain as Professor Arnold assumes. His own reference to Nöldeke's *Syriac Grammar*, and these very papyri (e.g., 8 (= No. 7):6) show that, when so construed, the participle is usually—in the examples known to the translator always—preceded by a particle (conjunction: "when," "after," "because," and the like). Torrey: "I have been sent by the king to ʾA. <and I have brought from Jerusalem the (customary) festal greeting from your brethren the Jew>s." A further possible reading would be: "a messenger <was sent or arrived> from the king." It is not certain that Hananiah, even though this Hananiah may be Nehemiah's brother, was ever, much less that he had lately been, at the king's court. The date, incidentally, is 419/8 B.C.; the instructions must, of course, apply to the following (Passover-) *Maṣṣoth*, in Nisan 418.

⁴ Quite evidently the satrap. If his name is to be read *APE* 4 = No. 3, he must have been in office under Artaxerxes I in the year 428. If he is the Ἀρταχέρης mentioned by Ktesias (*Recueil d'Archéol. orient.*, VI, 230), then the accession of Darius II did indeed find him already in office. He is first clearly mentioned here in 418. He is further mentioned in *APE* 1/2 (= No. 8):4, 30; 3 (= No. 9):3; 8 (= No. 7):1, 22, 27; 10 (= No. 11):5, 8, 9, 14. *APE* 3 certainly, and *APE* 10 probably, are to be dated at the end of 407 or later, to about 405-4. The title "satrap" does not occur in these papyri. The address is, "Our Lord."

⁵ The remnant of the word preceding "Now" has been read as the ending of <"the Jew">s. This is quite possible; but possible also are other readings, e.g., Egyptians, God, heaven, the ancients or forebears, etc.

⁶ Or perhaps: "<be ye r>esting."

⁷ Probably "Egyptian beer"; cf. Mishna, Pesahim 3:1.

11 ?? . | <To> my brethren, *Idnîh* and his associates,
(and?) the Jewish army, your brother Hananiah.*

NO. 5. A LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION

The men to whom this letter is addressed are evidently well-known characters and leaders of the Jewish community at Elephantine. They are not officials of the Persian government, but simply leaders, chosen or accepted by common consent, within the Jewish community, which formed a part of the Persian forces stationed at Elephantine and Syene. The leading figure, *Idnîh* (cf. Neh. 3:7), is frequently mentioned (*APE* 1/2 (= No. 8):4, 22; 5 (= No. 12):1; 6 (= No. 4):2, 11; 10 (= No. 11):1; in this papyrus; 15 (= No. 13):5; 18 VII:2; and perhaps in one or two minor fragments). He occupies within the community a position akin to that of the later Jewish ethnarchs. Uriah is named beside this *Idnîh* in No. 11 = *APE* 10:1, also. The writer of this letter, *Mʿyziḥ*, too, is named in this little group of leaders in *APE* 10:1, 17; 5 (= No. 12):2.

The Jahweh priests of Elephantine are mentioned in only one other document, the great petition *APE* 1/2 = No. 8. Their names are found here only, unless the Mattan of the fragment *APE* 71, 3:1 be identical with this priest Mattan. In that case the priest Mattan would seem to have been enrolled in the army, belonging to a *dgl* (cf. note on No. 14 = *APE* 35:3).

The Hananiah here mentioned is in all probability the writer of *APE* 6 = No. 4. This Egyptian Jew's opinion of him and his activities is interesting. 'Anani, of whom the writer expects so much, is probably identical with the 'Anani who receives prominent mention in No. 8 = *APE* 1/2:19, and with the one who signed and wrote (?) *APE* 8 = No. 7. He may have been chief secretary in the central secretarial bureau of the satrapy; in any case he was

* Line 11 is, of course, the address. On the whole cf. Lev. 23:4-8 (Holiness Code) and Exod. 12:1-20; cf. vss. 21-36. After all it may not have been any disrespect shown by the Jews to the rams of Khnum, but rather the tale of the Exodus and the attempt to purify and bring back the Gôlah, i.e., the Dispersion, from Egypt as well as from other lands, which caused trouble for the Jews of Syene at the hands of both Egyptians and Persians, in spite of "the Jewish army's" steadfast loyalty to the Persian cause, while signs of restlessness and the coming revolt were increasing among the Egyptians. There is no evidence that the sacrifice of rams caused trouble; *APE* 15 = No. 13 does, perhaps, justify the assumption here made.

a scribe or secretary of some prominence in this bureau, who was supposed to have some influence with the satrap. Perhaps one or the other of the 'Ananis mentioned in *APA* and *APE* may bear some relation to him.

This papyrus, which mentions troubles caused to Jews in Egypt by Hananiah, is the first in which we hear of ill-will shown to these Jews by the army commander *Uḏrng*, another straw pointing in the direction of the supposition expressed in note 9 on No. 4 (*APE* 6): 11. This document is, further, the only bit of evidence we have that the authority of the military commander of Yeb-Syene extended to Abydos, though this lay in a different judicial circuit and district of civil administration (see note on l. 11).

The true nature of this letter was first recognized by Professor W. R. Arnold of Andover Theological Seminary; see his article in the *JBL*, quoted in the notes here and under No. 4 (*APE* 6).

APE Pap. 11 (P. 13494):

To my lords *Iḏnjk*, Uriah, and the priests of the god *Iḥw*, Mattan,¹
 2 son of *Iḥbjk*,² and Neriah,³ son of . . . | your(?) servant *M'usjk*.⁴
 3 The welfare of my lords . . . be ye unto favor before | the
 God of heaven. To proceed: When *Uḏrng*, the army-commander,
 arrived at Abydos, he imprisoned me, because of a certain precious
 4 stone, which, | it was found, had been stolen by the traders. Finally
Šk and *Ḥôr*,⁵ young men of 'Anani's, exerted themselves with *Uḏrng* |
 5 and *Ḥrnyḫ*⁶ under the protection (*lit.* shadow) of the God of heaven,
 until they had delivered me. Now, behold, they are coming thither to
 6 you. Do you look after them, | whatever they may desire. And with
 regard to anything, which *Šk* <and> *Ḥôr* may ask of you, do you
 meet (*lit.* stand before) them in such manner, that a thing to blame |

¹ Jer. 38:1; II Kings 11:18; II Chron. 23:17; cf. also Mattenai, in Ezra and Nehemiah, and Mattaniah, in II Kings, I and II Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah.

² I Chron. 4:35.

³ Jer. 32:12, and *passim* thereafter.

⁴ Probably Ma'uziah; perhaps I Chron. 23:18; Neh. 10:8, also, instead of Maaziah.

⁵ Egyptian names.

⁶ An Egyptian name, probably to be pronounced *Ḥôr-nṯt* = *Ḥr-nfr* = Horus is good. Probably a local official, subordinate, or, at least, inferior in rank to *Uḏrng*; he evidently had something to do with the jailing of *M'usjk*. The Egyptians, here as elsewhere, are found in subordinate positions only.

7 they may not find with you. To you (is known?) the affliction(?),²
 which without cause has rested upon us, since Ḥananiah came to Egypt
 8 until now. | And whatsoever ye do for Ḥôr, for your <selves> ye are
 doing it. Ḥôr is Ḥananiah's young man.³ Do you sell cheaply from
 9 our houses | any goods that are at hand. Whether⁴ we lose or whether
 we do not lose, it is one to you. To explain why (*lit.* in that) I am
 10 sending (notice) to you— | he said to me: Send (word by) a letter before
 us. Even if we lose, a deposit⁵ will be established with his arrival⁶ in
 11 'Anani's house; what ye do | for him will not be hidden from 'Anani. |
 12 To my lords *Idniḥ*, Uriah, and the priests, and the Jews, who (*or*
 of) *M'usih*, son of Šḥ' (?).⁶

² Arnold, see note 2; probably correct.

³ In spite of Professor Arnold, whose excellent reading and rendering of this papyrus (*JBL*, XXXI, Part I, 1912; cf. No. 4 = *APE* 6) are here largely followed, this is probably the correct rendering of a troublesome word, both here and in line 4. Arnold's "an acquaintance of" would be an Arabism pure and simple, whose existence elsewhere in Aramaic has not been proven. Moreover, in No. 3 = *APE* 4:7 the meaning "acquaintance of" for exactly the same word is practically out of the question. In the meaning "young man," however, the word is a good and well-known Aramaic term. It need not mean "hired servant," but rather "belonging to the personal following of, and therefore under the protection of, and doing occasional service for, i.e., a retainer." This would account for their influence with *Ujdrng* and *Ḥrnyḥi*; for they had the ear of 'Anani and Ḥananiah, both connected with the central bureau of the Persian government in Egypt (see *APE* 6 (=No. 4) and 8 (=No. 7), cf. 1/2 (=No. 8):18 f.), and therefore close to the all-powerful satrap, Aršam. And this, together with the service rendered to *M'usih*, is quite sufficient to explain the deferential reception accorded to these subordinates of subordinates by the Jewish community of Yeb-Elephantine. The conception outlined would also obviate the objection of others, that one and the same Ḥôr could not be the *Ḥim* of both 'Anani and Ḥananiah, and that, therefore, the Ḥôr here mentioned must be a different personage from the Ḥôr connected with Šḥ' in lines 4 and 6—a really quite impossible supposition in view of lines 10 and 11.

⁴ Lit. "whatsoever."

⁵ Or "treasure"; Arnold: "credit." He means gratitude and good repute.

⁶ Lit. "after him"; Arnold: "because of him."

⁶ Line 12 is the address. The last name is very uncertain; cf. No. 12 = *APE* 5:2. The date of this undated letter of recommendation can be approximately determined by two fairly eminent personages mentioned, Ḥananiah and *Ujdrng*. The former necessitates a date some little time after 419/8; compare No. 4 = *APE* 6 with line 7 above. The latter, with his title "army-commander," or "commander of the army," demands a date before 410; for, while he had been "commander of the army" since 420 (cf. *APA* H:4-5; J:4), in 410 (No. 8 = *APE* 1/2:7) and for some little time before (No. 6 = *APE* 7:7) his son *Nḥjn* bore this title, and *Ujdrng* was military governor at Yeb (*APE* 1/2; Strassb. = No. 10). It is interesting to notice, by the way, that, though the civil administration and the judicial circuits recognized the division of upper Egypt into districts of "The South Canal" and the Thebais (see note on No. 3 = *APE* 4:2), the policing power of the military authorities at Elephantine-Syene extends to Abydos, well into the middle of the Thebais (cf. Herodotus ii. 30).

NO. 6. AN APPEAL AGAINST A JUDICIAL DECISION?

This document is too fragmentary to allow an exact determination of its nature. The deponent, whose name we do not know, is manifestly complaining of some wrong, which he supposes was done to him, apparently by a sentence or decision of a judge or court. To whom the appeal is made is not quite certain. The "my lord" of line 8 lends color to the supposition that it was made to the satrap Aršam; cf. note on No. 4 (*APE* 6):3. This would accord with the general method of appeal in the empire of the Achaemenians; cf. Ed. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, III, pp. 45 f. On the other hand, the plural "my lords" and comparison with No. 5 = *APE* 11 is equally possible.

The date, too, is lost, though the years 416 and 410 can be fixed as limits between which it probably belongs. As it seems to indicate, like No. 5 = *APE* 11, an increasingly hostile attitude on the part of the Persian commanders against the Egyptian Jews, the two are placed side by side. This arrangement has the further advantage of exhibiting in close proximity to each other the two great official documents of the collection *APE* 8 = No. 7 and *APE* 1/2 = No. 8.

APE Pap. 7 (P. 13478):

1/2 *ndn*(?),¹ son of . . . | having in charge for
 3 him² from the year 24 <to the y>ear 31 | I was inter-
 rogated <before> *Tr* <*yh*> and > the judge (*or* court), and I said before
 4 <them?> | . . . not did I?³ ?⁴ I have taken ?⁵

¹ If this reading be correct, it would probably be the second element, *-nadan* or *-nadin*, of a name of Babylonian type, whose first element would be the name of a god. The photograph looks more like *-dyn*, which might be part of the Hebraic name Nathân, found elsewhere in these papyri.

² See No. 7 (*APE* 8):3, note 2; No. 12 (*APE* 5):6, note 6. Perhaps simply: "holding it in trust," not "for him."

³ This line is tantalizingly fragmentary. This word is clearly legible; but without context its meaning cannot be fixed. "Chastise," "plough," "winnow," are possibilities, not to mention others.

⁴ "Of *or* from them" (fem.) appears to be the most likely reading from the photograph; others, however, have read very differently.

⁵ "To wife," in a contracted form not otherwise found in exactly this spelling in these papyri, is a possibility.

- 5 The judge (*or* court) | . . and as it were violence¹ was done to me, and I said before *Tryk* and the jud <ge> (*or* cour <t>) |
 6 <f>rom the year 24 to the year 31, and *Bgprn* and *Npin* and
 7 *Mnki* and . . . came to Syene and² | the chariots(?)
 of *Npin*, army-commander of Syene, and the judges of the district, as
 8 if for(?) | before my lord (*or* lords) I sent (word), say-
 9 ing: As it were violence was done to me, and now |
 ask(?) *Tryk* and the judge (*or* court) concerning this. As it were
 violence let not be done to me

NO. 7. AN OFFICIAL RESCRIPT FROM THE SATRAP ARŠAM, GIVING ORDER
 CONCERNING A DETAIL IN THE BUILDING OF A SHIP
 FOR THE GOVERNMENT

This is the only official document issued by the satrap's central bureau in the name of the satrap Aršam himself, though apparently without his signature, which is found in this collection. Unfortunately, it is fragmentary both at the beginning and at the end, and, on account of its isolation and the very technical terminology used in it, very difficult to interpret, especially in the large central portion, which is well preserved. Nevertheless the translator believes that it is possible to analyze this important typical document in greater detail and to arrive at a clearer understanding of its content than has yet been done.

¹ A technical expression of the legal vocabulary? Cf. lines 8 and 9, and *APE* 27:5, 8, and 9; the identity of position of this curious form of expression in these two documents of entirely different content, separated from each other by an interval of nearly fifty years, and the word "saying," introducing the "as it were" of line 8 in both, point to a well-established legal formula.

² The first name is probably the Persian name, written by the Greeks Megaphernes. The third name, probably the Babylonian Mannuki, and the fourth, of which all but the last letter is missing, are inserted above the line. Of the second name we do not know the pronunciation, though it is probably Persian; but we do know the bearer of it. He is the son of the well-known military governor of Yeb-Elephantine, *Ujdrng*, successor of his father as army-commander at Syene-Assuan, and a great Jew-baiter; cf. line 8; *APE* 1(=No. 8):7, 8; *APA* H:4/5; J:5; *APE* 11(=No. 5):3, 4. The references given make it practically certain (1) that this document, whose dating is lost, was written after 416 (when the father, *Ujdrng*, was still "army-commander of Syene") and, probably, before 410 (the great catastrophe at Yeb-Assuan); (2) that the regnal years here mentioned are those of Artaxerxes I Longimanus, being 441/40 and 434/33 respectively. A few letters following "to Syene and" may be read "to <ok>" or "to Q"

The specific order for the transmission of which this whole document was written is contained in the brief and to us cryptic statement, lines 22 f.: "Do thou according to that which the computers (?) say, as order has been given." As we know nothing further of the recipient *Wahapre'mehi*, except his name, and as the line which probably contained information as to the nature of his work, 6 | 7, is broken at precisely the decisive points, we do not know exactly what the order refers to. Some approach to its meaning, however, is gained by a correct understanding of the elaborate foundation laid for this order in the body of the document. This will, at the same time, give us an insight into the busy workshop of the governmental secretarial bureau and of the various bureaus and working bodies of the civil administration set in motion by it.

The document opens with the quotation of a report made to the satrap by two inspectors (?) of shipping, *Psamsenit* and *X* (name lost), through their chief (?), *Mithridates*. This report announces that certain work, described as carpentry, upon a ship of which these two inspectors had charge has been completed, and that, therefore, it is time to summon other workmen and to proceed to the next steps (line 2 | 3; cf. 7 | 8). This announcement is based on a previous order from the satrap, probably the original, summarily complete order for the building of the ship in question, which had said: Let the carpentry be done to measure and then let the computers be notified, etc. (lines 4-6; cf. lines 22 and 23, where it is distinctly said that these steps are in accordance with an order or decree which has been given). Line 6b quotes an order sent by the satrap to the governmental computers and givers of orders (or, perhaps better, makers of contracts) to proceed with their work. Next follows the elaborate report of these officials on their activities in obedience to this order: inspection of ?, and of the work completed by *Psamsenit* and *X*; recommendation of a competent foreman for the work to follow; calling in of this new foreman by the contract-makers for consultation; a complete and detailed statement of the materials needed for the work in hand (which to judge from the materials called for, and from the fact that the carpentry

is finished, must be the joinery); specifications as to the manner in which this material is to be delivered; designation of the appointed foreman as the man to whom delivery is to be made. The report closes with the recommendation, that the next step be taken expeditiously, thus quoting again, as is clearly stated this time, the original order, which had been quoted at the close of a similar report, lines 4-6. Now follows the order of the satrap to Waḥapre'meḥi. As this man is not concerned with the construction, and as the only other element dealt with in the computers' report, upon which the satrap bases his order, is the furnishing and delivery of the material, it is a fairly safe supposition, that it was this latter function with which Waḥapre'meḥi was concerned. What follows is sufficiently set forth in the notes.

The translator does not possess sufficient knowledge of shipbuilding, nor the time, at present, to acquire it, to determine more closely the specific parts of the ship for which the timbers, as specified, would be suitable. Though it may not be possible to determine every point with absolute precision, yet it is hoped that by expert examination of the specifications, as set forth, our knowledge of the obscure terms here found may be definitely furthered also.

APE Pap. 8 (P. 13492):

From 'Aršam to *Uḥpr'mḥi*.¹ To proceed:]
 2 unto us Mithradat,² the *nḥpt*,³ as follows: Thus says (said?)
*Psmsnt*⁴

¹ An Egyptian name: "Apries is in the horizon." Note the curt opening! Allowing for the official character of the rescript, it is still clear that the addressee is of no high rank or station.

² A well-known Persian name. Before "unto us" supply "sent notice or a report." This, again, must have been preceded by a dependent clause or phrase, stating time, reason, cause, or purpose of this report.

³ Probably Persian: *nḥy*, navis, ship; and *pat*, master; shipmaster, a title, applying, as the implications of our papyrus show, to foremen or overseers of varying rank in the government's shipbuilding and maintenance department. This Persian *nōpat* receives the report of two Egyptian *nōpats*, evidently his subordinates, and transmits it to the satrap directly.

⁴ An Egyptian name: "Psam (metich), son of Neit?" Supply from lines 7/8: "and X, the two *nopats* of."

- 3 | The Walled Towns,¹ thus said they: The ship of which we have charge,² it is time to make its *yṣṣd*⁴
 4 Let the carpentering be done to measure,³ and let the *hmdkr*⁶ of the stores be notified.⁷ They, together with the *frmnkr*⁸⁹ |

¹ Probably the name of the territory under the jurisdiction of Psamsenit and his partner; therefore hardly all the walled towns of Egypt, nor those of Tštrs (No. 3 = *APE* 4:1, note 4), but name of a nome? a subdivision of a nome? It would be an appropriate designation for the pair Yeb-Syene.

² The usual translation is: "which we own." Now it is true that this word, and even this very form, is used once in *APA*, and twice or thrice in *APE* in a connection which suggests the meaning "holder or owner of property." But even in those few cases the meaning "guardian," "keeper" is much more appropriate. In fact, nowhere in earlier Aramaic, neither in Daniel, nor in *APE*, *APA*, and *RES* I, 247, does the word clearly mean "to own." Wherever sufficient context makes it possible to determine the meaning at all, it clearly means "to guard, to have" or "retain charge of." Here, however, the meaning "own," "owners" is peculiarly inappropriate. If a new ship is building, which is admitted on all sides to be a possibility, and which seems to the writer to be so strong a probability as to be almost certainty, why should a pair of obscure little government inspectors of shipyards and shipping describe themselves as owners of a ship being built by the government? And if it is an old hulk of theirs which they want repaired at government expense, would they to that end set the whole machinery from the high lord satrap downward publicly into motion? See No. 12 = *APE* 5:6, note 6.

³ *yṣṣd*, or *-ṣr*, derivation unknown, is what is done to a ship after the carpentry is finished (see line 8; cf. line 4), i.e., the joinery. If so understood, the usual rendering "equipment (active)," "outfitting" may well be used.

⁴ Supply: "in accordance with the (original?) order, which was given," or the like; cf. lines 22 f.

⁵ Lit. "on the rope," i.e., "by the measuring line"; another possibility, less good to the translator's mind, is: "on dry land." A drydock which has also been suggested is out of the question. Carpentry was chiefly sawing.

⁶ Accountants, computers, are what the context suggests these officials to have been. If one could account in this early Persian for such heterogeneous formations as this *hmdkr*, the *hndyn* of lines 5 and 17, and the Semiticized *haddāberin* of Dan. 3:24, 27; 4:33; 6:8, as derivatives from the root of middle and modern Persian *hāndz*, "to reckon, calculate, compute," that would be a delightful solution of three troublesome problems at one stroke. *Caetera desiderantur*.

⁷ Lit. "sent to."

⁸ Another class of officials with a Persian name; these are the givers and promulgators of orders, not the *ṣdkr* of No. 3 = *APE* 4:5; the chief function, however, of the *frmnkr* seems to be the letting of contracts for work in the service of the government (cf. line 8 f.). This series offers interesting insight into the work of the Persian administration in Egypt: computing accountants, givers of orders, auditors or verifiers, and scribes are all at work in the civil administration; all work in bodies, whence the form of their reports: X (the chief or head) and his associates. For a few more bodies of this sort, from the judicial and police organization, the latter of which seems to have been connected with the military administration (see especially No. 5 = *APE* 11), see the Strassb. Papyrus = No. 10.

⁹ Supply: "shall do so and so"; very probably: "shall inspect the work and on the basis of their inspection let them. . . ." These are, almost certainly, not

5 ... and its ³*ʿwphrt*,¹ let them make, and let (an order) be sent to whomsoever it may be² (for) the materials³ (according to) *hmdm*.⁴ Finally |

detailed recommendations of Mithradat as to what should be done next, now that Psamsenit and X have completed their part of the work, although that is commonly held to be the import of these lines. More careful examination makes it clear that this can only be Aršam's original order for the building of the ship, or at least a previous general order, upon which Psamsenit and his partner base their report: It is now time to make the joinery. They are certain of this, because the original or previous order said: Let the carpentry be done to measure and then let notice be sent, etc. Their detail, the carpentry, is finished (see line 8). These subordinates, therefore, can now report with an air of finality: It is now time to go on to the next step. It is this rough carpentry, the making of the empty, hollow hull, which Herodotus describes as the first step in Egyptian boat building, ii. 96. The ancients did not first build up the skeleton of the hull and then put on the skin over it, as is now done. They built first the hollow hull; that was the carpentry. All the rest was joinery, equipment, outfitting. It is interesting to note the number of orders and reports involved in the building of a ship: an order to Psamsenit and X, perhaps through Mithradat, lines 4 ff. quoted in a report of Mithradat, based on a report of his subordinates, lines 2-6a; an order to the *hmdkr* and *frmnkr*, line 6b; their report in detail, lines 6 *frn*-22a, again quoting the original order, end of 22a; order of this document, 22b, 23a.

¹ The reading is not certain and the word in any case is unknown as to its etymology. The context, however, makes rather probable the meaning "an estimate of it," or the like.

² This is the translator's own reading, of which he hopes to publish a detailed account elsewhere. Though it has not to his knowledge been previously suggested, he believes it to be almost certain.

³ The meaning of this word, *ʿfrn*, of unknown etymology, is really quite clear in this document, here and especially farther on, lines 9 and 21: the materials for a woodwork construction, chiefly the timbers themselves, which were to serve as thwarts, keelson, dowels, etc. This ends the dispute concerning its meaning in No. 8=APE 1:11 and in Ezra 5:3, 9. In connection with the temple, whether at Elephantine or at Jerusalem, it can mean only all such material unmentioned in detail, supports, pegs, paneling, in Ezra the one timber "course" in three of stone, etc. The meaning "colonnade," assumed by one of our ablest American Aramaists, Professor Torrey, must be abandoned as impossible; equally untenable is Paul Haupt's "sanctuary," though some etymological connection with the well-known Ashera, which is a tree trunk, stake, or post, is not improbable. Torrey (by letter) suggests: "inside woodwork."

⁴ See note on line 4, *hmdkr*. "Specification" is a meaning which suits both this context and line 17 very well. The preposition of line 17 is omitted here; it may be inadvertently by a scribal error, or it may be intentionally, making this an adverbial accusative. Or is this a verb? Perhaps: "Let (notice) be given to whomsoever it may be: Specify the material!"

- 6 let be given,² and expeditiously(?)³ let its *ʔpšd* be made.⁴ Then, after (orders) had been sent by me unto them⁵ concerning this, they sent
 7 (this? report) | *ḥb*(-wood?)⁶ which (is) over against the fortress(?) in Y(?)⁶ Mithradat the *nypš* showed us the
 8 ship *nḥyḥ*⁷ which (or that which) by Psamsenit and | the two *nypšs*⁸ of the The Walled Towns, had been carpentered to measure.⁹ Then (*lit.* and) we designated to *Šmšlk*¹⁰ and his associates, the *frmmkr*,
 9 *Šmy*, s <on> of | *Knyfḫ*,¹¹ head of the ship(?) -carpenters; and thus they¹² said: It is time to make its *ʔpšd*. This is the material which *ʔpḫḫ*¹³ to

² Supply, in accordance with line 21b: "to a responsible workman designated by the *hmdkr* let these supplies be given," or the like.

³ Or completely, or skilfully?

⁴ This is the end of the satrap's original order (cf. end of line 22a), upon which the report of Psamsenit and X, on the completion of their part and the necessity of securing workmen and materials to go on with the next, is based.

⁵ I.e., by the satrap to the *hmdkr*.

⁶ Cf. lines 11, 15, 20; supply: "we have inspected," or "*Uḥpr-mḥḫ* showed us," or the like.

⁷ This suggests that perhaps *Uḥpr-mḥḫ*, the person to whom this rescript is addressed, may have furnished some of the wood, though this is not at all certain. He does not, at any rate, appear to have had anything to do with the construction. Is his "lumberyard" near the citadel of Yeb?

⁸ The usual supposition, that this is the name of the ship, seems to the translator the most improbable one; it scarcely seems ready to bear a name. Some statement like "we noting," or "while we noted," though not conforming to the "rules" of such little Aramaic of this older time as we know, might yet be a possibility. If so, the whole text at this point would read straight enough. Or is the solution simpler still, to be read: "Mithradat, the *nôpat*, informed us: The ship we will submit to inspection, which Psamsenit," etc. The name after "Psamsenit and" cannot be read; more than half of the upper part of the letters is missing.

⁹ Lit. "both of them the *nôpats*."

¹⁰ The translator fails utterly to see the insurmountable difficulty which decipherers and commentators alike have discovered at this point. Why, having read one word, "sawed, carpentered," in line 4, one should here read a different word, which could only mean "towed," is to him a mystery.

¹¹ A Phoenician or Punic name.

¹² Egyptian names, apparently, though the first may be Semitic; the second means "the Ka is good"; cf. No. 5 (*APE* 11):5.

¹³ I.e., of course, *Šmy* and his associates, the ship-carpenters in the employ of the government; another interesting example of the corporative organization of the provincial government of the Persian empire.

¹⁴ This can hardly mean anything else than "is needed," "is wanted." The order in the original is: "*ʔpḫḫ* its *ʔpšd* | to make."

10 make | its *ṣpšd*:

Timbers of cedar and *ṣ*, new, *ṣf* (boards? ?), ten cubits,
šim . *bṣg*, eighty cubits by three palms,
bgw sgwn, twelve cubits, |
 11 *ṣf*, fifteen (cubits?),
 . . . , twenty cubits,
b'bl, seventy cubits;
hnn for the belly, three,¹
ql's for the raising (?stature ? ?), one. ²

12 Timbers of *ḥb*-(wood), sixty cubits,

phšmyni lṣ'r'r, one for two cubits.³

*ṣṣṣ*⁴ under the *ḥb*, five,

13 nails of copper and iron,⁵ | two hundred.

¹ Three timbers or pieces? the ship's belly being probably the bottom, the lowest part, are *hnn*, as in Arabic, the keelson timbers? The keel, or what corresponds to it in the mortuary boat in the Field Museum at Chicago, the plank, which runs centrally from the prow through the lowest part amidships to the stern, consists of three pieces; but this, being a relatively small and expensive mortuary bark, can hardly be used in comparison, although an excellent detailed description of it by competent experts exists, which, through the kindness of Dr. B. Laufer, the authorities of the Field Museum generously placed at the translator's disposal in a typewritten copy. More valuable in this respect is the study of ancient models of freight boats, published by Chr. Belger in *ZdS XXXIII* (1895), 24-32, to which Dr. George Allen, Assistant Curator of Haskell Oriental Museum, called the translator's attention. The keelson-like construction in ancient Egyptian Nile boats is there clearly shown, especially on p. 26, where, as well as on the following pages, other parts of the "joinery" may also be seen. What is the relation of the *hnn*, ll. 14 ff., whose dimensions are specified, to the *hnn* here?

² Can this have anything to do with the well-known word for "sail" *ql'*? If so, then is it mast or yard? Cf. Belger, quoted in the foregoing note. Or has this to do with the high framework, on which the rudder or rudders were hung, for which the *ṣf*, "boards," may have been intended?

³ Has this anything to do with the two cubits of Herodotus, which seem to be a bit improbable as they stand? The planks of the little mortuary bark in the Field Museum are laid brick fashion correctly enough; but even in this comparatively small boat they are much longer than two cubits each. Or is this because of the difference in wood? Herodotus speaks of Acantha (thorn) wood; the Field Museum bark is sumptuously constructed of cedar throughout. Nevertheless the dowel-tenons (Herodotus' *ῥόμφοι*, for which Liddell and Scott give "crossribs," and George Rawlinson, "stakes or poles," neither of which are found in this connection in Egyptian boats) and their slots are roughly about two cubits apart, and the boards in the little decks fore and aft are about two cubits in length. The *r*'s in the second word may, either or both, be read *d*.

⁴ Points? Knobs? Projecting ends for support?

⁵ Bronze?

Timbers of cedar-(wood), old(?), strong(?) of *tmjs*,² twenty cubits,

Total.³

Let be brought, as calkage for them(?), old(?) and worn (*lit.* broken), unto the stores

14 cords (or cloths) | of flax, thick(?), one hundred and eighty *krš*, rags
(? *rq'n*),³ two hundred and fifty *krš*.

15 Timbers of cedar-(wood), new, *hmn* two, each five cubits | three palms
by three palms.

For the *hš*, nails of copper, one hundred and fifty, each three palms;
16 two hundred and seventy-five, | each ten
fingers,⁴

All the nails, four hundred and twenty-five.

Plates of copper, twenty cubits,⁵

their nails, two hundred. |

17 Timbers of cedar-(wood), old, *rsyt msn*, one talent, ten minas.⁶

Total.

Add to it: sulphur, *krš* ten;

and, according to its specification(?), arsenic, *krš* one hundred.⁷ |

² *tmjs* may be some standard of strength or thickness; see line 20.

³ Cf. line 17.

⁴ The word will bear the meaning given; and rags would be used for calking, as would be the ropes described. In fact this rope material, specified by weight, is, using flax for hemp, the modern oakum. The word translated "calkage," *hlift*, is quite capable of bearing this meaning, though not elsewhere found in such connection hitherto. Is this the troublesome *καλαφάτης*, *calafatare*, which can hardly be Arabic?

⁵ The palm being four fingerbreadths, these would be two and one-half palms long—still a most respectable nail.

⁶ Just enough to protect the keel or keel plank, when the boat was drawn up on the beach; not enough to sheathe the whole bottom of a seagoing vessel for protection against the action of salt water. Building at Syene or Elephantine, or in their immediate neighborhood, perhaps the old shipping center, Silsileh (Dümichen, *Gesch. des alt. Aegyptens*, pp. 37 f.), this was, of course not a seagoing vessel. The length of the copperplating, whose width may have been of a standard size, corresponds to the missing fifth item of the new cedar and 7 timbers in l. 11, and to the only item of old(?) and strong(?) cedar, l. 13. For such copperplating in antiquity see Kraus *Talmud. Archäologie*, II, 340; Speck, *Handels-gesch. des Altertums*, I, 28.

⁷ Lines 17 ff. are written on the back of the sheet. Is this just offal and scraps, perhaps with sawdust and shavings? It is specified by weight only, without other designation of measure. Such material would be used for the making of pins, pegs, dowel-tenons, etc., and, possibly, to help fill chinks too large for simple calking.

⁸ For painting, of course; trisulphide of arsenic, *auripigmentum*, orpiment, and disulphide of arsenic, realgar, were widely used as yellows and reds in dyeing and

- 18 And let be added¹ to the timbers, which are to be delivered:
to *ḥf*, in length to each three palms *ḥfṣ*,² and to the breadth
and thickness two fingers;
19 and to | *šim*, in length to each three palms *ḥfṣ*, and to the
breadth two fingers;
and to *šf* and the *ḥnns*, in length to each one palm;
20 and to | *bḥl*, the timbers of *ḥb*, of the thickness (?) of *ṯmjs*,³
in length to each three palms *ḥfṣ* and to the breadth one
finger.⁴
21 The cords (or cloths) of flax, the rags (?), | the arsenic, the sulphur, by
the (standard) weight of Persia shall it be delivered. Let (orders) be
sent as follows: This material is to be delivered upon the hands of *Šmy*,
22 the son of *Knyfi*, head | of the ship (?) -carpenters, for the 'g(?)*njn*⁵ of
the 'y^ḥ*ṣd* of that ship, and let him make (it) expeditiously,⁷ as order has
23 been given.⁸ Now 'Aršam says thus: Do thou do | according to that
which the *ḥmdkr* say,⁹ as order has been given. 'Anani, the scribe,

painting, also in the alchemy of late antiquity and the Middle Ages. How early?
The boat in the Field Museum shows traces of red paint. Have the pigments of
ancient Egypt and Persia been chemically examined? *Hndyn*, "specification" (?);
cf. note 4, l. 5.

¹ For good measure; to insure against possible shortage.

² If *ḥfṣ*, then, perhaps, = "sought out, tested, gauged," or "of standard size."
If *ḥfṣ*, then, possibly, "free," either "free from," i.e., beyond the size required, or
"not held to exact measure"; the latter would be a distinct Hebraism. In favor of
the former is the curious connection of the word *ḥaṣṣā*, "seeking, scenting out," with
"three palms" in the Babylonian Talmud, *Pesahim* 31b: In regard to the rule that
leaven, which can be scented out by a dog, must be removed before Passover, the ques-
tion is asked: "How far is 'the scenting out of a dog'?" The reply is: "Three palms."

³ For the *ṯmjs* see line 13; the possible meaning thickness for *drj* is derived from a
scrap of papyrus, found in January, 1902, at Elephantine, and published by De Vogüé
in *Répertoire d'Épigraphie Sémitique*, Vol. I, No. 246.

⁴ It is to be noted that the "old cedar," included in the general list of supplies,
lines 10-17, is not mentioned in these particular specifications for the timbers "which
are to be delivered."

⁵ See note on No. 1 = APE 25:3.

⁶ The second letter is uncertain; it may be *z* or *y* or *g*, not *i*, as is usually read.
If *g*, then possibly "the laying out of the joinery"; if *y*, then possibly "for the response,
i.e., the needs," or simply "for the matter, the affair of the joinery." For *z*, the most
likely reading from the photograph, the translator has no specific suggestion to offer;
some such verbal noun as those above mentioned it must clearly be.

⁷ See note on line 6.

⁸ End of the report of the *ḥmdkr*, quoting a previous, perhaps the original, order
of the satrap; cf. lines 3-6.

⁹ Exactly what *ḥḥprmkj* is to do is not clear; see note on line 7.

24 secretary in chief,² *Nbṣṣqb* wrote (it). | *Uḥpr mḥi* (or *ʿrīmḥi*) ??????? |
 25/26 as order has been given. ? Wrote (it) Sobk . . .³ | The baris⁴ . . . |
 27/28 From(?) *ʿAršam*? | *Nbṣṣqb* the scribe (or the document),
 on the 23d of Ṭebeth, year 12 of Dari<us>.⁴

NO. 8. A PETITION OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AT ELEPHANTINE TO THE
 PERSIAN GOVERNOR OF JUDAEA, BAGOAS (BAGOHI)

This petition is of an official character, though it does not issue from any officer or body of officers recognized, so far as we know, by the Persian government; its writers are the leaders of the Jewish community at Yeb-Elephantine (cf. Introduction to No. 5, *APE* 11), acting in the name of the community.

Its recipient, Bagohi (Bagoas; the same name, but referring to other persons, is found in the Old Testament, in the form Bigvai, Ezra 2:2, 14; 8:14; Neh. 7:7, 19; 10:17), is a *successor* of Nehemiah and others in the governorship of the little subordinate province of Judaea. There is little doubt that he must be identified with the Bagoses of Josephus' *Ant.*, XI, vii, 1 (297-301), who functioned in the reign of Artaxerxes II Mnemon (404-359). He

² For the name 'Anani, see I Chron. 3:24; cf. Neh. 3:23; 11:32. He is a well-known character in these papyri; see No. 8 = *APE* 1/2:19; 11 (= No. 5):4, 10, 11; the same name elsewhere also, once or twice as scribe. If this latter be our 'Anani, then Professor Arnold may be right in assuming that we must read: "'Anani, the scribe. Secretary in chief: *Nbṣṣqb* has signed." It is certainly most remarkable that the same fluent office handwriting runs through the words "Secretary in chief," to be replaced by a more stiff, vertical, and formal (?) one in the last two words. To whomever the title may apply, its meaning here is fairly clear: chief or head of the central scribal or secretarial bureau or chancellery of the satrap. The same title occurs in Ezra 4:8, 9, 17, there rendered "chancellor." The literal meaning is "Master of Decrees"; Torrey (by letter): "Master of Reports"; cf. *Ezra Studies*, 200. *Nbṣṣqb* is a West Semitic name found in Babylonian documents.

³ These two lines, immediately under the last line of the great rescript, are written in a very poor hand, evidently unused to Aramaic, probably in the bureau of *Uḥpr mḥi* and by his scribe or secretary, whose name, one element of which, the well-known Egyptian god, Sobk, is clearly legible, is written in Demotic.

⁴ This line, some distance from the previous one, is a docket in Demotic. Baris is a kind of ship used in Egypt; Herodotus ii, 96, evidently refers to the kind of ship in question.

⁵ These two, perhaps three, lines are written in the same fluent hand as the main body of the rescript, at the very bottom of the page, so that, with proper folding they would appear on the outside as the address. The date is that of the February lunation, 411.

is probably not to be confounded, as he formerly was, with the powerful eunuch Bagoas of Artaxerxes III Ochus and Darius III Codomannus.

Recipients of similar petitions, according to the statement of our document (lines 18, 19, 29), were other influential persons resident in Palestine. On the first of these, Johanan, the high priest of the temple at Jerusalem, see the passages quoted in the note on his name, line 18. Since his grandfather, Eliashib, was high priest in Nehemiah's day, this enables us to date Nehemiah's activity with almost perfect certainty in the reign of Artaxerxes I Longimanus (465-424). The second, 'Austan (?), brother of 'Anani, is not otherwise known. He seems to have occupied in Jerusalem a position similar to that of *Idniḥ* in Yeb. Sanballat, governor of Samaria (line 29), is without much doubt to be identified with the Sanballat of Nehemiah's time (see note on his name). Whether he be identical with the Sanballat of Josephus, *Ant.*, XI, vii, 2; viii, according to Josephus the founder of the temple on Gerizim and therewith of the Samaritan schism—in which case Josephus' dates must be wrong—or whether the Sanballat of Josephus be another, perhaps the grandson of this Sanballat, is a matter of dispute. The latter seems to the translator the more probable; that these Jews, for whose Samaritan origin, in whole or in part, even the clever Hoonacker has not succeeded in furnishing convincing proof, should appeal to the Samaritan authorities at all *after Nehemiah's days*, that they place on the same memorandum the statement of Bagohi and Delayah together (*APE* 3=No. 7), goes far to indicate that the schism had not yet been definitely consummated. Delayah and Shelemyah, the sons of Sanballat, to whom the petition mentioned in line 29 is addressed, though their father is still living and governor of Samaria (probably very old), are not otherwise known.

This papyrus is most important, because it establishes definitely the fact, of which scholars could not be certain from *APA* and Strassb., that the Jews of Yeb had in their midst a rather large and fully equipped temple of Jahweh with priests and complete and elaborate temple service, quite parallel to the same institutions at Jerusalem, except that a high priest is nowhere mentioned.

The form of the divine name used in these papyri is probably to be read Yahu, not Yaho, as some scholars contend.

The content of the document is not, as has been supposed, a request for permission to rebuild their temple. Neither Bagoas nor any of the other persons addressed had authority to grant such permission for Egypt; only Aršam, the satrap, or the king could do that. The nature of the reply, No. 9 (*APE* 3), as well as the wording of the petition itself, shows that what was asked for was the exertion of influence and, more especially, the writing of letters of recommendation, which would support and strengthen the request of the Jews before Aršam (which is probably found in Strassb.=No. 10) and help them to secure from him the desired permission to rebuild their temple.

The non-success of the Elephantine Jews with Johanan, the high priest, and ²Austan, the popular leader at Jerusalem, may in part have to be accounted for by the troubles between Bagohi-Bagoes and Johanan-Ioannes, Josephus, *Ant.*, XI, vii, 1. It may, however, have been in large part, if not wholly, due to the unwillingness of the Jerusalem Jews to sanction the existence of a complete Jahweh-temple and temple-service outside of Jerusalem, as the reply of Bagohi, the activity of Hananiah in Egypt (No. 4=*APE* 6 and No. 5=*APE* 11), the probable sequel (No. 12=*APE* 5), and the well-known attitude of the Jews of Nehemiah's day and thereafter toward the Samaritans and in regard to the temple at Jerusalem go far to show. Finally, it may have been caused by circumstances of which we have no knowledge.

The document is preserved in two copies, the second much more fragmentary than the first. Neither is, of course, "the original," for this was sent to Jerusalem. It is a matter of dispute whether these copies, retained at home, were rough preliminary drafts, or duplicate copies made to be kept at the home office. What little evidence we have, e.g., in Nos. 1 and 2 (*APE* 25 and 26), No. 3 (*APE* 4), points toward the latter alternative, which is the more probable also on general grounds.

The text given in the translation follows the lines of *APE* 1. The text of *APE* 2 is used to emend that of its fellow, where this

seemed corrupt or less good. Variant readings are, however, carefully noted in the footnotes.

APE Pap. 1/2 (P. 13495 and 13496):

To our lord Bagôhi,¹ governor of Judaea, thy servants, *Idnîh* and his
 2 associates, the priests who are in Yeb the fortress. | May the god of
 heaven provide for the welfare of our lord bounteously² always, and
 3 may he establish thee in the favor of³ Darius the king | and of (his)
 court⁴ more abundantly than now a thousandfold and may he give thee
 4 long life, and mayest thou be hale and hearty always. | To proceed: thy
 servant⁵ *Idnîh* and his associates say as follows: In the month of Tam-
 5 muz, the 14th year of Darius the king,⁶ when *Aršam* | had departed and
 gone unto the king, the shavelings⁷ of the god *Ḥnûb* who (are) in Yeb
 the fortress⁸ <made> a plot(?) with *Ujdrng*, who was military governor
 6 here,⁹ | to wit: Let the temple of *Ḥy* the god which is in Yeb the fortress
 7 be removed thence. Then that *Ujdrng*, | the accursed(?), sent a letter
 unto *Npîn* his son, who was commander of the army at Syene the for-
 8 tress, as follows: The temple¹⁰ which is in Yeb | the fortress shall be
 destroyed. Thereupon *Npîn*¹¹ led forth the Egyptians and other troops;

¹ In the space above line 1, in No. 1, faint traces of writing appear. "To Bagôhi . . .," can still be made out with fair certainty; probably a false start, erased by the scribe himself.

² Lit.: "inquire after, pray for"; a common formula of salutation.

³ Omitted in 2. The first two lines in 2 are very fragmentary; the only clear difference from 1 is the minor omission here indicated.

⁴ Lit.: "unto favor before"; cf. I Kings 8:50; Ps. 106:46; Dan. 1:9; Gen. 39:21; and No. 5=*APE* 11:2 f.

⁵ Lit.: "the sons of the house"; cf. Ezra 6:10; 7:23; probably includes, besides the king's sons, viziers and other high officials of the court. This phrase, judging from the space it occupies, seems to have been abbreviated in 2. Cf. No. 1 (*APE* 25):12.

⁶ 2 may have read "thy servants."

⁷ June-July 410 B.C. The king's name is written *Dryshyš*.

⁸ The word used for the priests of Khnum, here and No. 10=Strassburg A:3; B 3, is a good old Aramaic word for "priest." In the Old Testament, II Kings 23:5; Hos. 10:5; Zeph. 1:4, and in these documents it has a distinctly derogatory flavor. It is never used of the priests of Jahweh.

⁹ 2: "gave money and treasures to *Ujdrng* military governor, who was <here>." Both 1 and 2 exhibit at this point an incomplete text, which bears the earmarks of a hasty copy. 1 lacks a verb altogether. The Strassburg Papyrus, lines 2-4, has a fuller and better text of this charge against the priests of Khnum and *Ujdrng*, as it had taken fixed form in the minds of the Jews of Elephantine. Were their scribes weary of repeating the oft-used formula?

¹⁰ 2 adds: "of *Ḥy* the god."

¹¹ 2: "that *Npîn*."

9 they came to the fortress of Yeb with their implements(?),¹ | they entered into that temple, they razed it to the ground; and the pillars of stone which were there, they broke them in pieces. Moreover there
 10 were 5² portals | of stone³ built of hewn stone, which were in that temple; they destroyed (them), and their doors, which were in place, and the
 11 pivots | of those doors, (which were) of bronze. And the roof,⁴ (which was built) wholly of cedar beams,⁴ with the rest of the woodwork,
 12 etc., which was | there, everything they burnt with fire. The libation bowls of gold and silver and whatsoever (else) there was in that temple,
 13 everything they took | and appropriated. And since the days of the kings⁵ of Egypt our fathers had built⁶ that temple in Yeb the fortress,
 14 and when Cambyzes⁷ invaded Egypt, | he found that temple standing;⁸ and the temples of the gods of Egypt⁹ were all destroyed, but no one
 15 did any injury at all to that temple. But when this had happened,¹⁰ we with our wives and our children put on sackcloth and fasted and
 and prayed¹¹ to Iḥy, the lord of heaven: |
 16 Show us that cur *Uḏrng* with his anklets wrenched from his feet and bereft of all his possessions, and all the men |
 17 who sought evil against that temple slain, so that we may look upon their (dead bodies).¹² Moreover before this, at
 18 the time when this evil | was done to us, we sent a letter¹³ (to) our lord and unto Jehohanan¹⁴ the high priest and his associates the priests

¹ 2: "weapons."

² 2: "great portals"; the text of 1 is a faulty copy.

³ 2 adds: "of that temple."

⁴ 1 inserts here an inconsequential "of," which it had omitted a little earlier and then inserted above the line, without deleting the misplaced duplicate.

⁵ 1: "king" (*sic!*).

⁶ The awkward diction is due to literal rendering of the original; the meaning is clear enough.

⁷ *Kmbysj*.

⁸ Lit. "built."

¹⁰ Lit. "when it had been done thus."

⁹ 2: "the Egyptians."

¹¹ 2: "fas<ting and praying>."

¹² This passage is presented, with minor changes, in the latest translation, published by W. R. Arnold, *Ephod and Ark* (1917), Excursus II. In place of "his anklets" 1 reads "the anklets"; in place of "all the men" 2 seems to have read <"every man">. The rendering is not quite literal, but represents in good idiomatic English the precise meaning of Semitic idioms, which have no exact parallel in English. Others: "who showed us that *U*., the chains torn from his feet by dogs . . . and we looked . . ."

¹³ 2: "Concerning this; we sent unto our lord, also unto"; 1 is manifestly faulty.

¹⁴ Ezra 10:6; Neh. 12:22, 23 (Johanan), 11 (Jonathan); cf. Josephus, *Ant.*, XI, vii.

19 who (are) in Jerusalem, and unto ²*ʾyṣtn* the brother of | ‘Anani’ and the nobles of the Jews.² Not a single letter did they send to us. Moreover, 20 from the month of Tammuz, the 14th year of Darius³ the king | to the present day we are wearing sackcloth and fasting, our wives are made 21 as widows, we are not anointing⁴ ourselves with oil | nor drinking wine; moreover, from that⁵ and unto the present⁶ 17th year of Darius the 22 king⁷ meal-offering and⁸ incense and burnt-offering | have not been offered⁹ in that temple. Now thy servants *[dnḫ]* and his associates and 23 the Jews, all (of them) citizens of Yeb,¹⁰ say thus: | If it seem good to our lord, let him take an interest in that temple that it may be (re)built,¹¹ since we are not permitted to (re)build it. Lo, there are¹² men under obligation 24 to thee | for thy kindnesses and thy favors¹³ who are here in Egypt; let a letter from thee be sent to them concerning the temple of *ḫḥ* the god | 25 that it may be (re)built¹⁴ in Yeb the fortress, as it was built aforetime, and the meal offering and incense and burnt offering shall be offered¹⁵ | 26 upon the altar of *ḫḥ* the god in thy name,¹⁶ and we will pray for thee at 27 all time(s), we and our wives and our children and the Jews, | all who¹⁷ are here. If thus it be done¹⁷ to the end that that temple may be (re)built,

¹ See Introduction to No. 5 (*APE* 11) and No. 7 = *APE* 8, l. 23, p. 434, note 1.

² 2: “Of Judaea”; cf. Neh. 2:16; 4:14, 19; 5:7; 6:17; 7:5; 13:17, and see Ed. Meyer, *Entstehung des Judentums*, pp. 132 f.

³ *Drḫḫš*, *APE* 1: here and lines 21 and 30.

⁴ So probably 1; 2: “We have not anointed.”

⁵ 2: “That time.”

⁶ Lit. “the day of the.”

⁷ 407/6 B.C.

⁸ 2 omits “and.”

⁹ Lit. “made.”

¹⁰ 1: “All of the citizens of Yeb.”

¹¹ Lit. “to (re)build it.”

¹² Lit. “masters of thy kindnesses and thy favors”; the word “masters” is widely used in similar phrases, the idea of possession or ownership being in many cases highly attenuated. Only through such men subject to his influence by reason of past favors could Bagohi (Bagoas), the governor of little Judaea, exert any influence upon affairs in the great province of Egypt, whose governor, Arsam, was of much higher rank than Bagohi.

¹³ Cf. line 23.

¹⁴ 2: “We will offer”; lit. “bring nigh,” in both 1 and 2.

¹⁵ As was done for the king and the royal house in Jerusalem; cf. Ezra 6:10, and later for the Seleucid kings and the Roman emperors; cf. Ed. Meyer, *EdJ*, 51 f.; Schürer, *GVJ*, II, 246 f.

¹⁶ 2: “all the Jews who.”

¹⁷ Better 2: “thou do.”

28 then there will be greater righteousness¹ to thee before [thy the god | of
 heaven than (that) of a man who offers to him burnt offerings and sacri-
 fices to the value of 1 thousand² talents. And³ as for (the) gold, con-
 29 cerning this | we have sent information.⁴ Moreover, all the news we
 have sent in⁵ one letter in our name to Delayah and Shelemyah, the
 30 sons of *Swblf*,⁶ governor of Samaria. | Moreover, of all this which
 happened to us Aršam knew nothing. On the 20th of Marcheshwan,
 the 17th year of Darius the king.

NO. 9. THE REPLY OF BAGOHI AND OF DELAYAH, SON OF SANBALLAT TO THE
 PETITION OF THE JEWS OF ELEPHANTINE

Neither Bagohi nor the Samaritans consented to give a written reply. Why, else, were the replies of both summed up in a brief memorandum, written by someone else?

It should be noted, also, that the reply mentions meal offering and incense only, whereas the petition spoke of burnt offerings as well. A temple, lacking sacrifices and burnt offering, would be well on the way to becoming a synagogue or church. The attitude, or a change of attitude, of the Elephantine Jews and their leaders toward this aspect of their case seems to be indicated in No. 12 = *APE* 5. Nor may No. 13 = *APE* 15 be wholly overlooked.

Or did Bagohi, etc., respond, and is this the note of one of the men of No. 8 (*APE* 1/2): 23 f. ? (Torrey).

The date of the reply must of course be later than that of the petition, which is dated October–November, 407. From the reply it appears that at this time the satrap Aršam had returned to Egypt.

APE Pap. 3 (P. 13497):

1/2 Memorandum of what Bagôhi and Delayah said | to me. Memorandum,
 3 to wit: Thou art to say in Egypt | before 3Aršam concerning that altar-

¹ I.e., merit; cf. Deut. 24:13.

² 2: "a thousand"; the writing of 1 at this point is most peculiar.

³ 2 omits "and."

⁴ Lit. "we have sent, we have made known"; i.e., in a private communication, since even in those times a bribe could not be more than hinted at in an official petition.

⁵ 2 omits "in."

⁶ The Sanballat of Neh. 2:10 and *passim*; his sons are not mentioned in the Old Testament, though a Delayah occurs, I Chron. 3:24, another Neh. 6:10, and another Neh. 7:62; Ezra 2:60; and the name Shelemyah, Ezra 10:39; Neh. 3:30; 13:13; Jer. 37:3; 38:1; 37:13.

4/5 house of the god of | heaven which was built in Yeb the fortress | from
 6 aforetime, before Cambyzes, | which that accursed(?) *Uḫdrng* de-
 7/8 stroyed | in the 14th year of Darius the king, | that it may be (re)built¹
 9 in its place as it was aforetime, | and the meal offering and incense shall
 10/11 be offered² upon | that altar, even as aforetime | it used to be done.

NO. 10. COMPLAINT AND PETITION OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF ELEPHANTINE
 (ADDRESSED TO ARŠAM?)

This papyrus is in a lamentable state of dilapidation. It was purchased at Luxor, but came undoubtedly from Elephantine, where it probably had been found by peasants digging for fertilizer, as were *APA* some years later. Whether its present condition be due to the elements or to handling by the finders cannot be said.

Its existence was first publicly noted in 1901; the text was made public in 1903 in an admirable edition by the late Julius Euting. Hence it is known as the Euting Papyrus. As it belongs to the Imperial Library of Strassburg, it is also called the Strassburg Papyrus. The latter designation has been chosen in these translations (abbrev. *Strassb.*), because it is more impersonal, and because it names once for all its probably permanent home.

The whole consists of two pieces, on each of which are found five complete lines; on the back of the first are fragments of fourteen lines, the beginnings and endings of which are missing. These are labeled A, B, and C, respectively, as the translation shows.

It is the more to be regretted that this document has not come to us in a better state of preservation, because in it we have what is probably an official communication of the Elephantine Jews to the satrap Aršam concerning the disturbances in the course of which their temple was destroyed. That it was addressed to Aršam appears from a comparison of A:3/4 "when *our lord* Aršam had gone"; and C:9, 11, 12 "if it seem good to our lord," with No. 8=*APE* 1/2:4 | 5 "when Aršam had gone," and No. 3=*APE* 4:1 and 5 "To our lord Aršam(?)". The exact nature of the content is, of course, not quite clear. It may have been the very petition of the Elephantine Jews, which must have been sent to Aršam with the request for permission to rebuild their temple. It certainly did

¹ Lit. "to build it."

² Lit. "shall they (i.e., one) bring nigh"; cf. 1:25.

contain a series of requests, as C plainly shows, in spite of its fragmentary condition; and these requests had to do with the damages inflicted upon them and their temple in the disturbances of June-July 410. In fact, the requests are evidently based upon complaints made concerning this damage. But the complaints are not simple and direct; they are apologetic and defensive in tone. Accusations are being met by asseverations, denials, and countercharges. Between them and the permission to rebuild their temple there stood, not only the opposition of Egyptian priests to a Jahweh temple in their midst and the lukewarm attitude, if not the opposition, of their brethren in Judaea, but apparently, also, charges of disloyal and disorderly conduct, which were probably not wholly unfounded. They are preparing for a searching official investigation. Small wonder that they were seeking influential support from all possible directions. The exact date of this petition cannot be determined, because we do not know exactly when Aršam returned to Egypt. It must have been written soon after this return, before there had been time for an investigation. With relation to *APE* 1/2, No. 8, it seems to the writer to belong before, rather than after, this attempt to secure aid from Palestine. Their case before Aršam did not prosper. That is why they sought support, first from the high priest and the elders, then, sometime thereafter, from the political authorities. It follows *APE* 1/2 here, simply because its date is lacking.

Strassburg Papyrus:

A

. . . we (?) . . . among companies¹ of the Egyptians they revolted, we
 2 did not leave our posts² | and no subversive act whatever occurred on
 our part. In the 14th year of Darius the king,³ when our lord Aršam |
 3 had gone unto the king, this is the treasonable offense⁴ which the shave-
 4 lings of the god Ḥnûb <committed> in Yeb the fortress | in collusion (?)⁴
 with *Uḏrng* who was military governor here; money and goods they

¹ Or "troops"; see *APE* 35 (No. 14):2.

² I.e., on military or guard duty.

³ 410/409 B.C.

⁴ Or: "of the shavelings of the God Ḥnûb: They <made> in Yeb the fortress a riot (or plot)." The photograph shows only the personal ending "they" of the verb "made" or "committed," with a blank space before it. The restoration is practically certain.

5 gave him. There was a portion | of the s' of the king in Yeb the fortress, (which) they destroyed, and a wall was built in the *mnš'it(?)*² of the fortress of Yeb.

B

and now that wall is built in the *mnš'it(?)* of the fortress. There is a
2 well which was constructed³ | within the fortress, and it lacked not water
3 to supply⁴ the garrison, since, if they were *hndi's* |, they were to drink
water from that well; those shavelings of Hnúb have stopped up that
4 well. If (the matter) be | verified by the judges, *tišlāi's*,⁶ (and) *gyskādā'*
5 who are appointed in the district of *Tštr's*⁸ |, (then) it will be apparent⁹
to our lord in accordance with this which we have said.¹⁰ Moreover,
cut off were we (or "we were segregated")

C (on verso of A)

thy(?) . . (.) . . in (—? —)¹¹ of Yeb the f(ortress) . . . |
2/3 we and (?) between (?) | . . if(?) there be not found
4/5 | the <Egyp>tians(?) to bring from | . . to
6/7/8 do¹² there to *hhu*(?) | . . | . . | . . the woodwork; they took
9 and appropriated(?) | . . if(?) it seem good¹³ to our lord, let
10/11 him(?) greatly . . . | . . we of the army . . | . . <to our l>ord it
12 seem good, let be placed (or established, or decreed) . . | . . we, if
13/14 unto our l<ord> . . | . . to (or for) anything, which . . . | . . which
belonged to us, which they destroyed . . .

¹ Reading uncertain; buildings or treasures or stores or papers?

² Perhaps "midst"; or *mš'it*, possibly "breach." The latter would seem to indicate at least a partial dismantling of the fortress by the Persians, a situation similar to that described in II Kings 14:13. The accusation of the Jews against the Egyptians would, in that case, rival that of the "Samaritans" against the Jews, Ezra 4:11-16. Torrey: "<they> built."

³ An Oriental well nearly always has some stone constructions, walls, benches, troughs, frequently an overhanging roof or shed about it; in any case the well itself was lined with stone, brick, or cement of some kind.

⁴ Lit. "give to drink to."

⁵ Perhaps "confined" (by siege or for similar reason), or "assembled" (on duty or for review or inspection).

⁶ Dan. 3:2, 3; AV "sheriffs," RV mg "lawyers"—exact meaning unknown.

⁷ Probably a Persian word, meaning "listeners," i.e., secret-service men.

⁸ Cf. No. 3 (APE 4):1, note 4.

⁹ Lit. "it will be known."

¹⁰ Some would translate: "we have said and (which) we have explained." This does violence to more than one word in the original.

¹¹ A word whose reading and meaning are very uncertain.

¹² Perhaps "to do service in sacrifices, etc."

¹³ Or "very good," "excellent."

NO. 11. REPLY FROM JEWS IN EGYPT, PROBABLY IN THE THEBAIS DISTRICT,
TO LETTERS CONTAINING A REQUEST FROM THE JEWISH
COMMUNITY AT YEB-ELEPHANTINE

This document, also, which may have played nearly as important a rôle in the affairs of the Jewish community of Elephantine as the three previous numbers, is unfortunately fragmentary, though not quite so badly mutilated as Strassb. About one-half, more or less, of all but one (line 16, the two closing words of the letter proper) of its seventeen lines is missing. The date, too, if it ever had any beyond the day of the month mentioned in line 15 (cf. No. 5=*APE* 11), is lost.

The more intimate character of the letter and its consequent discursiveness and allusiveness make it even more obscure than the more fragmentary Strassb. Bribes given by an Egyptian or Egyptians remind one of the days preceding the catastrophe at Yeb. But bribes were given later as well, cf. No. 8=*APE* 1/2:28 f. The trouble has been carried before Aršam; somebody, Egyptians or Jews, takes comfort in the thought that a Mazda worshiper has been appointed to some office; a man, apparently a Jew, has been placed under arrest, it would seem; Aršam is annoyed and not altogether favorably disposed; somebody denies a charge before him; somebody is to make a plea before him. This much is tolerably clear. Also, the trouble does not seem to weigh heavily on the writers, be they at Thebes, or at Abydos (where some Jews seem to have been settled; cf. No. 5=*APE* 11), or elsewhere; "we are well here," say they. The Jews of Yeb seem to be more intimately concerned with it; cf. line 16 and the statement at the beginning of line 11, whose meaning, however, is anything but certain. What the "rations," or "wages," or whatever it may be, in lines 3 and 12 have to do with the affair, is utterly obscure. No less obscure is the cryptic line 10; the destruction of skins may indicate a transaction of a shady character. As a bare possibility, no more, the translator would suggest that these may have been skins of mummified beasts, perhaps rams of Khnum, or cats, or what not, which the Jews of Yeb in their counterrevolt may have robbed, as an act of vengeance for the destruction of their sanctuary.

In any case, the translator thinks it preferable to classify this undated papyrus with the undated material after the riot at Elephantine, when the Jews are known to have had just such troubles, as those above indicated, before Aršam, rather than to assign to it a still more hazardous position at some unknown period previous to the events of July, 410.

APE Pap. 10 (P. 13468):

1 To my lords *Idnīh*, *M^cysīh*, Uriah, and the army your servant. |
 2 may they provide for always.¹ We are well here. To proceed: On
 3 every day, when (*or of*) | he received *ptjprsn*² one *zīyh*,³ he
 4 received *ptjprs* |⁴ there is to us, because the Egyptian gave
 5 a bribe. Therefore we have given a price (*or value of* | of
 the Egyptian(s?) before Aršam.⁶ Therefore stealthily(?) did they (*or*

¹ The well-known formula: "May God (*or* the gods) provide for your welfare always." The plural of the verb with the plural of god is decidedly curious in a letter written by a Jew of this time to coreligionists; yet see APE 12:1; also 13:1; 43:1. In No. 3=APE 4, written by largely or wholly non-Jewish bodies of officials to a probably non-Jewish superior, this, if it were assured, would be much less striking.

² The meaning of this word is unknown; it bears some similarity to a word found in Dan. 1:5, 8, 13, 15 f.; 11:26, there rendered "dainties," originally simply "rations." So far as there is any context, this meaning would not be inappropriate here. *ptjprsn* may thus mean "(of) rations" or "(as) our ration"; *ptjprs*, "a ration" or "the ration of." Others: "wages"; still others: a unit of measure.

³ Almost certainly a unit of measure, value or capacity unknown.

⁴ Supply "trouble."

⁵ Some read: "because the Egyptians are giving to them (*fem.*; *sic!*) a bribe (*or* bribes) (to) a value of" Instead of "a price (*or* value) of" the photograph may be read: "and since. . . ."

⁶ For the dating of this document, whose date is lost, this name makes it certain that the events therein described, so far as they had to do with Aršam, did not take place in June-July, 410, nor for some little time before and after this date, "when Aršam had . . . gone unto the king," No. 8=APE 1:4, 5; No. 10=Strassb. A:2, 3. The bribes of the Egyptian(s?) and their apparent hostility remind one of the trouble brewing since 419/8 (cf. No. 5=APE 11 together with No. 4=6; No. 6=7; 1/2; and Strassb.), which culminated at Yeb-Elephantine in the great catastrophe of 410. To a point in this period near 410, when these troubles were coming to a head, this letter is frequently assigned. But Aršam had returned to Egypt by 406/7 (cf. No. 9=APE 3); we do not know exactly when. His stay this time was not a long one, as Egypt was lost to Persia about 405/4, and Persian rule there remained in abeyance during the long reign of Artaxerxes II Mnemon, 405/4-359; but it was a busy one. The Jews of Yeb were evidently importuning him, as were their adversaries, the Egyptians (and Persian officials?). And there were investigations to make. This letter is written to the Jews of Yeb and their leaders, precisely the men who were

6 we) act. Also(?) | the district of Thebes(?),¹ and thus do
 they say (or we said): A Mazda-worshiper² (is) he, appointed for the
 7 district | we fear, because we are small in money(?).³ Now,
 8 behold, ? | Even if we had not revealed our faces unto Aršam
 9 formerly, yet not thus | he will speak our(?) words before

especially interested in the Jahweh-temple at Yeb and its service. It is a reply to "letters" which seemingly contained a request (cf. especially lines 15 f.). The point of the reply seems to be that the writers will do their best, but that one must not expect too much of them, because they have not much money (?), and because, on account of a previous rather annoying appearance before him, they are not sure of a favorable reception before Aršam. Now, the period when the Jews of Yeb needed and sought all manner of support before Aršam, their satrap, was exactly this period after the disturbances of 410. Three or four requests for such support from outside of Egypt are indicated in *APE* 1/2, which is itself a petition for similar support in their attempt to secure permission from Aršam for the rebuilding of their temple and the restoration of its sacrificial service. There is, indeed, no mention made of the temple at Yeb in the fragment preserved (about one-half, more or less) of this papyrus, whereas other matters not wholly clear *are* mentioned. This is, of course, not proof positive that this temple and its sacrifices were not mentioned in the missing portion. But whether this was the case or not, the Jews of Yeb needed support before the satrap in many other matters at this time. Their case was not a simple request for permission to rebuild their temple and to resume its service; it was much more complicated than that. It was connected with charges against the Egyptians and Persian officials, but manifestly also with countercharges made by these against the Jews of Yeb themselves. The Strassburg Papyrus, probably a report, petition, or defense, addressed by the Jews of Yeb to Aršam himself, exhibits a decidedly controversial and apologetic tone. And the skirts of the Jewish soldiers were not wholly clear: *APE* 1/2 exhibit signs of insubordination to their Persian commanders. In their own charges in these matters and in their defense against the countercharges they would most naturally seek aid and corroboration from their brethren in Egypt, perhaps of a neighboring district; cf. line 6. It seems most natural, therefore, to correlate this written reply to the unwritten reply of Bagohi, *APE* 3 = No. 9, and, without being dogmatic about its exact date, to place it with the material after 410, when conditions apparently presupposed by it are known to have existed, rather than to assume that at another time similar conditions existed, of which we know nothing. These are the considerations which led the present translator to assign to this document a place after the likewise dateless Strassburg Papyrus.

¹ N(o)ḫ, Thebes; see note 4 on No. 3 = *APE* 4:1. It is possible also to read the photograph, not Nḫ, but -n(ḏ)ḫ which, connected with the preceding word, would mean "our district." This, as opposed to the district of the addressees, Tšḫs, might very well be the Thebais in any case, since this is the only district beside Tšḫs which is mentioned in these documents.

² Mzdšn, probably Mazdaizn(ian), i.e., a worshiper of Mazda; others consider the word a proper name.

³ Despite the misgivings of translators, it seems, after all, quite possible to read: "we fear, because we are small, spoliation," or, simply, "robbery."

10 Aršam persuasively(?)¹ calming our faces | ye will find
honey(?) ? ² we have destroyed the skins of the fur of |
11/12 ? ³ Pšy the son of Mnky came to Memphis, and | and the
13 pšprs,⁶ and he gave me the sum of 12 staters⁷ and one? |⁸ Hūri
gave me, when they detained(?) him. Thereupon⁹ said Tīrīb? |
14 in the company(?) of the king, and were detained (or were restraining,
or we restrained or he restrained us). Therefore Aršam was annoyed
15 and S . . . denied¹⁰ | and Hūri, whom they had detained. On
16 the 6th day of Phaophi came the letters | we will carry out
17 (lit. do) the affair (or word). | To my lords J^cdnih,¹¹ M^cysih, and

NO. 12. COMMUNICATION BY THE LEADERS OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AT
ELEPHANTINE TO A SATRAP OR GOVERNOR

Another cryptic fragment. It is not an ordinary letter in form. Nor is it a petition, as is sometimes confidently maintained; it is

¹ This may be a proper noun, the name of the speaker, Pšm; this is suggested, but by no means made certain, by APE 13:2.

² For the first word, though it is clearly legible, tqm, the translator has no suggestion to offer. For the second "wrapped up" has been hesitatingly suggested. This would be a pure Hebraism. Much more likely, in view of what follows, is a derivative from a root, which does occur in Aramaic, whose meaning is "to creep stealthily." A derivative from this root, very similar to the one here used, is found in Talmud and Targums in the meaning "cat." Therefore, here perhaps "cats," or, since this is Egypt, "Egyptian weasels," "ichneumons."

³ The only reason why this translation has not been offered before—at least, not to the translator's knowledge—is that it is too simple and does not offer sufficiently important information. What followed after "fur" must have been the name of some animal: "skins of . . . fur."

⁴ The best suggestion offered, though it is not absolutely certain, is: "they are full of wrath against you"; cf. APE 13:4; similarly Ezek. 16:30 should probably be read: I am full of wrath against thee, saith the Lord. . .

⁵ The first possibly, the second certainly, a Babylonian name. Both occur several times in these papyri.

⁶ See note on line 3.

⁷ Double-shekels, 11.2 g. silver each, ca. \$0.55; cf. APA L; APE 35=No. 14.

⁸ I Chron. 5:14; supply before the name: "which (X, son of?)."

⁹ Others: "according to the cor (a Hebrew measure). Said," etc.; not good Aramaic.

¹⁰ Or: "lest both Aršam should be annoyed and S . . . should deny." Others: "Aršam adjudged both damages and expiation"; this would be poor Aramaic from every point of view.

¹¹ Here only so written. This has caused some scholars to reject the more commonly accepted pronunciations Jedoniah, or Jedaniah for Jōdaniah; but in Aramaic writing this would more probably indicate the pronunciation Jēdaniah. Line 17 is the address.

not at all similar to *APE* 1/2 (No. 8) and Strassb. (No. 10), both of which are petitions in good form. Yet it seems to be addressed to a superior; the address "our lord" points to a satrap or governor. And it manifestly contains a request, a request, moreover, which has to do with the restitution of the temple-service at Yeb. Whether the request is for complete service, instead of partial service only (incense and meal offering; cf. No. 9=*APE* 3); or whether it be for partial service, at any rate, since complete service cannot be secured, it is impossible to ascertain. In the former case it might very well be addressed to Bagohi or Delayah in answer to their reply, No. 9 (*APE* 3). In the latter case the addressee would more probably be Aršam the satrap. In any case the gist of the letter seems to the translator to be contained in the last two lines. The most probable supposition is that this is a note offering a bribe supplementary to a petition.

APE Pap. 5 (P. 13472):

1/2 Thy servants, *Idniḥ* the son of Gem <ariah? by > name: 1, | *M^cuḥi*²
 3 the son of Nathan by name <: 1,> | *Shema'iah*³ the son of Haggai⁴ by
 4/5 name: 1, | *Hosea* the son of *Iḥm* by name: 1, | *Hosea* the son of *Nḥm*
 6 by name: 1, altogether 5 men, | Syennese,⁵ who are gu <ar>ds(?)⁶ in

² Cf. No. 13 (*APE* 15):5.

³ Cf. *APE* 10 (No. 11):1, 17; *APE* 11 (No. 5):2, 12; perhaps also *APE* 34:3.

⁴ I Kings 12:22 (late legend; see Comin.); Jer. 29:24, 31 f.; Ezra 8:13, 16; 10:31; Neh. 3:29 and *passim*; Chronicles, *passim*.

⁵ Hag. 1:1, etc.; Ezra 5:1.

⁶ I.e., of Syene (Assuān).

⁶ The reading is not very certain. If it be right, this is the word, used in similar connection in *APA*, D:2; *APE* 27:2, and, perhaps, also in *RES* I, 247. It cannot mean, as is constantly assumed, "owner of property." The verb in the form, of which this is a participle, does not mean "to own," but "to guard, to have or retain charge of," cf. note on No. 7 (*APE* 8):3. The introduction of the meaning "owner of property" in the places above quoted has been peculiarly unfortunate. It is in all these places a technical term connected with service "in a fortress," and is twice followed by the designation of the troop or company, to which the individual designated by it belonged. "Owner of property" would be wholly inappropriate. "Guard" is the only possible meaning; whether this means simply a member of the troops guarding the fortress or whatever frontier or other dangerous position the fortress is meant to protect, or whether it designates a man as detailed to some special guard duty or belonging to a special corps d'élite, or as appointed to some slightly higher rank than a mere private, cannot be said with certainty. Its infrequent use, in two cases (here and *APA*, D:2) of persons known to be of some consequence, makes for the last supposition. Cf. also No. 6=*APE* 7:2, note 2.

7/8 Yeb the fortress, | say thus: If our lord , | and that
 9 temple of Iḥy the god which | in Yeb the for-
 10 tress as aforetime (it was built ?), | and sheep(?), oxen, goats, *mqly*¹ shall
 11 not(?) be offered² there, | but (only ?) incense, meal offering
 12 | and our lord *ḥdy*³ ma(ke ?) |
 13/14 give(?) unto the house of our lord | a
 th <ousand ?> *artabae* of barley

NO. 13. A NOTE OR LETTER CONCERNING ACTS OF VIOLENCE

This is the most tantalizing of the Elephantine fragments. If the writer is not wholly mistaken, it contains chronologically the last mention made of the religious leaders of the Elephantine Jews in these documents. It is the only document containing their names, which is neither addressed to them nor written by their hands. The only possible place for it in point of time is, to the translator's mind, just this place between the last years of Darius II and the first years of Amyrtaeus, the king in whose reign the following document, No. 14 (*APE* 35), was written. The reasons for this opinion are set forth in greater detail in the notes.

APE Pap. 15 (P. 13471):

1 (the lower ends of a number of letters only)
 2 | Ḥnūm. Behold
 3 these are the names of the women who |
 <im>prisoned:⁴ *Dmī* (or *Rmī*), wife of *Hdy*⁵, *ṣṣy*⁶, wife of Hosea,⁷
 4 *Plḥ*⁸, wife of *Ish*, *Rī* | *Šbī*⁹, daughter of Meshullam,¹⁰ *Bry*¹¹
 (or *Qy*), his sister. Behold, the names of the men who were found in

¹ An unknown term; perhaps a general term for a sacrifice in which a portion was burnt or roasted.

² Lit. "made."

³ Meaning unknown.

⁴ Or: "-sirn"; perhaps a proper noun in whole or in part, the name of the husband of a woman previously mentioned.

⁵ Cf. I Chron. 3:24; 5:24; 9:7; Ezra 2:40; Neh. 7:43; also I Chron. 4:19; Neh. 8:7; 9:5; 10:11, 14, 19.

⁶ A compound with Osiris?

⁷ See line 5.

⁸ Cf. Neh. 3:25; 11:12.

⁹ Zibiah, II Kings 12:1; II Chron. 24:1; cf. I Chron. 8:9.

¹⁰ II Kings 22:3; Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah, *passim*; also *APA* and *APE*, *passim*.

5 the gate *bn*^x and were slain (? or seized) | *Idni*², son of Gemariah,³ Hosea, son of *Ithm*,³ Hosea, son of *Nthm*, Haggai,⁴ his brother, *hij*,⁵ son of *M* | the houses into which they had entered in Yeb,⁶ and the goods which they had taken,⁷ they(?) were returned unto their owners. But they remembered(?) the(?) lord 7 | *krj* 120. Further(?) a decree(?) no more(?) shall be(?), but here the welfare of thy house and thy children, until(?) the gods shall show us(?)⁸

NO. 14. AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBT

A most remarkable document. A simple IOU. But it is dated in the fifth year of "Amyrtaeus, the king." This is doubtless the Amyrtaeus, who in Manetho's dynasties constitutes in his own person the whole of the 28th dynasty, which follows the reign of

¹ Perhaps: "in No²," i.e., Thebes; on their way out of Egypt? or name of a gate? in Elephantine?

² Jer. 29:3; 36:10 ff., 25; cf. No. 12 (*APE* 5):1.

³ Cf. I Chron. 11:46; see also No. 12 (*APE* 5):4, and for the following name, *ibid.*, line 5.

⁴ For these names, prominent in the Jewish community at Elephantine, see the foregoing papyri, especially No. 12=*APE* 5; for Haggai in particular, see No. 12, line 3.

⁵ II Sam. 6:3 f.; I Chron. 8:14, 31; 9:37; 13:7.

⁶ This explicit mention of Yeb after all makes it not improbable that above, in line 4, No²=Thebes is to be read.

⁷ Were these men following the instructions of Exod. 12:1-36? Here was a real opportunity for the Israelites to "despoil the Egyptians."

⁸ This papyrus, which in its present state unfortunately bears no date, was written by an extremely illiterate scribe. The reason for the many questions, especially in the last few lines, lies both in poor handwriting and in poor grammar. Yet sinister meaning does hover about the uncouth and incoherent phrases, clearer meaning, the translator believes, than is generally admitted. The footnotes to the previous lines indicate the events which to his mind are pretty clearly suggested. Line 7 may mean that Persian rule has come to an end, but that it was still possible for a Jew to live and prosper in Egypt under the new state of affairs. The following document shows clearly that this really was the case. The writer of the present screed was probably an Aramaean, i.e., a foreigner; the language used, however poorly its writing was mastered, clearly shows this much. And he was a Jew, or whence his interest in these people? Palestinian echoes of the history and fate of these people, with which the papyri put us into immediate contact, are found in Isa. 52:4(?); Deut. 17:16(?); Isa. 19; Ezek. 30(?); and Joel 3:19. It is, of course, possible that the word, here translated "decree," may mean a number of different things, and that the last clause is a mere clumsy expression, commending the house and children of the addressee to God or the gods.

Darius II. The exact year to which this refers cannot be determined; 400 or 399 will not be wrong by more than a year or two. The Persians have disappeared from Egypt; a satrap rules there no longer. The temple of *Ihṣ* at Yeb is not; even if "*Idnḥ* and his associates" finally succeeded in winning the satrap's consent to the rebuilding—of which we have no evidence—there was no time for the building. There is not a scintilla of evidence that there was such a temple after 410 B.C. There is nothing to indicate that "*Idnḥ* and his associates" were in Egypt any longer, no sign that they were any longer in the land of the living; there is evidence which suggests strongly that the Egyptians in turn "had seen vengeance upon them." But there are still Jews in Egypt, borrowing and lending money, "marrying and giving in marriage." They are still of the garrison of Elephantine, and belong to the same "companies" to which they belonged in the days of the first Artaxerxes and of the second Darius. The "Foreign Legion" could change masters, evidently, almost as easily as in the days of the Diadochi. And with all obstacles, those from within and those from without their own people, removed, and with the times uncertain in Egypt, the day was approaching for propagandists like Hananiah (No. 4 = *APE* 6; No. 5 = *APE* 11) to reap their harvest, although this harvest was not quite what they expected.

APE Pap. 35 (P. 13476):

On the XXI < . . of Phamen > oth, year 5 of Amyrtaeus,¹ the king. At
2 that time | said <Menahem>,² son of . . um,³ Aramaean of Yeb, the
3 fortress, belonging to the colors⁴ of *Nbykdr*,⁵ | to *Slṣ* . . ,⁶ daughter of

¹ On this Amyrtaeus see Griffith and Poole, *Enc. Brit.*, 11th ed., Vol. IX, p. 88, col. 1 mid. (article "Egypt"); and Ed. Meyer, *ibid.*, Vol. XXI, p. 211, col. 2, end of second paragraph (article "Persia"). The date of this papyrus is very probably near 400.

² II Kings 15:14 ff.

³ Perhaps Shallum, as in the fragment, *APE* 32:1. This name occurs in the Old Testament, Jer. 22:11; II Kings 15:10, and thereafter throughout the historical books.

⁴ A unit of the Persian army; exact size unknown; roughly equivalent to the modern company. The designation of this unit remains the same under the Egyptian king. Cf. *APA* and *APE*, *passim*.

⁵ A Babylonian name: Nabû-kudurri. These companies were named after persons; their founders? first or present commanders? Cf. *APA*, *passim*. This very company occurs, *APE* 27:3 (Artaxerxes I, year 4 = 461/0) and 29:2 (Darius II, year 15+ = 409/8-). The hope of the writer of No. 13 = *APE* 15:7 was not disappointed.

⁶ Cf. Num. 25:14; I Chron. 9:7; Neh. 11:7; 12:7, 20. See also l. 10.

4 S. 44, as follows: I owe you the sum of 2 sh(ekels), | i.e., the su<m of>
 5 1 stater,¹ of the sum total in money and goods which (is written)
 upon thy | marriage-
 6 contract. I, Menahem, will give it and pay thee in full by | the 30th
 7 of Pharmuthi, year 5 of Amyrtæus, the king | and
 I (shall?) have given thee this sum, 2 <sh>ekels <i.e., 1> stater,
 8 this <sum>, which is written above shall(?) have(?) fallen
 9 due(?) on <the ? of Pa>chons | thy money the sum
 10 of <2> shek<els>, i.e., the su<m> of 1 <stat>er |
 S. 44² . . . The remainder of this papyrus is very fragmentary, so that
 only a few disconnected words can be made out: barley, this, 3 shekels, to
 the head (or foreman) of.³

¹ Cf. No. 11 = APE 10:12; APA L.

² Cf. No. 7 = APE 8:9.

[To be continued]

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

PALESTINIAN ARCHAEOLOGY¹

Although the war has put a stop for the present to all organized excavation of Palestine, a not inconsiderable amount of work has been done in furthering the progress of Palestinian archaeology. The material accumulated in the past brought with it many difficult problems, and one is sometimes inclined to believe that what is needed is not an ever-increasing store of evidence, but more critical and more synthetic methods of handling that which already lies to hand. It is true that new evidence may definitely settle disputed questions, but only methodical study teaches the archaeologist what to look for, what theories to test, and what lines of inquiry to pursue. Certainly a very great deal remains to be done in the archaeology of Palestine, and a welcome must be extended to every contribution to the subject. Mr. Handcock's book aims at presenting "some account of the arts, crafts, manners, and customs of the inhabitants of Palestine from the earliest times down to the Roman period." The writer, formerly assistant in the department of Egyptian and Assyrian antiquities of the British Museum, is one of the authorized lecturers for the Palestine Exploration Fund, and has produced other books on oriental archaeology. Here he has not attempted to give any history of the excavations, nor does he combine the biblical and archaeological evidence and use the one to illustrate the other; not biblical archaeology, but the archaeology of Palestine on the basis of the excavations is his field, and he succeeds in furnishing a competent introductory handbook which will form a useful supplement to the growing list of works that directly or indirectly handle this subject.²

After a brief prefatory chapter Mr. Handcock describes the caves and rock cuttings, and the architecture (the latter an important chapter);

¹ *The Archaeology of the Holy Land*. By P. S. P. Handcock. New York: Macmillan, 1916. 384 pages. \$3.00.

² Compare, e.g., Benzinger, *Hebräische Archäologie* (2d ed., 1907); Gressmann, *Altorientalische Texte und Bilder* (Vol. II, 1909); Driver, *Modern Research as Illustrating the Bible* (Schweich Lectures for 1908); P. Thomsen, *Kompendium der palästinischen Altertumskunde* (1913; small, but rich in bibliographical information). To these must now be added Barton's *Archaeology and the Bible*.

he then proceeds to a description of objects, classified according to their material (flint, bone, ivory, and stone; metals; pottery; terra-cotta). There is an interesting account of burial customs and a useful concluding chapter on "Worship and Places of Worship." The book is well illustrated with nearly one hundred and forty plates, figures, and plans; it has been conscientiously prepared, it is clearly written, and it gives the reader a good introduction to the more serious technical problems which at once arise. For these Father Vincent's admirable work on *Canaan after Recent Exploration* (reviewed in the *AJTh*, XII, 1908, 471-74), and his articles in the *Revue Biblique*, together with the critical discussions of Hermann Thiersch, are indispensable; but there is always need for convenient, up-to-date introductions such as Mr. Handcock's, and the author has taken good care to utilize all the published works on the most recent excavations. Consequently Gezer, Samaria, Jericho, Beth-shemesh, etc., find a place here, and special prominence is given to Macalister's voluminous work on Gezer, which is described as "by far the most important contribution that has been made to the science of Palestinian Archaeology," and "an inexhaustible mine of information upon which all students of the subject will be largely dependent for many years to come."

Mr. Handcock writes as an enthusiastic archaeologist. Unfortunately this has led him in his opening sentences to an extremely rash contrast between "ordinary history" and the "incontrovertible and concrete facts" of material culture, etc. (p. 17). It is necessary, therefore, to remind ourselves of the wise words of Hogarth, who protests against the "invidious comparison between the sound objective evidence of material documents and the unsound subjective evidence of literature"; for, as he says, "neither is the latter any less objective than the former, nor is the former less open to subjective falsification than the latter."¹ The truth is, of course, that the material objects inevitably need an interpretation and a historical setting, and the history of archaeological research is enough to show that they do not always bear their plain meaning upon their face. Indeed, the necessity of a delicate criticism and co-ordination of both the traditional (written) evidence and the archaeological is abundantly shown in all discussion of the chronological and archaeological periods; and here it is surely impossible to agree with Mr. Handcock when he dates the Fifth Dynasty of Egypt "perhaps about 3600 B.C." (p. 102), and ascribes the beginning of the

¹ See his *Authority and Archaeology*, p. ix; cf. also the present reviewer's *Study of Religions*, pp. 51 ff.

Hellenistic archaeological period in Palestine as early as "about 550 B.C." (p. 23). As regards details, it may be noticed that the spelling Aboughôch (Kirjath-jearim) on p. 282 is apparently taken from a French source, and stands for Abû Gôsh, that the unique "calendar inscription" from Gezer (pl. xviii) is printed upside down, and that on p. 178 the reference to Dr. G. A. Cooke is a slip (of a not unfamiliar type) for the present writer. Moreover, it is misleading to say that the Siloam inscription is written in "the old Hebrew characters which closely resemble those found on the Moabite stone" (p. 177, cf. p. 299); there are important differences, and it is a matter of dispute whether they are due to intervening centuries or to difference of material, style, environment, etc. The question of the date of the Siloam inscription and of the early history of Hebrew palaeography is of considerable importance for its bearing upon the inscribed jar handles which Mr. Pilcher and I associate with the Persian period.¹ It is extremely desirable that the subject should be kept steadily in view because if the jar handles are to be freely ascribed to this period, the result is significant for the more fundamental problems of the chronology of Palestinian archaeology.

Equally important, too, is the question of the "Philistine" graves (pp. 317 ff.). Here, on the one side, is the tendency to exaggerate the extent of "Philistine" influence upon the archaeology of Palestine and to find an early date for these graves; whereas, on the other side, the present writer, for one, is unable to repress the conviction that archaeological connections with Asia Minor need a fuller examination than they have received. Moreover, as regards date, three independent arguments can be cited for placing the graves well within the "Israelite" period. The first is the general archaeological argument of Mr. J. L. Myres (*Quart. St.*, 1907, pp. 240 ff.); the second, a very novel one, is the resemblance noticed by Mr. Pilcher between the contents of the graves and the goods mentioned in a Jewish fifth-century papyrus from Elephantine;² while, to crown it all, Mr. Leonard Woolley in a description of a North Syrian cemetery of the Persian period has recently pointed out the analogies between it and the graves.³ If these cases are sufficient to illustrate some of the problems of "comparative archaeology," it will

¹ See Pilcher, *Proc. Soc. Bibl. Archaeol.*, XXXII (1910), 93 ff., 143 ff.; Cook, *Quarterly Statement of the Pal. Explor. Fund*, 1909, pp. 291 ff.; cf. also F. W. Read, *ibid.*, 1910, pp. 232 ff., "the Persian and Egyptian affinities of the Jewish Royal Pottery Stamps."

² Viz., the marriage-contract G, see *AJTh*, XIX (1915), 355.

³ *Annals of Arch. and Anthropol.* (University of Liverpool), VII (1916), 128.

be understood why all the more fundamental problems are found to be interconnected. Thus Crete, Asia Minor, Turkestan, Elam, Babylonia, and Egypt become full of meaning for the archaeology of Palestine; and extremely complex questions, combining archaeological and historical factors, prove to be of unusual importance for all our conceptions of life and thought in Palestine.¹

It is small wonder that, as these researches progress, the work of the biblical and theological scholar becomes more arduous. Approaching the Bible from the outside, the field of external evidence, one is often struck with the narrow outlook of the ordinary biblical scholar or student; while, on the other hand, only the trained student can realize that biblical criticism is a severe discipline, and that promiscuous combinations of biblical and external evidence are unmethodical and mischievous. However highly one may rank the external or archaeological point of view, it must always be borne in mind that the external evidence in itself neither brings unanimity of conclusion among its champions nor, it must be said, reflects unanimity of method. Now, there are two especially vital questions for every biblical student upon which Palestinian archaeology has a voice, and it may be useful to conclude this notice with the briefest reference to them. The first is the absence of any gap or break in the cultural history, such as might have been anticipated had there been an Israelite conquest on the lines described in the Old Testament.² The second is more novel, but, if I am not mistaken, is of a sweeping character and has very drastic consequences: it is the appearance of a cultural deterioration which suggests some historical factor. Instead of the archaeological break which the biblical history would suggest in the pre-monarchical period (viz., the Israelite invasion), there is a *later* deterioration upon which the history seems at first to be silent. It seems quite impossible to associate this deterioration with the Israelite entrance (Sellin) or with the growth of national independence under the monarchy (Vincent).³ Already a relatively late date for the feature had been fixed by Petrie (*Tell el-Hesi*, pp. 47 ff.), and also by Bliss and

¹ Note, for example, Peake, "Racial Elements Concerned in the First Siege of Troy" (*Journ. of the Royal Anthropol. Inst.* XLVI [1916], especially 168 ff., where the chronology of Western Asia is involved); also the recent publication of the Berlin *Mit. Deutsch. Orient. Gesell.*, December, 1915, No. 56 ("Indo-European Elements in Asia Minor and Syria").

² Reference may be made to my remarks in the review of Vincent's book, *AJTh*, XII (1908), 473.

³ Sellin, *Ertrag der Ausgrabungen*, 1905, pp. 27, 37 (cf. *Quart. Stat.*, 1904, p. 123); Vincent, *Canaan*, 1907, pp. 344 ff., 352 ff.

Macalister, who observed that it overlaps with the Seleucid period (*Excavations*, pp. 72, 74, 101, 124). In fact, the data belong to a period contemporary with the jar handles and immediately below strata with distinctively Hellenistic and later indications (e.g., Rhodian stamps, Jewish ossuaries). Consequently, on purely archaeological grounds the significant deterioration may be placed nearer the close than the beginning of "Israelite" history.

Now this conclusion, which of course needs a careful working out, is in practical harmony with other lines of evidence. First and foremost, because of the objective character of the testimony, must be noticed the drastic dislocation and disorganization of conditions due to the Assyrian conquests.¹ The deportations, the breaking up of the earlier solidarity and culture, and especially the importation of new colonies, must have had the most serious effect upon the whole life and thought of the areas concerned. Everyone knows the biblical evidence for the new colonization, but few seem to weigh the full meaning of the extremely interesting fact that Sargon in 715-14 introduced into Samaria desert tribes (Tamud, Ibadid, Marsiman, Haiapa, and Arbai [?Arabians]).² In addition to these internal changes, the next century witnessed important movements east of the Jordan.³ Still later come the fall of Judah and the exile, and to this period scholars have independently ascribed a movement of semi-Arabian clans northward from the negeb of Judah.⁴ Hence in a variety of ways there were vicissitudes quite sufficient to account for cultural deterioration; and if the biblical account of the invading Israelites finds no justification in archaeology, archaeology, in turn, presents just the features which a critical view of the history of Israel leads us to expect, namely, the absence of any drastic change in the pre-monarchical period and the traces of one at or about the time of the downfall of the monarchies. It is very necessary that the points should be carefully considered, because all the vicissitudes which, on the ordinary view, apparently occurred at the Israelite invasion would recur,

¹ See, e.g., W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 35, 71, 79, 256, 258, 358, 472, and note especially p. 65: "The age of Assyrian conquest proved as critical for religious as for civil history, for from that time forward the old religion was quite out of touch with the actualities of social life . . . in the eighth century B.C. the national religion of the northern Semites had already passed its prime and was sinking into decadence."

² See, e.g., Paton, *Syria and Palestine*, p. 248; Montgomery, *Samaritans*, p. 51.

³ Paton, *op. cit.*, p. 269; see Winckler, *Keilinschr. u. d. Alte Test.*, p. 151, who significantly speaks of "eine Wiederholung der Einwanderung Israels selbst."

⁴ So, after Wellhausen (*de gentibus Judaeis*, 1870), G. F. Moore (*Encyc. Biblica*, col. 630), Curtis (*Chronicles*, p. 89 ff.), and many others.

mutatis mutandis, centuries later when the post-monarchical conditions would bear some resemblance to the pre-monarchical, and when nomad or semi-nomad peoples settled in Samaria and in the vicinity of Jerusalem. That is to say, a similar situation recurred, first when the Israelites entered, and later when other and in some respects rather similar nomad tribes entered into occupation; and just as the colonists in Samaria came to be regarded as Israelite, so, elsewhere, immigrants would identify themselves with the traditions of the land. It follows therefore that those biblical sources which are posterior to the great period of dislocation and disorganization may purport to deal in all sincerity with the pre-monarchical invasion and conquest, but the fact remains that at a relatively recent date the ancestors of the writers may have entered the land and have occupied great and goodly cities which they had not built, and vineyards and olive yards which they had not planted. In other words, late accounts of the Israelite invasion and settlement need an entire reconsideration in the light of the late disorganization and immigration of colonists.

It is to be remembered that *on any theory* the eighth and immediately following centuries are a turning-point for the history of Palestine and Western Asia, and, therefore, also for the critical view of the Old Testament (cf. *AJTh*, XIII (1909), 387). On literary-historical grounds we have to work back from the post-exilic reorganization. We have to recognize the mixed ancestry of both Samaritans and Judeans.¹ Hence we have to allow for a "composite history" in the Old Testament: the fusion of traditions of peoples who could have had different perspectives of the past. It is unmethodical, therefore, to throw into the wastebasket historical notices and glosses which conflict with our conceptions of the course of history, for, as it now becomes clear, vitally different points of view are only to be expected. Moreover, it is obvious that it is dangerous to seek to force some *orderly* development of religious thought from the entrance of the Israelites to the time of the Priestly Code, because in the very midst of such a development we have to allow for the break-up of the old culture of the monarchies, and the stages leading up to that which flourished in the Persian, Hellenistic, and later periods. This is not the place to refer further to points which, if sound, involve a serious revolutionizing of our conceptions of the Old Testament, and enough has been said, perhaps, to emphasize the fact that Palestinian archaeology is not to be neglected by the biblical student, that its theories and conclusions require careful testing, that where the archaeologist and

¹ Cf. H. P. Smith, *Old Test. Hist.*, p. 354, n. 1; Torrey, *Esra Studies*, p. 328, n. 53.

the "critic" disagree there can be no presumption that the former rather than the latter is in the right, and that what is throughout requisite is a sane, healthy, and strenuous criticism of both.¹

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BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN MYTHOLOGY²

The names Babylonia and Assyria have always been suggestive of fascinating mystery to the popular mind, and the volume under review represents another attempt to play upon this rather false interpretation of two ancient peoples and to present their myths and legends in popular and romantic form. Like others of its kind, it has not succeeded in this particularly well, for, after all, the Babylonians and Assyrians were no more wonderful nor in their life more mysterious than others of their day. They were men and women after the general order of their kind.

The title of the volume is just a trifle misleading. Although most of the myths and legends of the Babylonians and Assyrians are rather fully presented, in paraphrase rather than in translation, the book is after all more largely a discussion of the religion of these two peoples. The author has given his readers a fairly good presentation of that religion, but it requires more than the description of gods, temples, cults, myths, and legends to make a subject of this kind particularly attractive to the general public. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the book is one whit more interesting in its recital than many books in the field that are the work of specialists, and it was just this that the volume was intended to popularize. Jastrow, for instance, in many of his works writes in quite as interesting a way and is a thousand times more accurate.

The present volume, despite its good features, lacks what all popularizations of a technical subject by one who is not a specialist always lack—accuracy. Assyriology is too new a field and still too largely in

¹ On the archaeological and biblical points here touched upon reference may be made in the first instance to the *English Hist. Rev.*, April, 1908, pp. 320 ff.; the *Expositor*, August, 1909, pp. 97-114; the *Ency. Brit.*¹¹, XI, 584 ff.; XV, 387, 389 ff.; XVI, 513 ff.; XX, 615 ff.; and my notes on I Esdras in Charles's *Apoc. and Pseudepig.*, pp. 12 ff.

² *Myths and Legends of Babylonia and Assyria*. By Lewis Spence. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1917. 412 pages. \$3.00.

a state of flux for anyone to venture into it who does not know his ground. It is here that the author has failed. "Gold in the pure state," he says in his preface (p. 5), "is notoriously unserviceable, and an alloy which renders it of greater utility may detract nothing from its brilliance." The trouble is that his alloy has so much dross that it has destroyed the value of the gold that it contains. The book abounds in inaccuracies, hardly pardonable even in one who is not a specialist. The author has depended too largely upon older writings and upon men like Sayce and Hilprecht, neither of whom is particularly reliable. His chronology is that of the popular mind and is altogether antiquated. Likewise are many of his names of kings, gods, and heroes, his interpretations of names, and his translations. Even when he seems to know better—as, for instance, in the case of Akkadian and Sumerian, Bel and Enlil, etc.—he misuses the terms most incredibly. When so many Assyriologists have erroneously interpreted Bel as another name for Enlil instead of a title that was applied to him and to other gods, one need not be surprised to find the present writer falling into the same pitfall, but surely no other ever carried the confusion so far as to call the temple of Marduk in Babylon the temple of Enlil (cf. pp. 101, 196, and elsewhere)! Is it not a little naïve to accept the Book of Daniel as a true historical record of Babylonian times (pp. 98, 377)? The proofreading has been well done, but in a few cases there should have been more consistency in the spelling of proper names, e.g., Shamshi-Adad is spelled Samsi-Rammon (p. 24), Samsi-Ramman (p. 208), and Shamsi-ramman (p. 215).

In justice to the book, however, it must be said that, despite its technical imperfections, it presents on the whole a very fair treatment of its subject. The parallels with other religions that the author points out are all very apt, although more points of contact with the Hebrew religion might have been indicated. The black-and-white illustrations are good, but those in color by Evelyn Paul are neither artistic nor historically true. Chapter xiv, which would have been better as an appendix, gives a very fair review of excavations in Assyria and Babylonia. One other point has to be credited to the author. It is a pleasure to find a book that has given the Assyrians due credit for the development of their civilization, instead of making it a mere reflection of that of Babylonia, as most writers do.

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THE COPTIC PSALTER¹

Among the manuscript treasures recently purchased in Egypt by Mr. Freer were numerous fragments of books written in the Coptic language. They were in such condition that only by dint of great care and industry could the parchment leaves be separated and reduced to order. Professor Worrell, to whom the task of decipherment was intrusted, was fortunate in having the expert assistance of Professor Sanders in this preliminary task.

Some of the more considerable fragments proved to contain portions of the Bible in the Sahidic dialect, and it is these which are included in the present publication. The portions are the following: Pss. 7-52; 43:25-44:7, from another MS; Job 24:19-27:19. The volume is thus practically an edition of a considerable part of the Psalter, as its title indicates. A second volume is to contain the rest of the decipherable material in the collection, namely, part of a homily on the Virgin, and a magical text in the Bohairic dialect.

A new text of the Sahidic Psalter is very welcome, even after the publications of Budge and Rahlfs. The Freer MS gives no new readings of critical importance, but some of its orthographic variations are interesting, and the care with which it is here reproduced and collated, by the help of Mr. Crum, with the London MS edited by Budge, makes it a valuable starting-point for further study. Professor Worrell has been able incidentally to correct more than sixty mistakes in this portion of the Budge edition.

The remarks on the paleography of the MS in the Introduction, pp. xv-xviii, though brief, are of considerable significance. It certainly seems to be the case that one and the same hand wrote the whole Psalter MS, changing for no apparent reason from the "round" to the "square" forms of the variable letters, and then back again. The whole subject of early Coptic writing needs to have much new light shed upon it. The editor's conclusion as to the date of this MS is that it is hardly earlier than the fifth or later than the seventh century.

The font of type used was specially prepared for this edition, with the main purpose of reproducing the *ductus* of the MS characters. The result is quite satisfactory, and the printed page has a very pleasing

¹ University of Michigan Studies: Humanistic Series, Vol. X. *The Coptic Manuscripts in the Freer Collection*. By Professor William H. Worrell, Hartford Seminary Foundation. Part I. A Fragment of a Psalter in the Sahidic Dialect. New York: Macmillan, 1916. xxvi+112 pages, with 6 facsimile plates. \$2.00 net.

appearance, in spite of the inelegant form of a few of the letters, notably *hori* and *shima*.

Professor Worrell, the general editors of these "Studies," and the public-spirited owner of the MSS are alike to be congratulated on this publication.

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THE TRIAL OF JESUS

The author of the latest work on the trial of Jesus¹ is professor of classical languages at Dartmouth College, and was led to his task through a study of Roman criminal procedure, particularly in connection with Cicero's case against Verres. His conclusions are as follows:

The only "trial" of Jesus, properly so called, was the process before Pilate. The proceedings of the Sanhedrin were no true trial, for this body after the coming of the procurators had lost all criminal jurisdiction, except perhaps in petty cases. It had, however, a certain status in Roman law, for it was permitted to exercise inquisitorial powers not unlike those of a modern grand jury, with the right to make arrests, summon witnesses, etc., in order to prepare information to be laid before the procurator. A similar function in Egypt was fulfilled by certain native officials called "strategi," as is shown by the papyri.

The arrest of Jesus by the Temple police was consequently perfectly regular and valid. While waiting for the Sanhedrin to assemble he was brought before Annas, who questioned him, but this interrogatory had no judicial significance. There was only one session of the Sanhedrin, at morning, and the account of the night session in Mark and Matthew is an error. No exceptions can be taken to the actions of the Sanhedrin. As it was not sitting as a true court, the Mishnic rules for its practice were irrelevant, even if they were in existence. By the testimony of witnesses and the confession of the accused the Sanhedrin found that Jesus had made messianic claims and these claims were the basis of the indictment submitted to the procurator. The question of blasphemy did not and could not arise, for messianic claims were not "blasphemy"; the gospel tradition is due to the influence of later events.

Pilate acted in accord with all proper forms, as far as they can be known for the Roman provinces. His reluctance to pass sentence is

¹ *The Prosecution of Jesus: Its Date, History and Legality*. By Richard Wellington Husband. Princeton: University Press, 1916. viii+302 pages. \$1.50.

historical and was due to a conviction that Jesus was harmless, however complete the Sanhedrists' case might be. His reference of the prosecution to Antipas was to obtain advice, not to transfer the jurisdiction. In the Barabas incident Pilate offered to secure withdrawal of the prosecution in a case not yet tried, not to pardon a criminal already convicted, for Roman provincial officials had no power of pardon. The final condemnation of Jesus was based on the belief that messianic claims of any sort could become a danger to Rome and so were constructively "treason."

In this reconstruction of events the author has declined explicitly to follow schemes that dig too far below the surface of the sources; for instance, there is no mention of the theory of certain able scholars that attributes the condemnation of Jesus solely to his cleansing of the Temple. With this limitation Professor Husband has done his work well, moving in this perplexing realm of "may-have-beens" with an ease that would do credit to a technical specialist in gospel work. And his equipment as a professional classical scholar, with a knowledge of what was actually possible in the circumstances, has enabled him to make contributions of a sort that would escape a theologian. His summary of the evidence for Roman criminal procedure and his application of this evidence to the gospel accounts mark a real advance in our knowledge of the subject.

Appraisal of his results, however, is difficult, as so many questions are involved that lie outside of the actual accounts of the trial itself. To the present reviewer the position that seems least auspicious is the exclusion of the "blasphemy" charge, on the familiar ground that the tetragrammaton was not uttered. This leaves the origin of the story unexplained, for later times as well as for the time of Jesus. Later Christians did not abuse the tetragrammaton. And if it was held "blasphemous" for them to speak of Jesus as celestial Messiah, it would have been equally blasphemous for Jesus so to speak of himself. In fact, Professor Husband's discussion of the implications in the confession attributed to Jesus is seriously incomplete. That "Son of God" meant only "Messiah" (pp. 214-20) is, of course, true, but the real problem lies in the use of "Son of Man," a phrase that is not discussed at all. Nor is it pointless to say (p. 210) that the Sanhedrin did not present to Pilate the charge they found most culpable. The "blasphemy" accusation included the messianic claims, and so the latter alone could be laid before the procurator without any real "falsification of the findings" (p. 248); they were the only ones that he would be likely to consider. If

the Sanhedrin discussed only such matters as could stand in a Roman indictment, why was so much time spent in investigating the words about rebuilding the Temple?

A few matters of detail. The use of the Fourth Gospel on pp. 73 f. and 216 f. is uncritical, in contrast to the treatment elsewhere. To the passages that indicate some Jewish jurisdiction in criminal cases there should be added II Cor. 11:24 (pp. 164-72). The rending of the high priest's garments (p. 200) was an act carefully prescribed by law, and one that had nothing to do with any emotion felt (*Sanh.* 7:5). The distinction drawn in chap. ii between "religious" and "civil" Jewish uses is very difficult to define. A somewhat more copious citation of authorities would have been useful; such phrases as "one writer asks—" "wherefore it has been said—" (pp. 132 f.) are tantalizingly vague. But there is an excellent bibliography.

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CONSTANTINE THE GREAT AND CHRISTIANITY¹

Notwithstanding the vast amount of literature which has been produced concerning Constantine, the above-named discussion of the first Christian emperor in his relation to the Christian church will fulfil a useful service for the historical student. The very abundance of the material makes necessary just such work as Dr. Coleman has here done. Literature upon Constantine, the author tells us, has been almost steadily produced since the beginning of his reign. And yet the many theories which have been advanced by historians of all periods since, concerning the genuineness and the nature of his conversion to Christianity and the influence of his reign upon the Christian church, have created a problem which can find solution only on the basis of a re-examination of all original evidence in the light of the criticisms of modern scholarship. To this task Dr. Coleman has devoted the first part of his book, in which he discusses the historical Constantine in his relation to Christianity. The work will serve as an admirable introduction to the field. The product of American, English, and Continental scholars from Gibbon to the present day has been carefully considered. The theory of Otto Seeck, put forward in 1891, to the effect that there

¹ *Constantine the Great and Christianity.* By Christopher Bush Coleman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1914. 258 pages. \$2.50.

was no Edict of Milan, and the controversy it provoked, are thoroughly reviewed. The original data are adequately presented and handled, the evidence of the legislation of Constantine, his coinage, the inscriptions, his recorded utterances, and the histories concerning him, are all brought under review.

Dr. Coleman's summary of the religious position of Constantine (p. 94) is as follows:

He was at first a pagan inclined towards monotheism, and friendly in his attitude towards the Christians. In his government he extended more and more favors and privileges to the Christians, and before 323 put Christianity on a level with official paganism. After 323, when he was sole emperor, he used his imperial influence very extensively for Christianity and against paganism. Personally he allied himself to the church organization, without joining himself to it, associated immediately with Christian priests, took part in councils and identified himself in sympathy with church affairs so far as ceremonies and preservation of unity were concerned. He professed belief in that religion as a whole, in the lordship of the Christian God over the world, in his revelation through Christ, and in his providence over his people.

He believed that his own remarkable successes were miraculously furthered by his use of Christian symbols and by his course toward the church. He was by no means above reproach in either his private or his public life. He probably prepared for death by a resolution to live a better and more Christian life if he recovered from his illness, and by entering the church through a momentary catechumenate and through baptism.

Dr. Coleman feels that the historian has not finished with Constantine when he has treated only of the historical facts; like the "three Johns" in the "Autocrat" of Oliver Wendell Holmes there are three Constantines who have each in his place exerted a powerful influence on the history of the church. The "historical ghost" of Constantine must be made to walk, that is, the legends and the forgery connected with his name, for, says the author, "after a legend becomes crystallized its history is significant. . . . An accepted legend has just as much influence as an accepted historical truth."

Part II has to do with the legends of the life of Constantine.

From the work of Eusebius, the first of the legend-makers, the different stories of the conversion and baptism of Constantine are traced, with an appreciation of their influence, and also a critical discussion of their content.

The "Donation of Constantine" and the various refutations thereof form the subject-matter of Part III. A great deal of interesting and valuable material is placed ready to the hand of the interested student.

An appendix gives the texts of documents connected with the history of the *Constitutum Constantini* and the "Donation."

The ample index and the thoroughly complete bibliography add not a little to the value of the work.

THOMAS DADSON

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THE FOUNDATION OF MODERN RELIGION^{*}

The book bearing this title contains the Cole Lectures for 1916, delivered before Vanderbilt University. The author is an English scholar of considerable distinction. In the six lectures included in the work he has fully sustained his reputation.

His foundation is the mediaeval period. The first lecture deals with the church and its task in the Middle Ages. It was an arduous task—dealing with the downfall of the Western Empire, the inrush of the Barbarians, with all the accompanying confusion and apparent loss of everything that civilization had gained. To this day the fall of the Western Empire remains an inscrutable mystery. Of one thing, however, the author is convinced—there was in it a deep spiritual significance, for there was an essential antagonism between Christ and Caesar. The fall of the Eastern Empire and the triumph of Islam is an even greater problem. The Roman concept, he says, which had worked marvels in reducing chaos to order was almost identical in expression and aim with its modern imitation, the German *Kultur*. These selected examples show that the task of the church was difficult.

The second lecture, on the dawning of the missionary consciousness of the church, is a natural sequence. The church could accomplish her task only by bringing the heathen within her fold. "In the West it was the struggle of assimilation of discordant elements. . . . In the East it was the repulse of an alien religion." The lecture in considerable detail traces the steps by which these goals were reached.

The ideals and antagonistic forces of the Middle Ages are the subject of the third lecture. In the preceding lecture "attention has been confined to the external side of these heroic enterprises. . . . In the present lecture we propose to look at their intension; to discover the causes of the church's power as a civilizing factor, then to pass to an analysis of the effect of the mission efforts upon the social and ethical development

^{*} *The Foundation of Modern Religion*. By Herbert B. Workman. New York: Revell, 1916. 249 pages. \$1.25.

of the people." In this and in the succeeding lectures, on "The Dawning of the Modern Social Consciousness," "The Monks and Their Work," "Medieval Educational Ideals and Method," Dr. Workman accomplishes his task. Into these details we may not go. Through all the confusion and suffering of this tumultuous period the author finds steady upward development, and at the end the foundation of modern religion firmly laid.

J. W. MONCRIEF

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DISCUSSIONS OF WAR AND CHRISTIANITY

In his little volume *Is Christianity Practicable?*¹ Professor William Adams Brown has given us a courageous, candid, and constructive book—courageous, because it consists of lectures in the Orient upon the most embarrassing question of Christian apologetics; candid and constructive, because without artificial or question-begging theological premises, and working only with real facts and ideals, he has produced a clear and simple apologetic adapted to build up genuine Christian conviction. The lectures making up the book were delivered in Kyoto, under the auspices of the Doshisha, and in three other Japanese cities.

The problem they attack is the one raised by the Great War, which, as Professor Brown formulates it, is the problem: Is Christianity *socially* practicable? Our apologetic, he holds, must show that it is practicable in the social realm, for the anti-social interpretations of Christianity—pre-millenarianism and mysticism—are true neither to its historic essence nor to modern needs. But here is the war, and war "is the uncompromising foe of all in which as Christians we believe and for which we ought to strive." "In this age at least, and among nations calling themselves Christian, war on such a scale should have been impossible." And further, we must admit "the failure of the churches to exercise any controlling influence upon the national policy of the so-called Christian nations." On the contrary, "in each of the warring nations the ecclesiastical authorities have taken their cue from the utterances of their respective governments."

The solution of the problem is worked out, first, through "the Christian interpretation of history." The Christian does not demand a world in which there is no evil, in order that he may believe in God

¹*Is Christianity Practicable?* By William Adams Brown. New York: Scribner, 1916. xvi+246 pages. \$1.25.

and ideals; he demands only a power able to cope with the evil. Also, he does not demand a miraculous conquest of evil, but only a process by which evil is being progressively eliminated. Now, if we go back of the point when a certain spark ignited the explosion of this war and look for the causes which made the explosion inevitable when the spark came, we shall find the two chief causes to be the sin of unbrotherliness and the failure even to attempt to apply the Christian ideal to international relations. But the author shows that a great moral and redemptive process is at work. History is "God's training-school for character"; and in this school suffering may be a means of training, and suffering is inevitable when the fundamental moral conditions of life are violated. Also, history is "God's education for brotherhood." And here comes in vicarious suffering, pain to the innocent for the recovery of the guilty. The cross has a social meaning, which appears when we recognize that human solidarity may be made to "function as an agent of salvation." And, further, history is "the meeting-place of God and man." The full Christian interpretation of the cross "shows God involved with us, in our deepest tragedy, fellow-sympathizer with us in our sorrow, fellow-sufferer with us in our sin." "Here, and here alone, do we find the complete Christian theodicy, our ground for faith in the essential goodness of the world."

The second aspect of the author's solution is given in "the Christian program for humanity." This is the Kingdom of God: "a society in which trust shall replace fear, love take the place of strife, co-operation of selfish competition; in which helpfulness shall be the test of greatness, and the supreme reward, the consciousness of having deserved well of one's kind"—a society which covers both national and international relations. If the practicability of this program is doubted, one must consider the alternatives. They are materialism and nationalism, which, having had almost free scope in the past century, have landed us in the present war. Moreover, Professor Brown warns us: "War gives the advocates of national selfishness their chance. . . . Let them but keep control long enough, and they will do irreparable damage. In spite of all that we may say or do, they, and not the idealists who are dying by thousands at their bidding, will organize the new world which is even now in the making." Again, if we doubt the Christian program, we should remember that our present plight is due to the systematic inculcation of the ideas of nationalism through the press, the schools, and sinister financial interests. But the positive resources which can be marshaled for carrying out this program are very great: the war weariness of men, the new social consciousness of women,

socialism, the awakening of the Christian conscience to social responsibility, the great moral reserves which the war has revealed in humanity.

When the author asks what the next step should be, he rejects pacifism, for, though war can accomplish nothing constructive, it can clear away obstacles to spiritual forces. But he shows that we must organize for social righteousness within the nations and for federation between the nations. The two go together, for patriotism is consistent with cosmopolitanism. The responsibility of the church for these next steps is very great. The church "is committed by its very constitution to faith in the unity of mankind." In the foreign missions of the church "human brotherhood translates itself from faith into fact." But greatest of all its "contributions to social progress is faith in the living God." "For it is faith, after all, upon which all turns."

Dr. P. T. Forsyth's book, *The Christian Ethic of War*,¹ is a rather depressing attempt to find relief from our present moral emergency in a reactionary type of theology, and thereby to do something toward the reinstatement of that theology. "The Cross is the center, source, and key of Christian ethic." "Its final bearing was its bearing upon God, to whom it was chiefly offered." It was "the confession and effectuation of God's righteousness" in one historic act. "The great transaction is done." The Kingdom of Love is "already won for good and all, and already established in Christ's final overcoming of the world in his blood." What is this but the old legalistic view of the atonement?

This is made applicable to the war by stressing *holy* love rather than mere love as the meaning of the cross (though the author seems unaware that "holiness" in turn needs interpretation). Hence one of the chief meanings of the cross is "judgment" upon sin, and the Christian at war may regard himself "as a fellow-worker with the historic judgment of God." "There is no small hope that the war may help us in that way and put the color back into the blood of Christ."

But a reactionary attitude appears also at other points. In the chapter "Killing No Murder" the argument is introduced that Jesus himself inflicted death, as the destruction of Jerusalem proves, not simply because he foreknew it, but also because he is the Judge of history. There is frequent reference to the cleansing of the temple and to the whip of small cords, while the Sermon on the Mount is given a subordinate place. The Sermon has no national reference at all, but the

¹ *The Christian Ethic of War*. By P. T. Forsyth. London: Longmans, 1916. x+196 pages. \$2.00.

cross has, because it establishes "public righteousness." Also, "the Sermon was not regenerative."

The author naturally carries on a vigorous polemic against pacifism, which furnishes the extreme example of "the ethic of the graybloods." To be sure, he finds a place for passive resistance, but he assigns the right to it to the church rather than to the individual; and he finds that "the church's right to resist the state in the ethical region would be in proportion as its conviction on the point raised approached the unanimity of its worship of Christ." The only form of pacifism he discusses is characterized by religious individualism and by "a certain moral aloofness and a disconcerting impartiality as to affairs, which is apt to become an honest affectation and a naïve superiority—too proud to fight." He seems oblivious of the position of much of the pacifism in this country, which springs out of the new social consciousness and is represented by eminent social leaders—though in another connection he says: "America it were wiser perhaps not to discuss."

The author's criticism of pacifism often merges into a criticism of liberal theology in general.

The whole question is one of the type of religion which we cherish as Christ's. . . . There is no doubt that for the Christian public of the last half-century the type has undergone a great change—a change so great as to involve a departure, not only from a stiff orthodoxy, but from the New Testament norm. The book is reduced from a charter to a classic. . . . The ethical note has fallen out of piety. . . . Christianity becomes a humanitarianism, abetted by Christ and regardless theologically of holiness, historically of nations, and ethically of public judgment.

It is regrettable that at a time when Christianity is confronted by a colossal moral problem obsolescent theological distinctions should be revived and stressed. Dr. Forsyth's writing is marked by his usually brilliant mastery of antithesis. As polemic it is splendid, but it is not ethics.

EUGENE W. LYMAN

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A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE

The name of the author of the latest book on the sociological interpretation of the Bible¹ probably affords a sufficient characterization of its standpoint, which may be still further specified by the fact that the

¹ *The Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus*. By Charles Foster Kent. New York: Scribner, 1917. xiv+364 pages. \$1.50.

preface expresses special acknowledgments to Professors F. G. Peabody and J. W. Jenks. That is, the Hebrew-Christian history is interpreted as the history of the ebb and flow of social progress, with little or no attention to other possible factors involved.

There are four parts, treating respectively of the social ideals of the pre-exilic prophets (beginning with Moses), the post-exilic prophets and sages, Jesus, and the followers of Jesus (ending with modern socialism). The Old Testament discussion proceeds along familiar lines and accepts the usual literary-critical premises, but it is written with an extremely conservative apologetic interest. Hebrew history represents a practically steady social development, which was due solely to Hebrew inspiration. The only influence of surrounding cultures (grouped generally under the term "Canaanite") was for evil, and we are even told that "Moses is the first man in human history with a well-developed social consciousness" (p. 7). This is, to be sure, a lesser fault than treating Hebrew development as a mere by-product of the wider development of the Orient, but Hebrew originality can be overestimated as well as underestimated. Even though a manual of this kind could not discuss all the relations between Israel and her neighbors, it might at least have indicated that such relations existed and that Israel was not seldom the debtor. Similarly, it is a mistake due to a too-eager apologetic zeal to hold that we must praise all the characters lauded by the Old Testament narrators—e.g., in modern terminology Joseph would be best described as "the ideal monopolist," rather than as "the embodiment of the agricultural social ideals" (p. 37).

The gap between the Testaments is somewhat sweepingly described (p. 165) as "singularly lacking in social idealism" (a curious designation for the period that produced the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*), and Hillel is presented (p. 166) as the leader of the social reawakening (a position that is supported by a strained interpretation of the scanty fragments of Hillel's teaching). Hillel, together with the Essenes, who had a "zeal for social service," prepared the way for the Baptist. And the Baptist was no apocalyptic dreamer, but a social reformer, bent on inaugurating a new social era, which was ushered in by the work of Jesus.

Dr. Kent's conception of Jesus is well known from his earlier works, and reappears here with still sharper emphasis on the "social service" aspects. The contentions of the "apocalyptic" school are dismissed, and with them, apparently, all the other-worldliness generally found in Jesus' teaching (cf. especially pp. 223 f.). Jesus, it is contended, was a

teacher of a formulated social philosophy (p. 182), keenly interested in contemporary political conditions (p. 253), presenting a social program that could be realized in a not-distant future (p. 275), meeting death because of his advocacy of the principles of democracy (p. 257). The parable in Matt. 20:1-15 is designed to teach the moral of "a living wage for all" (pp. 234 ff.). And so on. The objections to this point of view hardly need recapitulating. In spite of the efforts of certain very able scholars, the critical excision of the eschatological passages has not yet been satisfactorily performed. Moreover, how could a social transformation be expected under a political and economic system that was beyond control? Is it to be thought that Jesus believed that Rome would look on with equanimity while Judea converted herself into a social utopia? Or did he expect that the Romans would be so impressed by Jewish social righteousness that they would hasten to follow its example? If so, Schweitzer's wildest exaggerations do not give a portrait of a more impractical dreamer; in fact, of the two pictures Schweitzer's is the more comprehensible in the psychology of the times.

All this is in no way meant to say that Dr. Kent has not written very much of very great value. The weakness is a weakness often to be found in writings of the "social service" school—a desire to obtain results too directly, a constant implication that the biblical teachers spoke with modern problems in modern phrasing ever before their minds. Good method requires that we determine the content of such teaching in the light of its own day, without reference to the problems of the present and without shrinking from acknowledging what may be strange or even bizarre to our eyes. Then, but not until then, it will be possible to apply the principles so discovered to the contentions of a different age and thought-world. As regards the social teaching of Jesus, this task is as yet incomplete, although all such books as this help toward the solution of the final problem.

The appendix contains an excellent bibliography, an elaborate list of subjects for investigation and discussion, and a brief classified index of biblical passages.

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
CHINA AND CHRISTIANITY

A most extraordinary book is this whose covers of bright yellow, black, and red challenge the attention of the writer as he sits down to pen this notice—a book in the English language by a Christian

Japanese professor on the Nestorian monument of China.¹ The erudition of the author, who has evidently mastered Japanese, Chinese, English, French, German, Latin, Greek, and Syriac, is apparent on all hands. His diligence is no less admirable, and no one who has to deal intensively with Nestorianism in China may henceforth disregard this book and the great store of information there collected. Even though it is, of course, noticeable that the author is writing in a tongue acquired, not native to him, yet the English is for the most part clear, easily intelligible, and fluent. It is quite probable, however, that a certain unevenness and haltingness in the manner of the author's presentation of his material and of his own and others' theories upon it are due to the fact that, after all, he is writing in another than his mother-tongue. But, when all due allowance for this has been made, there still remains an atmosphere of argumentativeness, the feeling of an evangelistic interest, no doubt dear to the author's heart, which at times beclouds the avowedly scientific object of the volume.

What the reviewer means will perhaps be best set forth by quoting a paragraph near the close of the introduction:

We have only to go back to the sources in Japan in order to "convince" the so-called "heathen" in our midst—whose ancestors actually heard the Christian verities so long ago!—to wake them up and make them understand that their ancestors were indeed Christians or (at least) possessed Christian truth under a different name. Yaso, Jesus, Ἰησοῦς, Messiah, Christ, Χριστός, Mi-lê Fo, and Miroku are all names for the one Being, "One without a second," as the inscriptions on the Egyptian Pyramids declared five thousand years ago.

This closing peroration is not the only place where unsafe combinations are hazarded and gaps of centuries bridged with a breath. Nor is the philology of the author always so meticulously careful as to make him an altogether safe guide for the unwary and the uninformed. For the Chinese text, indeed, the reviewer cannot well judge. But the simple equation, without even so much as a note, of Syriac  with English "George" (p. 178), is not only uncertain, but positively incorrect; this is, of course, one of those Persian hypocoristica in *-di* or *-de*, which Nöldeke has studied in his *Persische Studien*, I, 388-413. What a similar form for "George" would look like is there clearly shown, and our author's error is the less excusable in that he had the Syriac form of the name George before him in this very text.

¹*The Nestorian Monument in China*. By P. Y. Saeki. With an introductory note by Lord William Gascoyne-Cecil and a preface by the Rev. Professor A. H. Sayce. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. xii+342 pages. 10s. 6d.

Certain other details may be noted. "John, minister and secretary" (p. 176), is scarcely correct; if only the author had recalled his own list of p. 113, he could not have failed to read "deacon" for "minister," as, indeed, he does for the same Syriac on p. 175. The "secretary" is quite untenable; the whole context suggests almost imperatively the reading ܡܢܚܐ, "monk," for ܡܢܐ, "hand," which would properly be written ܡܢܐܐ, and never means "secretary" anyway; indeed, the photograph clearly shows that we probably have to do with a mere faulty abbreviation made by a stonecutter because of lack of space. In the case of the "George," mentioned above, "Doctor of Reading" seems a bit extravagant; "teacher of reading" is, indeed, the meaning given for the word in its rare occurrences elsewhere. What is meant is, of course, as in Jewish Aramaic, "Bible teacher," which, especially in China, would probably include the teaching of reading in Syriac. Or does the descending scale of titles, "priest, archdeacon . . . and *makrājānā*," point to the use of this form as a synonym for *kārō(ū)jā*, "reader," "lector," just as this latter was used in Jewish Aramaic as a synonym for the former? Certain transliterations, e.g., Meshihadad, p. 176, Shoubhalmaran, p. 179, might have been improved upon. The reviewer has at hand no means of controlling the reading ܡܢܚܐ on p. 265; the translation contains no hint of such a scribal error on the part of the Syriac, which in general seems to have been very accurately done by the Chinese stonecutter, if, indeed, the cutter of these characters was Chinese.

All this does not predispose the reader to the acceptance of Professor Saeki's theory about "*Shiang-thsua*" (pp. 254-56); the indispensable ? is lacking. "The other" *chorepiscopus* (p. 175) after all names a city (the word can scarcely mean province at this late date) as his residence, if not as his see; the reviewer fails to see the cogency of the author's reasoning in rejecting Heller's and his own former hypothesis. The idea of writing out the Chinese form of his title in Syriac letters may very well have occurred to one of these men. The correlative extension of the name "Kumdan" to a large district or province does not appear to the reviewer to rest on a sound basis. In spite of all this, the author's new theory is not unattractive, if only it were better founded or at least more cogently presented. Perhaps Professor Saeki will favor us with a note which will more fully and clearly represent the facts from which he is reasoning.

These are criticisms which, if this review is to be worth while, must be made, however unwilling the reviewer may be to make them. They

do not mean to suggest that the book is not a usable one, if only it be properly and carefully used. Nor may the reviewer fail to state that the volume has better, as well as less good, qualities. The correlative Chinese sources presented are a most welcome gift, and the indexing as well as the general disposition of the contents is very good indeed. In view of what has been said above, however, it must be said that this *primum opus* of Professor Saeki's would have been better off without the laudatory sponsoring given to it in the twofold foreign preface. What in the case of Queen Elizabeth and her ambassador, mentioned on pp. 49 f. sounds natural enough, does not seem quite so much the proper thing in introducing to the public a scientific effort. It is worthy of note, by the way, though it is perhaps natural, that with all of this argumentation about the relations of China to Christianity the T'ai-ping rebellion (on which see, e.g., *Enc. Brit.*, VI, 199) is not so much as mentioned, either in the body of the book or in the two prefatory statements just referred to.

M. SPRENGLING

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SERMONS BY THE NEW PASTOR OF CITY TEMPLE¹

It is a striking fact that from a town of the Central West, whose very name is unknown to England, a preacher should be called to the City Temple, London, a pulpit made famous by Joseph Parker and Dr. Campbell. It is hardly the Westminster Abbey of English Nonconformity, as Mr. Newton says in one of his sermons. No Free Church can claim such a place. Christ Church, Westminster, is nearer to it than the City Temple. Neither did Thomas Binney ever minister at the City Temple, as the publisher's announcement declares. He made famous the King's Weighhouse Chapel. It is not necessary to deal in exaggerations to state the fact that Mr. Newton is there recognized as a gifted preacher and worthy of a critical and commanding place. The sermons published under the title *An Ambassador* show the reasons.

No man could differ more than Joseph Parker and Dr. Campbell and Mr. Newton, though the two latter are more alike in their thought. Parker was a genius, possessing the greatest marks of genius of any man he ever met, is the judgment of Robertson Nichol. He was the unexpected; his sermons, a kaleidoscope of insight and visions and melodies.

¹*An Ambassador*. By Joseph Fort Newton. New York: Revell, 1916. 226 pages. \$1.00.

They were interpretations of the Bible in the light of his profound meditations on life. His preaching was essentially scriptural—as much so as Alexander Maclaren's, though not as correct. The people's Bible indicates this.

Dr. Campbell has been a mystic and a liberal, placing the emphasis upon personal experience and interpreting the ideal of Jesus in the light of development and social consciousness. Like a man lost in the woods, his progress is back to the point of his starting. In the Free Churches he misses the altar and returns to a church, or to a school of a church, that emphasized the historic faith and the historic priesthood and the objective fact more than the subjective experience.

Mr. Newton is a mystic, but of a different type. He goes back of the long line of doctrinal and ecclesiastical development to Jesus of the Gospels, to the ideal human life in whom God dwelt and through whom God revealed his redemptive love, the divine Savior and Master of men. This life is the living Christ, touching every life, the soul of every redemptive movement, actually working in men and with men for the world's salvation.

Mr. Newton is not in any strict sense a biblical preacher, though he is not ignorant or careless of biblical literature. Neither is he in any ordinary sense a doctrinal preacher, though he knows the development of doctrine and recognizes the duty of stating the ageless truth in terms of modern thought. He is intent on something more universal and vital. He interprets the truth of Christ, the personal relation to the living Christ, in the present thought and experience of men. "The Faith" is a good example of his spirit and method. So all the sermons are vital and timely.

He does this largely through the ideas and forms of the higher literature of the world. He is a wonderfully well-read man and he assimilates what he reads. The truth is his own, though the stream is fed by a thousand springs among the hills. He does not make his sermons from the last book he has read, but great books often give him his suggestion and point of contact and the most telling illustrations of truth. He is a fine example of what noble literature, especially poetry, may do for the preacher. It trains the spiritual faculties and makes the sermon flash its way where reason painfully gropes. The third sermon, "The Heart of God," is developed by suggestions from William Vaughn Moody, the most creative of the younger American poets. Stevenson, Shelley, Munger, Bushnell, Royce, all help to form the introduction to the "Higher Loyalty," and suggestive thoughts and happy phrases

from many others enrich the sermon. This material is never put upon the sermon like stiff and artificial ornament, but gives it spirit and harmony and grace. There is a fine sense of harmony between truth and sermon that is like a poetic sense and gives it the appealing and cleansing power of noble art.

The language is rich and abundant, even at times overabundant, and yet he has the power of drawing an epoch in a phrase, as when he defines Shakspeare's time as "an age of lengthening vistas and lifting skies."

There is a catholic spirit that now and then seems to remove all marks of definite thinking, and a warmth of feeling that borders on the sentimental, as when the word "sweet" is used three times in the same sermon and, still worse, in address to God.

The sermons speak especially to cultivated minds, yet through their simplicity and naturalness and humanness they make the universal appeal. Here is their real power. They do not speak the language of the church, but the language of humanity. They are not great sermons in the spiritual interpretation of the gospel or the prophetic interpretation of life; but they are real sermons of a warm, spiritual, enthusiastic manhood that knows the world's best thought and life and uses its gifts and attainments to glorify the "Lord and Master of us all."

ARTHUR S. HOYT

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BRIEF MENTION

SEMITICS

SCHAEFFER, HENRY. *The Social Legislation of the Primitive Semites*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915. xv+245 pages. \$2.35.

The social history of the early Semites has had fruitful and auspicious beginnings in the works of such writers as W. R. Smith and J. Wellhausen, but for the most part such works have either been based on what may be called classical sources and have been confined to limited areas or they have treated only a few aspects of the subject.

The wealth of new sources from the excavations, covering now pretty generally the ancient Semitic world, has made a comprehensive survey of the entire field from the aforementioned standpoint, not only desirable but inevitable, and it has only been so long delayed by the richness and variety of fresh data. The present volume is a step in this direction, but confines itself to "social legislation."

The title is somewhat misleading in two respects: (1) the book goes considerably beyond real legislation to include the broadest kind of custom and tradition (cf. chaps. i and ii on "Matriarchy" and "Partiarchy"); and (2) it by no means covers the Semitic area, nor is the material used exclusively primitive. The writer confines himself

consistently, in each chapter, to a discussion of a given topic as illustrated by Palestinian data of the biblical period, and then, wherever the topic permits it, materials from Arabia before and at the time of Mohammed, and from ancient Babylonia are added. Five chapters, however, namely, viii, "The Social Problem as viewed by the Prophets," x, "Sabbatical Year," xi, "The Year of Jubilee," xii, "Ezekiel's Plan of Allotment," and xiv, "The Development of Individual Landownership in Israel," are by their special character confined strictly to Israel. The more exact subject is, therefore, early Israelitish social customs and enactments as illustrated by the Koran and the excavations in Babylonia. There is no reference to the Amarna literature, the history of Phoenicia, or the Jewish colony at Elephantine.

The book is the outgrowth of a Doctor's thesis and makes no claim to great originality, although this is not exactly an excuse. A little more comprehensiveness, at least a general survey of the field in prolegomena form, was desirable with the present title. One misses any reference to feasts and the Sabbath, which surely belong to social enactments of the first order. The chapter on slavery lacks clearness, owing to the traditional confusion of actual slavery and temporary enslavement for debt. The writer apparently had not consulted John's *Laws of the Hebrew Peoples* and the *Laws of Babylonia*, which is indispensable to any further handling of the theme.

The topics discussed are full of interest and throw much light on the biblical page by appropriate citations from other parts of the Semitic field, while the liberal use of footnotes makes easy reference to the sources possible. The writer has shown much industry and has brought together valuable material by which the general reader will profit and be grateful; and the book will help to make clear in what manner Israel's development was but a small part of a larger civilization.

L. W.

CHURCH HISTORY

CADMAN, S. PARKES. *The Three Religious Leaders of Oxford—Wycliffe, Wesley, Newman*. New York: Macmillan, 1916. xvii+596 pages. \$2.50.

The range of this book is much more comprehensive than the title indicates. Instead of restricting himself to an intensive study of the three leaders, Wycliffe, Wesley, and Newman, the author has gone afield into discussions, oftentimes quite colorless, of the age in which these actors filled the stage. Forty-three pages in discussing the early history of Oxford and English papal politics from Hildebrand to Boniface VIII, ten pages on monasticism in general, an equal number or more on Bentham, Kant, and Schleiermacher, illustrate the writer's aptitude for digressions. Here and there, however, some incisive observations are made—the paralyzing effects of the Black Death on the monasteries (p. 95), the increased demand made upon the seculars (p. 104), Wycliffe's influence on the peasant revolt (p. 141), his pluralism (p. 72). The writer's estimate of his heroes shows no marked deviation from that of standard biographies. In point of accuracy and discrimination the Wycliffe section will probably be pronounced the best. For Wesley the author shows genuine appreciation, though his treatment has no original features whatever. The Newman section has a penetrating, though tediously long, survey of the background of the Oxford movement. The analysis of Newman's temperament is skilful. The steps in his religious career are presented as inevitable, and therefore not open to censure. The charm of this monograph lies in its diction, which in many places is brilliant and is always imposing in its grace and dignity.

P. G. M.

HORSCH, JOHN. *Infant Baptism—Its Origin among Protestants and the Arguments Advanced for and against It*. Scottdale, Pa.: Horsch, 1917. 157 pages. \$0.75.

Students of Anabaptist history will welcome the announcement from Professor Horsch that he has in preparation a history of the Anabaptists. As a part of what will be this history when completed, the author has decided to issue in advance this modest volume, which deals with the issue of infant baptism. Citations are freshly quoted to indicate that the reformers—Luther, Zwingli, Vadian, Hofmeister, and others—were anti-Paedobaptist until they realized the necessity of infant baptism as an adjunct of a state church. Convincing evidence is produced (p. 27) to show that Thomas Munzer was not, as has been asserted, the cause of the rise in Switzerland of opposition to Paedobaptism. The significance of public debates as a factor in propagating Anabaptism is well presented (chap. vii). Incidentally Zwingli is portrayed in a bad light for his attempts to prevent these debates, or for his bullying tactics in disputations when they were forced upon him. The arguments by which infant baptism was defended are outlined quite fully. Being familiar to scholars, this portion of the book is the least interesting. Two valuable documents are inserted—"A Dialogue between Balthasar Hubmaier and Ulrich Zwingli on Infant Baptism, Based on Zwingli's Book on Baptism," and "Discussion concerning Infant Baptism between the Preachers at Basel and Balthasar Hubmaier." The closing portions of the book give the views on baptism of Menno Simons, John Calvin, and John Wesley. To the diminishing constituency to which a subject of this kind makes any appeal a considerable amount of first-hand data is made accessible. The author's irenic spirit is to be commended.

P. G. M.

CLEVELAND, CATHARINE C. *The Great Revival in the West, 1795-1805*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916. xii+215 pages. \$1.00.

Miss Cleveland has had the good fortune, not always enjoyed by candidates for the doctor's degree, to devote her energies to an investigation as interesting as it was profitable. In point of interest her production will undoubtedly be pronounced a success. She has told her story clearly and succinctly. Chapters i, ii, and iii ("The Religious Condition of the West Prior to 1800," "The Revival Leaders; Their Teachings and Methods," "The Spread of the Revival and Its Culmination") will probably be universally regarded as the best portions of this investigation. One cannot but regret that the writer felt constrained to amplify with such detail and with considerable dogmatism the "Phenomena of the Revival" (chap. iv), especially since this discussion obviously necessitated the specialized equipment of the religious psychologist. The results of the Revival scarcely meet expectations. There is only a faint appreciation of the broad significance of this religious awakening upon the life of the nation as a whole. Probably this defect was inevitable in an investigation confined to only a small area of the country. When other students have done correspondingly intensive work for New England and the South, the task will then devolve upon someone to interpret the conclusions of these several dissertations in terms of the nation as a whole. Particular mention should be made of the appendixes, which contain illuminating and interesting documents hitherto inaccessible. A bibliography, well arranged, comprehensive, though slightly inaccurate at points, fills an important place in historical apparatus.

P. G. M.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

GULICK, SIDNEY L. *America and the Orient*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1916. x+100 pages. \$0.25.

This timely volume by Dr. Gulick, for years a missionary educator in Japan, is so small that it can be read through in an evening, but of importance out of all proportion to its size. It is replete with facts respecting the Orient, especially Japan, and the relations of the United States to the lands of the East. But its greatest significance is in that it presents with extraordinary clearness the questions which require the attention of thoughtful Americans in reference to our relations to the Orient, and suggests the considerations that must be taken into account in answering these questions. It is intended especially as the basis of a series of class studies, and, could it be so used throughout the country, it would go far toward making and keeping America right with the Orient.

E. D. B.

BEACH, HARLAN P. *Renaissant Latin America*. New York: Missionary Education Movement of the U. S. and Canada, 1916. vi+258 pages. \$1.00.

No one was more competent to bring the substance of the three-volume report of the eight commissions of the Panama Congress within a small compass than Dr. Harlan P. Beach.

He begins by telling the story of the Congress. Then in eight succeeding chapters he deals seriatim with the reports of the eight commissions and with the discussions following their presentation. The tenth chapter contains an abridgment of the addresses. A concluding chapter deals with aftermath and estimates. The volume is interesting from beginning to end and for the busy reader meets an urgent need.

J. W. M.

RUST, JOHN B. *The Life and Labors of the Rev. Herman Rust, D.D.* Cleveland: Central Publishing House, 1916. 287 pages.

This volume is a biography of a man who, for a period of about fifty years, played an active, though not a specially conspicuous, part in the work of his denomination, the Reformed church in the United States of America. From 1851 to 1862 he was a pastor in Cincinnati, and from 1862 to his death, in 1905, a professor in Heidelberg Theological Seminary, Tiffin, Ohio, occupying for the greater part of that time the chair of "Exegetical and Historical Theology." He was evidently a good, pious man and an inspiring preacher, but he does not seem to us, judging from the quotations of his writings given in the book, to have displayed any marked ability as a scholar.

The book has very little to commend it to the general reader. The author inserts a large amount of material that has little or no relation whatever to the subject of the book. Many incidents that he relates are trivial and commonplace; in fact, some are entirely out of place (see, e.g., pp. 38 ff.). There are certain marks of unsophisticatedness, credulity, and amateurishness about the book that offend the sense of a scientific student. The chapter headings are not always apropos to the material contained in the body of the chapters themselves. Chapter xii, for instance, devotes about two pages to the "Endowment of the New Chair," which is the title of the chapter; the remaining eight pages deal with other matters. The author is conservative in his attitude of mind and sometimes goes out of his way to defend "evangelical

views" and to attack rationalistic tendencies. The book as a whole cannot be rated as a first-class work.

However, it must be said that it contains some material that will be of interest to those who belong to the denomination of which the subject of the book was a member. It throws light upon the liturgical and baptismal controversies that occupied the attention of this denomination a half-century ago, and it furnishes much information on the founding and early history of Heidelberg College and Theological Seminary. But for the general reader the book possesses little value.

E. Z.

MOORE, JOHN MONROE. *The South To-Day*. New York: Missionary Education Movement of the United States and Canada, 1916. xiv+247 pages. \$0.60.

Dr. Moore was born and reared in the South, has lived in different sections of it, and has been a close student of its economic, social, racial, educational, and religious problems. At the same time, his residence as a student in Ohio, at Yale, and in Germany has enabled him to see the problems of his own section in their proper relation to those of the country and the world at large.

By the South the author means the sixteen states which "comprise the old slaveholding territory." In his discussion of economic conditions most readers will find not a few surprises in store. For instance, we are told that in 1860 the white population of the fifteen slaveholding states was 8,099,760, but that the slaveholders numbered only 383,637, of whom 277,000 owned less than ten slaves each. To put the matter conservatively: "There were at least 6,000,000 southern people who had no direct interest in slaves." Again: "Of the three richest states in the Union in 1860, two were southern; of the five richest, three were southern; of the ten richest, six were southern; of the seventeen richest, ten were southern."

The chapter "The South's Human Problem" is devoted to a study of the negro, the mountain man, and the Indian. In each case the social, economic, intellectual, and moral conditions are discussed, as well as the agencies at work for their improvement. In his study of the industrial and political trend of the present day the author brings out the fact that the uniqueness of the South's problems is passing away, since its industrial and political life is taking on more and more those characteristics with which we are familiar in the northern and eastern sections of the country.

Religiously the South is conservative. The program of Protestantism laid down by the author is to meet the opposition which the immigrants from Roman Catholic countries offer to evangelical Christianity and public-school education with "light, truth, love, and the power of the Christ-life in its adherents."

In the concluding chapter specifically, as throughout the book implicitly, the author makes good his promise to strike the national rather than the sectional note. He sees the South girding for national service, hearing the call for nationalism and promoting patriotism.

In the appendixes are to be found, besides an excellent bibliography, tables containing much valuable statistical material, which makes the book serviceable as a work of reference. The style of the author is direct, clear, and simple. His volume is a timely contribution to a subject all too little understood, and it is to be hoped that it will be read and studied widely and thus serve to clear away much misunderstanding regarding the South.

H. B. C.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

JAINI, JAGMANDERLAL. *Outlines of Jainism*. Cambridge: University Press, 1916. xl+156 pages. \$1.25.

This little volume is preliminary to a series, to be published by the Jain Literature Society, designed to present translations from authoritative Jain texts. Composed by a Jain, it presents a sympathetic exposition of the Jain religion and of the extremely complicated dogma which has grown up around that religion. In many accounts of Jainism we find only a meaningless enumeration of technical terms devoid of any understanding of the real motive forces behind Jainism as a religion.

An introduction gives a conservative but fairly critical account of the origin and history of the religion, but is not critical enough nor detailed enough to be of scholarly value. The description of the creed, treated under the heads of theology, metaphysics, ethics, and ritual, is accompanied by thirty-four pages of text and translation which give authority for the statements made. Appendixes give some details of Jain logic, cosmology, cosmogony, astronomy, ancient Jain sacred literature, etc. The texts, however, are not from the old canonical books, but from much later systematic treatises, some of them Digambara. The whole account is eclectic and gives no historical development of the religion and dogma. Further, there is little detail as to differences of doctrine among the Ājverambaras, Digambaras, and later sects. Treating Jainism as a whole, however, the book fulfils its purpose very well. The essentials of the religion, as opposed to the great complication and scholasticism of the dogma, are well brought out, and the minutiae of the dogma are well explained. The book does more than give an unmeaning enumeration of technical terms. It will serve as a helpful companion to Burgess' edition of Bühler's *On the Indian Sect of the Jains*, and to Mrs. Stevenson's *The Heart of Jainism*, the most useful works in English. The bibliography is interesting because of the full list of Digambara texts, but puzzling because of its difference from other published lists. A careful working out of the lists of texts, canonical and non-canonical, of the Āvetambaras, Digambaras, and other sects, and a tracing of their relationships is a piece of work much to be desired. It is to be hoped that the plan of translating all the important texts will be carried through. The Jain books have not received the attention they deserve. Many a detail of Indian history and of the general development of Buddhism and of Hinduism may be cleared up when all the old Jain material is available to the general student.

W. E. C.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

- Chiera, Edward. Lists of Personal Names from the Temple School of Nipur. A Syllabary of Personal Names. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum, 1916. 88 pages+xxxvii plates.
- Creelman, Harlan. An Introduction to the Old Testament—Chronologically Arranged. New York: Macmillan, 1917. xxxv+383 pages. \$2.75.
- Humbert, Paul. Un heraut de la justice Amos. Lausanne: Imprimerie Co-opérative la Concorde, 1917. 36 pages.
- Kent, Charles Foster. The Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus. New York: Scribner, 1917. xiii+364 pages. \$1.50.
- Sidersky, M. D. Etude sur la chronologie assyro-babylonienne. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1916. 95 pages. 4 fr.
- Spence, Lewis. Myths and Legends of Babylonia and Assyria. New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1917. 412 pages. \$3.00.
- Tait, Arthur J. The Prophecy of Micah. New York: Scribner, 1917. x+127 pages. \$0.75.

NEW TESTAMENT

- Hall, G. Stanley. Jesus, the Christ, in the Light of Psychology. 2 vols. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, 1917. xix+325 and 326-733 pages. \$7.50.
- Hatch, William Henry Paine. The Pauline Idea of Faith in Its Relation to Jewish and Hellenistic Religion. (Harvard Theological Studies, II.) Cambridge University Press, 1917. 92 pages.
- Moffatt, James. The New Testament. A New Translation. New York: Doran, 1917. x+395 pages. \$1.00.
- Scharling, Carl Immanuel. Ekklesiabegrebet Hos Paulus. Copenhagen: V. Pios Boghandel, 1917. 212 pages.

- Watson, Herbert A. The Mysticism of St. John's Gospel. London: Robert Scott, 1916. 186 pages. 3s. 6d.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Clarke, W. K. Lowther. St. Gregory of Nyssa. The Life of St. Macrina. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. 79 pages. 1s.
- Hitchcock, F. R. Montgomery. The Treatise of Irenaeus of Lugdunum against the Heresies. 2 vols. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. 146 and 151 pages. 2s. each.
- Overbeck, Franz. Vorgeschichte und Jugend der mittelalterlichen Scholastik. Eine kirchenhistorische Vorlesung. Basel: Benno Schwabe & Co., 1917. xii+315 pages. M. 7.
- Pease, Theodore Calvin. The Leveller Movement. Washington: American Historical Association, 1916. x+406 pages.
- Preuss, Hans. Unser Luther. Leipzig: Werner Scholl, 1917. 111 pages. 80 pf.
- Srawley, J. H. The Catechetical Oration of St. Gregory of Nyssa. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917. 123 pages. 2s.

DOCTRINAL

- Bennett, George H. The Challenge of the Church. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1914. 164 pages.
- Carpenter, W. Boyd. The Witness of Religious Experience. London: Williams and Norgate, 1916. 111 pages. 2s. 6d.
- Drown, Edward S. The Apostles' Creed Today. New York: Macmillan, 1917. 129 pages. \$1.00.
- Eckman, George P. When Christ Comes Again. New York: Abingdon Press, 1917. 287 pages. \$1.25.
- King, Henry Churchill. Fundamental Questions. New York: Macmillan, 1917. xiv+256 pages. \$1.50.

- McConnell, Francis J. *Understanding the Scriptures*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1917. 144 pages. \$0.75.
- Mains, George Preston. *Religious Experience. Its Evidential Value*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1917. 272 pages. \$1.25.
- Murray, David A. *The Supernatural, or Fellowship with God*. New York: Revell, 1917. 311 pages. \$1.50.
- Pringle-Pattison, A. Seth. *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917. xvi+423 pages. 12s. 6d.
- Quick, Oliver Chase. *Essays in Orthodoxy*. New York: Macmillan, 1916. liii+310 pages. \$2.00.
- Relton, Herbert M. *A Study in Christology*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917. xxxv+278 pages. 7s. 6d.
- Skrine, John Huntley. *The Survival of Jesus*. New York: Doran, 1917. 326 pages. \$2.00.
- Tait, Arthur J. *The Nature and Functions of the Sacraments*. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1917. xiii+104 pages. \$1.25.
- Book in the Bible. New York: Revell, 1917. 320 pages. \$1.50.
- Earp, Edwin L. *A Community Study or the Religious Social Survey*. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1917. 22 pages.
- Grane, William Leighton. *Church Divisions and Christianity*. London: Macmillan, 1916. xii+206 pages. 5s.
- Gulick, Sidney L., and Macfarland, Charles S. *Library of Christian Cooperation. Vol. II, The Church and International Relations*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1917. v+208 pages.
- Gulick, Sidney L., and Macfarland, Charles S. *Library of Christian Cooperation. Vol. III, The Church and International Relations*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1917. vi+205 pages.
- Joseph, Oscar L. *The Faith and the Fellowship*. New York: Doran, 1917. 226 pages. \$1.25.
- McAlpine, Charles A. *The Pulpit Committee*. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1917. iv+72 pages.
- Macfarland, Charles S. *Library of Christian Cooperation. Vol. I, The Churches of Christ in Council*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1917. v+362 pages.
- Macfarland, Charles S. *Library of Christian Cooperation. Vol. IV, The Church and International Relations—Japan*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1917. v+312 pages.
- Macfarland, Charles S. *Library of Christian Cooperation. Vol. V, Christian Cooperation and World Redemption*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1917. vi+325 pages.
- Meyer, Henry H. *Library of Christian Cooperation. Vol. VI, Cooperation in Christian Education*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1917. v+191 pages.
- Milligan, George. *The Expository Value of the Revised Version*. New York: Scribner, 1917. vii+147 pages. \$0.75.
- Selbie, W. B. *Belief and Life. Studies in the Thought of the Fourth Gospel*. New York: Scribner, 1917. viii+143 pages. \$0.75.
- Spencer, Frederick A. M. *Human Ideals*. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1917. xi+280 pages. 6s.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS


- Hartman, L. O. *Popular Aspects of Oriental Religions*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1917. 255 pages. \$1.35.
- Keith, A. Berriedale, and Carnoy, Albert J. *The Mythology of All Races. Vol. VI, Indian and Iranian*. Boston: Marshall Jones, 1917. ix+404 pages. \$6.00.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGIONS

- Barrow, George A. *The Validity of the Religious Experience*. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1917. xi+247 pages. \$1.50.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Atkinson, Henry A. *Arbitration in Industrial Disputes*. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1917. 16 pages.
- Christian Faith and Practice Papers. Groups I, II, III, and IV. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917. 2s. 6d.
- Dunham, James H. *John Fourteen. The Greatest Chapter of the Greatest*



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
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LUTHER'S PLACE IN MODERN THEOLOGY

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It is one of the essential duties of humanity to understand and to appraise its great men—a task that is never, in the nature of the case, finished. For developing knowledge means ever-increasing material and ever-advancing perspective and power of estimate.

Perhaps there is no man in modern history who calls so persistently and constantly for reappraisal as Martin Luther. This is not strange. He stood at the meeting-point of two ages—a pivotal man. He was likewise a very complex man. His personality was so vital, vigorous, and many-sided as to be an inexhaustible epitome of what is in man of strength and weakness, of rationality and irrationality, of good and—not so good. He changed swiftly and widely, both in character and in outlook—yet not quixotically—so that fixed judgments and static terms fail to describe him.

It is no mere respect for formal anniversaries, therefore, that impels thinking men repeatedly to reconsider and reappraise the hero of the Reformation. Modern Christianity is under inner compulsion, not only to re-estimate him, but in doing so to reorient itself in the light of his defining and illuminating mission, personality, and ideas. It will not do to say of this man that everything worth while has already been said of him. More must be said for the very reason that so much has been said.

In the natural absorption in Luther as hero and reformer it should not be forgotten that he was also theologian by training and choice. He was distinctly a university man—Doctor Martin Luther—and few men have attached so much importance to a degree as did Luther to his. It was as a lecturer in theology at the University of Wittenberg that he first came to self-consciousness and power. His first manifesto to the world was in the form of theses. It was not mere protests that he nailed to the church door at Wittenberg, but theological propositions to be defended by argument and authority. As theologian he began, and theologian he remained to the last—though happily much besides.

As a theologian he was fully equipped. His knowledge of the Scriptures was extensive and scholarly as well as experimental and practical, enabling him to make his translation of the Bible a monumental achievement. Hebrew was a delight to him, Greek was an everyday affair, Latin was the language of his classroom and of most of his writings. He was conversant, if not familiar, with the church fathers. Augustine was one of his master minds. Scholasticism was to him both friend and foe. "No one shall teach me scholastic theology; I know it," he declared. Occam he jestingly calls *meus magister*. Indeed, it was a growing distrust of Scholasticism, with its hairsplitting and syllogizing and frequent puerility, and its winking at a conscienceless doctrine of "good works," which awoke in him the inner revolt that finally issued in the German Reformation. It is true he failed to recognize the best in Scholasticism. Aristotle was to him only a "blind heathen."¹ Aquinas he knew but slightly and appreciated less. Yet he understood something of the strengths as well as the weaknesses of this masterly school of theology.

On the whole we have in Luther a true theologian, and manifestly no ordinary one. What we have from him is no closed system, but outspoken, open-hearted, vital theology, free and breezy and inconsistent, like the man.

The task defined for this paper is that of re-examining Luther's doctrinal holdings in the light of present-day religious thought, to determine how far his views reflected the essential nature of Chris-

¹ McGiffert, *Martin Luther*, p. 63.

tianity and how far they have been, and will continue to be, germinal in the reconstruction of theology. Our first endeavor will be to determine the more essential and original elements of his theology and then to set over against these the more archaic and negligible factors, and thus to reach as careful and comprehensive a judgment as possible concerning his influence upon modern theology.

I

Let us begin with a fundamental and determinative characteristic of Luther's theology which has been too largely overlooked, i.e., *its Christocentric character*. It will come to be realized, I venture to predict, that the Christocentric emphasis of Luther's theology is one of its most outstanding features, in contrast with Catholicism on the one hand and Calvinism on the other. Both his affection and his thought centered in Christ, "from whom, by whom, and unto whom, all my divine studies, day and night, have recourse to and fro continually."¹ It is commonly held that the chief and most distinctive doctrine of Luther is that of justification by faith. This is doubtless true in the main, for it is his own assertion that, "if the article of justification be once lost, then is all true Christian doctrine lost."² But it is not true in any such abstract and academic sense as that in which the phrase is usually employed. Luther was anything but philosophical or theoretical in his thinking. He was concrete, vital, personal. It was not justification, in the forensic sense that concerned him, or faith, in the theoretic sense. What he desired for himself and for others was relief from the burden of sin, someone to whom to turn for peace of mind and redeeming strength.

This he found richly in Jesus Christ, who became to him "wisdom and justification and redemption." "True faith," he declared, "is a sure trust and confidence in the heart, and a firm consent whereby Christ is apprehended."³ In other words, his experience, together with the doctrine which grew out of it, was strikingly Pauline. It was such, however, not in any imitative or servile fashion, but rather as a parallel than as a conforming experience.

¹ Preface to Luther's *Commentary on Galatians*.

² *Ibid.*, comment on chap. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, comment on 5:16.

To be sure, the suggestive norm of it came from Paul, but in itself and its expression it was intensely individual.

One reason why the theology of these two outstanding Christian leaders is so similar is manifestly the similarity of the system of bondage out of which each emerged into light and liberty. Roman legalism was in many ways the very counterpart of Jewish legalism. It had even led Luther to think of Christ as "a lawgiver, a tyrant, and a judge."¹ The whole-heartedness with which each at first sought satisfaction for the craving of the soul in his ancestral faiths, the disappointment, the growing revolt, the final emergence into light and peace, are strikingly alike.

In view of this parallel it is no wonder that Luther's *Commentary on Galatians* should be in many respects his *magnum opus*.² Most vividly and exultantly does it set forth the freedom and the joyfulness of the Christian life into which he has come, as well as the foundation upon which his faith rests:

It is not without good cause, therefore, that we do so often repeat and beat into your minds the forgiveness of sins, and imputation of righteousness for Christ's sake; also that a Christian hath nothing to do with the law and sin, especially in the time of temptation. For in that he is a Christian he is above the law and sin. For he hath Christ the Lord of the law present and enclosed in his heart (as we have said), even as a ring hath a jewel or precious stone enclosed in it. Therefore when the law accuseth and sin tempteth him, he looketh upon Christ, and when he hath apprehended him by faith, he hath present with him the conqueror of the law, sin, death, and the devil; who reigneth and ruleth over them so that they cannot hurt him.³

A still deeper insight into Luther's faith in Christ will be found in his noble treatise, *The Liberty of a Christian Man*. In this stirring magna charta of the Reformation the central significance of Christ stands forth in clear radiance. At the heart of the treatise is a prose lyric of Christ mysticism of remarkable beauty and tenderness. The mysticism of Luther is a subject that might well have received more attention than it has, as yet, in the present revival of interest

¹ Preface to Luther's *Commentary on Galatians*, comment on 4:4.

² He mentions it, though disparagingly, with his *Commentary on Deuteronomy*, and the sermons on the Books of John, as though he regarded it as one of his leading works; *Table Talk* (Hazlitt), xlv.

³ *Commentary on Galatians*, comment on 2:16.

in mysticism as well as in the recent studies of Luther. Among the latter McGiffert in his admirable biography makes no allusion whatever to the subject. Preserved Smith takes account of it, but only incidentally. Yet it is hardly possible to understand Luther without giving a large place to this factor of his inner life and thought. Böhmer, on the other hand, recognizes its importance. Hartmann Grisar, the eminent Jesuit theologian, in his recent scholarly, if disparaging, life of Luther, has given to his mysticism its due place in his theology, though interpreting it in the light of a distorted view of mysticism.¹

The manifest cause of the confusion with regard to Luther's mysticism is his own attitude of condemnation toward the fanatical mysticism with which he had to deal. Here his conduct was naturally determined by his responsibility as leader of the Reformation movement. But this vociferous and fanatical type of mysticism, while it had much of genuine spiritual inspiration, is not to be confounded with that deep, meditative, personal mysticism which Luther found in his Bible, in Augustine, in Bernard, and in such writings as those of Tauler and the author of the little book which he himself published under the title *Theologica Germanica*. From the chalice of their mysticism he drank deeply, and his whole inner life was refreshed and sustained by it. Not only so, but it entered formatively into his theology. In a letter written in 1516 to Spalatin he advises him to taste in Tauler "the pure thorough theology, which so closely resembles the old, and to see how bitter everything is that is ourselves, in order to discover how sweet the Lord is."²

The passage in the treatise on liberty, to which allusion has been made, is an example of pure Christ mysticism and makes use of that intimate symbol of bride and bridegroom which has been so great a favorite in mystical literature:

The third incomparable benefit of faith is this, that it unites the soul with Christ as a bride is united with her bridegroom. And by this mystery, as the apostle teaches, Christ and the soul become one flesh. And if they are one flesh and there is between them a true marriage, nay, by far the most perfect of all marriages, since human marriages are but frail types of this one

¹ *Luther*, translated by E. M. Lamond, Vol. I, chap. v. ² *Ibid.*, I, 177.

true marriage, it follows that all they have they have in common, the good as well as the evil, so that the believing soul can boast of, and glory in, whatever Christ has, as if it were its own, and whatever the soul has Christ claims as his own.

Such ardent though restrained Christ mysticism appears and reappears in Luther's writings, as in the *Fourteen of Consolations*—in which he calls upon the reader "to ascend with the Bride into the mountain of myrrh"—in his treatment of the sacrament, and in his sermons. It throws light for him upon the mystery of suffering, as appears in the beautiful letter to Michael Dressel, in which occur the words: "You say with Israel: 'Peace; peace'; and there is no peace; say rather with Christ: 'Cross, cross,' and there is no cross. For the cross ceases to be a cross as soon as you say joyfully: 'Blessed cross, there is no tree like you.'"¹

As a result of the more searching examination which has been made of the antecedents of Luther's *sola fides*, it is now quite probable that the doctrine of justification, as Luther conceived and proclaimed it, is an inadequate though well-chosen formulation of an intensely real mystical experience which came to him originally in the tower of the Black Cloister in Wittenberg at the time he was lecturing on the Psalms.² This in no way disparages the truth of the doctrine, but rather deepens the consciousness of the reality of the experience from which it issued. Nor should it cast reflection upon this experience to term it mystical, for mysticism of this order is nothing strange, irrational, and other-worldly, but the clearest insight into truth and the very power that "makes the world go round." The marrow of all truth and reality lies in the existence and relations of persons. And the bond between persons, while it is the most unquestionable of all things, is in its very nature mystical, too deep and real to be defined or fully understood. When Luther, therefore, maintains that such a bond of personal communion is not only possible but actual between the individual man and God in Christ, and that it is the most vital reality there is, he is simply reasserting what millions have realized both before and after

¹ See Preserved Smith, *Luther*, p. 32.

² Dr. Smith has shown this in his valuable article, "Luther's Development of the Doctrine of Justification by Faith Only," *Harvard Theological Review*, VI, 4; cf. Grisar, I, 391 f.; Böhmer, p. 84.

him. The bond, in his terminology, is *faith*; the effect, *justification*. These terms are symbols of a reality that is too great for precise formulation.

Reliance upon this divine grace gives full assurance of salvation. When one asks for the basis of this assurance, Luther answers, it comes from Christ, from the Holy Ghost; it is a "secret voice." "We must be assured that not our service only, but also our person is pleasing to God." This sounds like self-hypnotism, and it fails, as Luther himself confesses, in many an hour of uncertainty. "I cannot believe and yet I teach others!" he sorrowfully exclaims. But it is to be remembered that the difficulty here is much the same as that which obtains between friends or lovers. "How can I feel sure that my friend really cares for me?" asks the ever-questioning heart. Appearances sometimes confound one. He is at times compelled to fall back upon past assurances of fealty, expressed in words, but resting upon something deeper than words. This faith is only "fiducial," yet it is rational, with that order of certitude which no intellectual demonstration can equal.

This reliance upon "fiducial faith," in the sense of complete assurance, Luther reiterates and recommends in all manner of extravagant forms and phrases, that he may in some wise induce men to practice it. He is willing to risk self-deception, anti-nomianism, anything, that he may further it. "The Christian's work," he declares in one of his sermons, "is to sleep and do nothing." Christ is everything and does everything. To such declarations Schwenckfeld well objected: "How is it possible that such easy indulgence and soft and honeyed sermons should not lead to little account being made of sin, seeing the people are told that God winks at the sins of all those who believe?"¹ This was pertinent. Yet Luther was too intent upon his main end, which he knew to be incomparably good, to qualify in any way his presentation of it.

II

In close accord with its indomitable hold upon Christ, another pronounced trait of Luther's theology is, as has already been

¹ *Commentary on Galatians*, comment on chap. 2; see Grisar, I, 308.

² See Grisar, V, 260.

suggested, its *experimental character*. Indeed, the present emphasis upon experience as the substratum of theology—one of the most fruitful discoveries of modern theology—has made large account of the fundamental place of experience in Luther's theology. Not that Luther himself explicitly recognized that his theology issued from experience. He had no theological theory except the priority of faith over reason. He simply entered into the truths of religion whole-heartedly and let his theology flow from this experience naturally and fructifyingly. Here is the secret of his power, both as preacher and writer: "I believe, therefore have I spoken." The genuineness and spontaneity of the best that he wrote make it convincing and vitalizing. This characteristic comes out with fine flavor in his prefaces. In them one feels most strongly the writer's consciousness that he has a word which must be uttered. It is true that his "plentifulness of words," as he puts it, was largely due to the controversial motive of his work. He thanks his opponents for making him learned. It is they who have spurred him to his task. "When I am angry," he is reported in *Table Talk* as saying, "I can write, pray and preach well." But this heat of indignation was but the expanding medium in which his own latent conviction and experience uttered itself most warmly and effectively.

Luther's genius and sincerity as a controversialist by no means, however, excuse his egregious abusiveness. To be sure, some of his characterizations were so true and so apt that they carried a great deal of legitimate lightning with them, as when he called his opponents "merit-mongers" or addressed Henry VIII as "Henry, by God's disgust King of England." There is a place for polemics as well as irenics in theology, but Luther abused it. "Blunt wedges rive hard knots," as he said in justification of his conduct toward his opponents, but his wedge was often jagged as well as blunt. Nothing real is gained by expletives and epithets. To recognize Luther's strength as a controversial theologian as grounded in his own experience and conviction may justify his method but not his manner—common though it was in his day.

Whatever Luther's failings, the genuineness of his purpose, as well as of his religious experience, appears in the sincerity and constancy of his prayerfulness. With him prayer was no mere "tongue

threshing," as he stigmatized prayer in *Popedom*, but a "great" and "marvelous" thing. In his conversation, letters, tracts, sermons, everywhere, he evinces his reliance upon prayer. His method of fulfilling the injunction to pray for your enemies by praying that they might be cursed and damned¹ is, to be sure, a peculiar and perverse one; but Luther would be Luther, and the cursing of those deserving it was to him ever a means to the divine glory.

It is from the point of view of its values for experience that Luther's estimate of the Bible is to be understood. He was no priest of bibliolatry. If he had an exaggerated view of the value of the Scriptures, it was only because they furnish such incomparable food and drink for the soul. He saw clearly the intrinsic superiority, the inner splendor, of the Bible. In his preface to the first part of his German works he apologizes for having added so much to "the countless vermin, the swarming parasitic mass of books," which stand in the way of the Bible. He says that it was his intention and hope in putting the Bible into German "that there would be less writing and more studying and reading of the Scriptures. For all other writings should point to the Scriptures, as John pointed to Christ, when he said, 'He must increase, but I must decrease.' In this way everyone may drink for himself from the fresh spring."

This sense of value inevitably constitutes a differentiating test and explains the freedom with which Luther treated certain books of the Bible and likewise his refusal to be caught by criteria of authorship and external standards of authority. In the *Table Talk*, e.g.², he replies to the assertion that Moses did not write the first of the five books attributed to him: "What matter it even though Moses did not write it? It is nevertheless Moses' book, wherein is exactly related the creation of the world." Here, however, he escapes Scylla only to run upon Charybdis. Authorship authenticity versus revelation authenticity—it is all on much the same plane.

¹ "All who pray, curse. Thus when I say, 'Hallowed be thy name,' I curse Erasmus and all who think contrary to the Word." Luther's idea of cursing is evidently closely connected with the biblical use of it.

² xxxvi (Hazlitt).

With this experimental test there goes his admirable Christocentric criterion for adjudging scriptural authority: "That which does not teach Christ is not apostolic . . . that which preaches Christ is apostolic, though Judas, Annas, Pilate or Herod teaches it."

The task of translator, which he performed so worthily, Luther conceived and executed as the task, not of the scholar merely, but of the theologian. Not that he read his own ideas into the text, but that he rendered the meaning in the light of the conception of God and man which suffused his own heart and mind.

On the whole, in spite of much remaining traditionalism, Luther's view of the Bible as the Word of God was both sane and progressive, the reason being, as has been stated, that his whole treatment of it was governed by his sense of its value in experience. As Böhmer has said: "In Luther's opinion the Word of God can become revelation and authority actually only for him in whom it has impressively proved itself as a Word of God through direct action of God upon the soul."

III

A third characteristic quality of Luther's theological thinking, and one that attests its modern as well as its New Testament character, is its *ethical integrity*. It is no fabric of intellectual sheen; it is no reed shaken by the wind of emotion, but stands steady and strong, knit of firm moral fiber. The ethical interest is uppermost in this valiant soul. He is no friend of aestheticism, or romanticism, or speculation, or anything that minimizes morals. He constantly decries "reason" in the sense of pure intellect. In a forceful comment on the third verse of the first chapter of Galatians he has some very positive and pithy things to say about the folly of treating salvation merely as an intellectual affair:

Wherefore, whensoever thou art occupied in the matter of thy salvation, setting aside all curious speculations of God's unsearchable majesty, all cogitations of works, of traditions, of philosophy, yea, and of God's law too, run straight to the manger and embrace this infant and the virgin's little babe in thine arms. By this means thou shalt be able to shake off all terrors and errors, like as the sun driveth away the clouds.

In the sense in which they are used, these earnest words of warning against dallying with the intellectual aspects of truth, to the neglect

of its moral meaning, are wholesome and wise. The question of the rightful place of speculation in theology is a larger one and one with which Luther was not qualified to deal.

Over against all resolving of the gospel into terms of intellect Luther sets the practice of faith. In a strikingly cogent statement in the preface of his *Brief Explanation of the Ten Commandments, the Creed, and the Lord's Prayer*, he epitomizes salvation thus:

Three things a man needs to know in order to be saved. *First*, he must know what he ought to do and what he ought not to do. *Second*, when he finds that by his own strength he can neither do the things he ought, nor leave undone the things he ought not to do, he must know *where* to seek and find the strength he needs. *Third*, he must know *how* to seek and find and get this strength.

And then, with much of pertinence, he goes on to show that the Commandments, freely interpreted, answer the first of these questions; the Apostle's Creed, the second; and the Lord's Prayer, the third.

Although this is the logic of salvation, Luther always insists that the primary act is the exercise of faith. Faith is thus not passive but active—a work, and that the first and highest. “The first and highest, the most precious of all good works is faith in Christ,” is the forceful declaration of the *Treatise on Good Works*. This imperative emphasis upon faith seems, indeed, to disparage conduct, and at times Luther is guilty of this mistake; but it is to be borne in mind that the “works” against which he so earnestly fulminates are not so much acts of charity and service as specific “religious works,” such as penance, fasting, masses, and the like.

If Luther disparages conduct, it is due to his desire to relate it rightly to that which is behind it and which gives it character and worth. He has an exceptionally clear and pertinent conception of what makes conduct right or wrong. In nothing is Luther more modern, genuinely progressive, and convincing than in his emphasis upon motive as the key of conduct. The motive which he insists upon as the only right one is *faith*—an attitude primarily toward God and secondarily toward men—which it is often hard to distinguish from love.

Troeltsch in his sagacious study, *Luther und die moderne Welt*, well contrasts Luther's sense of righteousness and reality with the

“unverständliches sakramentales Stoffwunder das seine Wirkungen nur durch mühsame Vorbereitung und durch dunkeln Zauber ausüben kann.”¹

One cannot but be constantly struck, as he reads Luther, with the frank naturalness and wholesomeness of the man and of his influence, and the sagacity with which he linked the religious life to the fundamental human instincts, interests, and occupations of everyday life. As Goethe well said: “He gave back to men the resolution to stand firm once more upon the earth God gave them.”² Lover of music, of the home, of hospitality and good cheer, he removed from religion the pall of asceticism and gloom. This appears in a very marked degree in his catechisms, in which he succeeds, with an insight and breadth that is often better than modern, in translating Hebrew Decalogue and early Christian symbol, as well as the petitions of the Lord’s Prayer, into the terms of common life, with its pressing needs and duties. Here is wisdom and grace for the home, the school, the field, the shop, the office, strength for daily toil and care—in a word, religion applied to life. Not that there are not religious solecisms and incongruities here, but as a whole these are perhaps the sanest, most wholesome formulas for life lived in the light of religion since those of the New Testament. Take for an example the Fifth Commandment—*Thou shalt not kill*.

What doth this commandment teach? That we ought to fear and love God, and not to molest or damage the life of our neighbor, but that we assist him and serve him in every want or danger both of soul and body.

This is surely a negative transformed into a positive. The great virtue of all this is that it is not detached ethics, cold maxims of conduct, but is closely linked to religious motive and inspiration and is sustained by a rational and vital theology. Morals need motive. Good deeds flow from faith, as Luther was ever insisting.

It is right here that Luther hit Roman Catholicism one of his hardest blows. Consequently the champions of the church have done their best to discredit his ethics. Grisar, latest and most skilful of these critics, finds in Luther’s ethics “a far-reaching, dangerous rift between religion and morals.”³ He deprecates “the

¹ *Das Christentum*, p. 83. ² *Ibid.*, p. 84. ³ *Luther*, V, 61.

absence of any objective sanctum or higher authority for his new ethics."¹ It is true that Luther was often extravagant in his identification of deed with motive. It is not good ethics, or good religion either, to recognize no good or evil quality in the act itself, apart from its motive. On that basis alone many an evil custom and dastard deed could be justified. Yet at the same time motive is the main thing; this was the truth that the church had neglected and that Luther restored.

Nor was it good ethics for Luther to belittle conscience, as he did, in the interest of faith, declaring that "conscience is death's own cruel hangman" and urging men to get the better of their own consciences,² and even to commit sins, so as to free themselves from the slavery of a tender conscience. What he really and rightly sought in such cases was not, of course, to smother conscience, but to bring it into line with larger principles, to turn it away from little issues toward great duties. In this, as in so much else, the bigness of his mind shows itself, making Catholic casuistry look mean and petty.

IV

Yet it would be misleading to represent either Luther's theology or his ethics as uniformly enlightened and progressive. He was in many respects superlatively a man of his age. In no particular is this so manifest as in his attitude toward nature—his supernaturalism. We have found Luther in one sense a "naturalist," that is, with reference to human nature; but with respect to his view of nature he was emphatically a supernaturalist. He not only lacked the slightest trace of the modern scientific mind; he was extremely childish in his notions of supernatural powers and their effect upon nature. When we approach him on this side, we find ourselves in company with a thorough mediaevalist, and it is with difficulty that we keep from falling out with him altogether. His confidence in miracles—of the most extreme sort—was credulous to the point of childishness. Nature was to him anything but an ordered realm.

Probably nothing in Luther's writings—ubiquitous as it is in them all, including his hymns—strikes the modern reader as so strange and antique as the superabundant reference to the devil.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

² *Ibid.*, p. 67.

Apparently neither Luther nor his theological system could get on without this *vade mecum*. Satan is for Luther a most real and indispensable personage. He seats him securely, if not as Lord of Nature, at least as Counter-Lord. He is the father of storms and earthquakes and all that is alarming and destructive in nature. Luther evidently conceives of him as pluralistic, or at least as having countless agents and minions. "Many devils are in woods, in wildernesses and in dark poorly places, ready to hurt and prejudice people; some are also in thick black clouds, which cause hail, lightnings and thunderings and poison the air, the pastures and grounds." He is a convinced believer in witchcraft and urges the most stringent measures against supposed witches. "I would burn all of them," he coolly remarks.¹

But Luther's devil and his works are by no means confined to nature. He is the author of human sin and misfortune. It is singular, and in some ways all but inconceivable, how confidently Christians of that and other periods of history could saddle all the sin and misery of the world upon Satan and yet retain any sense of their own responsibility. Luther is one of the most pronounced of these devil mongers. He "maintains" that "Satan produces all the maladies which afflict mankind."² "He plagues and torments people all manner of ways." He is the cause of melancholy and sickness. He is the author of doubt and temptation. Of Luther himself he is the most intimate and exasperating enemy. He vexes, torments, beguiles, him incessantly. He devises all sorts of tricks to delude him. A vision of the wounded Christ that came to him—a vision which St. Francis would have received as a gracious revelation of his Lord himself—Luther bids begone, reflecting that "it must needs be an illusion and juggling of the devil, for Christ appeared to us in his Word, and in a meaner and more humble form."³

One needs to read but a fraction of this devil lore of Luther to realize that he lived in a radically different world from ours, a world into which science with its healing, normalizing, fear-dispelling mission had not even entered, in which psychology was not so much as dreamed of, and common sense itself was most

¹ *Op. cit.*, dccxxi.

² *Ibid.*, dxcvii.

³ *Ibid.*, cccxxvi.

uncommon. And yet, when all this has been fully granted, we still find ourselves asking: How could such a sensible, sane, clear-eyed iconoclast as Luther have made so much of the devil? The answer is twofold. In the first place, Luther was in no sense a profound or discriminating thinker. He was a perspicuous thinker. He saw through shams and around difficulties. His practical judgment was sound. But he never went to the bottom of profound problems. He was no metaphysician. In the second place, he found the idea of a devil useful. He took the common belief in a devil and put it to usury. He was ever a fighter, and here was a foe always at hand and doughty enough for his best and most belligerent powers. Luther was no Christian Scientist. He knew the reality of sin and its actual power. No devil could be too hideous and hostile to visualize and personalize this awful fact of evil. His mistake was a double one in confounding natural evil and moral evil—two things closely related, but not the same—and in localizing what is in its nature mental and moral and comes, as Jesus said, "from within."

It is well in the warfare of the soul to magnify rather than to minimize the puissance of the foe. But it is better still to come to see that it is not the devil but ourselves, individually and collectively, who produce evil, and that it is only as we realize this that we give the devil his due. It is well enough to personify this evil and call it the devil, but we need to know that the mischief itself is our own creation and self-artifice, and not something elemental and self-existent. Luther left this to be thought through by those who came after him, leaving the devil in the field for us, not only to fight, but to extinguish—if we can.

Another regard in which we of today find ourselves completely out of touch with Luther is in the common doctrine of a fallen and corrupt human nature, which he firmly held—a doctrine singularly out of keeping with the hearty and wholesome attitude toward human life which characterized this destroyer of monasticism. It is true that the doctrine of depravity does not occupy at all a leading place in his primary writings. But it lingers in the traditional background of his thought and appears as a sinister influence in his later and more somber theological utterances. It is strongly

stated in the *Table Talk*: "We are all sinners by nature—conceived and born in sin; sin has poisoned us through and through; we have from Adam a will which continually sets itself against God, unless by the Holy Ghost it be renewed and changed."¹ Again, in commenting upon marriage, after commending it as a "divine institution from which all things flow," he animadverts upon the difficulty of keeping married people together and adds: "Adam's fall has vitiated our nature and made it most fickle. It runs hither and thither like quicksilver."²

In contrast to the lightsome, roseate pan-evolutionism of the theology of the latter part of last century and the ante-bellum years of this, such solemn cognizance of the inbred tendency to wrong that has gained squatter sovereignty in our human nature is not without its truth and cogency. The race is no flower garden, but neither is it a cesspool. It is to be said for Luther, however, that he did not disparage human nature to any such degree as did many of the Protestant theologians who followed him.

If Luther had only found some way in which to make place, not only for the *Hange zum Bösen*, as Kant called it, but also for that *Anlage zum Guten* which he knew to be so inherent in humanity, and yet not dis sever the latter from the faith which he felt to be so essential to the very existence of goodness, he would not have left so dark a problem. For, while he had an exceptionally strong sense of the goodness of human nature, when subjected to Christ, his firm conviction of the need of faith in Christ to purify our nature led him to stigmatize all good works of those who do not believe in Him as sins. The best deeds of the heathen are worthless and *in ipsis heroicis virtutibus depravata*. This is neither reasonable nor righteous. The only escape from the difficulty in which Luther leaves us is that recognition of the essential Christ, present in men before his earthly advent, which both Paul and the author of the Fourth Gospel suggest, but which was holden from his eyes. Failure to recognize the indwelling Christ prevented him from reaching the universally Christocentric viewpoint toward which his thought pointed.

¹ ccxliv.

² Smith and Gallinger, *Conversations with Luther*, p. 61.

In natural alliance with this crude and sometimes exasperating supernaturalness we find in Luther's theology much of the repellent and lifeless mechanism of his age, which compels us, even while we feel the glow of his spirit, to become suddenly aware of the gulf which lies between his time and our own. The modern mind interprets Christianity as a life-process, a development, an inner spirit. Luther, though the forerunner and pioneer of this conception, did not, and could not be expected to, fully reach it. To him Christianity is still a prearrangement, a method of rescue, a set of terms to be accepted. His theology cannot free itself from the idea of schematism, a formal revelation, a plan of redemption. This mechanical construction appears in his determinism and in his theories of inspiration and atonement. These mechanisms are inseparable from his theology, though foreign to its real spirit.

Luther's *determinism* was a most unnatural component of his theology, though he regarded it as essential—*summa causa totius summae Christianorum rerum*. It was restrictive. It was in manifest contradiction to the whole movement of the Reformation. It belied his own faith. It alienated the freest minds of his time, especially Erasmus, whose diatribe on "Free Will" called out his *De Servo Arbitrio*. It was one of the causes of the disesteem felt for Luther in England.¹

The motive of this determinism is clear. Luther wanted not so much to disparage man—except in his pride and self-sufficiency—as to exalt the Most High, believing that, in the degree to which all things are subject to the divine will, man will feel his dependence and will exercise faith in God. For this purpose he describes man as a block, a stone, a pillar of salt, until God quickens him. In a picturesque but not very edifying figure he likens the will to an ass: "The human will is like a beast of burden. If God mounts it, it wishes and goes as God wills; if Satan mounts it, it wishes and goes as he will. Nor can it choose the rider it would prefer, nor betake itself to him, but it is the riders who contend for its possession."²

¹ See Preserved Smith, "English Opinion of Luther," *Harvard Theological Review*, April, 1917.

² *De Servo Arbitrio*, quoted by Preserved Smith, *Luther*, p. 208.

Calvin is even more pronounced than Luther in his determinism, and, later, Jonathan Edwards in his *Treatise on the Will* advanced the same doctrine still further, moved by similar motives. Melancthon alone saw the one-sidedness of the doctrine. It is strange that these trained and independent Protestant theologians did not realize that this extreme predestinationism in the end overreached itself and dishonored God instead of exalting him. The Lutheran church, in giving so much less prominent a place to this doctrine than did the Reformed church, has wisely indicated that it is aware that it occupied a less prominent part in Luther's thought than he himself at times seemed to think.

Yielding to the same mechanical tendency which he had at first transcended, Luther at times seems to venerate the Bible as if it were a fetish, a gift dropped from the sky, by virtue of which it should be accepted as a fixed and perfect revelation, a complete compendium of divine truth. These lingering shades of superstition which he shared with his predecessors as well as his contemporaries should not be regarded as germane to Luther's best thought. As a matter of fact, he had, as has been already pointed out, a far deeper sense of the real greatness of the Bible than this theory of inspiration grasps. He never tired of exclaiming over the depths and heights, the sweetness and the splendor, of the Word of God. The language of the Gospel of John seemed to him like a "sunbeam." However lowly in form, the Bible held for him a treasure of incomparable wealth. "In it thou findest the swaddling clothes and the manger whither the angels directed the poor simple shepherds; they seem poor and mean, but dear and precious is the treasure that lies therein."

If Luther elevated the Scriptures above "reason," it is, again, reason in the analytic sense, as appears in such a saying as this:

We ought not to criticize, explain or judge the Scriptures by our mere reason, but diligently, with prayer, meditate thereon, and seek their meaning. The devil and temptations also afford us occasion to learn and understand the Scriptures by experience and practice. Without these we should never understand them, however diligently we read and listened to them. The Holy Ghost must be our only master and tutor.¹

¹ *Table Talk*, iv.

When experience and the Holy Ghost are thus arrayed against reason, it can only be reason in the sense of that barren intellectualism against which the advocates of spiritual intuition have always protested, from Origen and the Mystics to Coleridge and Bergson. Luther himself declares: "Reason informed by the Spirit is a help in interpreting the Holy Spirit."¹ It was, in fact, as has been pointed out, the quibbling of the Scholastics that turned Luther against "reason"; and one must always have in mind this abuse of reason, into which Scholasticism fell, when one would interpret what Luther has to say in disparagement of it.

Mechanical theology gets a strange hold upon Luther in another doctrinal area in which in the main he also transcended it—his Christology. We have seen that his estimate of Christ centered upon his personality. It was Christ himself rather than his nature or his office that appealed to Luther. And yet, when it came to defining and formulating a doctrine of Christ, Luther fell back upon the established ideas of supernatural birth and equality with God. Gathering, as he did, his inspiration from a deeper source, he put into these doctrinal forms a warmth and personal feeling which the conventional theologians wholly failed to reach. When, for instance, Luther in the *Shorter Catechism* interprets the creed thus, "I believe that Jesus Christ, my God, eternally begotten of the Father, also very man, born of the Virgin Mary, is my Lord, by whom I, a lost and condemned man, have been released, gotten and won," the "Godhead of Christ is introduced," as Ritschl well says, "as a judgment of value." "The chief point is that in his exertions as a man His Godhead is manifest and savingly effective."²

In like manner, when he declares, "All the prophets well foresaw in the Spirit, that Christ, by imputation, would become the greatest sinner upon the face of the earth, and a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world," he goes on to point out how "Christ was made a curse for us, to the end he might deliver us from the curse of the law."³ This is the shell of substitutionary atonement, but not the kernel. In other words, we have here the same fluid, pragmatic use of a commonly accepted doctrine for a practical end which is

¹ Smith and Gallinger, *Conversations with Luther*, p. 115.

² *Justification and Reconciliation*, p. 293.

³ *Table Talk*, ccii.

characteristic also of Paul. Yet this does not excuse Luther—not to speak of Paul—from the duty of a more careful examination of his doctrinal holdings, which might have helped to save Lutheranism from the obscurantism into which it ultimately fell.

V

Luther, despite his freedom and good sense, was still under the spell of the supernaturalism and mechanism of his age. He was also limited by *his own individualism*. Indeed, in his theology as well as in his conduct he appears often as a rank individualist. His own experience naturally led him to this. When he broke away from the church, it was as one alone and undefended. And his emphasis ever lay upon the obligation of the individual soul to duty and to God. This was, indeed, one of the chief sources of his power and one of his greatest gifts to the world, but it would have been still greater had it been united with a fuller recognition of the obligation of the individual to other individuals and to the community.

It is true he had a vigorous and lofty sense of what the real church is, as contrasted with the loose associations of the sectaries, as well as with the Church of Rome. In devotion to this ideal he became a masterful organizer, almost an institutionalist. He was also an upholder of the state and of the rights of the people, as well as of the princes, and "sang his fool's song," as he put it, to the German nobility amazingly well.¹ Yet he had no comprehensive view of the Kingdom of God as a social order. He was, at first at least, a man of the people, their spokesman and protagonist and idol; but he was a stranger to the social message of the gospel. His conduct toward the peasants in their great uprising is extremely disappointing, both as revealing his deficiency as a man and his apparent indifference to the social meaning of Christianity. More and more he lost faith in the common man. He grew gloomy and pessimistic. "The common people," he declared, "should have the law, not the gospel."² When one contrasts such an assertion

¹ "No one," writes Böhmer, "before Luther, conceived and portrayed the paternal vocation of the state so broadly and definitely" (*Luther*, p. 304).

² *Conversations*, p. 127.

with the attitude of John Wesley, the contrast leaves Luther in the shadow.

It was not simply that, being a man of the age, he failed to anticipate the social message of Christianity as it has come to our age, but that he was blind to the great contemporary social movement of the Anabaptists—which he himself had done much to inspire—with its passion for social justice and opportunity. This is more than a practical defect; it involves the nature and scope of Christian faith and reveals Luther, with all his freedom and breadth, as hampered by a limited idea of the range and power of Christianity. In that he failed here, he failed as a theologian no less than as a man. For there is a social theology as well as a social gospel, and the two belong together.

Not that Luther's emphasis upon the individual is wrong. On the contrary, it has been of imperishable value. It only needed supplementing by the gospel of social righteousness to make it a truer kind of individualism.

In spite of Luther's pronounced individualism, it would be untrue to say that Protestantism, as a result of his influence, is committedly and exclusively individualistic and anti-social. To begin with, the Anabaptist movement was, as is now coming to be recognized, a genuine, though blundering, part of the Reformation itself—more so than Luther himself was prepared to admit. The appeal here is from Luther institutionalized to Luther free. If so marked a movement for social justice sprang from Luther's intrepidity, it is a reasonable inference that it had some vital connection with his courageous efforts in behalf of the submerged man. A protest for the rights of the individual against ecclesiastical tyranny needs only to be extended to become a protest against civil and industrial economic tyranny. How can the individual, in fact, be segregated from his fellows? The individual and the social messages of the gospel lie very close to one another and cannot be consistently severed. It was one of Luther's characteristics not to perceive the full implication of the truths that he propounded. But have not the great spirits ever "builded greater than they knew"?

Finally, we cannot overlook, among Luther's limitations as a theologian, the crass intolerance which he so often displayed. This

is at the root of that vituperative polemic of which we have spoken and shows how easy it is for a strong mind to pass from earnestness in defense of conviction to blind condemnation. Not only did he vilify Jews, Mohammedans, and papists, but many of the best of his fellow-Protestants. His conduct at the Marburg conference is typical of the dogmatism which runs through his treatment of all those who were not within his immediate circle. Stalwart loyalty to one's own convictions is one thing—and one of Luther's greatest virtues—but wilful refusal to consider the other man's honest conviction is another thing and throws suspicion upon the theologian who exhibits it. When the intrepid monk at the Diet of Worms refuses to retract, he wins our unqualified admiration; but when he maligns Zwingli and Erasmus and consigns Schwenckfeld to perdition, we cannot condone his narrowness. This intolerance is a serious defect in him, not only as a man, but as a theologian. Until theology becomes open and sensitive to truth from whatever quarter it cannot fulfil its true mission.

These impedimenta of Luther's theology, serious as they are, are, however, in part but the defects of his qualities, in part residual inconsistencies, survivals of his doctrinal inheritance and environment. They are the haltings and handicaps of a mind which had found a new and living way, but which was not critical enough to break wholly from the old order, nor constructive enough fully to organize and apply its own implicit findings. Unhappily there was no one to construct a Protestant theology great enough to embody and to carry forward the spirit of the Reformation. Melanchthon came the nearest to it, and Luther hailed him as the true theologian of the cause. But *loci* do not constitute a constructive theology, and great as were Melanchthon's services to the movement, he was not equal to the task of interpreting it. Calvin was a Christian jurist rather than a theologian and made theology serve the ends of the state rather than the ampler needs of the human mind and spirit.

It was not until Schleiermacher that the true Protestant theology appeared, and he left much to be done before the structure is complete.

VI

As we look back over Luther's theology, is there evident in it some real and distinctive advance over what preceded, some inclusive principle or doctrine which introduced a new era in Christian thought and entered into modern life with reconstructive effect? If so, what is it? Instinctively one feels the presence of something epochal and creative in Luther, but to seize and explicate it is not an easy matter.

At first it would seem to be that fresh realization of the meaning and power of faith which is so central in Luther's thought. And undoubtedly this is very near the heart of the matter. But, as we have seen, this is so thoroughly Pauline that it is hardly distinctively Protestant, except as we find its more specific form and application. In that this faith grounds in a mystical experience, Luther also reproduces Paul and the best of the mystics—in so far as for them this experience is directly connected with Christ.

The hitherto unequalled evaluation of the Bible as a book of religious experience might seem to be, as has often been claimed for it, the greatest and most distinctive of Luther's *principia*. Here again unquestionably is a principle of prime importance and one that has been a tower of strength to Protestantism. In Luther, one might almost say, Christianity came to full consciousness of the incomparable worth of its original literature. Unfortunately, as was the case with Augustine's idea of the Kingdom, Luther's higher evaluation of the Bible was too spiritual for the Christian world to grasp without degrading it. Thus, in part because of Luther's own failure to distinguish the husk from the kernel, it came about that the letter of the Bible became to a large degree a substitute for that very experience which alone could understand it.

It is of the utmost importance to the Protestant church that it should not lose hold of—or rather that it should recover—Luther's intimate sense of the worth of the Bible for life and should reinstate, in place of all external and mechanical evaluations of "scripture," the inner and experiential understanding of this true lover of the "Word of God." Not even the literary, nor the educational, appreciation of the Bible, important as each of these is in its place, will

yield its highest values. Nothing short of the key of experience will open its full meaning and values. Let Luther convince us of this, or we shall cease to be true Protestants.

With all due recognition and inclusion of these insights of Luther, the one most distinctive truth of the new era which he introduced—that which lifted it far above mediaevalism and all that had gone before and which has entered most forcibly into modern Christianity—is the great reformer's recognition of *the power of the gospel to hallow and transform life in all its instincts and activities*. In other words, Luther's chief insight was *the mission of faith in Christ to release and to reconstruct human life*.

This dynamic is in the New Testament because it is in Him "who is life indeed." It permeates the Fourth Gospel and the letters of Paul; but it failed to assert itself and expand because of the cramping conditions under which early Christianity was confined. It was present, at first, as the power of faith to *overcome* the world, not to *transform* it. When the new faith had intrenched itself and won acceptance by the Roman Empire, it had become so entangled with the problems of organization and government that it was unable to rise to the task of world-reconstruction. It needed to break wholly and finally from its self-imposed ecclesiasticism in order to come to a true realization of its own inner might and transforming grace. This occurred in Luther. To him and through him came into consciousness the sense of freedom and power of renewal that had lain dormant in Christianity, and he stood forth, another and greater Athanasius *contra mundum*, to reveal Christianity to itself as the power to redeem and to reconstruct life as a whole.

It is needless to give illustrations of the consciousness of a fresh chrism from God welling up in the soul of Luther. It appears in all its vigor and charm in those great tracts, *Christian Liberty* and the *Babylonish Captivity*, which sent the currents of a new life thrilling through Europe. There is something here that is not in *The Shepherd of Hermas*, or Justin's *Apology*, or Origen's *Principia*, or Augustine's *Confessions*, or Thomas' *Summa*, or Tauler's *Sermons*, or Bacon's *Novum Organum*. It is something deeper and fuller than the Renaissance could arouse. It is a religious, a Christian, a Protestant, note. It is New Testament faith once more—the

faith that had already overcome the world—but faith taking hold upon life in a new and prophetic manner, faith becoming conscious of its power to renew the life of the world. Before it “good works,” penances, propitiations, observances, all the familiar forms and fashions of institutional religion, shrivel like tinsel in the flame of the life-giving spirit. Once Luther had spoken, men looked up with open faces and saw Christ returning, with the words: “I am come that ye might have life and have it more abundantly.”

It is true the revelation was but partial. Faith was not great enough to lay hold of the renovation of the whole man and the whole social order. But the new heaven and the new earth were at hand, and men knew that a new day had dawned.

All too soon the fires of this new life of faith spent themselves in Luther. He lost hope and thought the world so full of wickedness that it would soon come to an end. He could not endure the vision of the transfiguring Christ. But the vision had come, the new song of redemption had been heard and could not be lost. Enough that he heard it once; humanity would hear it by and by—the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, faintly; the nineteenth and the twentieth, more clearly; and others that are to come, in its full harmony.

VII

This new consciousness of the larger meaning of faith in Christ, as it dawned on the soul of Luther, involved the truths that are most illuminating and releasing in modern theology. The limits of the paper forbid more than the mere mention of these.

It involved (1) *a new conception of the relation of God to humanity*. In Luther's mind, despite his incomplete break with tradition, God and man belong to each other. In his view, as Troeltsch has said, “belief in God belongs to the nature of man, and a special supernatural and supernal union with God are not needed.”¹

It involved, as Harnack pointed out, (2) *the death of dogma*.² For dogma is not consonant with a faith that feeds daily upon the Bread of Life. Not that Luther himself fully perceived this. As we have seen, even in his renunciation of dogma for experience he

¹ *Conversations*, p. 86.

² See Grisar, V, 432.

failed to see that the two cannot live in the same atmosphere, and he fell back continually upon the beggarly elements he had once left behind. Worse than this, the Lutheran theologians and the Lutheran church well-nigh lost all that was really great and distinctive in their founder's faith; yet it was bound to be recovered and come to its fulfilment.

The Reformation awakening involved, too, (3) *the universalizing of Christianity*. This distant horizon Luther himself could not see. The haze of ignorance that enveloped the age prevented. Other religions were but little known at this time. Mohammedanism was practically the only faith that Luther knew, outside of Christianity and Judaism, and that he regarded, as did all his contemporaries, as worthy only of cursing and contempt. They could not see that there are many other schoolmasters to Christ besides Judaism. The very idea of Christian missions was undreamed of. Yet it lay, like a seed, hidden in the experience that came to this rugged, human Everyman. This Christ whom, as Luther experienced, faith makes so real, so redeeming, so full of infinite possibilities to all who receive him, could not be confined to a fraction of the race. This that happened to Luther, and through him to humanity, was not done in a corner. His recovery of the gospel was in behalf of a world wider even than Christendom, though he did not realize it. To stand forth, as he did, before a hostile world with only "the right man on his side," "the man of God's own choosing," meant that the church was to come to the consciousness of its world-wide mission as the bearer of a faith too expansive to be bound by continents or oceans, languages or customs, centuries or cycles.

Did the awakening of Luther, and through him of Europe, to the larger meaning of Christianity involve ultimately, also, *a reunited church*? At first and for a long time it meant anything but that. It brought instead schism, strife, the Thirty Years' War, the Council of Trent, passions, parties, sects. Yet along with all this there came at least partial purification of the church, together with the emergence of the many-sidedness and wealth of Christian experience, ideas, and practices—developments essential to a complete Christian communion.

There is, moreover, at the heart of Luther's faith a principle, upon which we dwelt at the outset of the paper, which carries with it large hope of a reunited Christendom, i.e., its experiential, Christocentric character. If in place of creedal, dogmatic, historical, and governmental bases of unity the common bond of union shall come to be—as, in fact, it is coming more and more to be—*Christian experience* (however diverse in form) *centering in Christ*, surely we shall possess the foundation for a unity embracing both the solidarity of Catholicism and the freedom and individualism of Protestantism. When that union comes, the man who nailed the theses to the church door at Wittenberg, who wrote such vindications of the church of the spirit as *The Liberty of a Christian Man* and *The Babylonish Captivity of the Church*, and who aroused the world to the power and possibilities of Christian faith will be recognized—in spite of his own limited vision—as one of its chief founders and furtherers.

LUTHER'S RELATION TO LUTHERANISM AND THE AMERICAN LUTHERAN CHURCH

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An effect of his work which Luther had not foreseen was the rise of a church that was destined to bear his name. Such terms as "Lutheran," "Lutheranism," and "Lutheran church" were beginning to be used in Luther's time, but with an altogether different meaning from the one which they convey at present. In our day these words in the common speech of the people do not convey a reproach, or are meant as opprobrious terms in very rare instances. In Luther's days it was different; the terms had originated with the Catholic party and were used as terms of dishonor wherever the Roman Catholic church was confronted with the task of suppressing the new evangelical teachings. In the mouth of Catholics in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, France, and England "Lutheran" was equivalent to "heretic." In Roman Catholic circles the term has that meaning still, while in the world at large it has come to signify a religious party, a denomination, or a sect.

To Luther and his co-workers the idea was abhorrent that they were starting a new *Richtung* in theology, or founding a new church. The controverted question, which since the age of Protestantism has agitated the minds of many Protestants and, in fact, has divided Protestants into two opposing factions, to wit, whether the reformatory movement begun in the days of Luther was a return to old standards and a reassertion of the time-honored principles of Christianity or a quest for new standards and new liberal principles, still unknown and undefined to the searchers after them—this question did not exist in Luther's mind. Ever since the Leipzig debate with Eck, who probably coined the term "Lutheran," Luther consistently deprecated the use of his name in connection

with the evangelical principles which he and his friends had begun to champion.¹

In the confessional writings of the church that has been named after Luther the term "Lutheran" occurs in a solitary instance. Referring to a practice which had arisen among their opponents, the Protestant confessors at Augsburg said: "This blessed doctrine, the precious holy Gospel, they call Lutheran" (Apol. chap. viii, art. 12, No. 42, p. 225).²

¹ It is interesting to follow Luther's own references to the use of his name in connection with the reformatory movement. In the "Faithful Admonition to All Christians to Avoid Tumult and Rebellion," which he published during his exile at the Wartburg, January 19, 1522, he says: "I beg not to have my name mentioned, and to call people, not Lutheran, but Christian. What is Luther? The doctrine is not mine, nor have I been crucified for any one. St. Paul (I Cor. 3:4, 5) would not suffer Christians to be called after Paul or Peter, but only after Christ. Why should I—miserable piece of corruption that I am—have this honor that the children of Christ should be called after my abominable name? No, no, my dear friends; let us abolish party-names, and be called Christians after Christ, whose doctrine we have. . . . I share with the Church the one common doctrine of Christ who alone is our master. Matt. 23:8" (X, 370 f.). (All references to Luther's Works in this article are to the St. Louis edition of 1882-1910, the only complete edition—a revision and enlargement of Walch's—published in America.)

About the middle of March in the same year, after he had returned to Wittenberg to fight the iconoclasts under Carlstadt, Luther in a cordial letter to the noble Hartmuth von Kronberg, says: "We have to thank God with our whole heart because he still gives evidence that he will not suffer His holy Word to be removed, for He has given to you and many others a love for His Word and a spirit that avoids giving offense. This proves that these people do not believe on account of a man, but on account of the Word itself. Many there are who believe on my account; but those alone are sincere who adhere to the Word, even though they were to be told that I myself had denied or fallen away from the Word—which God forbid! These are the people that remain unconcerned, no matter what evil, horrible, abominable things they hear about me or my followers. For they do not believe in Luther, but in Christ Himself. The Word has laid hold of them, and they have laid hold of the Word. They disregard Luther; let him be a knave or a saint—God is able to speak through Balaam as well as through Isaiah, through Caiaphas as well as through St. Peter, yea, through an ass. These are my people. For I myself do not know Luther, and do not want to know him. Nor do I preach Luther, but Christ. The devil take Luther, if he can; but let him leave Christ in peace; then we shall also abide" (XV, 1670).

A month later Luther published his treatise: "Dr. Martin Luther's Opinion That the Sacrament Should Be Taken in Both Forms, and Other Innovations." He concludes the first part of his treatise with these words: "As Paul says, Gal. 1:8: 'Though we or an angel from heaven preach any other Gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed,' so say I, too, in the present case. In

(Footnote 1 continued on p. 514)

² All references to the Lutheran confessions in this article are to the People's Edition of the *Book of Concord*, Philadelphia, 1911.

There is a note of painful surprise, if not indignation, in these words. The men who, in the matter of their religious beliefs, had taken their stand by the side of Luther regard it as an injustice done to them that their creed is decried as Luther-made. They trace their spiritual parentage to another source: the gospel of the forgiveness of sin by grace, for Christ's sake, through faith. Luther has proclaimed this gospel to them, but by accepting it they have not obeyed Luther; Luther has been to them a guide to the saving truth, but he has not created that truth or faith in that truth.

This happened in the late summer of 1530. Being still under the imperial edict of outlawry, Luther did not attend the Diet of Augsburg. However, he was within easy reach at Castle Coburg, and his party at the Diet kept him closely informed regarding the

this and all other matters you must so firmly and surely build on the word of God that you would not depart from it, even if I should turn fool—which God forbid!—and should recant and deny my doctrine. In that event you must say: Though Luther himself or an angel from heaven should teach another doctrine, let it be accursed. For you must not be the disciple of Luther, but of Christ. It is not sufficient to say Luther, Peter, or Paul has said so, but you must feel Christ in your own heart, and you must be conscious, without faltering, that you have the Word of God, even though the whole world should fight against it. Until you feel thus, you surely have not yet tasted the Word of God. Your ears still cling to the mouth of a man, or to his pen; you have not yet embraced the Word with your inmost heart, and have not grasped the meaning of Matt. 23, 10: 'One is your Master, even Christ.' The Master teaches in the hearts of His disciples through the external word of His preachers, who convey it to the ear; but it is Christ who drives the Word home. Hence, consider that you are facing persecution and death. In those trials I cannot be with you, nor you with me. Every one must fight for himself, and overcome the devil, death, and the world. If in that emergency you were to look about to see where I am, or I, where you are, and were to surrender your faith because you were told that I or someone else had taught a different doctrine, you would perish; for you would have allowed the Word to slip out of your heart; you would not be found clinging to the Word, but to me or others. There would be no help for you" (XX, 73 f.).

To the friends of the Reformation at Miltenberg on the Main, who were suffering persecution for their faith, Luther wrote, in 1524, a consolatory letter, in which he says: "I do not like to see the doctrine and people called Lutheran, and must suffer to see God's Word sullied with my name" (V, 1283).

To his friends in the dominions of his greatest enemy among the German princes, Duke George of Saxony, Luther in 1528 wrote: "Luther himself purposes not to be Lutheran except as far as he purely teaches the Holy Scriptures" (XXI, 1093).

A year later Luther was compelled to issue against Duke George his treatise "Concerning Secret and Stolen Letters," to which he appended a brief exposition of the Seventh Psalm. The seventh verse in this psalm Luther applies directly to his

deliberations of that memorable meeting on affairs religious in the German Empire. Luther read the statement in the Apology and, we imagine, chuckled with delight. The statement, as we have seen, exactly expressed his own sentiments.

In 1537 the evangelical theologians were asked to draw up a statement of their teachings to be used as a basis of discussion at the Council of Trent. Luther wrote the statement—the Smalcald Articles—and inserted the following declaration: “It is of no consequence that articles of faith are framed from the works or words of the holy fathers. . . . We have another rule, to wit, that the Word of God should frame articles of faith; otherwise no one, not even an angel” (*Book of Concord*, p. 315).

When the Form of Concord, the last of the creedal declarations of the “Evangelicals,” was framed in 1580, the followers of Luther defined their relation to Luther in these terms:

We believe, teach, and confess that the only rule and standard according to which at once all dogmas and teachers should be esteemed and judged are

own work as a teacher in the church. Turning to God in prayer, he says: “Why, my hearty wish and prayer, my diligent teaching and writing, aim at nothing else than to see the poor masses of Thy people, who have been so miserably torn by sects and confused by dreams of men, scattered and straying like a flock of sheep, converted to Thee again, that by Thy Spirit they may know Thee in the true faith as their only Shepherd and Master and Bishop of their souls (Ezek. 34:23; I Pet. 2:25). And for their sake I still pray that Thou wouldest exalt and preserve Thyself and Thy Word through our ministry, in order that they may abide with Thee in the one faith. For I have not sought to have them cling to me, or that I should rise to honor or high station, but I have directed them to Thee, and made them cling to Thee, in order that Thou mightest be greatly exalted, and glorious and praiseworthy among them” (XIX, 542).

All these statements of Luther were well known to the Evangelical Estates at Augsburg, when they repudiated the charge that their religious convictions were founded upon the *ipse dixit* of one man.

A year after the Augsburg Diet, on Saturday after St. John's Day, July the first, 1531, Luther preached on the words of Christ in John 7:16: “The doctrine is not mine.” He said: “That is what I also say: The Gospel is not mine. Thus I distinguish my teaching from that of all other preachers who do not hold my doctrine. Accordingly, I can say: This is my doctrine—Luther's doctrine; and again: it is not my doctrine; it is not in my hand; it is the gift of God. Good Lord, I have not spun it out of my own head; it did not grow in my garden; it did not flow from my spring; it was not born of me. It is God's gift, not an invention of man. Thus both statements are correct: The doctrine is mine, and yet not mine. For it is of God, the Heavenly Father, and yet it is I that preach and maintain this doctrine” (VIII, 27).

nothing else than the prophetic and apostolic Scriptures of the Old and of the New Testament. . . . Other writings, of ancient or modern teachers, whatever reputation they may have, should not be regarded as of equal authority with the Holy Scriptures, but should altogether be subordinated to them, and should not be received other or further than as witnesses, in what manner and at what places, since the time of the apostles, the purer doctrine of the prophets and apostles were preserved.

The document proceeds to declare the loyalty of its authors to the three Ecumenical Creeds, to the Augsburg Confession with its Apology, and to the three Articles of Smalcald, and then mentions Luther's writings to the following effect: "We confessionally acknowledge the Small and Large Catechisms of Doctor Luther, as they are included in Luther's works, as the Bible of the laity, wherein everything is comprised which is treated at greater length in Holy Scripture, and is necessary that a Christian man know for his salvation" (*Book of Concord*, pp. 491 f.).

Lutheranism thus becomes attached to Luther only in a secondary sense: Luther is no authority to Lutherans except as far as he has reasserted the divine Word, which alone is the *norma normans* of the faith and practice of the Lutheran church.

In the terminology of old-school Protestant dogmatics, the roots of Lutheranism may be said to lie in soteriological and Christological soil. True, the pathetic experience of Luther during his monastic life is strongly reflected in the cardinal truths of Lutheran theology. However, Lutheranism is not on that account an accommodation to the peculiar views of Luther. It is not the universalization of the spiritual development of an individual. Luther's appeal to the gospel would not have seized men with such a powerful grip if Luther's experiences in his natural state under sin and the wrath of God were not the normal experiences of all men who are sincere with themselves. Luther's sensations of terror in view of the divine anger at sin, his feeling of despair because of the worthlessness of all human efforts to regain the lost favor of the offended Deity, of the utter incapacity of the human intellect by its own powers to grasp, and of the human will by its own powers to submit to, the evangelical plan of salvation, are the typical phenomena accompanying every earnest quest for genuine righteousness.

"This blessed doctrine . . . they call Lutheran"—better than they knew the Catholic critics of Lutheran teaching had with this censorious remark stated the origin and the leading characteristic of Lutheran teaching. Historically viewed, Lutheranism is the systematic and comprehensive answer to the agonized cry of the human heart: How can I pass muster at the bar of God's justice? It is the restatement and consistent application of the Bible teaching regarding "the grace which bringeth salvation" (Titus 2:11). It starts out with human sin and guilt as a necessary premise. In the Lutheran conception the term "sin" embraces estrangement from God, in whom sin is not and cannot be; furthermore, the retributive anger of God which is felt in the accusations of the sinner's conscience; lastly, as its ultimate dire effect, the certain prospect of perdition. Moreover, sin, to be fully stated, must not be represented merely as an act, but as an inveterate condition in the human heart. Sin in its true inwardness is viewed in Lutheran theology as a habitual proneness to evil and disinclination to good, that is, to what God regards so.

The pleasure of God regarding what is right and his displeasure with reference to things that are evil are declared to men in God's holy law. This law is to natural man the direct contradiction of what he is inclined to delight in or to shun. A person may be the brightest genius in every other respect, but, when face to face with the eternal principles of righteousness, he is ever found to be a scorner of God and unable to understand the justice of God's verdict, viz., that he cannot grasp the things which are of God. He may, like the Pharisees in the days of Christ, be a moral man in his own and other people's estimation and may angrily spurn the charge that he is contaminated in his innermost being, unfree in his moral actions, and unable to love God with all his heart and all his soul and all his strength, or his neighbor, without any stirring within him of self-interest. But when he denies these scriptural facts he merely proves the reality of what he denies: sin has so blinded and hardened him that his judgment is become crooked and his will perverse on every question that has a bearing on his standing with God. Lutheranism subscribes without reservation to the Pauline

assertion: "There is here no difference; for all have sinned and come short of the glory of God" (Rom. 3:22 f.).

At this point there enters in the saving element—grace. Lutheranism presents a plan of salvation which exhibits God himself as taking the first step toward a restoration of that relation which existed between himself and his foremost creature, man, in paradise. God, who abominates sin and has hurled his righteous curse at wrongdoers, of his own free determination makes overtures to fallen man, by which he desires to establish a union of love with man. "Grace" is that disposition in God which makes it possible for him to connect with the sinner. It is a peculiar manifestation of that goodness which God displays in many other ways; for instance, by his benevolent creation and by the numberless kind acts with which he governs the world. The grace of God brings God's goodness into touch with man, not in as far as he is man or in as far as he is puny man, but in as far as he is sinful man. Luther used to put it thus: By his grace God loves man *despite* man's sins, though he never loves man's sin. Out of this unlooked-for disposition of God toward the sinner springs the first thought and the possibility of salvation for man. God, not man, starts this business. God proposes to restore man, and does not wait for man to rehabilitate himself with God. The publication of this disposition on the part of God Scripture calls a "revelation" (Eph. 1:9). The record of this publication is the gospel.

With Luther, Lutheranism declines a view of saving grace and of the gospel that is totally at variance with the Scriptures. Grace is not to be viewed as something like the easy-going habit of an indulgent father, who is ever ready to condone the reckless vagaries of a wild son. Grace does not represent God as treating sin with indifference, with comparative complacency; it does not turn God into a doting old gentleman. Grace impels God to find a means for the sinner's restoration which leaves the claims which his justice has upon man, even in his fallen state, inviolate. This means was found in the person and work of the Redeemer, Jesus Christ. Saving grace, in the Lutheran view, is incorporated in the Savior. Basing on the declaration of Jesus: "No one cometh to the Father but by Me" (John 14:6), Lutheranism declares: There is no saving

grace for the sinner except such as he finds in Christ, the sole Mediator between God and man.

Because of his mediatorship the Redeemer had to be a strangely composite being: true God, begotten of the Father from eternity, and also true man, born of the Virgin Mary, in one undivided and indivisible person. Lutheran theology emphasizes the doctrine of the two natures in Christ and of the communication of the attributes, or properties, of either nature to the other.

As regards the work or mission of Christ, Lutheranism holds that the only adequate view to take of these is that all that Christ did or suffered he did and suffered as the representative of fallen man. Lutheranism is very clear and emphatic in teaching the doctrine of the vicarious atonement. It regards Christ as the Redeemer for this very reason that his works are substituted in the divine account for the works which man had failed to do; and his pains and death for the eternal torments which man had merited by his wrongdoing. The entire redemptive work was achieved by the God-man, each of his natures contributing toward the grand effect of man's reconciliation with God that which was peculiar to it.

The salvation which Jesus Christ wrought by his holy living and innocent death has been stamped with the divine approval by the resurrection of Christ. Luther made very much of the unmistakable emphasis which the New Testament places on the Easter miracle. He points, with Paul, to the resurrection of Christ as the foundation of the creed of the church, whose cornerstone is Christ. To Luther the rising of the Redeemer has afforded a wealth of comfort in his heroic struggles. To the mighty forces of the state and the official church of his day, which were arrayed against him, he declared: "There is a Mightier than you that is back of this movement." In hours of despondency his thought would turn with joy to the living Redeemer, and to remind himself of the fact that he was serving, not the dead champion of a lost cause, but the living Head of the Church, he wrote the word *Vivit* on his desk.

The completed work of reconciliation performed by Christ as the sinner's proxy must be appropriated, as regards its saving effects, by the sinner, for whom it was performed. To bring about this

appropriation, God has created the gospel for a conveyance of the justifying virtue of Christ's work to the sinner and the sinner's faith in the gospel as the means for receiving the entire redeeming virtue of Christ's active and passive obedience under the law of God. Lutheranism understands the term "gospel" when used in the strict sense as a doctrine that differs utterly from the law. The law states what demands God makes upon man; it holds out promises of reward for good conduct and threatens man with just punishment if he fails to do all that is written in the commandments of God. The gospel, on the other hand, states what God has done and is always bent upon doing in order to restore the sinner to a condition of righteousness in Christ, to reclaim him from the tyranny of sin, and to bring him ultimately into the life everlasting in a heaven full of joy and glory. The gospel lays down no conditions for the sinner to fulfil, but is a free, gratuitous offer of all that the sinner needs to be rid of sin and saved here and hereafter.

In Lutheran theology the gospel, in the strict sense, is not a historical narrative of the events in the life of Christ and the early church, nor is it the new law which Christ has laid down for the conduct of his people and the government of his Church, but it is a means of grace by which God seeks entrance into the hearts of men, causing them to understand his gracious purposes concerning them, to conceive a delight in such knowledge, to acquiesce in his declaration of peace, and to appropriate the work of Christ as their own, because rendered in their place. From the gospel there issue strong persuasive influences which attack the natural deadness, coldness, indifference of the sinner's heart over and against affairs of the soul and spiritual matters. The power of rescuing love is through the gospel exerted upon the human reason to make it grasp the divine logic of the plan of salvation which runs counter to all human logic, to overcome all its finely thought-out, reasonable scruples about the correctness, the validity, the ethics of this plan. This same power lays hold upon the human will, which is full of self-conceit and pride and stubbornly opposes the proposition that man can be saved only, like a beggar, by the mercy of God. It overcomes the reluctance, the diffidence, the doubts of the alarmed sinner, who imagines he is not worthy of such grace, and makes out of the unwilling, men joyously willing to accept the pardon of their Father in Heaven.

The promises of the gospel have been attached also to certain ordinances of Christ's appointment in which there is, besides the spoken word of grace, some visible element connected with the word. These ordinances—baptism and the Lord's Supper—are meant for the same purpose as the written or spoken word—they convey, confirm, and seal saving grace to the sinner. God seeks entrance into the human heart by every possible means of approach—through the eye, the ear, the touch, the taste. He makes multitudinous efforts to win the sinner's affection.

At no time, indeed, does God exert his irresistible power of majesty, compelling the sinner by main force to yield to his entreaties. This would be a self-contradiction, and would leave the sinner, convinced against his will, to be of the same opinion still. But there is a mighty moral suasion exerted through the gospel and the gospel ordinances. The sinner who comes under this influence feels that "the word of God is quick and powerful and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart" (Heb. 4:12).

This teaching—viz., that there is no saving grace without the means of grace—is the fruit of Luther's earnest theological labors in his many controversies with the theologians of Rome, especially Erasmus, and with the fanatics—the *Schwaermer*—of his day. It has given back to the world of sinners the old apostolic conception of what the gospel really is. In Lutheran teaching the gospel does not merely open up a possibility for the sinner to save himself, if he will try. It does not demand efforts to be put forth by the sinner; it does not ask that he must to a certain degree of intensity experience sorrow over sin, that he must pass through the agonies of remorse and contrition according to a certain method, and form the resolution to amend his conduct. It does not tell the sinner that only after he has done all these things he dare hope for mercy in God and take comfort in Christ. Lutheranism, with Paul, emphasizes the fact that Christ "died for the ungodly," that God sacrificed his Son for us "while we were yet sinners" (Rom. 5:6, 8). Gospel grace in Lutheran teaching is never conditioned grace; it is the simple announcement to the sinner that God is reconciled; it is the offer of a salvation that is already accomplished, not one

that must first be started by the sinner. In Lutheran preaching the call of grace is issued, not in this form: "If you are properly prepared by penitence, prayer, and holy resolves, and are thus ready, you may come," but thus: "Come; for all things are now ready." That means: come unconditionally; come just as you are!

The correctness of this teaching is verified by the common experience of all sinners on whom the grace of God has laid hold. They all describe the work of grace as a conquest, a victory, which the gracious influence of the gospel has gained over their unwilling and stubborn heart. "God came, God saw, God conquered; Jesus found me, Jesus picked me up, I followed. I know that I have passed from death to life, but how it all was accomplished, I cannot state in minute detail. It is a mystery of divine grace to me, but that this grace lies stored for every sinner in the means of grace, and that the spirit which regenerates the sinner comes to us only through the agency of the word of grace, I am certain"—this is the confession which expresses the Lutheran consciousness of the basic soteriological fact in the heart of the sinner whom grace has reclaimed.

Every student of history knows that a prominent feature in Luther's teaching of the way of salvation is faith. He stressed faith to the utmost, for instance, in his translation of Romans 3:28. What is meant by faith? Personal faith, the act of believing, occurs when the intellect grasps the message of salvation and credits it as truth and when the will accepts this message as designed for the individual sinner and acquiesces therein. Faith establishes for the individual that right relation to God which the gospel declares to have been established by the work of Christ for the entire world of men. By believing, each one of the redeemed appropriates for himself the merits procured by Christ. He knows that he is credited by God with all the holiness and innocence of Christ. He is righteous for Christ's sake; Christ's righteousness is reckoned as his own. It is like pronouncing a criminal "not guilty" in a court of justice. In scriptural parlance this is called justification. Justification is the primal and basic fact in personal Christianity. It represents the spiritual crisis in the sinner's life. It is the passing away of the old and the advent of the new. It

restores to the sinner a good conscience before God. The justified sinner faces God with no dread of his displeasure; on the contrary, he knows that God is pleased with him. He is become the child of God through the adoption of grace. He enjoys a child's privileges with God; he communes with him, speaks to him, and is answered. He is installed as heir of God and co-heir with Jesus Christ. The distant future, his fate after death, death itself and the grave, and the final judgment hold no terrors for him.

An effect of this, which in point of time coincides with justification, is a moral change that comes over the powers of the soul. God and all things divine have now become lovable objects to the sinner, who before hated them. His judgment on the value of things is changed, completely reversed. He feels new impulses impelling him to action and gladly follows them. Life has assumed a new meaning to him; it is become a grand opportunity for service to the Redeemer-God according to his expressed will. Christ himself is become a living reality in the person's existence; and Christ's word and example the principle that determines his likes and dislikes, his every action. This life, too, is nothing else than the same faith which at first grasped the pardoning hand of God and always holds that hand. It is manifested in a thousand forms in the routine of man's daily tasks. It determines every view of duty; it prompts every holy, generous, charitable resolve; it develops a prolific activity along the line of everything that is true, everything that is honest, everything that is just, everything that is pure, everything that is lovely, everything that is of good report, everything virtuous and praiseworthy (Phil. 4:8).

Here, in the faith which day by day and hour by hour lays hold of the redemption by Christ and which fills the commonest actions of believers with a spirit of gratitude and love, lie the mainsprings of true morality, as Lutheranism views the matter. The victory which this faith gained over the world in the days of the apostles Lutheranism proposes to repeat. This conquering faith changes the face of human affairs in the twentieth century as it did in the first. Its silent influences go out to all ranks and occupations of men. In its outward aspect it still bears the image of its despised master. The pride of reason and self-consciousness scorn it.

Because of the visible forms in which this faith is exhibited in much weakness, short-sighted men again and again assert its decadence. But it proceeds quietly, unostentatiously, with its work of reforming, remolding, re-creating, men. It possesses perennial youth, immortal vitality, unconquerable strength.

It is one of the curious evolutions of history that as a name embodying a confession of religious principles the name of Martin Luther has come to be more honored in America than in the Reformer's home land. Since 1748, the year when the Ministerium of Pennsylvania was organized, there have come into existence in the United States and Canada sixty-five synodical bodies—all but thirteen of them federated in four larger bodies—which subscribe to the confessional writings of the church that submitted its first public statement of doctrine and church polity to Emperor Charles the Fifth at the Diet of Augsburg in 1530. The ministers, teachers, and professors in all these bodies, on taking office, are required to declare that they will regulate their teaching and practice by the principles laid down in the Augsburg Confession. By far the greater majority of them accept also the later confessional writings of the Lutheran church incorporated in the *Book of Concord* of 1580. In all primary and secondary schools, in the Sunday schools, and in the homes of church members in these bodies Luther's *Small Catechism* is taught. Knowledge of this little compend of Bible doctrine is a requisite for membership in all these bodies. Last, but not least, all these bodies have perpetuated Luther's name in their official titles—they are all called Evangelical Lutheran.

In Germany the term "Lutheran" as the official title of the church became taboo in 1817. This was in deference to a pet notion of King Frederick William III of Prussia. It was a strange contribution which the king and his Prussian consistory made to the celebration of the tercentenary of the Lutheran Reformation, when by royal edict of September 27th of that year the union of the Reformed and Lutheran churches in Prussia into one Evangelical church was announced, and the time-honored term "Lutheran" was dropped from the official title of the church. The governments of Baden, Nassau, Waldeck, and Rhenish Bavaria adopted for their countries the same policy as the Prussian authorities.

The Prussian decree did not, indeed, prohibit Lutheran teaching. Luther's *Small Catechism*, for instance, was retained in the primary schools of the state. But exclusive and distinctive Lutheran teaching was placed at a great disadvantage, and strict Lutheran confessionalism was depreciated, the Lutheran church being forced into an artificial union with the Reformed church. For that is all that the royal order effected—it declared a union without creating it. It brought together the indifferent on either side, both among the clergy and the laity—men for whom doctrinal differences constituted no grave scruples, who placed the temporal interests of the body politic above the spiritual interests of the body of Christ, and were so shortsighted as not to see that true religiousness, genuine active faith, can never spring into existence at the behest of the secular authority and cannot be stimulated by human devices, no matter with what degree of enthusiasm and specious spirituality they may be offered.

The Prussian decree, unwise in its origin, became plainly harmful in its operation. Lutheran individualism and separateness were being severely frowned upon in high places. When that did not suffice to put Lutherans out of countenance, annoying restrictions were placed on Lutheran pastors who were unwilling, for conscience' sake, to surrender their confessional position in doctrine to the centralizing scheme of the government—their official activity was placed under police surveillance. Ultimately, even imprisonment and banishment were applied to these Lutheran non-conformists. Faithful Lutherans in those days emigrated to America in considerable numbers and founded Lutheran synods in this country. Conditions in Germany became more favorable to the Lutherans during the administration of Frederick William IV, and the Lutheran church now exists in Germany in a number of "free churches," independent of state control. In 1868 the large and influential General Lutheran Conference was organized at Leipzig. Moreover, there are pastors in the Evangelical state church who openly teach Lutheran doctrine. But the old prestige of the Lutheran name seems to be gone. Many nominal Lutherans, too, are known to make undue concessions to the non-Lutheran elements, especially at the German universities.

The events recounted naturally have had an influence on the Lutheran church in America. They explain, in a measure, why the name "Lutheran" has fared better here. Under the liberal institutions of the North American republic Lutheran consciousness has been free to exert itself. The earliest Lutheran settlers in America, indeed, did not come from Prussia—those who settled on the Island of Manhattan in 1623 came from Holland. The Lutheran colonists along the Delaware (1638 and later) were Swedes. The earliest Lutheran preaching in America was chiefly in the Dutch and Swedish languages and only occasionally in the German. Nor had these earliest Lutherans come to America because of restrictive measures that were adopted against them in their native countries, except, to some extent, the Dutch, with whose church activity the government at Amsterdam had occasionally interfered. However, the emigrants from parts of Germany, even from parts where the Lutheran church as such was still legally recognized, had tasted the bitter cup of persecution even before 1817. The Lutheran settlers in the states of New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Carolinas (after 1683) were Palatines fleeing from the ravages to which they had been exposed at home during the wars of the French. The Lutherans who were given a domicile near Savannah, Georgia, by Oglethorpe in 1731 were German Austrians from the Tyrol (Salzburg), who had been driven from their homes by the Catholic archbishop Firmian. Lutheran consciousness naturally had been rendered more intense in all those settlers whom persecution in their native countries had brought to our shores, both before and after 1817.

Another reason why the name "Lutheran" has been more loyally maintained in the New World than in the Old is because, as was partly indicated in the foregoing, the American Lutheran church has recruited her original membership from among the emigrants of other countries besides Germany. Large Scandinavian Lutheran bodies have grown up in the United States—Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish. Besides, Lutheran synods have been organized in America by former subjects of the Russian Empire, now Republic—German Russians from the Baltic provinces and southern Russia, Finns, Poles, Esthonians, Letts,

Lithuanians. Also the Austrian Empire has contributed to the up-building of the American Lutheran church—besides the contingent noted before there is in the United States a Lutheran Slovak synod and there are Hungarian Lutherans. In all these countries the Lutheran church has been for centuries an officially recognized body. In the Scandinavian countries it is the state church. The same is true of certain parts of Germany, such as Württemberg, Franconia, Saxony, Hannover, Mecklenburg, and Schleswig-Holstein, which were not affected by the edict of the Prussian king.

The body of Christians in America who are known as Lutherans can be said, upon the whole, to be sincerely and intelligently devoted to the principles for which Luther and his associates stood four hundred years ago. There have been periods in the history of the American Lutheran church when rationalism threatened to become dominant in it, and other periods when pietism seemed to hold sway. There have also been sad defections from the Lutheran standards by individual Lutherans and by Lutheran congregations in America; the early Lutheran Swedes have to a large extent been absorbed by the Episcopal church; in the early part of the nineteenth century the revivalism which swept the country at that time carried Lutherans into the Methodist churches, and, in general, a tendency to adapt Lutheran teaching to the tenets of the large and influential Protestant churches in America was developed in the oldest general body of the Lutheran church. This movement at one time assumed formidable proportions, although it operated with a gross misunderstanding of Lutheran teaching and was guilty of a plain self-contradiction; it denounced the binding authority of the Lutheran confessions and at the same time framed a declaration of principles that was to serve as the creed of the new party. It denounced true evangelical doctrines because of their seeming similarity to the Roman Catholic tenets. But the movement was short-lived. The Lutherans in America can be credited with having realized, even in periods of apparent retrogression, the importance of the fundamental principles of the Reformation—salvation by grace through faith in Christ and the inspired Word of God as the sole norm and authority in all matters pertaining to the teaching and practice of the church.

The cosmopolitan character and the splendid vitality of the Lutheran church has been exhibited by the wise methods which have been adopted by American Lutherans for the propagation of the Lutheran church under conditions that differed considerably from those prevailing in Europe. There has also grown up a distinctively American Lutheran literature that is increasing with the advancing years. The one grievous problem which has vexed the American Lutheran church repeatedly—the so-called language question—is being solved with commendable skill and in a spirit of conservatism, both in the German and the Scandinavian sections of the Lutheran church in America. The American-born generations of Lutherans naturally grow away from the languages of their immigrant ancestors, and thus the native English of America is being readily adopted in the public worship of congregations that formally were German, Swedish, Norwegian, etc. The only concern of loyal Lutherans in America is to carry over through these transition periods into the new era the heritage of the old historic faith proclaimed for the first time in systematic form in Augsburg in 1530.

LUTHER'S DOCTRINE OF GOOD WORKS

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I

It scarcely needs to be stated that Luther preserved and perpetuated in the system which bears his name much that continues to be the common heritage of nearly all who wear the Christian name. He was temperamentally a conservative, and every step of progress away from the ancient traditional positions was taken with labor and pain. A new position, once gained and firmly held, became the basis for a new conservatism, from which he could be driven only by the overwhelming logic of events. His conscious principle of reform was the preservation of all which the Scriptures did not require him to give up. Theologically he continued to stand upon the ecumenical creeds, though the elimination of the special priesthood and other means of mediating grace doubtless brought God much nearer to the consciousness of men. Knowledge of God became approximately immediate; communion between the soul and God much easier and more intimate. One of the most striking features of Protestantism is the gradual disappearance from the Christian consciousness, not only of the work of the sacraments as vehicles of grace and of the saints as mediators between God and men, but also of the angels. The angelology of Protestantism has almost disappeared from ordinary Christian consciousness, mainly because of an increasing sense of the nearness of God. The need of angels is no longer felt.

In estimating Luther's work we must not forget that he was himself a Catholic and sprang from the bosom of the common people. He was reared in the Catholic church, and from his earliest childhood knew the thoughts and feelings, the fears and hopes, the weaknesses and strengths, of the Catholic religion. He afterward entered a monastery and studied theology; there he

learned the theoretical and formal side of Catholicism, but he never lost touch with the people. It was this full and intimate knowledge of the religious life of the common people which enabled him to speak with such compelling power to the German nation. Now, in many of his writings, as in his sermons, he has in mind the masses of the German people rather than the authentic statements of Catholic theology as formulated by the scholars and councils of the church. His "divine brutality" was his effective method of reaching the heart and life of the common German man.

It was doubtless this characteristic of Luther's work which made it possible for Catholic theologians to charge that he misrepresented the church. He did not misrepresent or misinterpret the popular religion of his time, however much he may have failed to do justice to the carefully guarded statements later formulated by the Fathers at Trent. The fact is that Catholic theology, in some of its most distinctive and characteristic features, had never been formulated when he began his attack. Catholic thought was still somewhat fluid, and the statements of representative doctors of the church were not entirely consistent with themselves or with each other. From the Catholic standpoint it was the great honor and service of the Council of Trent that it was able to bring order out of this chaos and to crystallize the average Catholic thinking into a consistent system. Luther's polemic is not against the carefully articulated and guarded system of Trent, but against Catholicism as it was actually lived in Germany in his day, especially in his beloved electoral Saxony. The Tridentine Creed was drawn against Luther and the Augsburg Confession, and not the reverse. Lutheranism was systematized and formulated before Catholicism.

Now, the point where the two systems touch the life of the mass of men was not in their formal theology, or their philosophical basis, or their view of the church, or the position of the pope. These were questions for the theologians, more or less remote from the life and thought of the people. The point where the people were touched was in worship and the so-called "good works."

The essential factors in the process of salvation, according to Catholic thought, were the sacraments. These seven ceremonies, six of which were ordinarily administered to all Catholics who

reached adult years, were regarded as the indispensable vehicles of grace. In them grace was conveyed to the needy soul, as in vessels, by the mediating power of the priesthood and episcopate conferred in ordination. Without at least some of these sacraments salvation was ordinarily impossible. But, while they were necessary to salvation, these sacraments did not complete the saving process. They could be and ordinarily were supplemented by various other means of grace. These were almost numberless. Among them "good works" held a conspicuous place. The kinds of "good works" were multitudinous. They were mainly certain obligations imposed by the church and were destitute of any element of service to mankind. They consisted of prayers, pilgrimages, the founding of churches and altars, fasting, alms-giving, etc. To be of value they must have the sanction and authority of the church. The ordinary affairs of life and the ordinary services of philanthropy, dictated by the impulse of a Christian heart, were regarded as of minor importance and scarcely to be classified as good works. All life was classified into the sacred and the secular, only the former having any real value for the Christian life.

Moreover, "good works" were imposed by the church in the spirit of barter. They did not spring from the impulse to serve or the dynamic of love and faith. They were not the fruit of the Christian life, but the cost price of the grace that was being purchased from a somewhat unwilling God. This God cared more for the "good works" done than for the character of the doer. According to Luther, men who were utter hypocrites, guilty of many and gross sins, thought to buy the forgiveness and grace of God by the performance of these ecclesiastical "good works." Character became a minor consideration, religion was being entirely externalized, Christian faith and Christian experience scarcely existed. Men trusted in the great institution of the church as the purveyor of grace through its divinely endowed priesthood, its sacraments, its "good works," etc. In considering Luther's view of "good works" we must keep steadily in mind that "good works" needed a new definition as well as a new location in the Christian life. On both these questions Luther worked, especially in the earlier part of his reformatory career.

He enlarged the meaning of the term "good works" to include practically all the actions of life, when these are performed in the religious spirit. In his *Sermon von den guten Werken*, for example, he arranges in groups according to the Ten Commandments many things which were not ordinarily called "good works" at all. He regards abstention from evil as a good work as much as the positive performance of good. His opponents claimed that the abolition of the ecclesiastical "good works," as the reformers insisted, would leave nothing that the Christian could do to earn grace. He replies by showing that a multitude of good works would be left when "good works" were rightly understood. Not those things only which are done in the church and at the church's command are good works, but also the ordinary affairs of life may please God.

Moreover, he insisted that the good works which are recognized as such are good only when they serve some good purpose. For example, the number of holy days should be reduced, he believed, "since their works in our times are usually worse than those of the work days, with lounging, stuffing and drinking, gambling and other wicked deeds." He reveals the utter mechanical and external character of the mass by saying that it had come to such a pass that "one thinks enough has been done if we have seen the mass with the eyes, heard the preaching with the ears, and spoken the prayer with the mouth. We think not that we receive something from the mass in the heart, learn and retain something from the preaching, seek, desire, and expect something with the prayer." Against this naked formalism, this external view of these religious exercises, which makes them into magic, Luther protested with all possible decision and earnestness.

He declared that it was necessary to have the heart in the mass by faith; that the mass is valuable only when faith sees in it the seal and assurance of the forgiveness of sins.

Preaching is almost entirely neglected or dissipated in fables concerning the saints; but "where preaching is rightly done, there it is necessary that one hear the same with diligence, comprehend, retain, and often recall, and so strengthen faith against all attacks of sins, whether past, present, or future."

Prayer is a good work, but not when it is the mere repetition of words for their own sake. "One should pray, not as the custom is, to count many leaves or grains, but one should take up some pressing need and desire the same with deep earnestness, and exercise faith and assurance toward God so that we doubt not that we shall be heard." All churches and cloisters are full of praying and singing, but it brings no improvement. The reason is the absence of faith and trust. True prayer must be based upon personal faith and trust. One must believe that God will grant his petitions and must set no bounds to God's purpose or power. One must trust his goodness and grace and not be deterred by his own sinfulness or unimportance. Many pray in such a slovenly way that they cannot tell what they have prayed for when it is over. They think only of completing the prescribed words, believing that they have pleased God with this mummary.

Luther classifies faith (*Glaube*) as a good work, the highest good work, standing somewhat apart from and above all other good works and giving them significance and validity. "There are no good works other than those God has commanded, just as there are no sins except what God has forbidden. Therefore he who wishes to know and do good works, needs only to know God's commands." Now, faith in him is God's first and supreme command. Therefore "the first and highest, the noblest, good work is faith in Christ." It irradiates and transforms into "good works" the ordinary duties of life—"walking, standing, eating, drinking, sleeping, and all kinds of works done for the nourishment and ordinary needs of the body." By this conception Luther rendered two great services to the Christian world: he destroyed the basis for the division of life into the religious and the secular, and at the same time he destroyed the foundation on which rested the great claims which the church asserted over the destinies of the soul, while he lifted the affairs of ordinary life into the position of sacred things. All life was unified on the religious basis, and common things were crowned with a glory which flows from the Father's interest and care. Nothing more contradicts the essential spirit of Christianity than the age-long division of life into the secular, concerning which God has no care, and the sacred, which is the only part of life that

pleases him. Outside of the monasteries and the priesthood most of life, according to this conception, was secular, common, religiously worthless. Purity, faithfulness, loyalty in the common affairs of the life of man—some of the highest qualities of soul that can be developed—had no opportunity outside ecclesiastical relations. The life of the layman and the woman who fulfilled God's purpose in her creation by becoming a mother and a homemaker was inevitably secular. This weighed upon the conscience of pious people, depressing the standards of daily living. It is a great merit of Luther that he saw clearly and stated powerfully "the sacredness of the secular." He wiped out double standards of living by making all worthy living religious and well-pleasing to God. Holy places, holy days, holy seasons, holy actions, all prescribed by the church, ceased to exist, and all life was lifted to a higher plane. Even the "religious life," while theoretically and by comparison lowered, was, after a period of readjustment, greatly improved. The transformation of the inner life quickly bore fruit in the outward living.

II

But Luther had not solved all the problems connected with good works when he redefined them, enlarged their conception, and placed them on a basis of faith and service. If the Catholic theory and practice were wrong, what was right? What place do good works properly occupy in a right system of theology? What is the true Christian motive for good works? If they are not valuable articles to use in barter with God, what are they and why trouble one's self about them? These and other troublesome questions arose as soon as Luther began the constructive portion of his work. He was mighty in the work of destruction. Could we expect him to be equally great in the constructive part of his program?

These questions are constantly recurring in his preaching and in many of his other reformatory writings; but the clearest and most satisfactory treatment is in the early tract, "*Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen*," published in 1520. This tract is perhaps the greatest of Luther's writings, certainly one of the most beautiful and calm of all his works. There is nothing of storm and

vituperation, but a calm consideration of the essence of the Christian religion.

Luther lays down at the beginning these two apparently contradictory propositions as the foundation of what he has to say on the essential elements of the Christian life: "A Christian man is a free lord (*Herr*) over all things and subject to no man"; "A Christian man is a slave of all things and subject to every man." Under the first he sets forth the essential freedom of the Christian man in Christ Jesus from all external material things, and in the second he urges the attitude and obligation of service to all men and of subjection of one's own body.

To support his contention that a Christian man is a free lord over all *things* and subject to no *man*, he maintains the complete dualism of man's nature. He has two natures—"a spiritual and a bodily. According to the soul he is called a spiritual, new, inner (*innerlicher*) man; according to the flesh and blood he is called a bodily, old, outer (*äuserlicher*) man. And because of this distinction words are spoken of him in Scripture which are absolutely contradictory, as I have just spoken of the freedom and servitude."

When we consider the inner spiritual man, it is evident

that no external thing can make him free or pious, whatever it may be called, because his piety and freedom, as well as his wickedness and servitude, are not bodily or external. What does it help the soul that the body is free, fresh, and well, eats, drinks, lives as it will? On the other hand, how can it injure the soul for the body to be imprisoned, sick and weary, hungry, thirsty, suffering as it would not willingly do? No one of these things reaches the soul to free or imprison it, to make it pious or wicked.

These sentences state succinctly the essence of his contention for the freedom of a Christian man from the necessity of doing the host of "good works" which the church was accustomed to prescribe and insist on as necessary to salvation. "Good works" cannot affect the destiny of the soul, because it is in another realm of existence. It is by the very nature of its existence free from all such external things. Such was his contention in brief. This he elaborated: "It helps the soul not at all, if the body puts on holy garments, as the priests and clergy (*Geistlichen*) do; also not if it [the body] be in the churches and holy places; also not if it occupies

itself with holy things; also not if it in a bodily way prays, fasts, goes on pilgrimage, and does all manner of good works which might be done through and in the body forever." A wicked man and a hypocrite may do all these things; indeed, the whole tendency of such things is to produce hypocrites. Neither does it injure the soul for the body to wear unholy clothing, be in unholy places, eat, drink, and leave undone all the foregoing "good works."

The needs of the soul are entirely different. Really but one thing is necessary to its welfare; all else it can forego. That one thing is the word of God, "the holy gospel, the word of God preached by Christ." "The soul can dispense with everything except the word of God, and without the word of God it can be helped by nothing. When, however, it has that word, it needs nothing else but has in the word enough: food, joy, peace, light, art (*Kunst*), righteousness, truth, wisdom, freedom, and all good in superabundance." By the "word" Luther does not mean, of course, the Bible in any external way. He handled the Bible very freely, disparaging some portions and exalting others. He looked at the book broadly as the revelation of God to men and used it for its great moral and spiritual message to the souls of men. To him that message was the message of God, the commands were the commands of God, and the promises were the promises of God. The trustworthy message of God to men was not in the church as the experience of the individual Christian, but in the Bible, sanely and broadly interpreted. He was entirely free from the painful literalism and the mechanical views that characterized some of his contemporaries and even his own followers of a later period. The word of God as it is found in Jesus and Paul—that was the soul's one necessity in the view of Luther.

This view swept away, not only the Catholic doctrine of "good works," but also the supposed powers of the priesthood and the magical working of the whole sacramental system. If the "word" is the only indispensable need of the soul, all outward appliances lose their essential value, retaining only a relative worth. This is clearly the necessary conclusion, even with regard to baptism and the Eucharist, but, as we shall see later, Luther shrank from the ultimate logic of his own position.

If this be true, what becomes of the priest and the ministers of religion? Have they any function left? The Catholic church claimed to clothe them with wonderful divine powers which enabled them to confer salvation in the sacraments, to absolve the penitent of his sins, to confer additional grace, to shorten the pains of purgatory—in short, to bind and to loose on earth so surely and firmly as to bind and loose in heaven. What becomes of all this power? To Luther it was all pretense, without substance or reality. The “word” was the only real need of the soul, and therefore the only real function of the minister of religion was the proclamation of the word, the gospel. “Christ came for no other office than to preach God’s word. Also all apostles, bishops, priests, and other clergy were called and inducted into office for the sake of the word, although it is sadly otherwise now.” Luther’s doctrine of the “word” automatically abolished sacramental salvation and priestly mediation.

Now, this “word” is to be received by faith, implicitly, as the word of God. One must feel that God is speaking and receive the message as God’s message. “It ought surely to be the single work and exercise of all Christians that they form that word and Christ in themselves, steadily exercise and strengthen such faith. . . . Faith, in which all commandments are fulfilled in brief, will superabundantly justify all who have it so that they need nothing else to be righteous and pious. . . . Faith without any works makes one free and blessed.”

But if faith is the sole ground of piety and salvation, why are there so many commandments in the Bible? The whole of the Word is divided into commandments and promises. Are these related to each other in a causal or other way? If good works have no relation to salvation, why are they so constantly and strenuously commanded? Such questions as these at once arose to oppose the Lutheran view. Luther’s answer was ready. The commandments, all found in the Old Testament, were given to humble men, to bring them to a sense of their need, in fact, their impotence. They command right things, but they help not at all because they do not confer the power to perform the good works commanded. Man sees that he is lost, damned, if his salvation depends

upon the full performance of God's commands as revealed in the Bible.

Then come the promises. They say, if you would be free from your sins, your wicked desires, as the commandments demand of you:

Believe on Christ in whom I [God] promise thee all grace, righteousness, peace, and freedom; if thou believest, thou hast; if thou believest not, thou hast not. For what is impossible to thee with all the works of the commandments—of which there are many and none helps—that comes to thee easily and quickly (*kurz*) through faith. For I have briefly (*kurz*) placed in faith all things, so that he that has it shall have all things and be saved; he that has it not shall have nothing. Thus the promises of God give what the commandments of God demand, and fulfill what the commandments enjoin, so that it is all God's own, command and fulfilment. He alone enjoins and he alone fulfills.

The place of the commandments is, therefore, an important one in the religious life. But they are incapable of giving life and were never designed for that purpose. Good works cannot reach the soul, and, since the commandments only enjoin good works, they cannot reach the soul. Moreover, if they could give life, there is neither disposition nor ability to perform them. Therefore the commandments were never designed to give life.

No good work depends on the divine word as faith does, nor can it be in the soul, but only the word and faith rule in the soul. As the word is, so does the soul become. . . . So we see that in faith the Christian man has enough; he needs no work to become pious. Then, if he needs no work more, he is certainly released from all commandments and laws. If he is released, he is free. That is Christian freedom.

But does freedom mean freedom to be idle in the kingdom of God—freedom to do nothing? Does it mean freedom to live wickedly? If we are free from the necessity of good works as a means of salvation, does there remain any motive, or at least any adequate motive, for good works? Here was a vital question for Luther and for Protestantism generally. Paul had faced the same question. "Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound? God forbid. How can we that are dead to sin continue any longer therein?" There is the great conflict between the ideal and the actual. "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and do what you will," ought to be an actual working principle in Christianity, because

faith in Christ ought to cast out all evil desire. Like Paul, Luther was compelled to face the question, and, like Paul, he did it boldly.

We are not free that we may live in idleness or do evil. Faith will keep us from that. For "if the soul firmly believes God's word, it regards him as trustworthy, gracious, and righteous, thereby giving him the highest honor that is possible." By faith the soul becomes

like the divine word, full of all graces, free and blessed, and the soul is also united with Christ as a bride with a bridegroom. From this marriage, as Paul says, Christ and the soul become one body; the goods, incidents, and accidents, and all things become common to both; what Christ has also belongs to the believing soul, what the soul has becomes Christ's. Since Christ has all goods and blessedness, they are also the possessions of the soul. If the soul has all weakness and sins, they become Christ's.

Since Christ is both God and man, himself the sinless one, the sins which he has taken upon himself from the believer in the intimate union with the believer which faith has established—those sins are swallowed up and disappear forever for the believer. The will and commandments of God have thus been fulfilled by faith before the performance of any good works. "The fulfilment *before* all works must be accomplished through faith, and the works follow *after* the fulfilment."

But Luther felt that it was necessary to remind his readers that this freedom from, and lordship over, all things was spiritual. It did not involve possession and use, as men just liberated from religious and economic thralldom might naturally and unwisely conclude. The distance between freedom and anarchy is not great, and the road is easily traveled by a social order which is just making acquaintance with freedom. Less than five years after the appearance of this pamphlet on the "Freedom of a Christian Man" the peasants of southwestern Germany, almost certainly inspired by Luther's teachings, broke into open revolt, a revolution that was drowned in blood. Luther may have already felt some presentiment of this danger. Hence he warns that Christian freedom and lordship over things do not involve possession.

This is a spiritual lordship which reigns in bodily repression, that is, I can better myself in everything in regard to the soul, that even death and

suffering must serve me and be useful for salvation. That is indeed a high, honorable dignity and a truly almighty lordship, a spiritual kingdom, since nothing is so good or so bad but that it must serve me for good, if I believe; and yet I do not need it, but my faith is sufficient for me. Behold, what a precious freedom and power of the Christians!

So much for the freedom of the inner spiritual man. He is free from all things and subject to no man, free in Christ, made free by faith which unites him to Christ, who is the free and almighty Son of God. If we were only inner spiritual men, this would be the whole of the Christian life. But we are also outward bodily men. Therefore we are servants and subject to every man. Where we are free, we need to do nothing; where we are servants, we must do all sorts of things.

Man continues in this bodily life on earth and must rule his own body and associate with people. Now, at this point the works begin; here man must not go idle; here the body must truly be driven and exercised with fasts, vigils, labors, and with all sorts of discreet discipline, that it may become obedient and conformed to the inner man and the faith, not hinder or oppose as his manner is where it is not under compulsion. For the inner man is one with God, joyous and happy for Christ's sake, that he might also in turn serve God without compensation in free love; then he finds in his flesh an opposing will, which is determined to serve the world and seek what pleases him. Faith may not tolerate this and lays itself out to quell and ward it off.

But in taking up good works we must not forget that they are not done to please God or to promote piety. Only faith is necessary to put us right with God. To perform good works for this purpose is to misuse them and make hypocrites of ourselves. They are done only as a means of bringing the body into harmony with the inner spiritual man, who is already in harmony with God through faith in Christ—"only in the meaning that the body may become obedient and be purified of its wicked desires, and that the eye may look on wicked desires only to cast them out." So it comes about that the Christian must not be idle, but must perform many good works in order to cleanse his body and make it obedient to the will of the soul. "Therefore he fasts, watches, works, as much as he sees is necessary for the body, to bring his rebellious will into subjection." Works are a sort of chastisement for the body. He must be a genuine Christian before the good works,

otherwise all his works are mere foolishness, since they cannot make him pious or pleasing to God. "The person must always be good and pious before all good works, and good works follow and go out from the pious and good person."

The other reason for good works is found in the needs of men with whom we live. We cannot and do not live alone. We must speak and associate with others. Numberless opportunities for service in multitudinous forms come to us. This service we should render, not in the belief that such good works will make us pious or more pleasing to God, but solely out of love for our fellows and desire to serve them. Their good must be the test, not our hope of larger grace or piety earned by the service.

Summing up now in a few words Luther's early doctrine of "good works" we find it to have the following points:

1. "Good works" are redefined. They are only such things as God has commanded, not such as may be imposed by the church, apart from God's command.

2. They are enlarged to include the ordinary affairs of life when performed in a religious spirit, thus abolishing the double standard as between clergy and laity, between sacred and secular. All time, all places, all actions can be regarded as sacred when shot through with the religious spirit.

3. Faith is the spiritual element which gives significance to all good works. Without faith they are self-deception, blasphemy, an abomination before God, multiplying condemnation to the user.

4. It is faith alone that puts us into right relations with God, faith alone makes piety. Good works cannot produce piety or make us more pleasing to God. Faith and trust in him as revealed in his word is the highest honor we can pay him. Good works can add nothing to this. As spiritual men, we are entirely free from all outward things, lord over them, and subject to no man.

5. But we are also in the body and in this relation we need to pursue good works with diligence and zeal. Many good works, such as fasting, watching, laboring, etc., are for the purpose of chastising the body and keeping it in subjection to the soul, already renewed by faith and now in harmonious communion with God in Christ

Jesus. The second reason for good works is the need of men calling to us for help. It is the impulse of the regenerated soul to help the need of its fellows.

III

These were the views expressed in the earlier days of Luther's career. He doubtless exaggerated the distinction between soul and body. Modern psychology makes no such striking duality in the human personality. But he profoundly experienced one of the greatest truths of the Christian life. Nowhere do Catholicism and Protestantism stand farther apart at this day than on the place of "good works." As Protestantism sees the Christian life, harmony and communion with God can come only through faith in him as revealed in Jesus Christ; good works flow from this renewed life, as water flows from a fountain.

But Luther was not quite equal to the task of consistently carrying through to complete and logical conclusion the great truth which he discovered and so forcefully set forth. In 1524 and 1525 many radical elements, either awakened or released by his preaching, began to manifest themselves. The most notable of these were the Anabaptist movement and the peasant uprising. The Anabaptists demanded that Luther and the other reform leaders should at once carry through in a practical way and to a logical conclusion the truths and principles they had been proclaiming in their preaching. The Reformers were trying to carry civil government and all the institutions of society with them; they were too slow, hesitant, and conservative to satisfy these more radical reformers. The peasants took up some of Luther's religious principles and proposed to work them out in society at once.

These radical tendencies strengthened Luther's native conservative tendencies and after 1525 transformed him into something of a reactionary. The principle of ecclesiastical authority was re-established in different form, and sacramental salvation was not wholly abolished.

Contrary to his great principle of the sufficiency and soleness of faith, he retained baptism as a saving ordinance and continued to administer it to infants. It was at this point that the Ana-

baptists pressed upon him relentlessly. He realized this difficulty. Justification by faith contradicts the baptism of morally unconscious infants for their salvation. His only reply to his critics was an intimation, wholly unworthy of his intelligence and sincerity, that infants might have faith. But the value of infant baptism to society as then organized was so great that practical considerations and his native conservatism prevented his feeling the force of his inconsistency sufficiently to abolish the practice.

The same conservative spirit led him to retain the view that Christ is really present in the Supper. He rejected transubstantiation with decision, but his own view differed from the Catholic only as to the method, not as to the fact of the presence. His view also robbed the mass of its sacrificial character, and elevated the teaching element in catechism and sermon into a place it had not held since the early centuries of Christian history. But it did not require faith in the recipient.

But the wonder is that Luther accomplished so much in the emancipation of his people from the mental and spiritual thralldom under which they had so long suffered. The Catholic church was an institution of mighty power, the state was in close alliance with the church, the whole social order had been built up through these two great institutions. That the monk of Wittenberg, impelled by his own religious experience and by his own fresh study of the Scriptures, should have accomplished so much is nothing short of marvelous. Every great movement generates radical ideas which may be right in themselves, but which are impossible of realization at that time. Their adoption would mean anarchy and complete social disorganization. Humanity seems incapable of making progress rapidly. Luther might have gone farther along the road of actual reform toward the complete and logical realization of his fundamental ideas but for the radical elements which he was soon called to face. He felt compelled to oppose them in the interest of the general movement, but in opposing them he himself grew more conservative. His "Freedom of a Christian Man" is his most notable work. Its principle is fundamental to the existence of spiritual religion, the only view that will save Christianity from the blight of externalism, ceremonialism, hierarchy, and priestcraft

and make it the common possession of common men in the common affairs of daily life. Religion is an affair of only a section of life called the sacred, or it is the main motive of all life. Luther's view of "good works" puts religion into the whole of life, where it functions in the elevation, purification, and ennobling of the whole man. Life's sordidness and selfishness would disappear in the glory of the spiritual if Luther's doctrine of "good works" were truly operative in life.

As the struggle with the Catholic church thickened and deepened, looking more and more dangerous for the general cause of the Reformation, the Reformers felt impelled to minimize, as far as possible, the differences that separated them from the old church. This was especially true of Melanchthon, who was constitutionally timid and inclined to compromise. The first general statement of their views, drawn up by Melanchthon and laid before the Diet of Augsburg in 1530, is very careful and conservative on the doctrine of "good works." It walks very softly, and there is no evidence of the presence of a big stick; but on the whole it maintains the Lutheran position. This position was in the main followed by other Reformers and has become the common heritage of Protestant christendom. Neither would Luther's position nor his arguments be accepted as a whole today, but the great truth that we are united to God by faith in Christ Jesus, apart from works, has become more precious and significant in the light of the experience of succeeding centuries.

RITSCHL'S USE OF VALUE-JUDGMENTS

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In this article the effort is made to explain the method proposed by Albrecht Ritschl as the only right one for the attainment of religious knowledge, namely, the use of "value-judgments," as described in his book entitled (in English translation) *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*.

1. We must first answer the question: What does Ritschl mean by "religious knowledge," and how does that differ from other kinds of knowledge?

"In every religion," says Ritschl (p. 199), "what is sought, with the help of the superhuman, spiritual power revered by man, is a solution of the contradiction in which man finds himself, as both a part of the world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate nature." Again, referring to Christianity, particularly, as the highest type of religion, he says (p. 212): "Knowledge of God can be demonstrated as religious knowledge only when He is conceived as securing to the believer such a position in the world as more than counterbalances its restrictions." Superiority to, and mastery over, the world, then, is Ritschl's idea of the essence of that which is offered to man in religion, or at least in Christianity. If by "the world" we understand, not only physical nature, but also all within our *human* nature which injures, limits, or restricts us in our highest capabilities and aspirations, or if by the world he means, to use the old phrase, "the world, the flesh, and the devil," I think that we may regard this definition as satisfactory for our purposes.

Religious knowledge is therefore, so far as Christianity is concerned, such knowledge of God as enables man to overcome the world. It will be unnecessary to linger on the argument that the power which is superior to the world, so that through knowledge of

it *we* may also be superior to the world, is a *unity* and is *personal*. This sort of knowledge (or *faith*, as we should ordinarily call it, and as Ritschl elsewhere calls it) differs from scientific or philosophic or theoretic knowledge, first, in the *end* for which it is sought or held, namely, the overcoming of the restrictions and evils of the world. No matter *how* we seek it or come to it, this sort of knowledge, whether as sought or as attained, is *religious* knowledge.

2. The second question is: How is this religious knowledge attained (as *knowledge*), or what *confirmation* have we of its *truth* after the ideas involved in it have been presented, and how does the method of confirmation or proof of *religious* knowledge differ from the method in scientific or theoretic knowledge?

The answer to the first part of this question seems to be: The truth of our belief in God (as revealed in Christ) is confirmed by the fact of our experience that when we hold and act upon that belief we do in reality attain the end which we sought, namely, victory over the world. The nature of this victory is the triumphant feeling which we have that our personalities are severally worth more than the whole world (of nature considered as that which is not personality) and that through fellowship with God, the master of nature, we also share and shall more fully share in his mastery of nature. Now this feeling or these two feelings are judgments of value. In the first place, I judge of the value of my own personality or spiritual existence that its value is greater than that of the whole world of nature which restricts it. It therefore *ought* to dominate or overcome the world. My second value-judgment concerns the Christian idea of God. When I accept it as true and act upon it, I find it to satisfy just my greatest spiritual need—the need for independence of the world and for confidence that I am superior to it and shall eventually triumph over it. I judge, then, that it is of the greatest possible value to me since it satisfies my greatest need.

My confidence in the reality of the Christian God rests, according to this argument, on my judgment of my own value as compared with that of the world and on my judgment of what this valuation of myself implies—that is, the existence of one through whom this superiority to the world may be realized. The relation

of this argument to the similar one in Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* must be considered later.

How does this method differ from the method used in attaining other forms of knowledge? In seeking for theoretic knowledge we endeavor by observation and impartial thought to ascertain the relations, especially the causal relations, of the facts and phenomena of our experience to each other. This theoretic knowledge or scientific knowledge is often called "disinterested," but it is such only in the sense that we do not anticipate the results and desire them as having independent value or relate them immediately to our moral or religious life. The method of reaching conclusions, then, is that of impartial observation and of noting uniform and supposedly necessary relations as they actually exist apart from any desire on our part as to how they *should exist*.

3. The third question that we must answer from Ritschl's standpoint consists of three parts: Can we by the methods of *theoretic* knowledge come to any legitimate conclusions on the questions of *religious* knowledge? If so, may we not in this way substantiate the conclusions which we reach by the value-judgment method? If not, why not?

The first part of this question restated more specifically would be: Can philosophy, by the methods of science or by theoretic knowledge, attain to a single supreme principle or power by which to explain the world? To this question Ritschl gives a definite "No!" He characterizes all attempts of philosophy to do so as cases in which (p. 208) "the law of a *particular realm* of being is set up as the supreme law of *all* being, though the other forms of existence neither would nor could be explained by its means." The materialist attempts to explain the world by the laws of mechanical causality, which, however, quite fail to account for spiritual life, or indeed for life of any sort. "In all the combinations exhibited by the materialistic theory," he says (p. 209), "there is manifest an expenditure of the power of imagination which finds its closest parallel in the cosmogonies of heathenism—which is of itself a proof that what rules is not *scientific method* but an aberrant and confused *religious impulse*." Another vain effort of philosophy is illustrated by philosophical idealism, which, he says, assumes

"that the laws of *theoretical knowledge* are the laws of the human spirit in *all* its functions" (p. 210). "But, as certainly as feeling and will cannot be reduced to ideational knowledge, the last-named is not justified in imposing its laws upon the former." These two illustrations indicate the general position. Philosophy has always sought a unified world-view, Ritschl admits, but he finds that it has sought it, not from the scientific, but from the *religious*, impulse, and the supreme principles which it has proposed have either been borrowed directly from religion or been developed by the imagination after the manner of polytheistic myths and in no case have been reached by the use of the proper scientific method.

Here we have, then, the explanation of Ritschl's famous repudiation of any and all metaphysical systems as bases for religious knowledge—they are all fictions or phantasms of the imagination, untrue to their proper methods of theoretic cognition, or else they simply borrow (or steal) religious ideas directly and give them a pretense of scientific support by argument which is without value. Religious knowledge, then, if it exist at all, must depend on its own method of value-judgments, simply because there is nothing else for it to depend on.

4. But has religious knowledge no relation whatever to theoretic knowledge? Does Ritschl, as Orr, for example, charges, "stretch faith and reason apart until no contact remains"? By no means. There is a sense in which religious knowledge is a branch of theoretic knowledge. We noted above the similarity between Kant's argument and Ritschl's argument for the reality of God. Kant, Ritschl remarks, limits his proof of the Christian conception of God "to the merely practical use of the reason" (p. 221). "But this limitation hangs together with his *separation* of the spheres of the theoretical and practical Reason, in which Kant failed to estimate the practical Reason at its proper value. If the exertion of moral will is a reality, then the practical Reason is a branch of theoretical cognition. These two positions Kant never reached. The reason for this failure lies in the fact that with him sensibility is the characteristic mark of reality." Thus Ritschl, and a little later he continues: "Besides the reality of *nature*, theoretical knowledge must recognize as given the reality of the *spiritual life* and the

equal binding force of the special laws which obtain in each realm" (p. 222). "Spiritual life is the end," he maintains (p. 222), "while nature is the means. This is the general law of spiritual life, the validity of which science must maintain if the special character of the spiritual realm of existence is not to be ignored" (p. 223). "We must either resign the attempt to comprehend the ground and law of the coexistence of nature and spiritual life or we must, to attain our end, acknowledge the Christian conception of God as the truth by which our knowledge of the universe is consummated" (p. 225). "While, therefore, the Christian religion is thereby proved to be in harmony with reason, it is always with the reservation that knowledge of God embodies itself in judgments which differ in kind from those of theoretical science." The value-judgment still remains the bridge, and the only bridge, to the assurance of the reality of God, but reason in its theoretical activity is bound to acknowledge the existence and adequacy of this bridge.

5. We should hardly be satisfied, even in this brief study of Ritschl's method, without one more illustration—perhaps the most famous—of his use of the value-judgment. We must try to answer the question: What is the content and meaning of the Ritschlian doctrine of the deity of Christ, and how does this differ from the traditional doctrine?

As, for Ritschl, God is just the personal being who is superior to the world, and through fellowship with whom we may attain to mastery over, and independence of, the world, so we are to recognize any agent or instrument of the transmission of that power to us as divine, and, to the extent that we, following Christ, actually attain such mastery over the world as he had we are also divine. The Godhead or deity of Christ, then, is just his mastery over the world, or superiority to it, and the influence of his historical life upon us, so that we share in his mastery of the world. Ritschl accepts the dogma of the Eastern church that the purpose of the incarnation was the deification of humanity. That deification, then, is just the attainment of a position of victory over, and independence of, the world.

It will readily be seen that this doctrine corresponds more closely to what we now speak of as the *divinity* rather than the

deity of Christ, where those terms are contrasted. When Ritschl says that Christ has for us the religious value of God, he does not mean, on the one hand, that Christ is the eternal God or takes the place of the eternal God for us, or, on the other hand, that there is any *question* about his deity, or, as we should say, divinity. He means that we recognize the divine nature of Christ in just that overcoming of the world which he accomplished for himself, in his patient endurance of all the hindrances and trials of life in the world, and in his retaining, through and in spite of them all, his love for men, his spiritual independence, and his confidence in the infinite worth of his life as compared with the world with all its limitations. In that overcoming of the world for *himself* and in the power to overcome the world which *we* receive through faith in the *principles* of his life and in that *life* as the manifestation of the eternal God who guarantees to us final superiority over the world, we recognize Christ's divinity.

Christ therefore does not pre-exist as a *personal being*, but only in the eternal purpose of God. And his power as exalted, since his death, is *known* to us only in the continued influence of his *historical, earthly* life upon men.

Replying to his opponents, who desire that he shall confess the deity of Christ in his supernatural birth and in the Chalcedonian formula of the union of the two natures, etc., he answers, first, that his physical origin "has never yet been reconciled with his historical appearance and never can be" (p. 468) and that the Chalcedonian formula "rests only on tradition, detached from the circumstances of its origin" (p. 399), whereas the Godhead which led to that formula, and which we now can perceive, was and is recognized in the experience of the *saving work* of Christ and not through the methods of theoretic or a priori knowledge.

We must omit much that would be very interesting in the development of Ritschl's Christology, but we should at least mention the two elements in the life of Christ which make him unique. One of these elements is the fact that Christ stands historically *first* in revealing the world-conquering power—love—and thus becomes the head of all who follow him. The other is that "the members of Christ's community come to take this

attitude" (that of overcoming the world through love and faith in God) "as those who have within them [originally] *another* bent of will; whereas the figure of *Christ* cannot be understood at all unless it is His *original* and distinguishing characteristic that He finds His own personal end in the self-end of God." This seems to be another way of stating the doctrine of the sinlessness of Jesus as contrasted with the sinfulness of all others.

To recapitulate: We recognize the deity (or divinity) of Christ through that value-judgment which asserts that the power to overcome the world which we have through faith in God as manifested in him is just the greatest conceivable power, the power which our spirits require for their satisfaction and which we hold to as being God himself.

CRITICISM

The great question of theology or at least of Christian theology is: How can we know *what God* is and *that* he is? I think that we may agree with Ritschl that we can never get a satisfactory answer to this question apart from the consideration of the spiritual nature of man and its needs. At any rate, we know of no answer, and can imagine none, *which will satisfy the spiritual needs of man*, which has been or could be deduced from the consideration of any other facts or principles than those which belong to that spiritual nature. We may go a step farther and say that no world-view or theory about the supreme principle or God of the universe can be regarded as true and sufficient which does not explain man's spiritual nature and needs—for they certainly form a part of reality which is significant, and any theory which neglects them is therefore inadequate and incomplete. We may agree, then, that the Christian faith with regard to God explains the spiritual nature of man and the rest of reality known to man better than any other theory which has been proposed, and that we cannot conceive at present of a better explanation.

I understand Ritschl's position to be that I accept the Christian conception of God as true, because I judge that it has the greatest conceivable value for me or that the Christlike God, if he existed, would have such greatest conceivable value; and, further, because of the *experience* that, when I hold that idea to be real and act

accordingly, I do in a measure receive just the value which I should expect from such a being and have therefore evidence of his existence. So far this argument seems to me to be good.

But Ritschl seems to say that the *only* evidence which I have of the existence of God is the value which faith in him has for me in helping me to overcome the world. It seems quite true that this is the *only* evidence that could be called *decisive*. We must remember also the argument (which seemed a little inconsistent with his main contention) that this value-judgment method becomes after all a theoretical method, approved on logical grounds, if only you recognize the reality of the moral life and its laws; hence, it is not metaphysical systems *as such* that he excludes, but rather all metaphysical systems which attempt to explain the universe without taking into account *all* of the universe, and especially that which, at least for man, is most significant in it, namely, his own spiritual nature. Kant in the *Critique of Practical Reason* gave us a metaphysical system which attained the same end as Ritschl's, namely, the Christian God, but expressly limited its validity to the ethical life. Ritschl's system, while not identical, is very similar, except that he denies the *limitation of validity*. He agrees with Kant that the "*pure reason*" or "*theoretical reason*" can never by its proper methods reach up to God. But, when the Christian conception of God is once presented, Ritschl maintains that the theoretical reason must admit or affirm its validity, since the realm of the practical reason is—Kant to the contrary notwithstanding—a part of the realm of the theoretical reason.

Admitting that the conception of the Christian God is reached *directly* only as the explanation and satisfaction of the spiritual need of man for mastery over the world, and that the strongest evidence of the reality of this God is the religious experience of his power in the attainment of this mastery by man, we may nevertheless question Ritschl's right to exclude all other evidence on the subject. While it is true that the evidence of science and history is ambiguous, or that there is, if you please, evidence in them, both for and against the existence of the Christian God, yet one or the other of the contradictories must be chosen—"everything must either be or not be"—and under the guidance of the religious

argument we are justified in choosing the religious interpretation of the scientific and historical evidence with regard to the supreme power in the universe—and I think that evidence will not be inconsiderable.

The value-judgment in which we assert or recognize the deity of Christ is of the same nature as the primary one by which we come to the Christian conception of God, namely, this: that in Christ we see manifested the power which overcomes the world, and through his historical influence we receive such power for ourselves. In brief, this means that, wherever we find this power manifested, we call it divine power. This we understand to be the main contention in Ritschl's Christology, and we shall probably all agree to it, even though some other elements in his doctrine of Christ might be open to question.

In conclusion, we may approve Ritschl's position that the faith that the Christlike God and *only* he will satisfy the needs of the human spirit is a judgment of value, or perhaps two judgments of value—the first, that of the infinite worth of the human soul; the second, that the Christlike God and he alone guarantees that this worth of the soul shall be realized as over against the world. Ritschl is right in rejecting all metaphysical systems which do not take account of and explain the fundamental spiritual nature and needs of man as irrational in themselves and useless for religion. The *Christian* conception of God is the only one which is justified in view of this nature and these needs of the human spirit.

But Ritschl's own system is a metaphysical system, confirmable by the reason, in which the most significant *facts* are just this value-judgment or these value-judgments of the human spirit and the experience of satisfaction following upon the acceptance of the Christian idea of God as real. There seems, however, to be no sufficient reason why science and history should not be interpreted in harmony with the Christian conception of God, and the evidence coming from them, as so interpreted, be used in support of the Christian doctrine. If this position be correct, we cannot maintain that absolute distinction between religious knowledge and theoretic knowledge which Ritschl generally advocates.

UNITARIANISM

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The characteristics which make one religious fellowship different from another are not to be explained by reference merely to the typical views expressed. The personal influence of the men who lead the group, the polity of the organization, the immediate practical ends of the movement, the customs of worship, the hospitality or resistance of the religious atmosphere of the body to the various secular interests of life, the relation to local history and social standing—these and other factors attract or repel adherents, and this selective process reinforces the type of things that act by selection, giving increasing accentuation to what we may call the personality of the denomination. The modernism of theological view professed by Unitarians is sometimes indistinguishable from the modernism permitted in other Christian groups, and the necessity of a separate organization considered as a protest against older theological views is often disputed. Unitarianism, however, persists, and its adherents are acutely conscious of the spiritual advantage which, as they assert, belongs to them in distinction from the modern liberal who is housed, however comfortably, in the other branches of Christendom. Many imponderable elements enter into their separate spiritual situation, but there are some that have obvious weight. An explanation of the Unitarian movement begins inevitably with the most conspicuous defining factor.

The first and fundamental characteristic of Unitarianism is that it is an undogmatic Christian church. As such it is conducting a great historic experiment. Despite the implications of its name it is a church without creed and without official theology. Its members, preachers and laymen, do not hesitate on occasion to make declaration of the things commonly believed among them as the proper interpretation of religious experience, but such common

belief is strictly professed as only that which prevails in the given situation of social knowledge and insight, and it is not allowed to be instituted as a formula, or, if formulated by any volunteer, to become an authoritative tradition. This at once indicates that in the typical Unitarian there is a passion for truth, that for him truth is its own authority and must be sought by an honest inquiry kept scrupulously free and untrammelled. The pursuit of truth in a world of growing insight is impatient of the hindrances that lie in any formula established in the past, but, even if an expression of belief were attained that might be demonstrably infallible, there would still be an objection to the formal institution of it as the faith of a church. The demonstration would be accepted by those alone who by experience and culture had arrived at a certain stage of comprehension, while for the immature and those less given to reflection the supposedly infallible conviction would be an unattained goal and would operate as an alien constraint. For them it would not be spontaneous and inevitable. Its institution would limit the life of the church to those who had attained a certain degree of intellectual comprehension, while the religious unity of all is possible and desirable on a deeper level. The spiritual realities of the soul's experience reveal themselves before the right intellectual comprehension of them is possible, and the uninterpreted or even misinterpreted movements of the spirit in human hearts are a more fundamental and abiding ground for sympathetic and loving unity of life than agreement in the final understanding. Religious union begins before theological agreement. It begins whenever two souls recognize in one another a direct, real, and inward contact with the divine life. Whoever has found his way to an assured conception of the divine reality and its mode of entrance into a human life cannot check the craving for fellowship in the fundamental experience with those who have not begun to question and define or who halt in modes of thought which he has outgrown. He knows that it is possible for men to worship together and to live together in the spirit of Jesus without a creed, and the unlimited need of brotherhood which is his instinct tells him that a true catholicism must reject the use of any creed as a condition of religious union. Theological agreement is a desired goal, but to be a real agreement it

must be won with a perfect sincerity and conscientiousness of thought and expression. These conditions of purity of soul are offered to him only by an undogmatic church. Just as an association of scientists is constituted and sustained, not by the adoption of a theory, however certain, but by a common purpose and aim, so a church is possible by virtue of the common purpose to seek contact with the divine life and to find mutual expression of the experience. Unitarianism is demonstrating that this simple and natural and satisfying catholicism is a secure fact and is the proper solution of all the conflicts of the past.

This passion for veracity and this passion for catholicity are a development through a historical process. Unitarianism descends from the Socinians and Arminians. The great characteristic of these groups was not the body of conclusions they reached in respect to religious truth. It was their undogmatic method. The data interpreted and expressed were, to be sure, found by them in the objective revelation of Scripture, while the modern Unitarian, since Channing and Parker, shapes his convictions from the religious consciousness as an ultimate and independently valid functioning of the human spirit, cherishing the Bible as a classical expression of the intuitions of prophets and apostles supremely gifted with the religious sensibility. In their sole recourse to the Bible Socinians and Arminians were insistent on the method of inquiry into this source of truth. The search must be free of the control of any instituted tradition or creed, allowing, therefore, liberty of private judgment, and such investigation of the Bible conformed itself to that right use of reason which the culture of their age afforded for the study of religion. The Racovian Catechism offers, not dogma, but only conclusions as to the teaching of the Bible. "While we write a catechism, we prescribe nothing to any man; while we express our judgments, we oppress no one. Let every man have the free decision of his own mind in religion." As for changes in successive editions, "we think we need not blush if our church continues to make progress in some matters." The spirit and the method of the Socinians was developed by the Arminians. From that hour in Dortrecht in 1618 when Hales of Eton heard Episcopius and "bade John Calvin good night," this spirit and this method

found its way in the Church of England and in the eighteenth century even among the Dissenters except the Independents. Free inquiry into the Bible resulted in anti-Trinitarian views in the Church of England. By the end of the seventeenth century the Trinitarian understanding of Scripture was on the defensive,¹ and the frankly Sabellian views of South and Wallis began to prevail, while somewhat later the semi-Arianism of the influential Samuel Clarke prevented a general drift to Socinianism. In this situation the obligation to the Thirty-nine Articles and to the ritual involved a point of honor, and after a vain effort of a considerable body of clergymen to persuade Parliament to relax the terms of subscription the conscience of Theophilus Lindsey required him to resign his living and in 1774 to open the first Unitarian chapel in London with a revision of Samuel Clarke's liturgy. Veracity was the thing at stake, and if sincere fidelity to the oracles of God is ground for a denomination English Unitarianism may cherish reverence for its origin.

The same characteristic was entailed upon American Unitarianism by its origin. By the polity of their churches the Congregational clergy of eastern Massachusetts were not constrained by the letter of a creed, and after the Revolution they were generally Arminian in respect to theological method, if not in respect to doctrinal conclusions. For them divine truth was to be found in the Bible, and they were chiefly zealous to be Bible Christians. Their parishes contained believers of divergent understanding of Scripture, and it was the pastor's duty to minister to all without controversy over doubtful or disputed points. When a conservative party, disposed to modify the Congregational polity on the Connecticut model in order to have affiliation with the Presbyterian General Assembly, interjected the dormant issue of the Trinitarian doctrine, the avowal of an unorthodox understanding of Scripture was an honorable necessity for the rest. Together with the conscientiousness which they shared with their opponents, the Unitarians were actuated by a love of catholicity. It was the withdrawal of a theological party which left them also in the position

¹ Bishop Bull, *Defense of the Nicene Faith*, 1685; Dean Sherlock, *Vindication of the Trinity*, 1690.

of a theological party, and this was distasteful to most. Their inherited ideal was that of the community church in which men of divergent opinions could worship together as followers of Jesus. The process was long and slow and difficult by which these churches consented to be a denomination, and when they did so, it has been a repudiation of those conditions of denominational life which make a sect or a theological party. The horror of sectarianism, the passionate feeling for catholicity which rings in Channing's powerful discourse on the church, have actuated the group in its endeavor to find the simplest possible and the most inclusive basis for a church organization. In the end it has found that basis in the conception of a church as a union for religion understood as love to God and man. The single church is constituted by a covenant, not a creed, by a common purposive act. The typical form of such a covenant is the following: "In the love of truth and the spirit of Jesus Christ we unite for the worship of God and the service of man." Such a constitutive engagement creates a religious union, but it leaves every man free to conceive God and God's relation to the world and man as conscience and spiritual progress may require. This freedom and simplicity have been found to be a source of happiness and a challenge to conscientious thoughtfulness which no other condition could allow. The complete toleration thus practiced within the church enjoins and secures, moreover, toleration and sympathy toward every other religious group, so that the quest of universal union and concord becomes a distinctive trait of the whole movement. There is so much the more pain at their exclusion from the federation of the other churches.

This fundamental characteristic of undogmatic and catholic religion is strikingly exhibited in the prayers and hymns which are used in the order of worship. The effort here is to utter those elemental and universal responses of reverent awe and suppliant need which come from depths of the soul into which the differences of intellectual opinion do not penetrate. No suggestion of theological view is allowed to intrude into the act of worship and communion. It is surely in prayer and hymn that the spirit of a man is found, and the actual life of the undogmatic church in its scrupulous concentration upon worship as its constitutive principles and its con-

trolling desire for spiritual unification with all men may be instanced best of all by the order of worship in most common use.

What has been said would seem to be at variance with the fact that Unitarianism has been characterized by a polemic attitude toward the older theology. The contradiction which is so apparent can, however, be resolved. The polemic arose because the universality which was felt to be the mark of Christianity was imperiled by the theology reacting against the growing liberalism. This is evident from the theological history of Unitarianism in the nineteenth century. So far as the matter of a philosophic *Weltanschauung* and biblical criticism is concerned, Unitarian modernism has not been distinctive. It has shared in such modern movements of thought with the one special credit alone of being earlier receptive to the new light than others. Its main concern as a religious movement has not been for a philosophic conception of the universe. True, Priestly, even before Herder, had propounded the doctrine of divine immanence, but with such corollaries, and such poverty of historical application as compared with Herder, that Unitarians eventually came to enthusiasm for the conception only as Priestly was forgotten and the German current of thought had set in. Having a chartered freedom, Unitarians more easily and at an earlier date espoused the modern biblical criticism and the theory of evolution, but the distinctive and typical thing in their theological history must surely be found in their emphasis on the universality of divine grace—a principle not obtained as a part of a general philosophic construction. Apart from this participation in a general modern drift of thought, the theological history of Unitarianism appears to fall into two periods. The name of Parker initiates the second period. Before Parker the source of truth was found in the biblical revelation. After Parker the source of truth is found in the natural religious consciousness.

In the period before Parker the thing at stake for a Unitarian was the doctrine of human nature. The long reign of Augustinianism was nearing the end. Calvin and Melancthon had formulated sharply enough the view that in man, as he is by birth and until a miracle of grace transforms him, there is only contempt of God and hatred of good. How appalling this doctrine became appears in

the horrifying sermons of Jonathan Edwards. It does not appear that the clergy of the eighteenth century in the New England colonies arrived at heresy by any direct attack upon the general Calvinist construction or upon this particular conception of human nature. Their theology was remolded by an indirect process. They were more and more attentive to the eighteenth-century political thought which came from Europe and gave them arguments against the policy of the English crown. That political thought, however, emphasized the conception of a natural man responsive to reason and endowed with that very unselfishness of heart which the school of Edwards identified as a state of regeneration wrought by divine grace. The thorough adoption of this political thought discovered to them at last the incongruity of it with the Calvinist doctrine of total depravity by nature, and the discovery prompted a fresh examination of Scripture with an interest now irreconcilable with the Calvinist creed. Their departure from orthodoxy began with their more hopeful view of man and with their reliance on Christian nurture rather than on a catastrophic conversion. The liberalism which had publicity was related to this matter. In their ensuing and progressive emancipation from the creed their understanding of Scripture with regard to the person of Christ also suffered change; but in an age when no distinction could be made between Synoptic and Johannine and Pauline views the feeling could only be that as to Trinity and Christology the contents of Scripture were not perfectly transparent. This topic was wholly subordinate to the other and was argued only after Jedediah Morse had made it a ground of attack. Then, indeed, the imitableness of the human Christ became a conviction of special value. The main thing, the positive thing in the beginning, was such a view of human nature as repudiated the fearful conception of a race utterly and abominably depraved, of a God who justly hated the *massa perditionis* and for inscrutable reasons arbitrarily elected a few for the display of his mercy. Over against this they preached man as a being who, for all his sad moral history, is by nature responsive to good and who is being taught and chastened by a loving Father incapable of hating anything that he has made. With Channing this affirmation reached its most ardent and inspiring declaration. The universal

Father with a remedial grace for all his defective children was the great position, the distinguishing doctrine. Everything else is subsidiary to this. The anti-Trinitarianism of the movement, apart from its origin in Bible texts, has its positive meaning in that unity of divine character which had been sacrificed by the hypostatizing and opposition of attributes. God was One by the unity of his character of love.

The dynamic impelling movement of the first period is thus seen to be toward a revival of the principle of catholicity inherent in Christianity but checked by the sectarianism which would discriminate a self-conscious body of the elect as the sole recipients of the grace of God. The period which began with Parker is an intelligible and consistent forward step in the same direction of movement. It opens with Parker's famous *Discourse of Religion* in 1842, in which the young pastor, with amazing erudition and with a penetrating intuition which has been seldom adequately recognized, dealt with the phenomena of religion with what we should now call a *religionsgeschichtliche* and psychological method. It is generally recognized that for Protestant theology in general a new era began with Schleiermacher's effort to elicit all doctrines or convictions from that functioning of our being which we call the religious consciousness in distinction from any explanatory or ethical reaction to reality. This was an emancipation of religion and religious doctrine from mere Biblicism and from the dictation of a philosophical theory, whether that of the older rationalism or the speculative idealism which followed. It opened the way to a genuinely scientific treatment of religious convictions such as the older dogmatics could not furnish. Parker should be seen in this light. He was not wholly dependent on Schleiermacher. Channing, as distinctly as Schleiermacher, refused to start from a speculative notion of the Absolute. "We must start in religion from our own souls." Channing was arriving also at that discrimination of the religious consciousness by which Schleiermacher enriched Kant's trilogy of explanation, ethical and aesthetic. "We have faculties for the spiritual as truly as for the outward world." Parker began where Channing left off, and his clearer analytic penetration was shaped by the Cambridge Platonists as well as by

Schleiermacher and by the school of Fries as known through De Wette. The insight, however, was not dependent on book learning. Parker was a man of native religious genius. The modern psychological students of religious experience can ill afford to neglect the ardent and spontaneous utterance of his communion with God. Defects and inconsistencies belong to his discussion, but the main idea supported by this anticipation of comparative religion and critical analysis is luminous and in its effect revolutionary—even if it may be said to lurk in the *textus Quakerorum* of John 1:9. It is the affirmation of a religious “faculty” or capacity by which man, not when reconstituted by miracle, but through his native endowments, receives the action of God which is the health and healing of the soul. “Prayer is no soliloquy, but a sally into the infinite spiritual world whence we bring back light and truth.” Inspiration—this being but another name for the grace of God found in religious experience—is coextensive with the race. The same everywhere in kind, it differs in degree according to man’s use of his endowment, but it is never a coercion *ab extra*. It is the regular divine action on the sensitive receptive spirit whose powers it employs. The higher degrees of this direct experience when “the soul in faith rushes to its God” may be rare. “These hours, like the flower of the aloe-tree, may be rare, but are yet the celestial blossoming of man.” The high Christian privileges are thus but the clear, intense, supremely powerful instances of an experience of God which is universally human. With this insight all the pent-up tension of the restricted catholicity of Christianity was liberated. The distinction of natural and revealed religion faded out. The way to universal religion was open. The spiritual unification of all mankind was again the quest and prayer of men. Christianity could be that spiritual unification, that holy catholic church, by releasing itself from all those misconceptions which limit or deny the universality of divine grace. James Freeman Clarke essayed such an extrication of the elements of Christianity valid for man as man in his *Orthodoxy, Its Truths and Errors* (1866), and immediately began with lectures in the Harvard Divinity School that pioneer survey of world-wide phenomena which he published in his *Ten Great Religions*. This thought of universal religion was

not a cold academic idea, but a passionate faith. It found lyrical utterance, and many a Unitarian unversed in the literature which began with Clarke's lectures has breathed the faith by aid of the hymns of Samuel Johnson and Samuel Longfellow. Few hymns have been sung more often than Johnson's "Life of Ages" or Longfellow's "One Holy Church of God Appears." Just as the thought of the neighbor near at hand prompts the Unitarian to sing Theodore Williams' song of brotherhood,

When thy heart enfolds a brother
God is there,

so the vision of mankind requires him to sing with these other poets of the one universal spiritual life where the sense of one divine beneficence, one divine allegiance, shelters and enfolds all men. The brotherhood of man may be to some minds an anthropological doctrine. In the worship of a Unitarian church it is an enlarging religious idea which has all the richness and authority of that which is correlated and connoted—the universal fatherhood of God and the universality of his beneficent grace. In this faith and aspiration the Unitarian feels his emancipation from every sectarian or merely denominational attitude. His spirit is enlarged with that out-reaching catholic impulse which marked the birth of ethical monotheism in the Hebrew prophets, which in the Epistle to the Ephesians summoned all races to a new human unity in the Christian church, and which found again its lofty modern utterance in Channing's discourse.

Enough has been said to justify the claim that Unitarianism as a religious movement is not to be characterized by any system of metaphysics. It is rather the religious concurrent of the great enterprise which in universities is known as comparative religion or the science of religion. If the account of religion now prevalent in Unitarian circles is to be defined, it might be found sadly deficient in solving all the vexed problems of the relation of God to the world, although the sympathy would certainly be with the emphasis on divine immanence. The account would rather be that in all races and in all times there is a human experience which is specifically religious, not an effort at intellectual explanation, but a primal

and spontaneous recognition of dealing with something sacred, holy, divine. These words are practically synonymous. A man is religious, says Söderblom, to whom something is holy. In the presence of this discovered "holy" there is a sense of being tied or obligated, a vague sense of "ought" which in higher development might culminate in the saint's rapturous self-surrender with the saint's sense of elation and freedom. Hebrew prophets read the deeper meaning of this obligation in the "holy" and found that the Lord was holy through righteousness. That spell of awe and attraction, that need of yielding self, that obligatoriness, was the mandate of ethical righteousness. The prophet felt the universality of this righteousness whereby God was holy, and knew that the one only God realizes a will of moral good in the whole world. Just as the prophet heard the imperative, so he heard also the prediction of fulfilment, and his soul leaped to the vision of the future and perfect Kingdom of God. So in the fulness of time Jesus declared the deeper depth of meaning in the holy righteousness of God by his utterances of the divine fatherhood and of the life of love which alone could be the submission of self to the authoritative holy will. When it is said that the word of the Lord came to Hebrew prophets and was supremely disclosed in Jesus and by Jesus, it is meant that these great souls, uniquely sensitive to religious experience and uniquely clear in their intuitive comprehension of it, were elucidating more purely and more profoundly all that was involved in the earliest and the universal human experience. The Unitarian heir to this evolution of comprehension knows with others that it is an evolution through a certain current of historic life in the Western world, but he sees that it does not rise or fall with special contingent peculiarities of the occidental man. It is valid for man as a moral personality. It is universal religion. It states the truth implicit in any human awe before the holy presence. And universal religion alone will suffice the Unitarian.

Hence his polemic against a doctrine of human nature divorced from the life of God by a complete corruption. Hence the repudiation of a caste of the elect, of a salvation limited by knowledge and acceptance of an atonement through Christ's death. Hence the negation of everything that contradicts the faith in a Father

of universal grace and a humanity embrothered in God's impartation of light and leading whatever be the diversities and crudities of varying human conceptions. The Unitarians adopt the hymn of Matheson:

Gather us in, thou Love that fillest all;
Gather our rival faiths within thy fold.

Singing such a hymn as their positive faith, they know that historic Christianity must discard some misconceptions to be within the fold of that all-embracing Love. They frankly mean that Christianity, though the highest evolution in religion, can only become the world-religion it means to be and tends to be by assuming the simplicity which Unitarianism would fain achieve.

Into that fold of the divine Love the Unitarian would bring his response to the leadership of Jesus, not only as a name marking a climax of religious evolution, but as a truly sacramental means for men of receiving the grace of God. The new arrival from orthodoxy reacting against the scheme of salvation is not likely to indorse the last utterance, but if Thom and Martineau and Drummond and Channing and Parker and Clarke or those who are their heirs are speaking in the household of faith, this is their voice. For the modern Unitarian eliciting his religious statements from experience there can be no doctrine about Jesus save as a statement of the degree and manner in which the man of Galilee stimulates and clarifies the religious consciousness. For the Unitarian there is still the wonderful note of the concord of the divine and the human, the eternal and the temporal, in the life of the man Jesus. Just as the dying Bunsen could say to his wife, "In thine eyes I have seen the Eternal," so the Johannine saying persists, "He that hath seen Jesus hath seen the Father." In neither case is there any thought of identity of being or ontological speculation about two natures in one person. Even the "value-judgment" of Ritschl or Herrmann seems like a sophistry. It would be difficult to find a Unitarian who would go beyond the adoptionism of Paul of Samosata, though the anxiety is not to have a historic master in theology, but rather to have a scrupulous and adequate expression of what is possible experience. It is enough to say, in whatever individual fashion that experience suggests, that in the man Jesus, subject like other men

to historical limitations, there is seen a perfect righteousness of will which was a thrilling gift of love and compassion for the man guilty of unrighteousness, and that in this sheer absoluteness of loving goodness the human heart recognizes that perfection of goodness which the Father shows to men. This mirroring of the divine love in a human character enables many a needy man to fling away his distress and grief and to cast himself with confidence upon the infinite compassion of God. Into this experience the metaphysical theory about substance and nature do not enter. *Hoc est Christum cognoscere, beneficia ejus cognoscere, non ejus naturas, modos incarnationis contueri.* Jesus can render such a spiritual office to any human soul who can see and rejoice in goodness, and he can be an efficacious Christ to a whole world without invalidating the grace mediated to men through other saviors.

The policy of these churches in regard to foreign missions has been conditioned by the attitude of sympathy already explained. The desire could not be to induce the Oriental to discard his own spiritual tradition abruptly and to think his life in terms of Western history. What corresponds to the customary foreign missionary work exists in the relations sought by the Unitarian body with circles in India and Japan. The effort has been to present the simplicity and catholicity of the Unitarian apprehension of Christianity to minds that were endeavoring to mold oriental faiths into a kindred theism. The typical instance is the friendship and co-operation established with the Brahmo Somaj of India, a circle whose spiritual life has recently been illustrated to the Western world by the writings of Tagore. Students of the Brahmo Somaj resort to the Unitarian theological schools in England and America. Such schools and such students find an essential agreement in faith. The Unitarians think of the Brahmo Somaj as their own movement expressing itself in terms of Indian tradition.

At the outset it was said that a religious movement is not to be defined solely by its theological statements. Life in a Unitarian communion seems to involve a certain relation to the general life of the world, a hospitable co-operation with its progressive tendencies in education, reform, government. Out of all proportion to its numbers it breeds leaders in the work of local and national prog-

ress. There were brave men before Agamemnon, and there was progress before there were Unitarian churches, but it is nevertheless true that the spirit of service for the world is in constant generation in such churches and that it is regarded as an integral part of piety. To support philanthropies, to foster schools and libraries and reforms of government, to seek and to share culture—these are undoubted general tendencies among the Unitarians of Hungary, of England, of America. We may or may not easily deduce these interests from the faith professed in the churches. There is many a gap between logic and life. The logic of the New England theology forbade Hopkins to love any whom God did not love, and since a man could not certainly identify the elect his love of another must be tentative and provisional. But Hopkins was a philanthropist and loved the enslaved negroes without waiting for certainty about the divine decrees. Wilberforce and the Evangelicals were prodigal with philanthropy, but held doctrines about man and God which Unitarians would regard as fatal to such generous instincts. In any case philanthropy is inevitable in Unitarianism. A brave array of American authors attended Unitarian churches. The Brook Farm community makes a chapter in the history both of literature and of Unitarianism. The exact relation between this New England Renaissance and the emergence of Unitarianism is a nice problem for investigation. It would be fatal to infer that Unitarians necessarily excel in literary culture or scholarly erudition. It is enough to note that there is a characteristic sympathy between the religious humanism and the humanism of culture and that a love of human completeness is really a mark of this religious movement. *Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut zu leben*—many a Unitarian has echoed Goethe with a genuinely pious fervor. There is a complete absence of that hostility to intellectual quests which has marked the circles related to German pietism. This is not because the piety of the Unitarians is itself intellectualism. It means only that the great modern tendency to reconceive the Kingdom of God as involving an intramundane expression and a transformation of the total life of the world has found in the men named Unitarians agents peculiarly sensitive and responsive. In every variety of expression they have echoed Aquinas: *Gratia*

naturam non tollit sed perficit. The old antithesis of church and world has ceased to be a regulative thought. "To resemble our Maker," said Channing, "we need not quarrel with our nature or our lot. Our present state is worthy of God and may be used throughout to assimilate us to him." Instinctively and without much reasoning this type of religion refused to isolate and abstract the religious consciousness from all other normal responses to the world's appeals, from scientific explanation, ethical choice, aesthetic joy. In the Middle Ages monasticism had made an instructive failure with such an effort to limit and isolate that which was specifically religious. The effort proved itself unwholesome by its production of stunted and unserviceable men and by the blight that threatened religious feeling itself in the spiritual malady of accidia. The story of David Brainerd illustrates a similar morbidity of result in the Edwardean circles absorbed in religious emotionalism divorced from life. The Unitarians learned what Channing reiterates—that in a life in which ethical religious feeling dominates all other good becomes moral and that an organic unity of our propensities is essential to the health and salvation of our personality. To love God with the whole mind as well as the heart, to conform self to him with the whole personal being, to conceive the grace of God indeed as ministered in the illumination of the inquiring intelligence as well as in the tender mystery of the presence that dawns as worshipful holiness to the penitent and prayerful heart—that has been an insistent theme in this young tradition, though now somewhat obscured by the hard practicalities of social reform. For a long time study-classes for the higher literature were a distinctive feature of these churches. Apparently the rush of life today has less time for such spiritual enlargement.

The unity of character in God, the harmonious unity that religion can establish with life—these faiths are seemingly fundamental to that complete engagement with the world's progress that relates Channing and his heirs to the life of citizenship. The false, abstract antithesis of nature and grace had gone. The disinterested love which the Edwardeans attributed to a miracle of grace was found in the natural man, just as natural defects persist in the saint. Conformity of the personal being to the divine original of human

personality was seen as a salvation only imperfectly yet progressively realized. For that salvation all men are capacitated. The Kingdom of God is every man's birthright. Every man is heir expectant. Honor is due to all men who are moving toward that fulfilment of personal being. At once the earthly vista of life obtained a program. It was not a mere waiting-place to contemplate a perfection beyond death. It was the arena for the toil of a fraternity of men seeking personal fulfilment. In the Christian ethics the principle of democracy long had slumbered. Now it came to sudden manifestation. Channing and Parker became publicists and prophets of a complete democracy—a democracy extending beyond rights of suffrage into economic reforms and the equalization of culture. Democracy and Christianity were for them interchangeable as social manifestations. Both meant the concerted ardor of moral persons to achieve their destiny. The quest of a free society of mutually co-operating moral persons united in mutual trust, mutual honor, and loyal fraternity was but another expression of the conformity of our flesh to the divine fatherhood. Many a follower of Channing feels that his religion is the overtone of the music of the American life. Whatever be the measure of the service rendered to social progress, here at least is an attestation of the instinct for spiritual unification which is an essential mark of this religious type.

And what are the prospects of this movement which appears thus to draw momentum from the Christian past and to reach forward with hope of a new synthesis destined to enrich the meaning of the name Christian? The new catholicism fares somewhat as the early Christians fared. In the earliest the Christian forfeited worldly place and bore the monstrous charge of atheist and enemy of the human race. Such is the peril of those who deny ancient sanctities, however outworn and discredited those sanctities may be. Something analogous has marked the fortunes of Unitarian churches. Misconception and disparagement have restrained their growth. Under the law of England civil disabilities lingered until 1813. In America, save in eastern Massachusetts, social and professional success had to be paid for a time as the price of existence. Then, too, being pioneers of Protestant modernism, they have moved

forward without halts to consolidate their gains. An energy which could have been confined to propaganda was spent by preference in social reforms. The relaxation of orthodoxy in older churches prevented recruits. Only the attacks of Mr. Sunday bring rapid reinforcements.

In America the churches number about 500; in Great Britain, 371; in Hungary, 166; in Australia, 6; in New Zealand, 3; in Tasmania, 1; in Denmark, 1; in Norway, 1; in Belgium, 1; in Bulgaria, 1; in Egypt, 1. This is no large number. But these churches have the sympathy and co-operation of large elements in the Protestant churches of Switzerland, Holland, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. The full scope of the movement comes to expression in the International Congress of Free Christians and Other Religious Liberals, which has met six times since its formation in 1900.

The ground of confidence for the future is twofold. The catholic unification of humanity is an irresistible human necessity and can be accomplished only in the form of a free, undogmatic church. The second ground is the certainty that in the modern world convictions and interpretations must be won by the use of a scientific method. The scientific method steadily wins adherence in theological schools. The data of experience can be agreed upon, and the agreement is growing. The meanings implicit in experience can be explicated by a common method into forms commonly accepted. Unitarianism does not aim at anything else, and it is not deterred by the fear of any change in its present consensus of faith. When it sees farther, it will go farther.

NEW BABYLONIAN MATERIAL CONCERNING CREATION AND PARADISE

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We are just beginning to appreciate what a fascination the problem of beginnings had for the ancient Babylonians. Recently discovered texts make it clear that a number of myths were cherished which professed to tell how man was formed and how the elements of civilization, as they were known in Babylonia, came into existence. Opinions still differ as to the exact interpretation of some of these, and claims made for some of the texts will, in the opinion of the writer, have to be abandoned, but the new material is nevertheless most interesting and instructive.

All readers of this *Journal* are familiar with the epic of creation, parts of which were discovered by George Smith more than forty years ago. It has been translated many times and is accessible in many publications.¹ It is, in the form known to us, a version current in the seventh century B.C., but was apparently expanded from an earlier version. This story formed the culmination of the development of the Babylonian myths of origins. It accounts for the creation, not only of man, animals, and civilization, but of the heavens and earth and the stars as well.

A second account of the creation has also been known for nearly thirty years. It was unearthed by Rassam at Abu Habba in 1882, published by Pinches in 1891.² It has also been made known to theologians through many translations.³ It assumed the existence of the earth, and proceeded from that starting-point to trace the creation of agriculture and of city life.

¹ For example, in L. W. King's *Seven Tablets of Creation*, R. W. Rogers' *Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament*, and G. A. Barton's *Archaeology and the Bible*.

² In the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (new series), Vol. XXIII.

³ See note 1.

Another very fragmentary account of the creation written in Assyria exists in the British Museum. It naturally makes the god Ashur the chief agent of creation. The tablet is too badly mutilated to afford much knowledge of the details of the Assyrian version of the myth.¹

To these fairly well-known versions several items have been added during the last four years. As the first interpretation of any unilingual Sumerian text must in the present state of knowledge be considered tentative, the new material that has been added has to be sifted by critical study. This process is still in progress. Before taking up the new material it will be well for us to recall two detached bits of information that bear upon the questions involved, both of which have been known for several years. One has to do with the creation of man; the other with Paradise.

In the fifth tablet of the Gilgamesh Epic there is a description of the creation of the hero Engidu, or Eabani, by the goddess Aruru, who was, apparently, Nintu under another name. The passage runs:

The goddess Aruru, when she heard this,
A man like Anu she formed in her heart.
Aruru washed her hands;
Clay she pinched off and spat upon it;
Eugidu, a hero, she created,
An exalted offspring with the might of Ninib.

This passage has often reminded scholars of the account of the creation of man in the J document in the second chapter of Genesis. It does not appear that the epic poet intended the tale to be taken for an account of the first creation of man. According to the epic, men had existed before this act. The goddess at the time of this creative deed desired a special hero for a special occasion, so she resorted to this method to obtain him. It is clear that he who passed on to us this myth left ample room for other myths as to the ultimate origin of man.

The other subject to which reference has been made is the so-called "temptation" cylinder, which represents two figures, a male and female, seated on either side of a palm tree. The male

¹ See Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 53 ff.

bears on his head the horns indicative of deity, while behind the female stands a serpent. George Smith published this in his *Chaldean Genesis*, without question, as a representation of the story of temptation of which the third chapter of Genesis gives us a biblical version. Menant in his *Glyptique orientale*¹ vigorously dissented from this view. Menant's reasons for his skepticism were based on the fact that a cylinder in the museum at The Hague also depicts a palm tree, on either side of which a goddess is standing. Each goddess is plucking fruit, and one of them is handing some of it to a third female figure. Shrubs are also pictured in the scene, as well as two birds. Ward has discussed the two cylinders at considerable length in his *Seal Cylinders of Western Asia*² and reaches the conclusion that both are representations of agricultural deities and have no necessary connection with the story of the temptation.

While the Hague cylinder is clearly no more than an agricultural scene, its existence has no necessary connection with the "temptation" cylinder, which certainly contains in picture the main elements of the story of Eden. Even if the contention that the seals are both to be regarded as agricultural or garden scenes, it does not follow that there is no reference to the temptation in the one which pictures the man and woman. The writer has long believed that the story of Eden was a survival of a recollection of conditions in an early oasis.³ Oases are garden spots. In them vegetation flourishes. In Arabian oases palm trees are abundant. The scenes on these seals may well be "agricultural." They represent in each case a garden, or "paradise." In Babylonian thought the "garden" or palm orchard took the place of the oasis. The recognition of this in no way diminishes the probability that the scene which depicts the man, woman, and serpent surrounding the palm gives evidence that the Babylonians knew a story of Paradise which contained the essential elements of the third chapter of Genesis. With these facts in mind we are ready to consider the texts that have recently come to light.

¹ Pp. 189-91.

² Pp. 138-39. The "temptation" cylinder is reproduced in Fig. 388 and the Hague cylinder in Fig. 389.

³ Cf. *A Sketch of Semitic Origins, Social and Religious* (New York, 1902), p. 96, n. 1.

In 1913 Langdon published in his *Babylonian Liturgies* a "Liturgy to Nintud, Goddess of Creation," the text of which is inscribed on a clay prism in the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford. The prism is not in a good state of preservation, and numerous gaps in the text resulted. One fragment of this text from a tablet found at Nippur had previously been published by Radau,¹ and three other fragments from the same Babylonian city have since come to light.² The most important of these is the one contained in the writer's *Miscellaneous Sumerian Texts*, since it supplies a complete new section of the composition. With reference to this so-called "liturgy" Langdon says: "Each section of this liturgy ends with the same refrain, which, according to my interpretation, refers to the creation of man and woman, the biblical Adam and Eve."³ A closer study of the text in the light of the new fragments seems to dispel completely the idea that it refers to the creation of man. Langdon himself believes that the occasion which gave rise to the composition was probably the coronation of a patesi of the city of Kesh.⁴ Whether this be true or not, it appears to the writer that the refrain refers to some queen or goddess and should be translated: "Its lady, like Nintud in form, gave the land abundance." If this is the correct understanding of the passage, it follows that the "liturgy" adds nothing to our knowledge of the Babylonian conceptions of the creation of man.

In 1914 Dr. Arno Poebel published a new account of the deluge⁵ which appears to have had at the beginning of the tablet an account of the creation. About half of the tablet is broken away. The

¹ In his "Miscellaneous Sumerian Texts" in the *Hilprecht Anniversary Volume* (Leipzig, 1909), No. 8.

² One found by Langdon at Constantinople was published by him in the *Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania, Series A: Cuneiform Texts*, Vol. XXXI (1914), Pl. 22; another from the Philadelphia Museum Langdon published in his *Sumerian Liturgical Texts* (Philadelphia, 1917), Pl. 61; the most important fragment is also in the Philadelphia Museum and is to be published by Barton, *Miscellaneous Sumerian Texts* (Philadelphia, 1917), No. 11.

³ *Babylonian Liturgies*, p. 86.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ The text was published in Vol. V of the Publications of the Babylonian Section of the University Museum of the University of Pennsylvania, entitled *Historical and Grammatical Texts*, Pl. 1, and translated in Vol. IV of the same series, entitled *Historical Texts*, pp. 9 ff.

lost portion includes the beginning of all the columns on the obverse of the tablet. The legible portion of the text begins in the midst of a speech of some deity. If the writer correctly understands the text, it reads as follows:

My human-kind from its destruction I will [raise up];
 With the aid of Nintu my creation. . . . I will raise up;
 The people in their settlements I will establish;
 The city, wherever man builds one (it is his protection),
 therein I will give him rest.
 Our house—its brick may he cast in a clean spot!
 Our places in a clean place may he establish!

Thus far we have the address of one deity to another. Then the text proceeds:

Its brilliant splendor, the temple platform, he made aright,
 The exalted regulations he completed for it;
 The land he divided; a favorable plan he established.
 After Anu, Enlil, Enki, and Ninkharsag
 The black-headed race had created,
 All that is from the earth, from the earth they caused to spring.
 Cattle and beasts of the field suitably they brought into being.

At this point the first column ends. That it is really part of an account of the creation is shown from the extant portion of Column II, which, though fragmentary, tells how certain guardian spirits or deities were assigned to different cities, Nudimmud or Enki to Eridu; Utu or Shamash to Sippar, etc. Further, the account of the deluge probably did not begin until Column III, for in the extant portions of that column the reader finds himself in the midst of an account of the deluge, where the mother-goddess Nintu is uttering a lament over her lost children similar to the lament of Ishtar in the account of the deluge from the library of Ashurbanipal.¹

Clearly, then, this text discovered by Dr. Poebel contains a brief account of creation, but whether it is the original creation or

¹ The new text reads:

"Nintu [cried out] like [a woman in travail],
 The brilliant Ininni [uttered] a groan on account of her people."

The text from Ashurbanipal's library reads:

"Ishtar cried like a woman in travail,
 Wailed the queen of the gods with her beautiful voice:
 Those creatures are turned to clay," etc.

a re-creation after a partial destruction antedating the deluge is not quite clear. There is considerable to be said for the last-mentioned view. The allusion to raising up humankind from destruction in the first extant line of the text implies that what follows is a re-creation rather than the initial creation of mankind. This interpretation finds some confirmation in the last of the texts to be discussed below.

Who the god was who was to raise up people by the aid of Nintu is not clear. When the text tells of the creation of the "black-headed" race—the Semites of Babylonia—it attributes their creation to four deities, Anu, Enlil, Enki, and Ninkharsag. Anu was god of Erech; Enlil, of Nippur; Enki, of Eridu; while Ninkharsag, or "lady of the mountain," was an epithet applied to a mother-goddess in different cities—in Adab, Kesh, and Nippur. At Nippur the epithet was applied to Ninlil, the spouse of Enlil. Nintu was also an epithet applied at times to the same goddesses. It is doubtful, however, whether the poet who composed this text thought of Nintu and Ninkharsag as the same. In antiquity a new name usually meant a new divinity. Probably, therefore, Nintu and Ninkharsag were to him two goddesses. Interesting as the text is, it affords no complete account of the creation.

Another new and important text was published by Dr. Langdon in 1915 under the title *Sumerian Epic of Paradise, the Flood, and the Fall of Man*¹—a title that in the judgment of others who have studied the text is based on a misunderstanding of its contents.² It should be said that at one critical point in the text some lines are broken at the beginning. At least one of these Dr. Langdon com-

¹ It forms Vol. X, No. 1, of the publications of the Babylonian Section of the University Museum of the University of Pennsylvania. Before the publication of his book Langdon had published two articles on it in *PSBA*, 1914, pp. 188-98, 253-63.

² The text has been treated in the following publications: A. H. Sayce, *Expository Times*, XXVII (November, 1915), 88-90; Langdon, *ibid.* (January, 1916), pp. 165-68; J. D. Prince, "The So-called Epic of Paradise," *JAOS*, XXXVI, 90-114; "Further Notes on the So-called Epic of Paradise," *ibid.*, pp. 269-73; M. Jastrow, "The Sumerian View of Beginnings," *ibid.*, pp. 122-35; G. A. Barton, *Archaeology and the Bible* (Philadelphia, 1916), pp. 283-89; Langdon, "Critical Notes on the Epic of Paradise," *JAOS*, XXXVI, 140-45; M. Jastrow, "Sumerian Myths of Beginnings," *AJSL*, XXXIII, 91-144; Langdon, "The Necessary Revision of the Sumerian Epic of Paradise," *ibid.*, pp. 245-49.

pleted with an emendation different from that which seems probable to other scholars. It will be made clear as we proceed what the grounds are for the formation of an opinion as to how the line should be completed. To present the facts clearly to the reader and not lose him in the mazes of controversy, a new translation of the text in the light of all the work done on it by others will be presented section by section. Each section will be accompanied by discussion of the points involved.

Holy is [the place] where you are;
 The mountain Dilmun (?) is holy.
 Holy is the place where you are;
 . . . the mountain Dilmun (?) is holy.
 The mountain Dilmun (?) is holy, the mountain Dilmun (?)
 is pure,
 The mountain Dilmun (?) is pure, the mountain Dilmun (?)
 is brilliant.
 Alone in Dilmun (?) they lay down;
 Where Enki and his consort lay,
 That place is pure; that place is brilliant.
 Alone in Dilmun (?) [they lay];
 Where Enki with Ninella lay,
 That place is pure; that place is brilliant.

(Col. I, 1-12)

The beginnings of the first lines are broken away. Langdon supplies the lacuna in line 1 from the following syllables, so as to read:

[e-ne-ba]-am e-ne-ba-am me-en-ši-en

Jastrow supplies the lacuna from line 4 so as to read:

[ki-azag-ga]-am e-ne-ba-am me-en-ši-en.

In either case the emendation is conjectural. Although I formerly accepted Langdon's guess, Jastrow's gives a sense that is so much superior that its correctness seems probable.

The name of the mountain is uncertain. As has often been said, the ideogram is not the ideogram for Dilmun. In some places in this text, however, as well as in that discovered by Poebel, the ideogram is followed by the phonetic complement *na*; the name probably, therefore, ended in *n*, hence it may provisionally be read Dilmun (?). Dilmun, as we know it from other texts, was, however, not a mountain, but an island. It seems possible, therefore,

that the Dilmun of this text may not have been the same as the Dilmun of other passages. Jastrow has conjectured¹ that, like Mount Nizir, the mountain on which the Babylonian ark rested after the flood, it may have been in the far north. The mention of Magan at the end of the tablet suggests that it may have been in Arabia. These are possibilities, but at present we must be content to confess our ignorance and to wait. Wherever the writer of the poem believed the mountain that we have tentatively called Dilmun (?) to be situated, his conception of its condition is clear. He regarded it as holy, pure, and brilliant. Enki and his consort dwelt there alone. Its sacred soil was defiled by no other beings. In the light of this statement the lines that follow must be interpreted:

In Dilmun the raven (?) its cry uttered not,
 The *dar*-bird its *dar*-cry uttered not,
 The deadly lion destroyed not,
 The wolf a lamb seized not,
 The dog the kid tore not,²
 The *dun*-animal the food-grain destroyed not,
 She planned not for the young offspring . . .⁴
 The birds of heaven their offspring hatched not,
 Doves eggs (?) lay not,
 To eye-disease "Thou art eye-disease" one said not,
 To headache "Thou art headache" one said not,
 To a mother "Thou art mother" one said not,
 To a father "Thou art father" one said not,

¹ *AJSL*, XXXIII, 105 ff. Langdon's effort to find a location for Dilmun on the eastern shore of the Persian Gulf (*Sumerian Epic of Paradise, the Flood and the Fall of Man*, pp. 9 ff.) does not commend itself. There is no real evidence for it.

² Langdon's reading *zu* at the end of the line is most improbable. As at the ends of the two following lines, *ba* should be read. His latest rendering, "The dog knew not the kid in repose," (*AJSL*, XXXIII, 245), is as unsuited to dog nature as the reading *zu* is to the context. His earlier suggestion to take *zu* in an obscene sense (*JAOS*, XXXVI, 140) has been sufficiently disposed of by Jastrow (*AJSL*, XXXIII, 106, n. 3).

³ The sign for the *dun*-animal appears to have been the picture of a pig (see the writer's *Origin and Development of Babylonian Writing*, No. 427). The animal in question would accordingly seem to have been a female swine.

⁴ The line is broken and the rendering uncertain. I take it to continue the preceding line. The two state that the sow neither uprooted grain nor cared for her young.

In a holy place no libation was poured out, in a city
 one drank not,
 The river-man "Cross it?" said not,
 The overseer filled no right hand,¹
 The musician "Sing!" said not,
 The prince of the city [Col. 1:13-30] commanded not.

Langdon takes this section to be a description of Paradise. Certain lines of the passage afford some resemblance, especially in Langdon's translation, to the description of the messianic kingdom in Isa. 11:1-9. A close examination convinces one, however, that if this is intended as a description of Paradise it is a most peculiar paradise. In hot oriental countries the first requisite of a paradise or "garden" or "park" is plenty of cool running water. Out of the biblical Eden there went a river that was divided and became four heads (Gen. 2:10). The apocalyptic vision of the heavenly Paradise included "a river of water of life bright as crystal" (Rev. 22:1). Mohammed described the paradise to which his followers were to go as "gardens twain . . . with dark green foliage . . . in each two gushing springs" (Koran 65:60 ff.). It is the abundant waters supplied to Damascus by its rivers that have led Arabian poets to sing of that city as a paradise. The mountain described in our text had, as yet, no water. That fact the sequel makes clear. We can, accordingly, scarcely call it a paradise.

It has already been noted that the opening lines of the poem declare that Enki and his consort lay down there alone. It was indeed, then, believed to be a divine dwelling-place, but not a place where gods and men dwelt together. As Jastrow and the writer have elsewhere pointed out, "the lion destroyed not," because there were no lions there.² Other animals and birds are declared not to have acted out their nature, because they too were absent. Eye disease and headaches were absent, because there were in this mountain no human eyes or heads to suffer. No one said, "Thou

¹ "Filling the hand" was an ancient expression for employing a person or consecrating him to an office; see Judg. 17:5, 12. Later it came among the Hebrews to be equivalent to "appoint to the office of priest," or "consecrate," as in Exod. 28:41, and often in the Priestly document. I take the text here to mean that the "overseer employed no one."

² See Jastrow, *JAOS*, XXXVI, 124; and *AJSL*, XXXIII, 106-8; also Barton, *Archaeology and the Bible*, p. 284.

art my father" or "Thou art my mother," for the place did not contain fathers, mothers, or children. Similarly there were there no overseers, ferrymen, musicians, or princes. The whole passage is simply a poetical way of saying that the gods were there alone. It describes no paradise in the ordinary acceptation of that term.

The third section of the poem represents the goddess Ninella, "the bright lady," who appears to have been both the wife and daughter of Enki (unless, as in Semitic, "father" is employed here as a designation of husband), as appealing to Enki to supply water for a city he had constructed. It runs:

Ninella to her father Enki said:
A city thou hast founded, a city thou hast founded,
its destiny thou hast fixed;
In Dilmun (?) thou hast founded a city
. . . . thou hast founded a city;
. . . . a canal there is not;
. . . . thou hast founded a city.

(Col. I, 31-36.)

[About nine lines are here broken away.]

That from the bright covering of thy great heavens may waters flow,
May thy city be refreshed with water, may it drink,
May Dilmun (?) be refreshed with water, may it drink,
May the deep of bitter water flow as a deep of sweet water,
May thy city be a house for the multitudes of the land,
May Dilmun (?) be a house for the multitudes of the land!
To shine, O sun-god, come forth!
O sun-god, stand in heaven!
Bring open water from the womb of this land,^{*}
(And) fish, O moon-god, from the water!
(In) the water-course on the face of the land, O earth's sweet water,
come!

(Col. II, 1-11.)

These lines call for little comment. They emphasize the waterlessness of the city in the holy mountain of which the opening

^{*} The line is difficult, and every scholar translates it differently. No translation is more than a guess. The rendering here given takes *a* = "water," *tug* = *pitu* = "open," and *šar* (or *esen*) = *kirimmu*, "womb"; see *Origin and Development of Babylonian Writing*, No. 170²¹.

lines speak. They also make clear the fact that no one except the god and goddess dwell there. It is the desire of Ninella that, with the gift of water, the city may become the house of the multitudes of the land.

The lines that follow contain Enki's reply to this appeal:

That from the bright covering of the great heavens waters may flow,
Its city be refreshed, may drink,
Dilmun (?) be refreshed, may drink,
The deep of bitter water flow as a deep of sweet water,
The fields, the meadows
The city be a house for the multitudes of the land,
Dilmun (?) be a house for the multitudes of the land,
To shine may the sun-god come forth—let it be so.

(Col. II, 12-19.)

After making this reply Enki proceeded to take the necessary steps to bring about the accomplishment of the request that he had granted.

In accordance with a widespread belief of early peoples, creative acts were believed to follow marital unions of a god and goddess. This was the view of this poem, as the following lines make clear:

He who alone is wise,¹
To Nintu, mother of the land,
Enki, who is wise,
To Nintu, mother of the land,
His member he fully exposed,
His member, inserting, he caused to sink into her womb;
His member large verily he did not draw aside.
She said, "To me no man has ever come."
Enki cried,
By the spirit of heaven he swore,
"Lie with me, lie with me," he said.
Enki, the father of Damganunna, spoke his word,
By Ninkharsag the fields were flooded.

(Col. II, 20-30.)

The idea set forth here is corroborated in another text which is translated below. It is the conception that creative acts are acts

¹ I.e., Enki.

of marital union on the part of a god and goddess. Jastrow has cited examples of this from many parts of the world in his elucidation of this text. In addition to the examples cited by him attention may be called to the Japanese conception that the other gods, the islands of Japan, and the imperial line were all begotten by Izanagi, the primal male deity, and Izanami, the primal female deity, through natural generation.¹ The physical union of Enki and Ninella (also called Ninkharsag) brought forth the waters necessary for the irrigation of the hitherto waterless holy mountain where the god and goddess dwelt. The next lines describe in a somewhat enigmatical passage how these waters came.

The fields received the waters of Enki.
 It was the first day whose month is first;
 It was the second day whose month is second;
 It was the third day whose month is third;
 It was the fourth day whose month is fourth;
 It was the fifth day whose month is fifth;
 It was the sixth day whose month is sixth;
 It was the seventh day whose month is seventh;
 It was the eighth day [whose month is eighth];
 It was the ninth day whose month is ninth—the month of out-
 pouring of water^a
 Like fat, like fat, like abundant sweet cream,
 [Nintu], the mother of the land,
 . . . Had brought them forth.

(Col. II, 33-45.)

In the enumeration of the months these lines present an iteration such as appears to have been very attractive to early men. The period covered is nine months. What is the significance of this? It is possible to trace here two ideas. Possibly the two were combined. The Tigris begins to rise in March, which, according to the later Babylonian calendar, was the first month. The overflow of the Euphrates does not fully subside until the sixth month, and

¹ See G. W. Knox, *The Development of Religion in Japan* (New York, 1907), pp. 21 f.

^a In *nam-sal-a-ka* (translated differently by different scholars) the important element is *sal*. It is the sign for "womb," "woman," and designates also various derived meanings, among which is *šipku*, "pouring out." As pointed out in the text, this meaning seems on the whole to fit best.

the winter rains are at their height in the ninth month. Possibly these facts influenced the poem, but they could not have been the determining facts, since the rains do not cease in nine months. It seems altogether probable, as Jastrow has suggested,¹ that the determining fact in the mind of the writer was that the period of gestation before a human birth is nine months. After nine months Nintu brought forth waters that produced fertility as abundant as fat and cream. This fits in with the whole idea that the fertilizing waters were born from the goddess. This idea being kept in mind, the period involved in the actual irrigation of Babylonia by the overflow of the rivers and the rain might easily seem to be nine months also.

At the conclusion of line 45 our present text of Column II ends with a fracture in the tablet. Evidently, however, the account of how the waters were generated and began to flow upon the earth was concluded with Column II. Column III is occupied with an account of how the water was received by two earth-goddesses, Ninshar, goddess of gardens or of cultivated land, and Ninkurra, goddess of the mountains. Of course logically there could be no gardens until there was water, but in the naïve thought of early men the goddess of garden lands was thought to have existed before that. The fondness of early men for repetition—a fondness akin to that of children—is manifested in the poem by putting practically the same words into the mouth of the two goddesses, one after the other. They are as follows:

Ninshar on the bank of the river cried (?):
 "O Enki, for me they are filled!"
 His messenger, Usmu, he called:
 "Man, their favorite son, has not been purified,
 Ninshar the favorite has not purified."
 His messenger, Usmu, answered:
 "Man, their favorite son, has not been purified,
 Ninshar the favorite has not purified."
 My king, the storm-bringer, the storm-bringer,²

¹ *AJSL*, XXXIII, 114.

² Jastrow, *AJSL*, XXXIII, 126.

His way at once to the boat went,
 Two streams (?)¹ like Shamash² he carried.³
 He closed the hatch,⁴ with fire he purified;
 Enki flooded the fields;
 The fields received the waters of Enki.
 It was the first day whose month is first;
 It was the second day whose month is second;
 It was the ninth day whose month is ninth, the month
 of the outpouring of water.
 Like fat, like fat, like abundant sweet cream,
 Ninshar like fat
 Had brought them forth.

(Col. III, 1-20.)

In these lines several strands of thought are mingled in that sort of confusion that sometimes occurs in folklore when two or three stories, originally different, are blended into one. At the beginning Ninshar appears to be rejoicing that the canals are filled for her. Then Enki and his messenger, Usmu, speak of the non-purification of man. The creation of man is here taken for granted. Possibly it is assumed that the creation as described in the tablet, discussed

¹ This line has puzzled all interpreters. My rendering of it is wholly tentative: *gu-ba* may possibly be an ideogram, or *gu* may be an ideogram and *ba* = "his." If my interpretation of the line is correct, it states that Enki carried two *gu-ba*, like Shamash. From Col. IV, 22, it appears that the *gu-ba* could hold water. On the seal cylinders Shamash is frequently pictured carrying a vase from which two streams issue; see Ward, *Seal Cylinders of Western Asia*, Nos. 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 292. Sometimes, when so represented, Shamash is represented as sailing in a boat as Enki does here (Ward, *ibid.*, No. 292). It seems probable, therefore, that as Enki sailed away to irrigate he may have been thought to have carried streams.

² Jastrow (*op. cit.*, p. 126) claims that the next sign is the sign for 2/3. In this he is, however, mistaken. I have examined the tablet, and it is clearly the sign for 1/3, *šuššana*. But how is it to be interpreted? The ordinary numerical sign for "20" also had the meaning *šuššana*, because in the sexagesimal system 20 is 1/3 of 60 (see *OBW*, 4317). Now "20" is the numerical writing of the name of Utu (Akkadian, Shamash), the sun-god; see *CT*, XXV, 50, 10). I take it that here *šuššana* is employed as a numerical writing of Shamash, and that the text states that, as Enki sailed away in the storm cloud, he sailed as Utu does on his daily course through the heavens. A Sumerian hymn represents the moon as thus sailing in a bark across the heavens; see *CT*, XV, 17, 11 f.

³ I divide the syllables of the line differently from Jastrow, taking the verb to be *ba-nam-mi-in-rá*. *rá* or *tum* (the sign may have either phonetic value, *OBW*, 207³) may be given a causative signification.

⁴ *gab* = *pitá*, "open," "opening"; *OBW*, 180³; so Jastrow.

below, is known to the reader. At all events, man is not purified. Enki, the god of the storm cloud, accordingly embarks on his boat and launches into the deep, but instead of purifying man he brings rain on the earth and fills the canals. Then when this is done, a kind of refrain repeats the closing lines of Column II, substituting Ninshar for Nintu, thus attributing the begetting of rain to Ninshar. The first two lines appear to continue the previous narrative. Lines 3-8, which refer to the purification of man, have no connection with the context, unless it was necessary that he should be purified before the benefits of irrigation could be enjoyed by the earth. If this is the point of view, it is not made clear. One is tempted to think that the lines are an extraneous element that was imperfectly fused with the story. Lines 9-14 embody a myth whereby Ea brought irrigation by rain. This may have been a part of the original story, however, simply supplying the detail of how the water was distributed after Nintu had brought it forth. It seems probable that it was a separate myth that was woven into the epic. Lines 15-20 probably embody still another myth that made Ninshar the mother of the rain. If one says that Ninshar is but Nintu under another name, it does not alter the fact of the separate myth. In antiquity difference of name implies difference of personality, and the blending of deities is a later syncretistic movement.

Ninkurra [on the bank of the river] cried (?):
 "O Enki, for me they are filled, they are filled!"
 His messenger Usmu he called:
 "Man, their favorite son, has not been purified.
 Ninkurra the favorite has not purified."
 His messenger Usmu answered:
 "Man, their favorite son, has not been purified,
 Ninkurra the favorite has not purified."
 My king the storm-bringer, the storm-bringer,
 His way at once to the boat went,
 Two streams (?) like Shamash¹ he carried.

¹ The reading here is *bar-dim* instead of *šuššana-dim*, as in line 11. If there were one more perpendicular stroke, *bar* would become *šuššana*. Probably the omission is a scribal error. *bar* = *uṣṣubu*, *uṣṣulu*, and *namaru*, all of which mean bright (OBW, 77^{M, 3, 106}), is, however, a good descriptive epithet of the sun-god.

He closed the hatch, with fire he purified;
 Enki flooded the fields;
 The fields received the waters of Enki.
 It was the first day whose month is first;
 It was the ninth day whose month is ninth, the month
 of the outpouring of water.
 Like fat, like fat, like abundant sweet cream,
 Ninkurra like fat had brought them forth.

(Col. III, 21-38.)

As already remarked, Ninkurra is goddess of the mountain land. The word *kur* also stands for "country," i.e., lands both cultivated and uncultivated. Ninkurra was accordingly the goddess of land in general in contrast to the garden lands. This section tells how the irrigating waters reached these lands, but its material presents the same sort of mixture and motifs as the preceding section concerning gardens.

The next episode, III, 39-IV, 48, introduces a new and much disputed character, the god Takku (whom Langdon calls Tagtug).¹ So many lines of Column IV are lost that the significance of the episode is obscure, though it is clear that it, like the others, deals with the giving of fertility. It will be best first to present the translation. I shall call the name of the god Takku instead of Tagtug.

The god Takku to receive his outpouring*
 Nintu to Takku [concerning the outpouring] spoke:
 "I will irrigate¹ thee with my irrigation
 With favorable words will I speak
 The one alone that will restrain it

¹ How the name should be vocalized is as yet not clear. Langdon reads it Tagtug (which is phonetically possible), and endeavors to show that Noah is a translation of it (which is most improbable). It is far better to follow the general rule that when two signs stand side by side, the first of which possesses a syllabic value ending in a consonant with which one of the phonetic values of the other begins, they are to be so vocalized as to express this vocalic harmony. This gives the reading *Takku*.

* The phrase is *sal-ni dim*; *sal*, as we have seen, can mean "outpouring"; *dim*=*liqá*, "take" (*OBW*, 60¹). I take *sal-ni*, as in II, 42; III, 17 and 36, to refer to the coming of the waters. As will appear below, Takku, as a god of cultivated land, was particularly interested in this.

¹ *ri*=*rahasu*, "inundate," "wash." On account of the context it seems better to interpret it as referring to the inundation than to render it "purify," as Jastrow does.

Enki for me shall. . . .

[IV, 1 ff., twelve lines are wholly lost.]

To Takku to receive the outpouring. . . .

[Four lines are broken away.]

The tree (?)¹ let him plant,

The tree (?) let him plant,

At the tree for explanation of the great outpouring² let my
begotten stand (?),

Let the two *gu-bo*³ be filled with water,

Abundant water let him pour out,

Reservoir water let him pour out,

The barren land let him irrigate,

As gardener let him go forth (?),

On the bank, along the bank let. . . .

Who art thou? The garden

For Enki, the gardener. . . .

[Five lines are broken away.]

The tree (?) he planted,

The tree (?) he planted; at its base he rested.

Enki turned his eyes to him; his sceptre he lifted up;

Enki to Takku took his way.

At the tree (?) he said: "A holy revelation," "a holy revelation!"⁴

"Who is it that thou art?"

"I am a gardener; joyful

For a price I will give thee."

Takku with joyful heart at the tree (?) the revelation beheld,⁵

Enki to Takku explained his outpouring.

The promised fruit was given to him,

At the tree (?) it was given to him,

At the tree (?) it was given to him.

Takku received the outpouring; with the left hand he grasped it;
with the right he seized it.

(Col. III, 39—Col. IV, 48.)

The translation of this broken and difficult section is tentative only. If this rendering at all represents the meaning of the original,

¹ Jastrow's reading of the text is here tentatively followed.

² I read *dim-sal-nun*, taking *dim* = *liqá*, "to receive," or "how to receive." It might be explained as equal to *kababu*, "bend," "subdue," and be held to refer to the knowledge of how to subdue the overflow to the uses of agriculture.

³ Whatever this object was, it appears to have been something that could hold water.

⁴ The signs are *gál-el gál-el*; *gál* = *pišá*, "open," and *el* = "bright," "holy."

⁵ *šub* = *pádsu*, "see" (?); *OBW*, 69²⁰.

Nintu first promises to her offspring Takku, a god of agriculture, to gain for him from Ea directions how to take advantage of the irrigating waters that had been begotten. After the first break in Column IV Nintu appears to be giving to Takku directions as to what he shall do in order to induce Enki to come and impart to him the necessary directions for the use of the waters in irrigation. The last section of Column IV apparently relates how Takku did this, how Enki came and imparted to him the secret, and how as a result he received fruit. Enki would seem to have imparted the information in a dream while Takku was resting at the foot of a sacred tree. In other words, like the myth of Oannes in Berossos, we are here told how Enki, the original of Oannes, taught agriculture. Thus understood, this episode follows naturally upon the preceding ones.

The fifth column contains (lines 1-36) a description of the growth of certain plants and an explanation of their use. Seven lines are broken away at the beginning, so that we do not know how the episode began, though, as Jastrow has pointed out,¹ line 7 can be restored in part from line 22. Without troubling the reader with the intricacies of restoration, the translation of this episode is as follows:

[The wood-plant grew,]
 [The salt-plant] grew,
 [The . . . plant] grew,
 [The *a-pa-sar*-plant] grew,
 [The *tu-tu*-plant] grew,
 [The . . . plant] grew,
 [The . . . plant] grew,
 [The cassia] plant grew.
 "O Enki, for me they are brought forth;
 they are brought forth."²
 To his messenger Usmu he spoke, he said:
 "The plants, their fate forever [I have determined].
 "What is this? What is this?"³
 His messenger Usmu returned:
 [.]

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 133.

² Perhaps it is Takku speaking.

³ The question is apparently asked by Usmu. The reply is omitted, but is really given in the words of Usmu to Takku.

"My king has commanded the wood-plant,
 That it may be cut off and eaten.
 My king has commanded the salt-plant,
 That it may be cut off¹ and eaten.
 My king has commanded the . . . plant,
 That it may be cut off [and eaten].
 My king has commanded the *a-pa-sar*-plant,
 That it may be cut off and eaten.
 [My king] has commanded the *tu-tu*-plant,
 [That it may be cut off] and eaten.
 [My king has commanded the . . . plant],
 [That it may be cut off and eaten].
 [My king has commanded the . . . plant],
 That it may be cut off and eaten.
 [My king] has commanded the cassia plant,
 That it may be cut off and eaten."

(Col. V, 7-36.)

For the plants whose fate he had fixed he pronounced the edict. In the lines just translated the words "my king" refer, of course, to Enki. Usmu, in reporting the words of his master, thus designates him. Usmu accordingly reports that eight plants may be eaten. Through a misunderstanding of the passage, entirely natural in studying a fragmentary text the first time, Langdon in his earliest articles on the tablet inferred that the plant which he now rightly translates cassia was the forbidden fruit. Having taken Tagtug (Takku) for Noah, he reached the conclusion that according to this text Noah ate the forbidden fruit which was the cause of the fall of man. Later study of the passage has, however, shown that Enki gives permission to eat the cassia as well as the other plants, so that there can be no question of forbidden fruit at all.

In the preceding section Enki had taught how to make use of irrigating waters in agriculture, so as to obtain fruit; in this section he explains what fruits may be eaten. The episode therefore follows naturally upon those that precede, and relates another step in the unfolding of the knowledge which made civilization possible.

The next section relates how the goddess Ninkharsag, another of the mother-goddesses, who was in reality identical with Nintu,

¹ In the Sumerian two different words are employed with regular alternation for "cut off." One of them might be rendered "plucked," as Langdon and Jastrow have done.

Ninshar, and Ninkurra, though perhaps not recognized as such by the makers of this poem, became angry for some reason and uttered a curse upon man, whereupon Enlil placated her. The passage runs:

By Ninkharsag in the name of Enki a curse was uttered:
 "The face of life when he dies he shall never see [again.]"
 The great gods¹ in the dust sat down.
 The rebellious one to Enlil said:
 "I, Ninkharsag, brought forth for thee people; what is my reward?"
 Enlil, the begetter, answered the rebellious one:
 "Thou, Ninkharsag, hast brought forth people;
 In my city I will make two thrones (?) and thy name shall be called
 on there.
 As a dignitary his head alone is exalted;
 His heart (?) alone is changed;
 His eye alone is endowed with light."

(Col. V, 37-47.)

The last three lines here refer apparently to Takku, who would seem to be in some way the representative of humanity. Because of the favor that Enki had bestowed upon him, Ninkharsag, the spouse of Enlil of Nippur, became jealous of him and uttered a curse denying immortality to man. In order to placate her, Enlil promised that her throne should stand with his in Nippur, and that her name should be called upon there too. In conclusion he explains to her that she need not be jealous of her offspring as a whole, that only Takku has been accorded this extraordinary honor.²

This passage reflects the Sumerian-Semitic view that the gods were jealous of man, lest he attain immortality. The best-known expression of this view is in Gen. 3:22, but it also finds expression in the Babylonian Adapa legend.³ In that legend it is Enki (Ea) who manifests the jealousy; here it is Ninkharsag. The basic explanation of human mortality is the same in all these narratives, though, owing to the various forms assumed by myths in early folklore, the details of the explanation differ. The passage here translated affords a hitherto unknown explanation.

¹ The text has *dingir* (an) *a-nun-na-ge*, not *an-nun-na-ki*.

² This view is based on the interpretation suggested by Professor Prince (*JAOS*, XXXVI, 106), that lines 45-47 refer to Takku.

³ For the legend cf. G. A. Barton, *Archaeology and the Bible*, pp. 260 f.

The first twenty-three lines of Column VI are too broken for connected translation. It appears from the few words which can be made out that some appeal was made to Enlil and that some kind of a colloquy occurred between him and Ninkharsag. From the last part of the column it appears that, in view of man's mortality and the illnesses which resulted in death, the deities determined to impart to him a knowledge of the medicinal or curative powers. This inference is based on the following passage:

"My brother, what of thee is ill?"
 "My stable-cow is ill."
 "The god Absham have I brought forth for thee."
 "My brother, what of thee is ill?"
 "My flock is ill."
 "The goddess Nintulla have I brought forth for thee."
 "My brother, what of thee is ill?" "My mouth is ill."
 "The goddess Ninkautu I have brought forth for thee."
 "My brother, what of thee is ill?" "My mouth is ill."
 "The goddess Ninkasi have I brought forth for thee."
 "My brother, What of thee is ill?" "My genitals are ill."
 "The god Nazi have I brought forth for thee."
 "My brother what of thee is ill?" "My right hand is ill."
 "The god Dazid have I brought forth for thee."
 "My brother, what of thee is ill?" "My rib is ill."
 "The goddess Ninti have I brought forth for thee."
 "My brother, what of thee is ill?" "My brain is ill."
 "The god Enshagmê have I created for thee."
 "Gloriously are they brought forth; they are created."
 (Col. VI, 24-42.)

These lines indicate that the cure of certain diseases of man and beast were assigned to different spirits. It seems probable, therefore, that an agreement that this should be done was reached by Enlil and Ninkharsag in the broken lines which precede.

¹ The names of these deities form a series of puns on the names of the things that are ill. Thus to cure *ab*, "the cow," there is the god *ab-sham*, "Father of the plant"; for *ku*, "the flock," Nintulla, "Lady of the flock"; for the first *ka*, "mouth," there is Ninkautu, "Lady who makes the weak mouth to speak"; for the second *ka* there is Ninkasi, "Lady who fills the mouth"; for *na-si*, "genitals," the god Nazi; for *da-sid*, "right hand," the god Dazid; for *ti*, "rib" or "life," Ninti, "Lady of the rib" or "life"; for *me*, "intelligence" or "brain," Enshagmê, "Lord of the favorable intelligence."

The tablet concludes with the following invocation:

May Absham be king of vegetation!
 May Nintul be lord of Magan!
 May Ninkautu choose Ninazu as a spouse!
 May Ninkasi be the full heart's possession!
 May Nazi be lord of strength!
 May Dazid grasp the outreaching right hand!
 May Ninti be mistress of the month!
 May Enshagmê be lord of Dilmun (?)!
 Glory!

(Col. VI, 43-51.)

The appropriateness of a number of these petitions is still obscure to me.

Such is this so-called "epic" as it appears to the writer in the light of all that has been written upon it. As here interpreted, each part leads to the next subsequent part in an order that is, for a poem made from collected folk-tales, wonderfully logical. The whole has to do with the beginnings of irrigation and agriculture and with the civilization that grew out of them. The "Flood," as ordinarily understood, does not appear in the narrative. There is no ark, no Noah. Equally clear is it that there is in the narrative no fall of man. But what of the being Takku? What is to be made of him? It seems clear from the narrative that he is a god, but it is also clear that he seems in some way to be a representative of humanity. May he not be a kind of deified man—an Adam? Before answering these questions it will be well to present another document, discovered in the University Museum in Philadelphia by the writer, in which Takku is mentioned three times.¹ It runs as follows:

The mountain of heaven and earth

The assembly of the great gods entered as many as there were.

¹ Translations of this tablet have been published by the writer in *JAOS*, XXXVII, 36 ff.; *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, LVI, 275 f.; and in the second edition of *Archaeology and the Bible*, May, 1916. The tablet is badly and carelessly written, and in studying the text finally, before sending the cuneiform copy to press, it has been possible to improve the readings in a few points. The reading "Takku" instead of "Tikku" is one of these. The rendering here given is based upon these improved readings and such maturing of judgment as, by further pondering on the possibilities and probabilities of Sumerian constructions, the writer has been able to reach. The character of the document, as at first perceived, is thus made to stand out more clearly. No one who knows the difficulties of a Sumerian text and the varieties of meanings that are possible to Sumerian words will need to be warned that the writer does not regard this rendering as final. He feels confident, however, that it represents the general meaning of the text.

A tree of Ashnan¹ had not been born, had not become green;
 Land and water² Takku had not created;
 For Takku a temple-terrace had not been filled in;
 A ewe (?) had not bleated (?), a lamb had not been dropped;
 An ass (?) there was not to irrigate the seed;
 A well and a canal (?) had not been dug;
 Horses (?) and cattle had not been created;
 The name of Anshan, spirit of sprout and herd,
 The Anunna, the great gods, had not known;
 There was no *šes*-grain of thirty fold,
 There was no *šes*-grain of fifty fold,
 Small grain, mountain grain, "hand-of-the-brilliant-lady"-grain
 there were not;
 Takku had not been brought forth, a shrine not lifted up;
 Together with Nintu the lord had not brought forth men.
 Shamash as leader came, to her *lalû*³ came forth,
 Mankind he begat;⁴ many men were brought forth;
 Food and sleep he did not plan for them;
 Clothing and dwellings he did not plan for them;
 The people with rushes and rope came,
 By making a dwelling a kindred was formed.
 To the gardens they gave drink;
 On that day they were green;
 Their plants. . . .

[Four lines are here broken away.]

REVERSE

[One line is broken away.]

Father Enlil (?)

 Of mankind
 creation of Enki
 Father Enlil
 Duazagga is surrounded (?), O god. . . .
 Duazagga, the brilliant, I will guard (?) for thee, O god.
 Enki and Enlil cast a spell. . . .
 A flock and Ashnan from Duazag[ga] they cast forth,

¹ An agricultural god.

² The Sumerian is *kalam-e-bi*, which might also be rendered "his land" in the sense of Sumer. In favor of the rendering given in the text is the fact that six times elsewhere in the poem two concrete nouns are followed by *bi* in the sense of "and." In discussing the identity of Takku we shall return to this again.

³ In the Gilgamesh Epic *lalû* is employed for *vulva*.

⁴ Literally "he planned" or "knew."

The flock in a fold they inclosed (?),
His plants as food for the mother they created.
Ashnan rained on the field for them;
The moist (?) wind and the fiery storm cloud they created for them.
The flock in the fold abode;
For the shepherd of the fold joy was abundant.
Ashnan as tall vegetation stood;
The bright land was green; it afforded full joy.
From their field a leader arose;
The son from heaven came to them;
The flock of Ashnan he made to multiply for them;
The whole he raised up, he appointed for them;
The reed-country he appointed for them;
The voice of their god uttered just decisions for them.
A dwelling place was their land; food increased the people.
The prosperity of their land brought them danger;
They made bricks of clay of the land for its protection.
The lord caused them to be and they came into existence.
Companions were they; men with wives he made them dwell;
By night, by day, they are set as helpers.
Sixty lines.

The colophon which states that the tablet contained sixty lines assures us that not more than five lines are entirely lost. The text contains a new creation myth, parallel in some respects to that discovered by Dr. Langdon, but independent of it. It deals in a different way with the story of creation, telling first of the creation of man and then of the development of agriculture and the institutions of Babylonian life. It is much more brief than the text published by Langdon; fewer strands from extraneous folklore have found their way into it.

Like the so-called paradise myth, it begins with an elaborate statement of the things that were non-existent, when the great gods, as many as then existed, entered the mountain of heaven and earth. It then proceeds to tell how men were begotten from the marital union of Shamash and Nintu, just as the other text tells how the irrigating waters were begotten by a similar union between Enki and Nintu. According to the myth, these men lived in Babylonia—at least they made themselves huts like the primitive huts of Babylonia—they also began to cultivate gardens. So much

the legible portion of the obverse tells us. From the fragmentary lines at the beginning of the reverse it appears that for some reason an appeal was made to Enlil, whereupon Enlil and Enki by means of an incantation created the vegetable and agricultural god Ashnan and cast him forth from Duazagga. His advent to the earth inaugurated an era of prosperity that made the land pre-eminent. The last three lines form a kind of summary of the whole and state the divinely established relations of people in society.

This tablet, together with those discovered by Poebel and Langdon that have already been discussed, proves that at Nippur there existed in the third millennium B.C. a cycle of creation myths. Still others, or more complete versions of these, may come to light any day. While the one discovered by Poebel seems to have been an earlier and briefer form of myths circulated in later centuries, the other two introduce us to circles of ideas hitherto unknown to Babylonian scholars. They are genuine bits of Babylonian folklore. Of these, the one last mentioned seems to be the more primitive in form. It presents less evidence of reworking, less effort to mold it into a continuous epic.

In this poem Ashnan, as already remarked, was a god of vegetation and fertility. His name is expressed by an ideogram that was compounded of a head of wheat and two tree-tops. The name designates such a deity as in many Babylonian texts was called Dumuzi or Tammuz. Ashnan appears to have been an old Babylonian name for Tammuz.

We are now prepared to return to the question propounded above: Who was Takku? The answer to this cannot, from our present information, be given with certainty. It depends upon the interpretation put upon four passages in the document last translated. Two of these passages are perfectly clear:

For Takku a temple-terrace had not been filled in—
Takku had not been brought forth, a shrine not lifted up.

These lines indicate that Takku was a being to whom shrines (presumably several of them) existed in Babylonia. From the other two passages two different inferences are possible: (1) Takku is a

god of fertility like Ashnan—in reality Ashnan under another name, or (2) Takku is a deified king.

The fourth line of the poem as translated above runs:

Land and water Takku had not created.

If this is the correct rendering, Takku was not a deified king. As already noted, however, we might translate:

His land (i.e., Sumer) Takku had not created.¹

If thus we take *kalam* in a political sense, Takku might be a deified mortal. In six other passages in the tablet where two nouns are followed by *bi*, *bi* is clearly the postpositive conjunction, and in still two others we have a similar construction with *bi-da*. The grammatical analogy of the text is, accordingly, strongly in favor of the rendering of the line which would make it impossible to think Takku a deified mortal. For this reason the rendering in the text has been adopted.

The second of the passages referred to occurs on the reverse of the tablet:

Ashnan as tall vegetation stood;
The bright land was green; it afforded full joy.
From their field a leader arose;
The son from heaven came to them;
The flock of Ashnan he made to multiply for them;
The whole he raised up, he appointed for them;
The reed country he appointed for them;
The voice of their god uttered just decisions for them.

Who was this leader? Was he some earthly king, who was thought to be heaven born, because of what he was able to accomplish? Or was he a god? The name of Takku is not mentioned in the immediate context, but when we consider the connection of Takku with agriculture set forth in Dr. Langdon's tablet it may be plausibly argued that Takku is the being referred to as leader. If, however, Takku were another name for Ashnan, all that is said here would be just as appropriate as it would be were he a deified king.

¹ This rendering of *kalam-e-bi* regards the *e* not as a noun, but as a vocal affix kindred to the definite article (Delitzsch, *Sumerische Grammatik*, § 61), and *bi* as the pronominal suffix "his" rather than as a postpositive conjunction.

The phrase "the son from heaven" (*dumu-gál-an-na-ta*, "the son descending from heaven") applied to the leader introduces the word *dumu* with which the name Tammuz¹ begins, and favors the view that the leader is the god of vegetation. While the matter cannot be definitely decided, the writer is inclined to the theory that Takku is, like Ashnan, a god of fertility and not a deified mortal. If this be the true explanation of him, it is easy to understand how such a god became in the myth the representative of humanity, since men are so dependent upon vegetation and fertility. But in any event there is nothing in this text, as there was nothing in the tablet previously considered, to connect Takku with Noah.

¹ Tammuz is *dumu-si*, "son of life." Perhaps *gal* here is a scribal error for *si*.

CRITICAL NOTES

ON SOME POINTS, DOCTRINAL AND PRACTICAL, IN THE CATECHETICAL LECTURES OF ST. CYRIL OF JERUSALEM

The writer of a paper on the catechetical lectures of St. Cyril is fortunately relieved from the necessity of discussing the troubles that befell their author during his agitated and harassed episcopate, thrice tossed, as he was, into exile, and often maligned and misunderstood, though finally vindicated and graced with the title of Saint. For the lectures were delivered while he was yet in priest's orders as a young man of some three and thirty years. It is as a presbyter that we listen to him.

Cyril was born about the year 315, apparently of Christian parents, in Jerusalem or its neighborhood. He was ordained deacon by Macarius, the bishop of that see about 335, and priest about 345 by Maximus, whom he succeeded as bishop in 350. He died in 386.

The first eighteen lectures were delivered on week-day evenings in Lent of the year 348 in the Church of the Golgotha, or Martyrium of the Holy Cross; and the five mystagogic discourses at noon during Easter week in the *Andstasis*, or Church of the Holy Sepulchre—all within the precincts of Constantine's elaborate constructions on the holy sites which had been unearthed by his mother, Helena, in 328.

The *competentes* whom he addressed were adults, men and women, but grouped separately in the basilica. They gave in their names, were questioned and examined as to their past life, made confession of their sins, were exorcized or breathed upon, and went about with faces veiled. The exorcisms seem to have been repeated before each catechizing. After enrolment, their instruction in the faith began, forty days before Easter, the lectures being continued at intervals till the week before Palm Sunday. Immediately before Easter the details of the baptismal rite were explained to them (xviii. 32), but this lecture is not given in the extant course. They were baptized and received their first communion on Easter Eve, and then further instructions, on the doctrine and rites of baptism, chrism, and the Eucharist, followed during Easter week.

Cyril spoke in a popular and flowing style, now and then distinguished by poetic figures and rhetorical hyperbole. His knowledge of Scripture

was full and minute—almost every paragraph is illuminated and illustrated by a biblical citation. And if some of these quotations are applied mistakenly or unhistorically, we must remember two things: first, that there was, and is, no one authoritative traditional Catholic exposition of isolated texts of Scripture; the Catholic use of Scripture concerns itself with doctrines, not with interpretations; and, secondly, that the early church read the Bible for edification, and individual students of it often saw illustrations of the doctrinal truths they held, even where they did not really exist. On the other hand, we, in the light of increased knowledge, can discern useful proofs which they overlooked, or were unable to appreciate owing to want of literary or scientific experience. Cyril's use of different illustrative texts does not profess to be traditional. His interpretations are adaptations, or, as Paley would call them, "accommodations" of language, like many of St. Paul's Old Testament quotations, witnessing to the great principle of the "ever-living intelligence, deep and varied meaning, and inexhaustible fulness of Holy Scripture" (Newman, *Lib. Fath.*, xx).

The course of the lectures was well planned out, so that Cyril can tell his hearers that if they miss one they will imperil the completeness of their instruction.

I think my best plan will be to touch upon certain outstanding teachings that arise in the lectures, grouping them under the headings of points of doctrine and points of ritual and practice.

I. *Points of doctrine.*—The first general remark to be made is that Cyril insists with great emphasis upon the fact that the Christian doctrines are essentially scriptural (iv. 17), for he says:

Do not believe me because I tell you these things, unless you receive from Holy Scripture the proof of what is declared. This salvation, which is of our Faith, is not by ingenious reasonings, but by proof from the Holy Scriptures. . . . For concerning the divine and sacred mysteries of the Faith, we ought not to deliver even the most casual remark without the Holy Scriptures.

Cyril is sound on the doctrine of the atonement: "One only is sinless, Jesus Who purgeth our sins" (ii. 10).

On the question of the *ὁμοούσιον* we know that for many years Cyril shrank from its use, preferring the formula *ὅμοιον κατὰ πάντα*, "like in all things." But his teaching embraced all that the *ὁμοούσιον* stood for. He speaks of the Son of God as "eternally begotten, by an inscrutable and incomprehensible generation" (xi. 4). "The Father, being Very God, begat the Son like to Himself, Very God." The Father was never

without the Son (xi. 8 f.). Athanasius himself could not wish for more explicit teaching, and indeed Athanasius himself was by no means wedded to the use of the word *δμοούσιον*. In the whole of his four orations against the Arians it occurs only once (i. 9), and once only in his *Expositio Fidei* (2), though more frequently in some of his other treatises. This is at least a reminder to us not to judge harshly the faith of other people when their phraseology does not exactly coincide with our own. Their *πίστις* may be sound, even though their mode of expression of it may lack technical accuracy.

The "resurrection of the dead" is the form of words which Cyril evidently prefers, though the "resurrection of the flesh" was the expression of this truth which stood in the Jerusalem Creed. He argues for the resurrection from the usual and familiar analogies in nature, and also, in common with other Fathers, from the story of the phoenix (xviii. 3). The existence of the phoenix was part of the ordinary belief of the time, shared by the most intelligent and learned heathen writers—Tacitus, Aelian, Celsus, Philostratus—and, as such, it was naturally appealed to by Clement of Rome, Tertullian, Epiphanius, and others, much as our forefathers believed in the four elements and the motion of the sun around the earth. We know now that the origin of the phoenix fable was purely astronomical, the Egyptian hieroglyph for the phoenix-period of five hundred years being a date-palm (*φαινξ*), which stood for the world-era ushering in a "resurrection" or "restitution of all things." Cyril speaks of there being no inherent difficulty in the idea of flesh being restored to flesh, and dwells, after St. Paul's manner, on the resurrection of the body—not the same body, but a spiritual one—and interprets the clause "resurrection of the flesh" as quite obviously and naturally meaning "resurrection of the dead," i.e., an eternal continuance of life after death (xxiii. 28).

At this point one may note Cyril's views as to the Canon of Holy Scripture. He accepted all our books of the Old Testament *plus* Baruch; and in the New Testament all except the Apocalypse; receiving seven Catholic epistles—James, two by St. Peter, three by St. John, and Jude—and reckoning the "Hebrews" as Pauline. Here he followed the general usage of the Greek church. He carefully cautions his hearers to be content with these, and on no account to read "spurious" works either of the Old Testament or of the New Testament. "What is not read in Church, that do not read by thyself" (iv. 33 ff.).

One is struck throughout the lectures by the extraordinary pains Cyril takes to confute the Jews, and to put counter-arguments into the

hands of his hearers that will enable them to refute Jewish slanders and Jewish evasions of the meaning, plain or obscure, of their own prophecies. The Jews were naturally strong in numbers and an influence in Palestine, and especially in Jerusalem—a fact which was emphasized some twelve years later in their frantic efforts to assist in the abortive attempt under Julian to rebuild the Temple.

Let me pass now to the question of the Creed of the mother-church of Christendom. One of the most interesting results of the study of these lectures is that, although in accordance with the *disciplina arcani* of the age, the formal and exact verbal transcription of the Creed is not given, we are enabled to learn what were the clauses that it contained. This is the more important because the Jerusalem Creed formed the foundation of that Imperial and Constantinopolitan recension of the Creed which nearly the whole of Christendom recites today in the liturgy under the misnomer of "Nicene." It is true that Professor Lebedeff, of Moscow, has recently (see *J. Th. St.* iv. 285) termed the early Jerusalem Creed thus extracted from the lectures "merely the ingenious composition of modern scholars"; but it is obvious that such a Creed existed, otherwise Cyril could not have lectured upon it; and equally obvious that its phrases can be deduced from these lectures without any great exercise of ingenuity, for some of them are expressly stated by Cyril to be those of the Creed. We may affirm then without any hesitation that the early Creed of Jerusalem was cast in the following form:

We believe in One God the Father Almighty,
 Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible:
 And in One Lord Jesus Christ, the Only begotten Son of God,
 Very God, begotten of the Father before all worlds,
 Through Whom all things were made,
 Who became Flesh, and was made Man,
 Was crucified and buried,
 Rose the third day,
 And ascended into the heavens,
 And sat down on the right hand of the Father,
 And is coming again in glory to judge quick and dead,
 Whose kingdom shall have no end:
 And in One Holy Spirit, the Paraclete,
 Who spake by the prophets:
 And in One Baptism of Repentance for the Remission of sins:
 And in One Holy Catholic Church:
 And in the Resurrection of the Flesh:
 And in Life Eternal.

Our knowledge, as a rule, of the exact forms of local symbols is very imperfect, partly because of the dislike of church teachers to give in consecutive order the words of their baptismal symbol, and partly because the importance gained by conciliar creeds pushed the others into the background; but in the case of the Creed of the mother-church of Christendom this is happily not so. We owe our knowledge of it, however, solely to these lectures of St. Cyril.

The *disciplina arcani* seems to us very extraordinarily unnecessary and unpractical. "Tell nothing to a stranger," says Cyril (*Procat.* 12). The catechumens were not permitted to learn what the *competentes* were taught, nor were the latter allowed to write the Creed down, but only to commit it to memory (v. 12). At the head of his lectures Cyril solemnly warns his readers, after the lectures had been published—if one may use such an expression: at any rate, after they had been taken down in writing and circulated—to allow only candidates for baptism and baptized believers to read them; "thou mayest by no means put them into the hands of catechumens, nor of any others who are not Christians, as thou shalt answer to the Lord. And if thou takest a copy of them, write this prohibition in the beginning, as in the sight of the Lord." Very strange does this sound in view of what one imagines must have happened after Nicaea, when creeds were handed about and freely discussed. Nor does this notion as to the secrecy with which Christian truth was guarded agree with what ecclesiastical historians tell us of heathens present in Nicaea out of curiosity as to the Christian belief (Soz. i. 18), and of familiar and colloquial bandying of sacred subjects and questions in the market-places and in the theaters, such as Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Eusebius complained of. Eusebius, (*V.C.* ii. 61) tells us that "solemn matters of divine teaching were subjected to the basest mockery in the very theatres of the heathen." Athanasius (*Or. c. Ar.* i. 7) speaks of boys in the streets and women being questioned on points of doctrine. Socrates says (ii. 2), "The chamberlains in the palace discuss doctrine with the women, and in the family of every citizen there is a logical contest." But the most remarkable testimony is that of Gregory of Nyssa:

Men of yesterday, mere mechanics, offhand dogmatists in theology, servants and slaves that have been flogged, are serious and philosophical with us about matters incomprehensible. The whole city is full of such—clothes-vendors, money-lenders, victuallers. Ask about pence, and he will discuss the Generate and the Ingenerate; inquire the price of bread, he answers Greater is the Father, and the Son is subject; mention that you would like a bath, and he defines that the Son is out of nothing (ii. 898).

Yet in spite of all this, the theory of the *disciplina arcani* persisted at least till the time of Augustine, and indeed later (Council of Orange, Canon 19, 441 A.D.)¹

It is of importance to notice that, before beginning his detailed exposition of the articles of belief, Cyril imparted to his hearers a large body of church teaching on the subjects of the Being of God, Christ, the incarnation, the virgin-birth, the cross, the burial, the resurrection, the ascension, the future judgment, the Holy Spirit, the soul of man, his freedom of will, his body, marriage, food, fasting, dress, the resurrection of the body, the laver of baptism, and Holy Scripture (iv). This teaching naturally varied in its form and language. But after this the candidates were taught orally the exact words of the Creed, which were to be committed to memory and, as I have said, neither to be written down nor recited in the presence of the unbaptized (v. 12).

Before I pass to the points of ritual and practice there are two matters upon which I ought to touch. The first is Cyril's well-known references to the wood of the cross. There are three passages in which he speaks of it, and I will quote them in full, as it may be that they have been misunderstood.

a) "Christ was crucified for our sins truly; shouldest thou be disposed to deny it, the very place which all can see refutes thee, even this blessed Golgotha, in which, on account of Him Who was crucified on it, we are now assembled; and further the whole world is filled with the portions of the wood of the Cross" (iv. 10).

b) Again, speaking of the many witnesses to Christ, Cyril enumerates *inter alia* the manger, Egypt, the Jordan, the winds rebuked, the five loaves, and adds, "The holy wood of the Cross is His witness, which is seen amongst us to this day, and by means of those who have *in faith* taken thereof, has from this place now almost filled the whole world" (x. 19).

c) Once more: "For though I should now deny His crucifixion, this Golgotha confutes me . . . the wood of the Cross confutes me, which has from hence been distributed piecemeal to all the world" (xiii. 4).

Surely there is something very rhetorical in these passages. Is it possible that Cyril used the phrase "the wood of the Cross" metaphorically for faith in Christ's Atonement, or for Christianity itself, which had

¹The theory of the *disciplina arcani* was probably based on the Jewish distinction of certain esoteric literature (or apocrypha) which was more highly treasured than the canonical Scriptures. It could never have been more than a well-recognized and strongly supported convention. See Charles, *Apocr. and pseudepigr.*, I, p. viii; Batiffol, "L'Arcane," *Études d'histoire et de théologie positive* (1902).

spread almost throughout the known world? What does he mean by "those who have *in faith* taken thereof"? Neither Eusebius nor Constantine (Euseb. *V.C.* iii. 28, 30) speaks of any other discovery, at the time of the empress Helena's excavations, beyond the site of the Holy Sepulcher. That was in 328, when Cyril was a boy of thirteen. It is almost incredible that within twenty years there should have grown up a belief that the Cross had been found, and that it should have been distributed piecemeal throughout the world. Pilgrimages to Jerusalem were not so common then as in later times. As a matter of fact it is not until about 394 that Chrysostom gives us the first form of the story of the discovery of three crosses, with the *titulus* attached to the middle one—a story which was amplified and embroidered, doubtless in good faith, by Ambrose and Sulpicius, Rufinus, Socrates, and others in the fifth century. If, however, you prefer to think that Cyril did really believe that the true cross had been discovered, you will probably wish to add that the sifting of evidence as to matters of fact was not his strong point. In any case his language is not innocent of some exaggeration.

The other point I wish to touch upon illustrates Cyril's methods of exegesis, and, besides, is interesting for its own sake. I refer to his interpretation of the symbolism of the water and the blood which issued from the Savior's pierced side (iii. 10; xiii. 21). In speaking of the necessity of baptism, he says:

Unless a man receive Baptism, he hath not salvation; except martyrs only, who even without the water receive the kingdom. For the Saviour Who redeemed the world through the Cross, when His Side was pierced, gave forth blood and water; that in times of peace men should be baptized with water, in times of persecution with their own blood. (Cf. Tertullian *De bapt.* 16.)

In another lecture he speaks differently:

The beginning of signs under Moses was blood and water, and the last of all Jesus's signs was the same. Moses began by changing the river into blood, and Jesus at the end gave forth from His Side water with blood. This was perhaps on account of the two speeches, his who judged Him, and theirs who cried out against Him; or because of the believers and the unbelievers. For Pilate said, I am innocent, and washed his hands in water; they who cried out against Him said, His blood be on us. There came therefore these two out of His Side: the water perhaps for him who judged Him, but for them that shouted against Him, the blood. And again it is to be understood in another way. The blood was for the Jews: the water for the Christians; for upon the Jews as conspirators is the sentence of condemnation by the blood; but to thee who now believest, the salvation which is by water. For nothing happened without a meaning. Our fathers who have written comments have given

another reason of this matter. For since in the Gospel the power of salutary Baptism is twofold, that namely, by means of water bestowed on the illuminated, and that to holy martyrs in persecutions through their own blood, there came out of that salutary Side blood and water, to ratify the gift to confession made for Christ, whether in illumination or on occasions of martyrdom.

He adds characteristically:

There is something besides meant by the Side. The woman who was formed from the side led the way to sin; but Jesus Who came to bestow the grace of pardon on men and women alike, was pierced in the Side for women that He might undo the sin.

II. *Points of ritual and practice.*—

1. First, the ritual of the baptismal rite: The candidates assembled in the outer hall of the baptistery, and there, barefoot and clothed only in a tunic (χιτών), facing the west, they stretched forth the hand and made their renunciation: "I renounce thee, Satan, and all thy works and all thy pomp, and all thy service." They then turned to the East and made their confession of faith in the words of the early Baptismal Creed of Jerusalem: "I believe in the Father and in the Son and in the Holy Ghost, and in one Baptism of repentance." Entering then into the inner chamber they stripped off their tunics and were anointed all over with exorcised oil. The water in the "holy pool" (ἁγία κολυμβήθρα) was sanctified by "the Invocation of the Holy Ghost, and of Christ, and of the Father." Standing on the edge of the font, a second confession of faith in the Holy Trinity was made, and then came the trine immersion, a triple descent beneath the saving waters, pointing (Cyril says) to the three days' burial of Christ. The actual baptism was immediately succeeded by the chrism or unction with holy ointment on forehead, eyes, nostrils, and breast, carrying with it the gift of the Holy Spirit. He says:

Beware of supposing this to be plain ointment. For as the Bread of the Eucharist, after the Invocation of the Holy Ghost, is mere bread no longer, but the Body of Christ, so also this Holy Ointment is no more simple ointment, nor as one might say, common, after the Invocation, but the *charisma* of Christ, and is made effectual to impart the Holy Ghost by the Presence of His Own Godhead. It is symbolically applied to thy forehead and thy other senses; and while thy body is anointed with visible ointment, thy soul is sanctified by the Holy and Life-creating Spirit.

The "illuminated ones" now put on white robes, symbolical of baptismal innocence, which were worn throughout the Easter octave. Thus clad they proceeded into the great Church of the Resurrection, being

welcomed in the words of the Thirty-second Psalm, and admitted to their first communion.

2. The ritual of the Eucharist can be gathered in all its salient features from Cyril's mystagogic lectures, though not, of course, in full detail. In the *Missa Catechumenorum* we read of the Lections, and the Gospel, and the Sermon, with its text and its final doxology. In the *Missa Fidelium* we find the *Lavabo*, followed by the Kiss of Peace. We may infer from the citation of St. Matthew, vss. 23 f., about bringing the gift to the Altar, that here followed the Offertory (xxiii. 3). Then came that most ancient and invariable section of the liturgy beginning with the Anaphora (cf. Cyprian, 252, A.D. *De orat. dom.* 31), the Preface, and Triumphal Hymn. Then followed the Epiclesis, the Great Intercession for the quick and dead, which included one clause particularly interesting to us just now—"for our soldiers and allies"—and the Pater-noster. Then came the Elevation with the words *Tà ἅγια τοῖς ἁγίοις*, to which the people responded, "One is Holy, One is the Lord, Jesus Christ." The Invitation to Communion was sung by a chanter in the words of Psalm 34:8, "O taste and see how gracious the Lord is." Then the reception of the Body of Christ, "the left hand a throne for the right," touching the eyes with the sacred particle, being careful not to let a crumb fall, and responding "Amen." Then the Chalice, bowing before it in reverence, and with the same response. "And while the moisture is still upon thy lips, touching it with thine hands, hallow both thine eyes and brow and the other senses." The liturgy concluded with the Thanksgiving and Blessing.

One other detail of daily or hourly practice calls for notice. In two passages, reminiscent, I think, of Tertullian (*De coron.* 3, 202 A.D.), Cyril urges the use of the sign of the cross. "Let us not then be ashamed of the Cross of Christ; but though another hide it, do thou openly seal it on thy brow, that the devils beholding that princely sign, may flee far away trembling. Make thou this sign when thou eatest and drinkest, sittest or liest down, risest up, speakest, walkest: in a word, on every occasion; for He Who was here crucified, is above in the heavens" (iv. 14). And again:

Be the Cross our seal, made with boldness by our fingers on our brow, and in everything—over the bread we eat and the cups we drink, in our comings in and goings out, before our sleep, when we lie down and when we awake, when we are in the way and when we are still. Great is that preservative; it is without price, for the poor's sake; without toil, for the sick; since its grace is from God (xiii. 36).

I conclude: there is a splendid breadth in Cyril's outlook, a wide horizon, which we might do well to cultivate. After all his explicit directions toward the truth and antidotes against error, he is constrained to conclude with these words:

The ways of finding Eternal Life are many, though I have passed over them by reason of their number. For God in His loving kindness has opened, not one or two only, but many doors by which to enter into the Life everlasting, that as far as lay in Him, all might enjoy it without hindrance . . . which may we all, both teachers and hearers, by God's grace enjoy (xviii. 31).

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CORRECTION

Professor C. C. Torrey of Yale was kind enough to call the attention of the writer to an erroneous statement and an argument based thereon in the *American Journal of Theology*, XXI (January, 1917), 94-109. The Arabic of the first sentence in Abulfeda and Ibu Athlr may very well bear the meaning: "to be the younger contemporary of," "to be born before someone's death." The writer has no data at hand at the present time to show how early this usage is, but it is certainly early enough for Abulfeda and Ibu Athlr. How Galen came to be correlated chronologically with Ptolemy is, of course, another question, which need not and cannot be broached here. For non-Arabists it will be simplest and safest to excise the statement and the arguments deduced therefrom. The argument as a whole will not, the writer believes, be materially affected by this excision.

M. SPRENGLING

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE OLD TESTAMENT¹

This is not a book for the "general reader," but distinctly a work for those studiously minded. It is crammed full of information. The author has brought together here practically all the divergent opinions of leading scholars as to the time of origin of the individual chapters and verses of the Old Testament. With becoming modesty he refrains for the most part from thrusting his own views upon us, where there is any great difference of opinion. He cites an enormous amount of bibliography on every topic, confining himself, however, to books written in English. The accuracy of these citations and the perfection of the proofreading as a whole, in a work involving so much detail, are worthy of the highest praise.

The plan of the book arranges the literary materials to be dealt with in seven groups, viz., (1) "Prior to the Conquest," (2) "The Period of the Judges," (3) "The United Kingdom," (4) "The Divided Kingdom," (5) "The Exile," (6) "The Persian Period," (7) "The Grecian Period." Each of these groups is treated under two heads—the first a general introduction to the literature of the period, and the second a chronologically arranged list in detail of the writings pertaining to the period, with brief critical and chronological notes. An index of biblical passages enables the student to find the treatment of any verse or group of verses with ease. Thus it is a simple matter to find at what period any given passage is placed by modern scholars and why it is thus chronologically located.

The book ought to be very useful to all who are willing to give a little serious attention to the history of Old Testament literature. It is not itself a history of that literature, but it furnishes the materials for such a history. In the hands of a teacher who knows how to integrate the literature with the life of the times, who can bring out clearly the circumstances and forces which produced these literary reactions and show the method and aim that dominated the makers of this literature,

¹ *An Introduction to the Old Testament Chronologically Arranged.* By Harlan Creelman. With a Foreword by F. K. Sanders. New York: Macmillan, 1917. xxxv+383 pages. \$2.75.

the book should prove a great success. Its general point of view, of course, is that of the historical school, and the author's conclusions, in so far as they are indicated, are of the cautious type represented by such scholars as Driver and the contributors to Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*. But the critical literature so abundantly cited, if used by the inquiring reader, will bring him into touch with every shade of opinion.

J. M. POWIS SMITH

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A NEW TEXTUAL CRITICISM

To devote the first of three lectures on textual criticism¹ to an attack upon the modern historical interpretation of the Old Testament seems at first sight a strange procedure. But it becomes explicable when it appears that the lecturer's theory of textual criticism involves the claim that Abraham brought his biography with him from Babylonia already written up in cuneiform characters, and that Moses wrote the entire Hexateuch, using such sources as were available and employing the cuneiform script. Concerning the post-Mosaic books Naville can only conjecture that such books as Joshua, Judges, and Samuel were written in cuneiform, while the later books were prevailing in Aramaic, though the prophets occasionally resorted to cuneiform when they had something particularly important to say. It was Ezra's task to translate the cuneiform documents into Aramaic. Last of all, about the beginning of the Christian era, the rabbis, in order to make a sharp distinction between the Jewish and Samaritan Scriptures, created the square script and turned the Aramaic Scriptures into the Jewish idiom, viz., Hebrew, which now for the first time became a written language.

This strange view is not altogether new. Professor Naville himself has written on it before, and he gives credit to Conder, Sayce, Philippe Berger, and Jeremias as his predecessors on this path. But he carries it out in greater detail and to further conclusions than heretofore. The result is a structure worthy of all praise as a work of the imagination. We can hardly accept it, however, as a piece of serious historical reconstruction. It can scarcely be expected that Professor Naville in one brief lecture should sweep away the labors of the scholars of half a century and rehabilitate Moses as the author of the Pentateuch. As a matter of fact, the considerations emphasized in Lecture I have been weighed again and again and found

¹ *The Text of the Old Testament*. (The Schweich Lectures, 1915.) By Edouard Naville. London: Oxford University Press, 1916. viii+82 pages. 3s.

wanting. If Moses did not write the Pentateuch, it is of course gratuitous to say that he did not write it in cuneiform. In any case, one may wonder where Moses, whose legislative activity was all exercised in the desert, succeeded in finding the clay for his cuneiform tablets. Again, if the Pentateuch was written on cuneiform tablets, why is the specific term for "tablet," viz., **לִפְתָּח**, used only in connection with the stone tablets of the Decalogue? Elsewhere in the Pentateuch the law of Moses is described as written in a **סֵפֶר**. This term is used in Jer., chap. 36, in connection with **סֵפֶר הַכְּתוּב**, "the roll of the book." Cuneiform tablets were never rolled up. In the story of Jeremiah's purchase of a field (Jer., chap. 32) **סֵפֶר** denotes the title-deed, and the record at first sight reads very much as if that deed were written on a clay tablet. But, on the other hand, every statement made in the record is equally well satisfied on the supposition that papyrus was used. It is sound philology to hold that **סֵפֶר** means the same thing in similar contexts everywhere, until we have definite proof of the existence of another meaning.

As to the second claim, that the prophets wrote in Aramaic and that Hebrew did not arise as a literary tongue till about the first Christian century, space forbids adequate discussion. That such a radical change in the language of Scripture as this, at so late a date, should have escaped mention in any literature would be almost unbelievable. Further, that Hebrew should have been the dialect spoken only around Jerusalem is more easily alleged than proved. Indeed, Dr. Naville himself refers to the Canaanite glosses in the Amarna letters as Hebrew (p. 37), and rightly so. Yet these Hebrew words and forms come from such places as Megiddo and Hazur. What then becomes of Hebrew as a local dialect of Judah? The author's attention might also be called to Breasted's article on the origins of the Phoenician alphabet, in *AJSL*, XXXII (1916), which appeared too late to be reckoned with in these lectures.

J. M. POWIS SMITH

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A NEW TEXTBOOK ON HEBREW RELIGION¹

This book belongs to the series of "Handbooks of Ethics and Religion," designed mainly for use as college textbooks. It is not usually the aim of such books to strike out on new and independent lines of

¹ *The Origin and Growth of the Hebrew Religion*. By Professor Henry Thatcher Fowler. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916. xv+190 pages. \$1.00.

investigation, but rather to present the generally accepted results of historical criticism concisely, accurately, clearly, and, if the writer has the happy gift, attractively. Certainly the last quality is by no means the least important, for it is the mission of such books not so much to satisfy an interest in the subject already awakened as to create an interest.

The present little work fulfils these requirements in large measure. It is not weighted with the pros and cons on mooted questions which might have great interest for scholars but very little for the youthful reader. The main themes of the book are therefore allowed to stand out clearly so that they can be grasped without difficulty, and the summary at the close gathers up the results of the previous studies succinctly and forcibly. A definite impression is thus left upon the reader's mind, and this is most desirable. This impression will enable him to proceed farther into biblical studies with a correct sense of direction. The book furnishes excellent starting-points for more detailed reading and study. Finally, the material is presented attractively. The book is pleasant reading, though I cannot say that it is calculated to pique curiosity or to challenge attention by any very striking or picturesque way of putting things. But the necessary conventionality of the textbook and picturesqueness of treatment are qualities difficult to combine.

The general critical attitude of Professor Fowler may be seen in the following extracts. He is interested in tracing back to Moses the sources of the moral elements rather than the cult elements in Hebrew religion. Budde's covenant theory, Paton's emphasis upon Jahweh's pity and power in the redemption of Israel from Egypt, and Wellhausen's emphasis upon Jahweh's justice in the "decisions" at Kadesh are the roots of the moralized religion of the Hebrews. The nimbus which gathers round the figure of David is of course dissipated in the usual way. Isaiah still teaches the inviolability of Zion in 701, though just why he should have done so when the country was apostatizing from Jahweh under the leadership of the Egyptian party is not explained (p. 92). A hesitating position is adopted with reference to the specifically messianic prophecies in Isaiah (pp. 93, 155). It is interesting to notice, by the way, how doubts of these prophecies are finally making their way into popularizations of the historical treatment of the Old Testament. The significance of Jeremiah and Ezekiel for the development of individualism is properly underscored, though a much-needed criticism, or suggestion of criticism, of Ezekiel's doctrine of individual

responsibility is missing. The identification of the servant in Deutero-Isaiah is left somewhat in doubt, though with leanings toward the theory of his identification with the remnant. For my own part I should have preferred to see the individualistic interpretation of the servant definitely eliminated. One of the most useful features of the book is the very well-selected series of Scripture passages at the beginning of each chapter, which it is intended that the student should examine before reading the chapter. These passages will undoubtedly prove to be most helpful in quickening the student's interest in the following discussion. Professor Fowler has not allowed any controversial element to enter into his book. The impression which it makes is altogether constructive. The student is introduced to the modern view of the Old Testament as if it were a matter of course. This is in keeping with the sound pedagogical theories which obviously underlie the arrangement and general treatment of the subject. Teachers will find Professor Fowler's work a very serviceable handbook on a theme which has a perennial interest and importance, even in the din of these wild days.

KEMPER FULLERTON

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A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF JESUS

Two portly and expensive volumes¹ represent the culmination of President Hall's long-continued and monumental activities in his chosen field, and have been awaited with great expectation. They rightly claim the interest and appreciation of many students. The title is likely to mislead the general reader; the work is not a contribution to the study of Jesus, but to the study of genetic psychology. Librarians need to note this in cataloguing it. The student who wishes to know what Jesus said and did, or to understand the Gospels, will find only incidental benefit here; it is not the psychology of Jesus which is treated, but the psychology of those who have reflected on Jesus. How the human mind has reacted upon this name; above all, how a modern encyclopedic mind, superlatively trained in psychological analysis, reacts upon it, is exhaustively and illuminatingly presented. The distinction between the original fact and the reaction upon it is unimportant for the author's purpose, and is rarely drawn. It is easier and more productive to psychologize the reaction. For example, it is obviously quite mean-

¹ *Jesus the Christ in the Light of Psychology*. By G. Stanley Hall. New York: Doubleday Page & Co., 1917. 2 vols. xix+733 pages. \$7.50 net.

ingless to discuss the psychology of the actual physical birth of Jesus. But Dr. Hall, in his forty-one pages on the nativity, discusses the mental processes which, as he supposes, went on in those ancient minds which shaped the legend of the virgin birth (which is twice—pp. ix and 343—inexcusably called the Immaculate Conception), and adds much psychological reflection of his own on the same mythic motif. All this casts no light at all on the actual circumstances of Jesus' birth and very little on the gospel narrative, but very much on the psychology of the Clark University school. In short, the book can be adequately reviewed only by the psychologist; the New Testament student has little concern with it or it with him. He may feel that at times the author is too severe on the humble desire to know the truth as to what Jesus said and did, as in this comment on the miracles (Introduction, p. xiii): "Negation of them by crude rationalism is not progress but regression. All discussion of whether the nature miracles of the New Testament were literally performed or not represents a low plane of crass religious materialism." Indeed (p. 400), "the whole progress of recent critical studies of Christianity has consisted largely in emancipating it from merely textual criticism and historical research. The certain data are so meagre, gappy and contradictory that psychology must, even more than it has of late, become henceforth our chief guide. . . . In fact, the Jesus problems have already become, some solely, and all increasingly, those of psychology or the higher anthropology."

It is natural, then, that Dr. Hall should have an antecedent sympathy with the contentions of Drews, W. B. Smith, and others of the Christ-myth school. He presents at length and in the most favorable light their arguments, with such evident interest that it is something of a surprise when he rejects (p. 312) their central hypothesis. His real feeling comes out in the statement (p. 488) that Jesus "is the center of the greatest psychic synthesis ever yet made, and from this viewpoint, as from most others, it makes vastly less difference than was till very lately thought how much of his majestic figure is historic, and how much a 'focus of projection of the optimal ideals of the race.'" Again: "I believe in the historical Jesus, but I have tried to show how even the church can get on, if it should ever have to do so, without him, and that this might possibly ultimately make for greater spirituality" (Introduction, p. viii). Then this (p. 34): "Whether we regard Jesus as myth or history, we all need him alike. If I hold him a better and purer psychological being than any other, although made warp and woof of human wishes, and needs, and ideals, I insist that on this basis I

ought to be called an orthodox Christian, because thus to me he remains the highest, best, and most helpful of all who ever lived, whether that life be in Judea or in the soul of man." We are thus prepared to read (p. 259) concerning the virgin birth: "Its truth so far transcends historicity that the psychologist of the folk-soul can say . . . with a fulness of conviction that criticism can never give and that the old faith never knew, that Jesus was veritably 'conceived of the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary.'" Page xviii of the Introduction puts this attitude still more concretely: "As a result of all this, I believe I can now repeat almost every clause of the Apostles' Creed with a fervent sentiment of conviction. My intellectual interpretation of the meaning of each item of it probably differs *toto caelo* from that of the average orthodox believer. To me not a clause of it is true in a crass, literal, material sense, but all of it is true in a sense far higher, which is only symbolized on the literal plane."

The reader, thus prepared, cannot justifiably feel surprise or disappointment that we do not come to the historic Jesus until page 288, near the end of the first volume, and that the subject of discussion is so prevailingly a gospel phrase or modern comment which Dr. Hall does not regard as historic. There is a long chapter on "Miracles," although we are told that "true miracles are things which are absolutely false. They never happen. . . . These are only fabrications, and that of a low order" (p. 609). Yet "psychoanalysis" can find in these fabrications a rich store of significance, and each miracle-story is discussed in great detail, in quite "uncritical" fashion, with no discrimination of sources, all the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel being freely mingled, while modern reflections quite unrelated to the original motives are everywhere attached. The resurrection, too, has a great chapter to itself, but the subject dealt with is *the belief* in the resurrection, irrespective of any fact behind that belief. "The risen Jesus is . . . in danger of being a little besmirched by too much peering criticism as to times and places, which sometimes only vulgarizes the purely ideal" (p. 699). So pages 678 ff., on the "Passion," treat only of others thinking of Jesus' death, not of Jesus' own thoughts and feelings as the catastrophe overwhelmed him. Perhaps chapter vii, on "Jesus' Eschatology," gives most attention to his own psychology. Yet even here the interest is chiefly elsewhere. Typical is page 428, which presents an impressive series of contrasts in Jesus' character; in reality the contrasts are not in Jesus, nor even in the discrepant gospel records, but in various later accounts and interpretations by theologians and biographers. This

chapter, like all the rest, is vitiated for the student of history by the entire failure to discriminate sources. The development of Jesus' messianic consciousness is described (on pp. 345-47) with chief reliance on Fourth Gospel passages, which are freely mingled with others from the synoptists. So we read (p. 352): "Many of the above Johannin passages show that he also revered the God within his own breast," etc. Students will not be satisfied with the account of the Kingdom of God in chapter vi, nor with the understanding of the term "Son of Man" (p. 339). Contestable also are the statements that Jesus began by conceiving the Kingdom as an inward reality (p. 370), that the priests knew of his claim to messiahship before the disciples did (p. 373), that Jesus demanded from the people messianic recognition (pp. 433 f.), above all, the statement (pp. 404 f., 434) that Jesus adopted the mythical concept of the dying and rising god and deliberately set himself to fulfil it. Incidentally, the account of this concept on pages 716-22 is superficial and inaccurate. The historical theologian will pause over the statement (p. 15), "To Paul and the early Church he [Jesus] was no less very God of very God, in whom divinity had eclipsed humanity." Along with this goes the constant assumption, so gratifying to traditional orthodoxy, that Jesus regarded himself as God (p. 303 and *passim*), that the terms "Messiah" and "Son of God" implied deity. The related definition of God may be quoted (p. 285): "It is this man's better generic self outwardly projected that man has always and everywhere worshipped. Than himself thus spiritualized there is no other God." The next page has cryptic words: "The birth-story of Jesus . . . might be called the return of the not so much prodigal as ostracized God to his father, man. . . . So there is a sense in which generic man or humanity is truly God's father and is recognized as such by the title Son of God, which Jesus gave to himself." Add to this the sentence (p. 159): "No more glorious affirmation was ever made than that God and man simultaneously became each other."

It is clear that what Dr. Hall furnishes is not contributions to the historian or to the exegete. All the more is it to be regretted that in those passages which have specific New Testament reference there should be so many slips and inaccuracies, suggesting inadequate familiarity with the material. We read (p. 201) of "the bewitched *Galileans* (Gal. 3:1)," and later (p. 592) of "the churches Paul founded at Corinth and *Galilee*." Of the centurion Dr. Hall says (p. 124): "Jesus, we are told, was profoundly impressed by his unprecedented faith, and *with no remonstrance* healed *him*, though a gentile, *the only case in which he*

did so, indicating that Jesus himself had exceptional reverence for a believing soldier." Besides the threefold error of fact in this sentence, the argument for Jesus' military sympathies is notable even in these times. On page 195 we learn, to our surprise, that Apollos taught Aquila and Priscilla, "to whom he expounded the way of the Lord more perfectly"! The true statement (p. 523), that "John records not one true parable," suggests a rephrasing of the words (p. 525), "Some of Jesus' parables, like the 'good shepherd' and the vineyard, seem amplified from Old Testament metaphors." The chapter on the parables has a very full discussion of the passages in detail, but, again, not from the standpoint of the exegete. The reference (p. 547) to "the very scholarly but finicking and jejune Jülicher" suggests the method of approach. Incidentally, if a sensitive reader shrinks a bit at "storiettes," near the beginning of this chapter (p. 518), he may experience real distress at "parablette" (p. 537). On page 620, "It hath been said by this or that prophet, priest, or king of high degree of old, but I say unto you," does not reproduce the wording or the thought of Matt., chap. 5. What authority is there for the inference (p. 613) concerning the paralytic let down through the roof, that Jesus "thought the disease due to infection from a sex disease"? On page 688 and several times later the use of the word "parousia" for the post-resurrection appearances of Jesus is misleading. "Twenty-five or thirty leagues" (p. 658) gives a false idea of the "25 or 30 *stadia*" of John 6:19; the extreme dimensions of the lake are thirteen by seven miles. "The first news of the empty tomb was brought by Mary the Mother" (p. 688) is a slip; so is Bethesda (p. 605) for Bethsaida in a reference to Mark 8:22. More complicated is the confusion (p. 606) in regard to the Bartimaeus narrative. "Matthew *and* Mark say there were two, while Luke says only one blind man, Bartimaeus. Mark says it was on the way to, and Matthew *and* Luke say it was on the way from, the city." In reality, Matthew alone says two men, while Luke alone places the incident on the way *to* the city. "At Cypress" (p. 718) apparently means "in the island of Cyprus," while "the banks of the Arno," in the description of a religious festival in Rome (p. 720), is easily corrected.

Particularly noticeable are the errata in the references to books and authors. Many are obviously uncorrected misprints; not all are so explainable. J. M. Robertson becomes "Robinson" (p. 14); we have Professor "Baumgarte" of Kiel (p. 117), "Haase" and "Weissäcker" (p. 134), "Wellshausen" (p. 241), "Fiehm" (for "Riehm") and "V." Völter (p. 339), "Oelshausen" (p. 658), "Woolstan" (p. 611),

"Mossiman" (p. 690), "Raville" (p. 711). Similarly "Charimus" (for "Charinus," p. 51), "Wölfenbeutel" (p. 155), "Gundry" (for "Kundry," p. 300), "Piraeon" (for "Perean," p. 322). James Denny is called "G. Denny"; the elder Holtzmann is given the initials "J. H."; Bernhard Weiss and Erich Haupt take an initial from their doctorates and become respectively "D. B. Weiss" and "D. E. Haupt" (all these on p. 470); similarly "D. M. Rade" (p. 667). The "Lectures on the Religion of the Semites" are ascribed (p. 731) to Wm. Ramsay Smith. Page 138 attributes to Wendt a *History of Jesus*, translated in 2 volumes, 1901; and to Bousset is ascribed a work, *Teachings of Jesus* (London, 1906). His "Jesus" may be intended, though the chapter citation is quite wrong for this. Father Tyrrel's *Christianity at the Cross-Roads* is cited (p. 397) as *The Church at the Cross-Roads*. T. J. Thorburn, *Jesus the Christ, Historical or Mythical?* becomes (p. 148) J. T. Thorburn, *Jesus the Christ. History or Miracle*. August Wünsche's *Leiden des Messias* is thrice described as an account of Jesus, presenting him as suffering, solitary, and misunderstood (pp. 160, 420, 694). There is nothing of the sort in the book, which is a critical discussion of the idea of Messiah as suffering, according to Old Testament and rabbinic sources. Tolstoi's familiar novel is not "*The*" *Resurrection*, as it is called on page 82. Who is "Krishna (B.C. 1580), the editor of the Vedas" (p. 106)? The notes on page 595 are meaningless and unrelated to the text. Page 40 has an amazing amount of error in a discussion of what are everywhere called *Agraphia*. Alfred Resch and his well-known book become C. Reich, "*Agraphia ausserevangelische Fragmente*." Then Uhlhorn's *Conflict of Christianity with Heathenism* and Nestle's *De Sancta Cruce* are gravely presented as discussions of the *Agrapha*, which take up and carry farther the researches of Resch. Uhlhorn's book, we are told, reaches the conclusion that only ten out of Reich's 154 *Agraphia* are genuine! What can Dr. Hall or his secretaries have in mind? Neither of these books has the slightest relation to the *Agrapha* or to Resch. Uhlhorn appeared in 1874, fifteen years before Resch; the English translation (which Dr. Hall dates 1912) appeared in 1879. Nestle's book on the cross appeared in the same year with Resch (1889). Such blunders should not appear in a professedly scientific work. On the same page Klostermann becomes "Kostelmann," and we meet another student of *agraphia* (and *pseudepigraphia*, p. 41) in the person of "B. Peck."

Misprints are especially frequent in foreign (mainly German) words. So "*der* Christus-mythe" (p. 205), "*der erdischer Besitz*" (p. 383),

"Aufsetze" (p. 581, for "Aufsätze"), "Zur Lehrer der heiligen Abendmahl" and "Der Abendmahl" (p. 728), "lebenfreudige" (p. 694), "wieder" (for "wider," p. 574), "vorn Sonnenaufgang" (p. 115), "*pietàs*" (p. 26), "manzier" (for "mamzer," p. 70), "Judaorum" (p. 86). The Greek word for "fish" is misprinted on p. 654. English misprints are "doctrinaire" (p. 149), "immanence" (twice for "imminence," pp. 135, 149), "ancestor" (p. 223), "hynagogic" (for "hypnagogic," p. 306), "murderer" (for "murder," p. 563), "acclimation" (for "acclamation," p. 434). "Supernal" is twice (pp. 677, 723) incorrectly used for supernatural. "Johannin" is everywhere used, but never "Petrin" or "Paulin." "Messianity" is the standing substitute for "messiahship"; "collection" becomes "colligation" (p. 708), and "perseverance," "perseveration" (p. 551). In a discussion of animal symbolism (p. 16) we have the statement that "the dragon is a favorite image of sin" followed by the happy thought "that King Arthur's *pendragon* may have been suggested by now extinct monsters"! Split infinitives and other awkward grammatical constructions abound. Indirect quotations and reminiscences reveal the enormous reading that lies behind the book. For example, of the belief in Jesus' bodily resurrection we read (p. 706): "An intelligent man who affirms that he holds this belief can hardly know what *intellectual* honesty means." This is George Burman Foster's classic remark concerning miracles (*Finality of the Christian Religion*, p. 132), reproduced, italics and all. Dr. Hall's book would have been vastly improved had the hundreds of books read or consulted in its preparation been more completely digested and assimilated. At present they often protrude somewhat too obviously. The same is true of certain erratic blocks of learning scattered here and there without direct coherence with the context, like the long and unrelated account of totemism in the chapter on "Jesus' Ethics and Prayer."

But perhaps the outstanding peculiarity of the book is the vocabulary in which it is written. Certainly it cannot be intended for the perusal of "the average reader." What would such a reader get from this: "Thanatophobia and gennaphobia were harnessed up with hamartophobia" (p. 415)? Here an English dictionary is of no avail; we must read with an open Greek lexicon before us. Is *faith* clarified by being defined as "the inner psychic evolutionary excelsior nismus of the racial soul in the individual"? What reader will surmount this: "Man's moral therapy was supposed to be accomplished, in Ritschl's phrase, thymically, that is, the saving feidism might act autistically" (p. 244)? What is "a spurty diathesis" (p. 333), or what is conveyed by the statement

(p. 376) that Jesus' "very diathesis was perfervid and even fulminating," or by the reference (Introduction, p. ix), to his "erethic calenture"? It may be true that "the gastropathies and psychic anxorias are rich in spiritual analogies" (p. 513), but we fear most readers will miss these analogies.

Everywhere abound rare and obsolete forms, which one finds only in the appendix of our larger dictionaries, and there not infrequently in a sense other than Dr. Hall's. Some the dictionary does not know, though the meaning may be fairly obvious, as "divinitization," "dedivinitization," "dedivinization," "inwardization," "factualize," "definitize," "presentification," "crassify," "betone," "Jesusism," "Christism," and many such. Still worse is the use of a host of technical or semi-technical terms, unknown to most, or all, English dictionaries, the meaning of which must be dark to all but a very few readers. Out of more than a hundred such let these suffice: "thumic," "mythopheme," "ambivalent," "psychotic," "psychopheme," "psychodynamogenic," "hebammic," "trancoidal," "schizophrenia," "rabulations," "hormones," "pistobasic," "pedagometric," "leipothumia," "misogelasts," "pathetogenic," "antiscortatory," "macrobiotism," "de-eschatolization." Pages over which such words are thickly scattered make thorny reading. That the author is not remote from the vocabulary of common life is shown by his use of such vernacular phrases as "to ring up" (as by telephone, p. 297 *bis*) and "what he is up against" (p. 417). The latter phrase contrasts amusingly with the ponderous words of the preceding sentence, "This consummation of the noetic must not check but rather excite a counter-conative reaction."

On the box-cover the publishers state that Dr. Hall "seeks to penetrate to the inmost soul of Jesus and to vindicate the spiritual Christ over against those who would reduce Him to the dimensions of a good and great man." Whether the aim intended by these words is attained, or what would constitute real "reduction," it is not for the student of the gospel history to say. At any rate, "the perfect totemic man," the "fictive" creation of "Mansoul" who forms the subject of these pages, is not the good and great man of Galilee in whose goodness and greatness the world has seen its clearest vision of the divine character. Final judgment on this exhibition of psychology in the light of Jesus the Christ must be left to the psychologist.

CLAYTON R. BOWEN

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A NEW EXPOSITION OF MATTHEW'S GOSPEL

During the years 1911-15 Dr. A. Lukyn Williams delivered a series of twelve Warburton Lectures, which have been published in a stately volume.¹ They were written, he tells us, with a triple purpose—to interpret the First Gospel in the sense its author meant it to bear, to apply the teaching so interpreted to the problems of today, and (incidentally) to present a Christian apologetic for the benefit of Jewish readers.

These three aims have been pursued systematically throughout the book, but to them there has constantly been added a fourth, which the author unfortunately has not recognized as a distinct aim. That is, he has endeavored to expound, not only the meaning of the First Evangelist, but also the historic facts underlying the record, and the two problems are continually confused. He is, to be sure, familiar with the elements of the synoptic problem, and he assures us that he accepts the usual hypotheses. But he makes it evident that synoptic research means to him mere literary investigation without historic significance; Matthew is based on Mark, past doubt, but Matthew's version is wholly as accurate as Mark's and can be used without reference to Mark's. So we are told, e.g., that Matt. 16:16 proves that Jesus was actually called "Son of God" in his lifetime, and Dalman is taken to task for asserting the contrary (pp. 316 f.). The results of such a method need no description. They are seen at their worst in the eighth lecture, devoted to the topic, "Son of Man." As all the occurrences are considered of equal weight, the consequence is sheer bewilderment.

On the other hand, Dr. Williams' treatment of the First Gospel as a piece of first-century apologetic is very well done. For such a task some familiarity with talmudic literature is indispensable, and Dr. Williams' knowledge of this field is really adequate. And he uses it with a caution that should be impressed on all students of Judaism: "It has ever been a temptation to students, Jewish and Christian alike, to foist in upon us any and every statement of the Mishna, and even of the Talmuds, as an illustration of the life and thought of the Jews in the early part of the first century. Nothing can be more absurd" (p. 150). The application of the Jewish material has led to the discussion of the arguments of many modern Jewish scholars—Bacher, Schechter, the two Friedländers, Dr. Montefiore, etc.—and this in turn has led to a formal anti-Jewish apologetic, which forms the most

¹ *The Hebrew-Christian Messiah; Or, The Presentation of the Messiah to the Jews in the Gospel According to St. Matthew.* By A. Lukyn Williams. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. xxii+425 pages. 10s. 6d.

interesting portion of the book. The central question in the discussion of Jesus' teaching is found in the value of free and inspired personality as contrasted with "nomism." And the problem of "practicability" is solved by finding Jesus' emphasis on clarity of ideal rather than on actual achievement. This would seem to be right, although, as the author adds, "the characteristics enjoined . . . will be found eventually to mark every one of the perfected saints" (p. 235). Interim-ethic ideas are discarded with decision, as would be expected in a writer who holds that Jesus really looked forward to a church developing throughout centuries. The apocalyptic material is disposed of by looking forward to a literal, visible reappearance of the Messiah at some time in the future. It can only be regretted that a construction of this kind has been grafted upon an otherwise really admirable treatment.

The remaining part of the book—the practical exposition—calls for little comment. Dr. Williams is evidently a skilled and experienced preacher, and his notes often rise to a level of real distinction.

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AFTER THE WAR, WHAT?

The principal governments of the world are bending all their energies to bringing the war to the conclusion which seems to them good. Humanity is counting the hours until war's horror and chaos shall be over and it can give its strength again to progress and development. But progress is not entirely arrested by the war. Indeed, many steps forward seem to have been hastened by the arousing and setting free of forces immense and difficult to control, but which in quieter times would have remained sleeping much longer. It is not only wise, but indeed a very pressing duty, for those whose strength is not fully taken up with the war itself or the industries necessary to maintain it and to keep some part of humanity alive while it still rages, to look ahead to see what conditions may be expected when its fury has ceased, and particularly to prepare to make those conditions, as rapidly as possible, what the interests of humanity require.

An exceedingly helpful book, called very aptly *Human Ideals*¹—it might almost better be called "Divine Ideals for Humanity"—is offered

¹ *Human Ideals*. By Frederick A. M. Spencer. London: Unwin, 1917. xi+280 pages. 6s. net.

to assist us in laying broad and permanent foundations for the society for which we are hoping in the future—we should like to say the *near* future. Perhaps it may be nearer than we dare to think. The author is thoroughly acquainted with the main interests and problems of humanity—religious, ethical, economic, educational, and political—and gives in simple and convincing form the results of much study and thought in all these lines. While the society of the future which he sketches is immensely in advance of that of our own day, still he proposes no absurd extremes or utopian programs, but rather indicates lines of progress which seem feasible, natural, and thoroughly Christian, and expects results which the best thinkers in the various phases of thought and life which he considers would probably very largely agree to be the ends most worth striving for.

The special value of the book is not in any novel suggestions as to what should be sought by humanity, or how it should reach any particular goal, but rather in the assembling in *one view* of the ends worth seeking in all the departments of social activity. A sentence in the Introduction indicates the sober method of Mr. Spencer: "Our task is to take the acknowledged principles of life and develop them and apply them." In the chapter on "Morality" he proposes the doctrine, certainly revolutionary in view of present ideals of large classes of men, but not a grain less than Christian principles warrant: "It is to be branded as sin to spend on oneself either wealth or strength or time which could be spent with better effect on others." And, again, one hardly needs to have an application made to present-day conditions of so-called patriotism and worse to realize the meaning and importance of this maxim: "To live for oneself or for any portion of the whole in dissociation from the life and ideals of the whole is the wickedness of all wickedness." The converse is well stated: "The development of humanity into the Kingdom of God is the cause of all causes for which a man will rejoice to live and labour and suffer and die."

In the chapter on "Religion" the author states a very important principle in saying that "God co-operates with mankind, not, or not primarily, in His function of Creator of the material world, but as Father of souls, acting upon them without sensible media but in some direct psychic contact." "Not belief, or conduct, or ritual, but prayer, is the essence of religion," he says, and he finds the Lord's Prayer the model on which Christian worship should have been and should be founded.

The subjects of the remaining chapters will help give an idea of the scope of the book: "The Distribution of Wealth," "Production and

Consumption," "The Higher Mental Life," "Liberty," "Brotherhood," "Parenthood," "Education," "Sex," "Eternal Life." The book is not one for technical study in any line, but would be in place in the library and in the mind of the best educated and those most acquainted with all phases of human interest.

E. ALBERT COOK

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REPORTS OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL

These volumes¹ constitute the official report of the Third Quadrennial Meeting of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, held in the Second Baptist Church, St. Louis, Missouri, December 6-11, 1916. Volume I contains the official record of the council, together with the administrative reports and other matter confined to the administration of the council. The other volumes contain the reports of the commissions connected with the council. The editor-in-chief is Rev. Charles S. Macfarland, general secretary of the Federal Council, with the co-operation of the secretaries of commissions, notably of Rev. Sidney L. Gulick, formerly a missionary to Japan, now associate secretary of the Council.

As a record of proceedings the volumes are cumbered with much matter which is of little interest to the ordinary reader, or even to the student of social and ecclesiastical movements. The statesman, and the Christian of world-vision, will turn to Volumes II and III, which contain the report of the Commission on Peace and Arbitration, with an account of practically all peace movements, both national and international, and to Volume IV, which gives the report of the Commission on Relations with Japan. Volume V, entitled "Christian Co-operation and World Redemption," carries the largest measure of value to the ordinary Christian worker and the church, discussing, as it does, through the reports of the commissions, evangelism, social service, family life, temperance, Sunday observance, negro churches, country life, state and local federations, federated movements, home missions, and foreign missions.

The substance of these volumes is a fivefold testimony: (1) that there is a movement in nearly all communions, respectable and weighty, which,

¹ *The Library of Christian Cooperation*. In 6 volumes. Published for the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1917.

respecting the integrity of each single denomination, seeks to combine them, not in declarations of faith and doctrine, not in forms and arrays of organization, nor by an exchange of members, resources, or territories, in any kind of interdenominational communism, but by the simple process of doing those things which they all do, at the same time and together—the process of concentrating, synchronizing, and co-operating in common tasks; (2) that, in nearly all communions, there is a positive tendency for the church to minister to mankind in terms of social service, not merely contenting herself with a preaching in spoken words, but with a sacrificial message of deeds; (3) that the church is awakening to the needs of the countryside and the rural district, with concern for isolation and economic need, and is seeking to show herself an agency of salvation for all human interests; (4) that the function of preaching, in terms of a revised and modernized evangelism, is receiving new emphasis; and (5) that emphatically the church has a message and a mission for world-conditions and must help men and nations to find the Christian basis for peace and good will.

ALFRED WILLIAMS ANTHONY

LEWISTON, MAINE

THE MEANING OF HISTORY¹

The author at the outset puts to actual history this question as to human life viewed in the large: "Has it within itself spiritual forces that result in a spiritual tendency?" (p. 5). The book is an argument in answer to this question.

The author passes in rapid, though by no means superficial, survey some of the typical interpretations of history. He touches first on two somewhat antiquated theories—the view which regards history as mere "dust-storms of facts" and the theological theory of "divine interposition and direction through miracles." A more serious treatment is given to theories which are live issues today. Among these are the geographic, which emphasizes "the operations of mountain ranges and plains, rivers and seas, tillable soil and desert." This theory shows the influence of nature on the genesis of history, but fails to take due account of the human element. Even more in evidence today is the economic interpretation. "The key to history is asserted to be man's economic

¹ *The Spiritual Interpretation of History*. By Shailer Mathews. [The William Belden Noble Lectures.] Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916. 227 pages. \$1.50.

production and consequent antagonisms. Relative economic scarcity is therefore the incentive to progress, and in the effort to solve the problems which arise from such scarcity history is said to emerge" (p. 17). This view is credited largely to Karl Marx. While this view, according to the author, emphasizes an important aspect of the process of history, it seems "partial and indifferent to the full mass of the actual facts of human life" (p. 20). The difficulty with the economic and all other monistic interpretations of history is that they are too simple. There is truth in materialistic determinism, but it is not the whole truth or the most significant truth. "Man has always felt himself to be something more than a peripatetic chemical laboratory driven by the sex instinct" (p. 25).

The interpretation of history, like all other interpretations, must be founded on induction based on the actual movements within history. The spiritual interpretation of history then becomes a question of fact. We must seek the spiritual interpretation, whether in the large or in the small, "in the discovery of spiritual forces co-operating with geographic and economic to produce a general tendency toward conditions which are truly personal" (p. 34).

In studying history we must bear in mind that history as history is process as truly as a mass of events and must be so studied. The process, moreover, is a social process. The unit is not the individual, but the group, however important individuals may be in such groups. This makes it necessary to take account of a multiplicity of causes. "When we combine these two elements of history in the one concept of social progress, the need of extensive rather than intensive observation is apparent" (p. 37). If we look at events as tension points in a continuous stream and try to get a perspective, we find indeed that geographic and economic causes have played an important part in the arising of the various series of phenomena. But we must remember that physical nature has been practically constant. "Nature and animals are today essentially as ten thousand years ago. Man has changed" (p. 42). To understand this change, we must take account of the plus element in humanity, man's creative contribution. This is as striking in his primitive inventions as in those of today. Economic tension has served to bring out more reflective and purposeful reactions from men. But "human personality has been, not a passive, but an outstanding creative co-factor in these changes" (p. 44). Final causes have been more and more substituted for nervous reactions.

In Lectures III, IV, and V the author examines three inductions which, according to him, we can derive from the study of social evolution. These he expresses "in a threefold thesis; namely, the course of social evolution tends to set from materialistic situations toward (1) the substitution of inner sanctions and inhibitions for appeal to force; (2) the increasing appreciation of the personal worth of the individual; (3) the transformation of the fight for rights into a giving of justice" (pp. 67-68).

1. Taking up first the substitution of moral control for external force, the author shows the steady progress, from a state of society where "justice is simply the advantage of the stronger" and where fear is the chief motive of control, to internal sanctions. The earliest form of control is that of custom, where the individual is restrained by the prevailing folk-ways. But in the necessity for new customs and the clashing of these with the old there arises a new tendency of control—that of abstract principles of right or conscience, founded upon personal experience. This can be traced in the development of the higher religions where loyalty to a divine lawgiver gradually takes the place of force and impersonal custom. The general development of law, where the law-abiding spirit rises superior to fear of punishments, also reveals the emancipation of the group from the tyranny of petty customs and gradually broadens the conception of human relations until we have at last the beginnings of the development of an international code of law. In Christianity, with its "symbol of a sacrificially social mind," we have at least the emphasis of the primacy of personal values upon which is to be built the Kingdom of God.

2. The second tendency the author takes up is that of "the growing recognition of the worth of the individual." Again our reliance must be upon history rather than metaphysics or statistics. Here we meet the old question of the relation of great men to history. Our concern is not with "the individual *and* society," but with "the individual *in* society." Great men are both "creatures and creators. . . . They are individual dominants mating with social dominants to produce social—and rarely individual—descendants" (pp. 114 and 115). A more practical question, however, "is whether the general tendency of human life has been to give larger worth to the less outstanding individuals" (p. 118). That such is the case the author finds indicated in the disappearance of slavery, the advance of woman into the field of persons, the growing tendency to recognize the personal rights of childhood, the new sense of the rights of the aged, and the new attitude in the treatment

of the unfit. It can also be seen in the spirit developing in our modern industrial world. "The progress of the future we may well expect will be written in terms of persons, not of mere producers" (p. 141). The tendency, as seen in all these facts, is toward "the subordination of the economic efficiency of individuals to their personal values" (p. 126). "The development of economic efficiency is being slowly transformed into a new opportunity for expressing the fraternity of the spirit" (p. 142).

3. The third tendency taken up by the author "is the substitution of the giving of justice for the struggle for rights." "'Rights' is a term of acquisition and 'justice' is a term of extension. We seek our rights; we give justice. To give justice is to recognize the other man's rights, and among such rights is that of having justice done him—that is to say, of having his rights recognized" (p. 143). Whatever may be our theory of their origin, "rights involve a social recognition of the inviolability of exclusive control of some natural agent, some economic, political, social, or other advantage" (p. 146). This is illustrated in the history of the conception of property, which is the prototype of other rights; in the old status of women and children as contrasted with men; and in a society organized on the basis of classes. "The most perfect political contrast in history is not between democracy and some highly organized absolute monarchy, but between democracy and a society organized on the feudal or the caste system" (p. 153). In the development of English constitutional history, we have the story of the transformation of rights into justice, involving the gradual extension or democratizing of rights, though not without a constant struggle to get rights. "Democracy is being transformed from an effort to acquire to an effort to share rights" (p. 166). This involves, "first, a new conception of the individual as social, and, second, a new conception of rights as collective justice" (p. 168). "A man's rights are ultimately set by his capacity. . . . The formula of justice is not to each according to his needs, but to each according to his personal possibilities" (p. 170).

In his retrospect, in the final chapter, the author affirms that in history "we see the operation of many forces, but only one tendency. And that is spiritual" (p. 192). We thus (the author quoting from Flint) "obtain a veritable increase of our knowledge of God's character and ways." For the vital principle which presses forward to realization in history "can be described only as spiritual—the expression of a supreme person" (p. 194). With this recognition comes the call to be conscious co-workers with the spiritual tendency of history. Such a

call comes particularly in our day from the problems and opportunities of democracy where a renewed "loyalty to the fundamental principles of life embodied in the religion of Jesus" is ever the vital need. Three important fields of opportunity present themselves at present according to the author: First, a closer relation of religion with the thought of the day. If religion needs science, so does science need religion. A second field is that of social reconstruction—the organizing of spiritually minded men and women into collective spiritual forces for the promotion of industrial justice as well as justice everywhere between man and man. The third great field of opportunity is that of foreign missions which involves no less than the moral reconstruction of the Orient. In the light of this view of history, religion becomes "an ever developing attitude of mind which on rational grounds seeks further personal development by the appropriation of the personal forces of the cosmos from which has come so much of personality as we humans possess" (p. 217).

This bare summary gives but a meager idea of the wealth of illustration and convincingness of exposition of this timely and inspiring book. While the author surveys a large field in a small volume, the treatment is far from truncated. On the contrary, the style is lucid and attractive throughout; and the conclusions are based on an unusually rich and varied mastery of the field of human experience. The author shows fine justice and sanity in dealing with conflicting theories, each of which is given its due place in the synthesis of the whole. While the author aims at an induction on the basis of concrete historic tendencies, he is well aware that an interpretation of so large a field, where so small a section of an infinite process is even in part accessible to us, is necessarily an adventure of faith. "We cannot see our port, but we know we are going some-whither because we have come some-whence" (p. 66). In such a world the attempt to sketch the direction of the future from the wake of the past must in the nature of things be largely prophetic rather than inductive in the strict scientific sense. In a field so unlimited in extent our theories must necessarily be the result of selective emphasis. The pessimist would have selected his facts differently from the author. But it is well to remember that faith is itself a mighty, constructive factor in our world. In history in the large as in the small it holds eternally: "Be it thee according to thy faith." And if humanity in this hour of trial can be inspired with the idealistic faith of the author, then we may indeed hope for better things.

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION

Two works of very diverse nature have recently appeared in the field of the psychology of religion, representing two sharply contrasted points of view—one of them by a theologian,¹ one by a psychologist.² Perhaps it is a mistake to speak of them as being in the same field, although they are meant to be; for Dr. Snowden's work contains little psychology beyond what one finds in the title. It is, in fact, not directed to the psychologist, but to the preacher and the religious worker, and it contains much sound advice and much useful material for this class of readers.

A very different sort of work is Professor Leuba's *The Belief in God and Immortality*. This book will be of very great interest to the technical student of the psychology of religion, and is one that will probably bring but scant comfort to the preacher and the religious teacher. Yet it is a book which every clergyman and practical religious worker, as well as everyone interested in the psychology of religion and in the future of religion, should read and ponder. For Professor Leuba has made a contribution to our knowledge of religious belief that is of very considerable significance.

The book falls into two quite distinct sections, Part I being chiefly anthropological and dealing with the origins and history of the belief in a continued existence after death, while Parts II and III present the results of a statistical inquiry into the present status of religious belief and some considerations as to its utility. It is in Part III that the author's own point of view explicitly appears, but the reader should bear it in mind throughout the entire book. Professor Leuba presents belief in a personal God and personal immortality with insight and some sympathy, but he himself is thoroughly persuaded that both beliefs not only are false, but have today become actually harmful. In spite of this personal attitude, however, it must be said that he has, with occasional exceptions, succeeded in viewing and presenting his subject objectively and without unfair prejudice.

When one opens a treatise on the origin and history of the belief in immortality, one expects (thanks to much boring experience) to be presented with the same old facts and theories that anthropologists

¹ *The Psychology of Religion*. By James H. Snowden. New York: Revell, 1916. 390 pages. \$1.50.

² *The Belief in God and Immortality*. By James H. Leuba. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1916. xvii+340 pages. \$2.00.

have been giving us for so many years and with so little real variation. It is, therefore, a pleasure to find, as one does in Leuba's work, a really fresh presentation and something like an original point of view. The thesis which is defended in Part I of Professor Leuba's book is that there have been historically two quite distinct types of belief in a future life, differing from each other both in origin and in nature, and indeed so unlike that "it would be nearer the truth to maintain that, save for the idea of continuation, the two beliefs have nothing in common. Nothing else belonging to the old conception remains in the new, and none of the services rendered by the new were known to the believers in the old." The first of these two forms of belief, found among savage tribes of ancient and of modern times, owed its origin to the various psychological factors—dreams and the rest—commonly pointed out by anthropologists. And the savage who held it applied it, not to himself, but to the dead. So far as the savage himself was concerned his thought was centered on this life; nor did he as a rule consider the next world as one of delight, and never as one of reward and punishment. Thus the "primary belief" was a theory about the dead and their ghosts, *not* a hope for one's own future. The second or modern form of belief in immortality had a much later and a quite independent origin. It presupposes a considerable mental development and owes its rise to a "conviction of the insufficiency of this life to satisfy fully the instincts of preservation and completion as enlarged by moral perception," and also to the faith in a benevolent and just Creator. The holder of this belief was not interested in ghosts, but centered his attention on the hope of his own future destiny. Nor was this modern belief merely a continuation and transformation of the earlier form. History shows us, in the author's opinion, the earlier belief actually coming to an end and actively combated by the ethical and religious leaders of the peoples at the eastern end of the Mediterranean in the centuries immediately preceding the Christian era. Instead of being mutually helpful, the two beliefs were positively antagonistic; and the acceptance of the later form was almost conditioned upon the decay of the earlier. Professor Leuba discusses most interestingly the transition from one form of belief to the other among the Hebrews, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Egyptians. In spite of his clever presentation, it must be said that his theory fits the facts of Egyptian religious history but ill, and that if he had included in his survey the religions of India and Persia his powers of interpretation would have been taxed to their utmost. Our earliest sources for the Indian belief already point to a longing on the

part of the individual for the joys of Yama's realm; and in Egypt the relatively moral form of the belief connected with Osiris plainly antedated the less moral conception found in the religion of Amon Ra. On the other hand, it must be admitted that Leuba's hypothesis lights up several phases of the religions of Israel, Greece, and Rome which hitherto had been somewhat dark.

Interesting and valuable as is the first part of Professor Leuba's book, it is the second part that will make it memorable. For we have here a rather startling revelation of the present status of the belief in God and in immortality among American college students and American scientists and scholars. I have called it a "revelation," for the author is not here giving us his guess, but recording certain facts which he gleaned by means of one of the most careful and truly scientific questionnaire investigations ever conducted. The dangers of the questionnaire method of obtaining information are obvious—its tendency to *select* only a certain type of respondent, the difficulty in interpreting the answers received, etc. Professor Leuba succeeded in obviating these difficulties to a very considerable extent by making his questions exceedingly simple and by asking for little beyond "Yes" and "No" answers, and (in most cases) by sending his questionnaire to a fairly large proportion of a very limited type of respondent. These respondents were: "all the students of a number of classes belonging to non-technical departments of nine colleges of high rank and two classes of a normal school"; 90 per cent of all the students of a certain woman's college; two groups of 500 scientists each, whose names were taken at random from *American Men of Science*; 375 historians, taken by a rule of chance from the membership list of the American Historical Association; 345 sociologists, taken in similar fashion from the list of the American Sociological Association; and all the members of the American Psychological Association after eliminating non-teachers and "those who are decidedly educators and philosophers rather than psychologists." Within each list of scholars, moreover, he made a distinction between the more and the less eminent. The results, as has been indicated, are of very considerable interest and are, briefly, the following: Concerning the first group (from the nine colleges) he writes: "As many as 31 per cent of the men, and only 11 per cent of the women conceive God as impersonal. If the doubtful cases are added, the percentages rise to 40.5 per cent for the men and to 15.7 per cent for the women. . . . Considered all together my data would indicate that from 40 to 50 per cent of the young men leaving college entertain an idea of God

incompatible with the acceptance of the Christian religion, even as interpreted by the liberal clergy."

As to the second group above referred to (the woman's college), Professor Leuba tells us: "The most striking result of this inquiry is the high percentage of believers in the lower classes and the relatively high percentage of disbelievers in the higher classes. Only 15 per cent of the Freshmen reject immortality, and 4 per cent are uncertain; while nearly 32 per cent of the Juniors have given it up, and 8 per cent more are uncertain." Of the scientists, 41.8 per cent believed in God, and a somewhat higher proportion accepted immortality. Of the historians, 48.3 per cent testified to their belief in God, and 51.5 per cent to belief in immortality. The percentages for the sociologists on these two questions were 46.3 and 55.3 per cent. With the psychologists, belief in both these conceptions suffered a notable drop—standing at 24.2 and 19.8 per cent, respectively. One of the most notable results of the investigation was the fact that in every case the percentage of believers among the more eminent men was considerably lower than among the less eminent, the low-water mark being touched in the belief in immortality among the "greater" psychologists, which stood at only 8.8 per cent. Professor Leuba sums up the results of his inquiry as follows:

The situation revealed by the present statistical studies demands a revision of public opinion regarding the prevalence and the future of the two cardinal beliefs of official Christianity; and shows the futility of the efforts of those who would meet the present religious crisis by devising a more efficient organization and co-operation of the churches, or more attractive social features, or even a more complete consecration of the church membership to its task. The essential problem facing organized Christianity is constituted by the widespread rejection of its two fundamental dogmas—a rejection apparently destined to extend parallel with the diffusion of knowledge and the moral qualities that make for eminence in scholarly pursuits.

Professor Leuba's own view seems to be that the two beliefs in question are destined to be nearly or quite abandoned by all thinking people. Those who hold a view different from his as to the utility and the essential truth of these beliefs will here of course be unable to agree with him. The chief consideration leading so many scholars—particularly biologists, sociologists, and psychologists—to give up the beliefs in question is, as Professor Leuba himself indicates, the inconsistency of these beliefs with the extension of the causal law to the realm of the spirit. Certainly the movement for such extension is being carried on

rapidly and radically in our times; but there are at least some signs of an antagonistic movement, even in the class of most eminent scientists and thinkers. It may be that the tendency toward mechanizing the universe has reached its acme. If so, it is certainly possible that religious faith—and particularly the belief in immortality—may enter into a period of growth, transformation, and rejuvenation comparable to that which, on Leuba's theory, the human race was witnessing two thousand years ago. Yet this is but a hope, and one can only say in conclusion that Professor Leuba has put in his debt all those who have the welfare of religion at heart by showing them that the situation is really much more serious than most of them had supposed.

JAMES BISSETT PRATT

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LECTURES ON PREACHING

The title of Bishop McDowell's lectures clearly declares their purpose,¹ and the lectures with growing clearness and force accomplish the end. There is no effort to reinterpret religious truth, but to connect Christian experience with its source and make it more vital and effective. But the method of approach is modern. The author understands that the order of faith for most men is through personal knowledge of Jesus, and that the condition of power for all men is in the true imitation of Jesus; not a servile repetition of creed or copying of manner, but the entering into his fellowship with God and growing in his love for men. Familiar doctrines of the church, such as incarnation and reconciliation, get a new and dynamic meaning through such natural and human interpretation.

The lecturer here is always the preacher. Every lecture is a sermon. To the young men before him he pours out his own experience of the grace of Christ, his own passion to bring men into the obedience of sons. It is the spirit of the lectures that is cleansing and impelling. The method naturally leads to repetition and the danger of appeal. But Bishop McDowell's noble spiritual manhood saves him from the least touch of unreality.

The lectures have large-mindedness as to practical problems of religion and wisdom in dealing with men. Every page has suggestions for the preacher. A brief quotation must be enough. There is no wiser

¹ *Good Ministers of Jesus Christ*. (Lyman Beecher Lectures on Preaching, Yale University, 1917.) By William Fraser McDowell. New York: Abingdon Press, 1917. 307 pages. \$1.25.

chapter than "The Ministry of Co-operation." "Co-operation consists in working with all the forces that make for the new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. Nor is this easy. Some of those forces are not baptized. They do not care much for the church or the ministry. There is an immense quantity of such power outside the church. Work with them. Work with them. Do not fight against any force that is fighting Christ's hard battles in the world. The church is not the only agency he has. To change the figure, we are not the only sheep that belong to him" (p. 242).

ARTHUR S. HOYT

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BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

LONGACRE, LINDSAY B. *A Prophet of the Spirit. A Sketch of the Character and Work of Jeremiah.* New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1917. 128 pages. \$0.75.

This is an admirable little book to put into the hands of an inquiring student who yet has everything to learn regarding the modern way of approaching the study of the Old Testament. It is excellently written and well adapted to the purpose for which it was written. The prophet Jeremiah is made to appear like a real man working among his fellow-men. The conditions of his day are vividly presented, and his own personal qualifications and weaknesses are clearly portrayed. There is nothing in the book to shock the most pious soul, and yet the whole spirit and method of the work are modern. Probably no scholar would agree with all of the positions assumed in the book. For instance, the acceptance of the "new covenant" material as coming from Jeremiah is not commonly granted, nor is it quite clear that Jeremiah at first aided Deuteronomy's reform. Some things perhaps might have been added to the treatment with advantage. A work on Jeremiah that does not discuss the question of Jeremiah's authorship of much that goes under his name and does not emphasize his tremendous influence upon the development of monotheism leaves much to be desired from the point of view of an adequate presentation of Jeremiah's work; but the author is not offering us an original or exhaustive treatment, and with what he has presented we have every reason to be well satisfied.

J. M. P. S.

DOCTRINAL

MAINS, GEORGE PRESTON. *Religious Experience: Its Evidential Value.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1917. 272 pages. \$1.25.

The first part of the book is an affirmation that there is a supernatural power working upon man, lifting him out of his purely human state of wretchedness and sin. The second part attempts to show that the actual Christian experience is such as to

demand for its explanation just such a supernatural power. While the skeptic may not be convinced, the devout and believing soul may read this book with the assurance that his faith will not be disturbed thereby.

F. A. S.

SELBIE, W. B. *Belief and Life. Studies in the Thought of the Fourth Gospel.* New York: Scribner, 1917. viii+143 pages. \$0.75.

As the subtitle indicates, we have here a number of brief studies in the Gospel of John. Each of the eight chapters contains an exposition of a passage from the Fourth Gospel which the author deems characteristic of its general teaching. The purpose is devotional and practical. Many readers will find the book interesting and stimulating.

F. A. S.

CARPENTER, W. BOYD. *The Witness of Religious Experience.* London: Williams & Norgate, 1916. 111 pages. 2s. 6d.

Through an examination of the facts of religious experience the writer finds that religion grows out of the instinct of self-expression. The search for God is the search for a medium in which the whole personality can realize itself in all the completeness of its nature. There is a discussion as to the general principles according to which religious experiences go forward. In this he confines himself to a study of Christian experience, taking Paul as a typical representative. A chapter is devoted to showing that the religious experience of Jesus follows the same general principles as that of Paul. The book will be found suggestive and stimulating.

F. A. S.

MOZLEY, JOHN RICKARDS. *The Divine Aspect of History.* New York: Putnam, 1916. 2 vols. xx+407, x+509 pages. \$10.00.

The task which this work undertakes is an extremely ambitious one: it is to relate the history of the religious element in the life of man. The author, however, does not deem it necessary to consider the early forms of religion as found among the more primitive races, but begins his study with the developed and organized religions of Egypt, Babylonia, India, Persia, China, Japan, Greece, and Rome. These are treated as preparatory stages through which the divine will was preparing the race for the final and adequate religion, Christianity. In the Hebrew religion is seen the growth of an ideal which is to find its incarnation in the coming Messiah. It is to Christianity that the author devotes the larger part of his space. He opens this part of his work with a chapter in which he sets forth his own view of Christianity and gives his appraisal of Jesus its founder. Then follows a somewhat detailed account of the events in the life of Christ, the beginnings of the church, and the chief events in its history down to the present.

The author has evidently bestowed much study upon his subject and shows a readiness to come to an independent judgment upon many matters. He handles the biblical material critically and with considerable freedom, coming to conclusions which from the orthodox point of view would be considered extremely radical. There is, however, a vein of supernaturalism running through the whole discussion to which many modern students would take serious exception. Physical miracles are disavowed, but what might be called spiritual miracles are quite taken for granted.

F. A. S.

JONES, RUFUS M. *The Inner Life*. New York: Macmillan, 1916. xii+194 pages. \$1.00.

Professor Jones's previous writings on the mystical aspect of the religious life lead the reader to take up this new book from his pen with high anticipations. Nor is he disappointed. It is marked by the same wide knowledge and sympathetic insight, the same sanity and absence of dogmatism, the same beauty and clearness of expression, that mark all his work in this field. The author insists again and again that the two aspects of life, the inner and the outer, cannot be separated. Life is one; to divide it is to destroy it. He selects the inner life for special emphasis, realizing that he is not dealing with the whole of religion. This inner life which he would portray is essentially communion with an unseen spiritual order and the harmonization of one's desires and purposes with what is found there. This spiritual order, God and his will, seems to be directly presented to consciousness, discovered by the man whose eyes are open to it. The content of that life in God is set forth in the life and teaching of Jesus, in psalmist, prophet, and apostle, as well as in the deeper experiences of common life. Only he is capable of perceiving this spiritual order who himself possesses it—"the pure in heart shall see God." Is it then a projection by man of his own hopes and ideals, or is it a perception of something objectively given? The answer is as follows: "Either there is far greater depth and complexity to the inmost nature of personal self-consciousness than we usually take into account, that is, we ourselves are bottomless and inwardly exhaustless in range and scope, or the fragmentary thing we call our self is continuous inwardly with a wider spiritual world with which we have some sort of contract-relationship and from which vitalizing energy comes in to us. It is too soon to decide between these two alternatives.

F. A. S

CARUS, PAUL. *The Dawn of a New Religious Era*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1916. ix+131 pages. \$1.00.

This book contains nine essays around the central theme "The Religion of Science." It is frequently reiterated that "science is not of human make," but is a revelation of divine truth. The author seems to feel a real religious fervor in expatiating upon the divinity of scientific truth. For him there is even "holiness in mathematics, and there is ethics in the multiplication table." Religion is indestructible, as is science. Yet a harmony is perfectly feasible, for religion is "the rule of truth applied to practical life," while science is "the search for truth according to the best . . . methods of investigation." The author's appreciation of value calls forth more admiration than his sense of discrimination.

A. S. W.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

- Chiera, Edward. Lists of Personal Names from the Temple School of Nippur. Part II. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum, 1916. 82 pages+xxxii plates.
- Holy Scriptures According to the Masoretic Text, The. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1917. xv+1136 pages.
- Humbert, Paul. Un héraut de la justice Amos. Lausanne: Imprimerie Co-opérative la Concorde, 1917. 42 pages. 50 c.
- Langdon, Stephen. Sumerian Grammatical Texts. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum, 1917. 44 pages+lviii plates.
- Langdon, Stephen. Sumerian Liturgical Texts. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum, 1917. 100 pages+lxii plates.
- Langdon, Stephen. The Epic of Gilgamesh. (University of Pennsylvania Publications of the Babylonian Section, Vol. X, No. 3.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum, 1917. 20 pages+7 plates.
- Margolis, Max L. The Story of Bible Translations. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1917. 135 pages.

NEW TESTAMENT

- Burton, Ernest DeWitt, and Goodspeed, Edgar Johnson. A Harmony of the Synoptic Gospels for Historical and Critical Study. New York: Scribner, 1917. xv+275 pages. \$1.25.
- Charles, R. H. The Apocalypse of Baruch and the Assumption of Moses. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917. 96+42 pages. 2s. 6d.
- Gilbert, George Holley. Jesus for the Men of Today. New York: Doran, 1917. 176 pages. \$1.00.
- Harris, Rendel. The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel. Cam-

bridge: University Press, 1917. vii+66 pages.

Morgan, W. The Religion and Theology of Paul. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1917. xi+272 pages. 4s. 6d.

Parry, R. St. John (Editor). The First Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians. Cambridge: University Press, 1916. lxxvii+284 pages. 4s. 6d.

CHURCH HISTORY

Cobern, Camden M. The New Archaeological Discoveries. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1917. xxxiv+698 pages. \$3.00.

Forsyth, P. T. Lectures on the Church and the Sacraments. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1917. xv+289 pages. \$2.00.

Freisen, Joseph. Verfassungsgeschichte der katholischen Kirche Deutschlands in der Neuzeit. Leipzig: Teubner, 1916. xxiv+455 pages. M. 12.

Sockman, Ralph W. The Revival of the Conventual Life in the Church of England in the Nineteenth Century. New York: W. D. Gray, 227 W. 17th St., 1917. 230 pages.

Willett, Herbert L., Jordan, Orvis F., and Sharpe, Charles M. (Editors). Progress. Anniversary Volume of the Campbell Institute on the Completion of Twenty Years of History. Chicago: Christian Century Press, 1917. 329 pages. \$1.50.

DOCTRINAL

Cunningham, W. The Increase of True Religion. Cambridge: University Press, 1917. viii+50 pages. 2s.

Du Bose, Horace M. The Consciousness of Jesus. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1917. 144 pages. \$0.75.

Elements of Pain and Conflict in Human Life, The. Cambridge: University Press, 1916. vii+206 pages. 4s. 6d.

Forsyth, P. T. The Justification of God. New York: Scribner, 1917. viii+233 pages. \$0.90.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

- Barton, George A. *The Religions of the World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1917. x+349 pages. \$1.50.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Brunner, Edmund deS. *The New Country Church Building*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1917. xv+141 pages. \$0.75.
- Diffendorfer, Ralph E. *Missionary Education in Home and School*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1917. 407 pages. \$1.50.
- Garvie, Alfred E. *The Master's Comfort and Hope*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1917. xiv+239 pages. 4s. 6d.
- Gwatkin, Henry Melvill. *The Sacrifice of Thankfulness*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1917. xxiv+166 pages. 4s. 6d.
- Hutton, J. Gertrude. *The Missionary Education of Juniors*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1917. iv+140 pages. \$0.60.
- La Chiesa e i Nuovi Tempi. Rome: Scuola Teologica Battista, 1917. xxxi+307 pages. Lire 3.50.
- McDowell, William Fraser. *Good Ministers of Jesus Christ*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1917. 307 pages. \$1.25.
- Newton, Joseph Fort. *An Ambassador*. City Temple Sermons. New York: Revell, 1916. 226 pages. \$1.00.
- Paterson, W. P. *In the Day of the Ordeal*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1917. 262 pages. 4s. 6d.
- Patton, Cornelius H. *The Lure of Africa*. New York: Macmillan, 1917. xv+205 pages.
- Speer, Robert E. *The Unity of the Americas*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1916. 115 pages. \$0.25.
- Winchester, Benjamin S. *Religious Education and Democracy*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1917. 293 pages. \$1.50.

MISCELLANEOUS

- Barron, Clarence W. *The Mexican Problem*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1917. xxv+136 pages. \$1.00.
- Carroll, H. K. *Federal Council Year Book Covering the Year 1916*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1917. v+250 pages.
- Carus, Paul. *The Dawn of a New Religious Era*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1916. ix+131 pages. \$1.00.
- Figgis, John Neville. *The Will to Freedom, or the Gospel of Nietzsche and the Gospel of Christ*. New York: Scribner, 1917. xix+320 pages. \$1.25.
- Hart, E. I. Virgil C. Hart. *Missionary Statesman*. New York: Doran, 1917. 344 pages. \$1.50.
- Jourdain, Margaret. *Diderot's Early Philosophical Works*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1916. v+246 pages. \$1.25.
- National Service Handbook. Issued by the Committee on Public Information. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917. 246 pages.
- Science and Learning in France. Chicago: Society for American Fellowships in France, 31 W. Lake St., 1917. xxxix+454 pages. \$1.50.
- Sinclair, May. *A Defence of Idealism: Some Questions and Conclusions*. New York: Macmillan, 1917. xvii+355 pages. \$2.00.
- Strong, Augustus Hopkins. *American Poets and Their Theology*. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1916. xxiii+485 pages. \$1.00.
- Wenley, R. M. *The Life and Work of George Sylvester Morris*. New York: Macmillan, 1917. xv+332 pages.
- Wilson, Theodora Wilson. *The Last Weapon*. Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co., 1917. 188 pages. \$0.25.
- Wundt, Wilhelm (translator, Edward Leroy Schaub). *Elements of Folk Psychology*. New York: Macmillan, 1916. xxiii+532 pages. \$3.75.

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
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